The American Culture of War The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom ~% a i 4* a Li ■«*«•< * * <<*; W* ADRIAN R. LEWIS The American Culture of War The American Culture of War The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom ADRIAN R. LEWIS j J Routledge S^ Taylor Si Francis Group Routledge Routledge Taylor & Francis Group Taylor & Francis Group 270 Madison Avenue 2 Park Square New York, NY 10016 Milton Park, Abingdon OxonOX14 4RN © 2007 by Adrian R. Lewis Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business ■n acid-free paper No part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any informa- tion storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lewis, Adrian R. The American culture of war : the history of U.S. military force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom / by Adrian R. Lewis. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-415-97976-5 (hardback : alk. paper) - ISBN 0-415-97975-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. United States— History, Military— 20th century. 2. United States— History, Military— 21st century. 3. United States— Military policy. 4. War and society— United States. I. Title. Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com and the Routledge Web site at http://www.routledge-ny.com To my wife Colleen Michele Lewis And our daughters Alexandria Adrienne Allison Michele Aubrey Danielle Anastasia Kathryn Angelica Noelle To my mother and father Marion and John Lewis And to my sister and brother-in-law Allison and Richard Evans Contents Acknowledgments Abbreviations Figures Introduction 1 Culture, Genes, and War 2 Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War 3 The Legacy of World War II: Man versus Machine 4 Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine 5 The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 6 The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 7 Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation 8 Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure 9 Limited War: Kennedy and McNamara 10 The Vietnam War: The Opening Phases, 1955-67 1 1 The Vietnam War: The Final Phases, 1967-75 12 The Recovery and Reorganization of the U.S. Armed Forces 13 The Persian Gulf War: War without the People 14 The Persian Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1 5 The New American Way of War 16 The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War 17 The Second Persian Gulf War: The Unfinished Insurgency War 18 The New American Citizenship viii • Contents Appendix: Military Map Symbols Notes Selected Bibliography: The American Culture of War Index Acknowledgments I am indebted to a great many scholars whose works are dutifully noted. This study covers more than sixty years of American military history. It is, thus, a synthesis of a great many works. It is also an analysis of the American conduct of war based on primary documents, the official and unofficial publications and documents of the services, the professional journals of the services, and the spoken and written words of the historical actors: from privates to generals, from secretaries to presidents, and from private citizens to professors. I have endeavored to provide a cultural explanation for American behavior in peace and war from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom. To provide a more complete explanation I have used anthropological and political science theories, and historical methods. I have endeavored to be fair to all concerned by letting the historical actors speak for themselves; delineating the published, historical arguments; and presenting all sides of the various issues. While endeavoring to present the various sides of the historical issues addressed I have not failed to render an opinion based on my analysis. However, if I have erred in judgment or fact, the fault is mine. Special thanks are due to my professors, mentors, and friends: Michael Geyer at the University of Chicago and John Shy at the University of Michigan. I owe them much. John Shy provided many insightful comments on my first draft that caused me to rethink and rewrite. I am grateful for his knowledge, time, perspective, and understanding. Thanks are also due to my colleagues in the History Department at the University of North Texas whose support, knowledge, and friendship I have benefited from over the years, specifically, Ronald Marcello, Richard Golden, Randolph Campbell, Marilyn Morris, Pete Lane, Alfred Hurley, and Alfred Mierzejewski. The generous, professional people at the following institutions assisted in finding materials necessary for this study: the National Archive and Record Center in College Park, Maryland; the Military History Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania; the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair in Washington, DC; the U.S. Air Force, Office of Air Force History in Washington, DC; the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in Fort Monroe, Virginia; the Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas; the Eisen- hower Library and Archive in Abilene, Kansas; the Military Oral History Center at the University of North Texas in Denton, Texas; the Naval Oral History Program at the U.S. Naval Institute at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland; the U.S. Marine Corps University Archive in Quan- tico, Virginia; the Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army in Arlington, Virginia; and the Main Library at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York. I have benefited from the analytical exchange with my students at the USMA; University of California, Berkeley; The Naval War College; and the University of North Texas. A number of my graduate students at the University of North Texas deserve recognition; John Chalkley, William Watson, Donald Mitchener, Christopher Bean, Josh Montandon, Sylvia Stastny, Mervyn Roberts, Peter Kaiser, Carol Mohney, and Ben Hegi. My 2005-2006 Naval War College students also deserve x • Acknowledgments special recognition. They read many of the chapters of this work and provided a U.S. Navy perspec- tive. Many thanks goes to Philip Coyle, Leonard Davis, Michael Digman, Gerald Gafford, Melanie Hall, Andrew Moore, Joel Royal, James Scarcelli, Lorelei St James, Jonathan Thorp, Matthew Vaughan, and Michael Vengrow. Jean Probst at the university bookstore has gone the extra mile to find books that I needed for this study. I am thankful for her efforts. Many thanks are also due to the many fine soldiers with whom I have had the privilege to serve. The list is too long to publish; however, special recognition is due to Generals Richard Cavazos, Dave R. Palmer, James E. Mace, Roy Flint, and Robert Doughty; Colonels Monte R. Bullard, Patrick L. Hatcher, Franklin D. Young, David Foye, and Ken Hamburger; Major James Sullivan; and First Sergeants Kahiki, Meno, McSpadden, and Mobley; and Sergeant Karen W. Kennedy. Research and writing require time and money: the University of North Texas, Faculty Develop- ment Leave Program, Junior Faculty Research Grant, Developing Scholars Grants, and the Office of the Dean of the College of Arts and Science provided me with the time and funds to research and write this book. Thanks are also due to the many professional people at Routledge who made this work possible. Special thanks are due to Kimberly Guinta and Lynn Goeller who edited this work and provided numerous helpful comments. I am indebted to my wife, Colleen. She has read every word many times, and made numerous helpful suggestions. She has and does maintain my health and morale. Without her assistance, time, and patience I would not have written this book. Finally thanks are due to our smart, talented, won- derful, beautiful daughters, Alexandria, Allison, Aubrey, Anastasia, and Angelica. They produce the joy and purpose in my life. Abbreviations This listing is by no means complete. Acronyms that are used infrequently are not listed. AAF ARVN CAP CCF CENTCOM U.S. CG CIA CIB CIDG CINCFE CINCUNC CINSAC CJCS COMUSMACV CORDS CPV DOD DPRK DRV EU EUCOM EUSAK FDL FEAF FEC FMF FRUS FSS Gl GWOT HES ICBM Army Air Force Army Republic of Vietnam Combined Action Program Chinese Communist Forces Central Command Commanding General Central Intelligence Agency Combat Infantry Badge Civilian Irregular Defense Groups Commander in Chief of the Far East Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later Rural) Development and Support Chinese People's Volunteers Department of Defense Democratic People's Republic of Korea Democratic Republic of Vietnam European Union European Command Eighth U.S. Army Korea Fast Deployment Logistics Ship Far East Air Force Far East Command Fleet Marine Force Foreign Relations of the United States Fast Sealift Ship General Staff Personnel Officer or Office Global War on Terrorism Hamlet Evaluation System Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ID IDF JCS JFC JFCOM JSOC KATUSA KIA KTO LOC MAAG MACV MIA MOOTW MPS NASA NATO NG NKPA NLF NME NMP NMS NSC NSS NTC NVA ODS OED OIF OJC ORC OSD PAVN PGM PLA PLAAF PMF PPBS PRC PSYOP RAF RMA ROK ROKA RVN SAC Infantry Division Israeli Defense Force Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Forces Commander Joint Forces Command Joint Special Operations Command Korean Augmentations to the U.S. Army Killed in Action Kuwait Theater of Operation Lines of Communication Military Assistance and Advisory Group Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Missing in Action Military Operations Other Than War Maritime Prepositioning Ships National Aeronautic and Space Administration North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Guard North Korean People's Army National Liberation Front National Military Establishment National Media Pool National Military Strategy National Security Council National Security Strategy National Training Center North Vietnam Army Operation Desert Shield/Storm-Iraq Operation Enduring Freedom- Afghanistan Operation Iraqi Freedom-Iraq Operation Just Cause-Panama Organized Reserve Corps Office of the Secretary of Defense People's Army of Vietnam Precision Guided Munitions People's Liberation Army People's Liberation Army Air Force Private Military Firms Planning-Programming-Budgeting System People's Republic of China Psychological Operations Royal Air Force Revolution in Military Affairs Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Army Republic of Vietnam Strategic Air Command Acknowledgments SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command SU Soviet Union SVN South Vietnam TF Task Force TO&E Table of Organization and Equipment TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command UCP Unified Command Plan UN United Nations USAF United States Air Force USASOC U.S. Army Special Operations Command USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VC Viet Cong WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear) Figures Figure 4.1 President Harry S. Truman signs the Armed Forces Day Proclamation making May 19 Armed Forces Day for 1951, during a brief ceremony in the White House. Figure 5.1 Korea, Area of Operations. Figure 5.2 Korea, Nature of Terrain. Figure 5.3 Arrival of General Collins and General Vandenburg. Figure 5.4 Attack of North Korean Forces. Figure 5.5 South Korea, The Pusan Perimeter. Figure 5.6 South Korea, Inchon Landing and the Breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. Figure 5.7 Korea, Exploitation across the 38th Parallel. Figure 5.8 North Korea, Chinese Appear in North Korea. Figure 5.9 Korea, Eighth Army and X Corps Retreat. Figure 6.1 Black American Soldier with 75 MM Recoilless Rifle guarding the Approach to Command Post on the Front-line in Korea. Figure 6.2 Korea, the Last Battle. Figure 7.1 President Dwight Eisenhower. Figure 7.2 General and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway bid farewell to General George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense, as he leaves Haneda Airbase, Tokyo, Japan, for the United States. Figure 8.1 This 1947 chart shows the relationship of major elements of the National Security — resources, civil economy, foreign policy, strategy, and military effort. Figure 8.2 Chart of thejoint Chiefs of Staff. Figure 8.3 Chart of the Administrative/Logistics Chain of Command. Figure 8.4 Chart of the Unified Command Structure. Figure 9.1 President John F. Kennedy signs General Dwight D. Eisenhower's Commission as General of the Army, as others look on during a ceremony at the White House. Figure 10.1 South Vietnam, U.S. Corps Tactical Zone Boundary. Figure 10.2 President Lyndon B. Johnson and General William C. Westmoreland present SSG Charles Morris with the Distinguished Service Cross, Came Ranh Bay. Vietnam, October 26, 1966. Figure 10.3 Major US. Combat Units in South Vietnam. Figure 10.4 U.S. Troops in Vietnam. Figure 10.5 Men of the 1st Cavalry Division on landing zone. xvi • Figures Figure 10.6 General Westmoreland with Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman (USMC), CG III MAF, and General Wallace M. Greene Commandant of the Marine Corps. Figure 11.1 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of Defense- designate Clark Clifford hold a meeting at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., February 7, 1968. Figure 11.2 President Richard M. Nixon and President of South Vietnam Nguyen Van Thieu, January 30, 1969. Figure 11.3 General Creighton Abrams took over from General Westmoreland in July 1968. Figure 1 1.4 Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Strength. Figure 13.1 President George Bush with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and Chairman of the JCS Colin Powell. Figure 13.2 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Figure 13.3 Persian Gulf War, Colonial Rule, 1920. Figure 13.4 Persian Gulf War, Iraqi Order of Battle. Figure 13.5 Persian Gulf War, The Ground Offensive Plan. Figure 14.1 Ml Abrams Main Battle Tank and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Figure 14.2 VII Corps, January 1991. Figure 14.3 Persian Gulf War. "Jump Off Location." n Gulf War, Ground War Situation, February 24, 1991. n Gulf War, Ground War Situation, February 25, 1991. n Gulf War, Ground War Situation, February 26, 1991. n Gulf War, Ground War Situation, February 27, 1991. n Gulf War, VII Corps Final Assault, February 28, 1991. n Iraqi Freedom, Area of Operation. n Iraqi Freedom, V Corps and I MEF maneuver to Baghdad, n Iraqi Freedom, The V Corps Logistics Line of Communication, n Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi Force Disposition, n Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi Force Disposition, Northern Iraq, n Iraqi Freedom, Thunder Runs in to Baghdad. Appendix Military Map Symbols Figur el4.4 Persian Figur el4.5 Persian Figur el4.6 Persian Figur el4.7 Persian Figur el4.8 Persian Figur el6.1 Operatic Figur el6.2 Operatic Figur el6.3 Operatic Figur e 16.4 Operatic Figur el6.5 Operatic Figur el6.6 Operatic Introduction This study seeks to describe not only the American conduct of war from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom, but also to explain why Americans fight the way they do. The thesis is that culture decisively influences the way nation-states conduct war. Culture decisively influences the way nation-states conduct war, and the objective of this work is to identify the major tenets of American culture dominant in the aftermath of World War II, and then explain how those tenets influence American behavior in war to this day. I argue that culture influenced the organization of the national command structure, force structure, strategic and operational doctrines, national military strategy and theater strategy, research and development, the acquisition of technology, civil-military relations, and other factors pertaining to war and national defense. Using culture as one of the major determining factors in historical change, I argue that the tra- ditional American way of thinking about and conducting war was no longer valid in the latter half of the twentieth century. As a consequence of becoming a superpower, that had taken responsibility for the security of the "Free World," along with the development of nuclear weapons, the tradi- tional American system for procuring soldiers and conducting war did not function as originally designed. It failed to achieve political objectives and produce decisive victories. In Vietnam, the system collapsed, and what emerged was a new American way of war, ironically, based on cultural tenets that had dominated American thinking about the conduct of war since World War II. In the wake of World War II, there was a radical change in the political objectives that had directed the national and military strategy of the United States for two hundred years. Until the twentieth century, the American citizen-soldier army had defended America. However, as American power and influence grew, as technologies and trade made the world smaller, as old Europe collapsed under the weight of two world wars, and as the threat of Communism grew, the United States as- sumed new responsibilities and new roles in world affairs. By the end of World War II the United States was in essence a European power and an Asian power, and the American government had assumed responsibility for defending over two hundred million people in Asia, Europe, and other parts of the world, who were racially and ethnically different from the majority of Americans, and with whom they had no cultural affinity The new U.S. global political objectives were to stop the spread of Communism, deter nuclear war, implant American capitalism on a global scale, and transplant American culture worldwide. Permanent readiness for war, defensive national strategy and doctrine, and major limited wars were the results of these new political objectives and the advent of nuclear weapons. The justifications advanced by political and military leaders for adopting new strategies and doctrines were difficult to explain and comprehend. What were Americans defending these foreign people from and, more importantly, did the perceived threat rise to the level of grievance required to produce a unified effort in war? Theoretically, Americans were defending the "free world" from xviii • Introduction Communism, a system of beliefs about the nature of human existence. But did the average American middle-class family want to risk the lives of their sons to defend the people of Pusan, Korea or Hue, Vietnam from an ideology they only poorly understood? And, could the government explain to them why they should be willing to risk these precious lives? The ideas the United States sought to contain were difficult to grasp and understand, particularly when they only indirectly threatened Americans. They were, thus, typically expressed in simplistic terms. Americans understood that they were bet- ter off than the people who lived under the Communist system, that they had more possessions and more freedom. But, they did not consider these sufficient reasons to sacrifice their sons to save the people of Seoul or Saigon. In addition, the U.S. government asked Americans to sacrifice the lives of their young in limited wars. In limited war the nation did not expend its full resources, and did not intend to achieve decisive victory. In the latter half of the twentieth century the United States did not fully employ its technol- ogy, its manpower, its industry, its intellect, or its tenacity in war. In other words, those individuals whose sons were drafted were being asked to fight a total war, while the U.S. government itself fought a limited war. (There is nothing limited about limited war at the tactical level of war where the killing takes place. Limited war is only limited at the operational and strategic levels of war.) With the advent of nuclear weapons came a new form of limited war, artificial limited war, where nations placed imaginary restraints on the conduct of war, such as, "You can't use that weapon" or "You can't follow the enemy across that line," which meant friendly forces could never complete the destruction of enemy forces, and bring war to a decisive end. Artificial limited war did not make sense to American families. While they were being asked to make the most total commitment humanly possible, the government was holding back, failing to use resources it so richly possessed to hasten an end to war, and thereby save American lives. Because the government could not satisfactorily explain this new form of limited war, could not explain Communist ideology, and could not explain why American sons should fight to defend the people of South Korea and South Vietnam, Americans came to oppose the draft and war as never before. Artificial limited war and fighting against ideas and for people that were not directly related to the security of the United States violated major American cultural tenets of war. From 1945 to 1975 a great many Americans grew to oppose this new form of artificial limited war, but endeavored to adjust their cultural understanding of war to the new realities. During periods of peace their opposition only simmered. And, in the early days of the cold war when there was palpable fear of Communism in America, when China was "lost" to Communism, and the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb, the relationship of the draft to the security of the nation seemed evident. However, as American technology expanded, as America expended billions of dollars on the most advanced war machines ever produced, as Americans learned of the capabilities of their airpower and nuclear arsenals, and as the palpable nature of the threats receded and Americans turned their attention toward the pursuit of "happiness," they were less and less able to see the links between the sacrifice of their children and the security of people in foreign countries. Thus, during hot wars, when Americans were fighting and dying on foreign battlefields, opposition mounted. The Korean War ended before the opposition reached critical mass; however, the Vietnam War did continue long enough for opposition to the war to reach critical mass. The cultural imbalance resulted in an implosion that ended the citizen-soldier army, and the traditional American way of war. The Vietnam War marked two important transformations in the American conduct of war. It was the first war in American history in which ground forces were subordinate to airpower. Under the Doctrine of Graduated Response, airpower was supposed to be decisive. New technologies, opera- tional doctrine, and strategic plans created the belief that the United States could achieve its political objectives without a decisive ground war. Airpower seemed to offer a cheap and easy solution. This was a way of thinking about war that emerged from World War II, continued in the post- Vietnam period, and into the new century. The second important transformation took place in the closing days of the Vietnam War. The citizen-soldier army went away, passed into history effectively removing the American people from wars of the United States. In the Persian Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003 the American people had no legal, positive duties to the United States; and because of the fragmentation of American culture into diverse "clusters," there was little real sense of cohesion and responsibility to the nation. 1 Americans were disconnected from the wars the United States was fighting. The first Persian Gulf War, operations in Afghanistan, and the second Persian Gulf War only partially tested the new professional forces. However, some of the results of the new American way of war were evident. The men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces formed a distinct "military cluster" with values, ethics, and beliefs that were different from those of the people they served. After the Vietnam War the armed forces developed doctrines for war that endeavored to mitigate or eliminate the need for the support of the people. In short, they sought a way to fight a war that was not dependent on the will of the people, which many military leaders believe had failed during the Vietnam War and affected its outcome. The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and Commander in Chief, Central Command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, while voicing the importance of the support of the people, planned and fought the first Persian Gulf War without them. It was to be a short, intense war. Under the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, overwhelming force was employed. Airpower was to be the primary means for the destruction of the enemy's main forces. It was a war in which the emotions, feelings, and passions of the American people had no time to manifest. With the demise of the citizen-soldier army one of the principal institutions of the modern nation-state no longer existed. The "Clausewitzian" "remarkable trinity," the marriage between the government, the armed forces, and the people, which was required for the conduct of more total wars and major limited wars, had been transformed. Many of the most significant attachments between these entities were severed, giving each greater freedom; but it was a freedom that also meant separation and disunity. The responsibility of the White House to limit the use of the armed forces to actions acceptable to the American people was greatly diminished. The White House had greater freedom to go to war, the White House and Pentagon had greater freedom to fight wars as they saw fit, and, the American people had greater freedom to pursue the American Dream without concerns of conscription. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Americas wars resembled the wars of seventeenth-century monarchs, where kings made the decision to go to war, a small professional army fought them, and the people were uninvolved. In 2003 President Bush "elected" to go to war in Iraq. He endeavored to isolate the war to a struggle against Saddam Hussein alone. He did not seek war with the Iraqi people. He planned to fight the war primarily with airpower employing a new operational doctrine, "Shock and Awe" or the Rums- feld Doctrine. While American technology created the illusion of victory, the war morphed from a conventional war into an insurgency war, creating the need for large numbers of ground forces. The war Bush elected to fight was a "chameleon," and its true nature was only slowly revealed. Within weeks of Bush's dramatic appearance on the decks of the USS Abraham Lincoln, and his declaration of an "end to major hostilities," American soldiers and the Iraqi people were being killed in growing numbers in the insurgency war. As American technology proved less and less useful, the demands for ground combat forces increased, causing the redeployment of Army and Marines forces, and the employment of tens of thousands of private contractors and subcontractors. Leaders from the Army and Marine Corps— and a few senators— cautioned that the insurgency war was growing in strength and vigor, that ground combat forces were too few to stem the tide of the insurgence and provide security throughout the country, and that security was essential to win the support of the Iraqi people. Yet during the Presidential debate of 2004, between President George W xx • Introduction Bush and Democratic candidate Senator John Kerry, both men felt compelled to promise the American people that there would be no draft, that there would be no new taxes to pay for the war, and that, in fact, there would be additional tax cuts. In the midst of the global war on terrorism the President of the United States promised the American people they would not be called upon to fight or to sacrifice. Rather than call upon the American people to serve — an act that both Bush and Kerry considered political suicide— the Bush administration chose to increase the burden on active duty, reserve, and National Guard personnel; to employ private military firms (PMF); and to try to substitute technology for manpower. The administration extended tours of duty and rotated soldiers and marines back to Iraq after a relatively brief tour at home. It accepted greater risks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Eastern Europe, and other parts of the world by reducing American troop strength, and "outsourcing" the war. It employed American and foreign contractors and subcontractors to provide security and to support American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. It endeavored to replace soldiers with technology by employing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), satellites, aircraft, and information technologies. It employed Special Forces to carry out missions normally conducted by much larger units. It employed surrogate forces, which held no loyalties to the United States or its political objectives. And it lived with the prospect of failure in the insurgency war in Iraq. When the United States was attacked on 9/11, the American people had accepted a way of war based on the dominance of technology, particularly airpower, and had effectively removed themselves from the conduct of the war. In the months just prior to 9/11, the Rumsfeld Pentagon was planning to deactivate two of the Army's ten divisions, in part to secure additional funding for three new jet fighters, one for each air service. 2 Had this reduction in force taken place, the United States would have been incapable of fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as defending Korea and Eu- rope, and maintaining its other commitments around the world. And while billions of dollars worth of airplanes sat on runways, soldiers purchased their own body armor, purchased communication equipment from Radio Shack, and jerry- rigged armor plating for their military vehicles in an effort to reduce casualties. The United States with all its great power was stretched thin in terms of the type of power applicable to the war it was fighting in Iraq in 2003. Consequently, soldiers and marines died and were wounded unnecessarily in an insurgency war that might have been avoided had the Bush White House and the Rumsfeld Pentagon listened to the advice of Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, and deployed sufficient numbers of troops at the outset to "win the peace." 3 And while the United States invested billions of dollars to develop and manufacture the most advanced aircraft ever produced, to replace the most advanced aircraft ever produced, it was incapable of fighting an insurgency war, a peoples war, in only one of the countries targeted by the Bush administration in the global war on terrorism. The most advanced aircraft known to man were incapable of stopping an insurgent with a rifle or a suicide bomber, were incapable of discriminating between a determined enemy soldier and a fright- ened child, and were incapable of establishing the kinds of relationships with indigenous people that were required to win their confidence and support. While there were voices that called for a more traditional response to war, voices that called for conscription and taxes to pay for the war, they were too few to form a chorus large enough to influ- ence policy. With the end of the draft in 1973, the American people were all but removed from the conduct of war. The result of this is that out of more than 280 million Americans less than 1 percent is carrying the burden of the the war on terrorism. And with the loss of the draft went the loss of much of the interest in war. While patriotism seemed at an all time high, the vast majority of Americans did nothing. In the year 2001, very few Americans had positive duties to the nation-state. 4 With this new force structure came questions: Could the U.S. Armed Forces fight a major insur- gency war without calling upon the American people? Would the president have to retract his words Introduction • xxi and issue orders for conscription? Or, would the administration accept defeat, declare victory, come home, and leave Iraq to find its own solutions? Other questions were implicit: Has technology finally replaced man on the battlefield? Has the world been made a safer place by diminishing the involve- ment of the American people in the nation's wars? To whom are PMFs loyal, and what is their status under the international laws of war? Does America want armies made up of mercenaries? Is it fair to place the entire burden of the war on the "military cluster"? And, what does this practice say about the American people and American nationalism? By stepping back and looking at the American military experience since the end of World War II we can identify the cultural conflicts and historical events that caused the evolution of the American culture of war. This work is divided into eighteen chapters. The common themes that run throughout the work are national strategy, national military strategy, the defense and foreign policies of administrations, civil-military relations, force structure, technology, strategic and operational doctrines, interservice rivalry, the media, personnel policies, the air war, the ground war, the cultures of the services, Ameri- can culture, and the role of the American people. This approach allows readers to trace the changes of these various facets of the American approach to war over the more than sixty years of evolution, or, as some have argued, "revolution." Because each of the wars discussed is the subject of numerous volumes, a comprehensive, definitive treatment of each war is beyond the scope of this work. The endnotes help tell the story, and a bibliography of the major wars fought by the United States since World War II provides information on additional studies. 1 Culture, Genes, and War Whether one accepts or rejects Karl Wittfogel's thesis that the organization of agriculture and irrigation provided the model for military command, it is clear that disciplined, hierarchical fighting forces, once developed, were not only ideal means of aggression but imposing instru- ments of social control. So man's first political agenda was set; he became an imperial ape and a soldier, a conqueror and an organizer. And this, it would seem, is how and why war was born War is and always was a cultural phenomenon among humans. What we learned to do, we can choose to stop doing. We may not so choose, but it is possible. Our fate is in our hands. Technology, particularly nuclear technology, has rendered war, man's most powerful social institution, obsolete. If we recognize this in time, we will probably remain alive .... —Robert L. O'Connell 1 Political actors are predisposed to learn certain things over others. In the modern global system, realist folklore has provided a guide and cultural inheritance for Western states that has shaped and patterned the behavior of major states in certain situations. . . . War is an institution within the modern global political system that serves an important political function — the resolution of intractable issues. Until there is a functional equivalent to this institution, war will remain a way of handling certain situations. War and the steps and practices that lead to it must be seen as part of a culture of violence that has given birth to these practices. — John A. Vasquez 2 On the eve of World War II, the noted anthropologist Margaret Mead published a book to explain to the American people that war was a cultural endeavor, and that culture could be a strength or a weakness that influences the outcome of war. She wrote: This book is based upon ... the premise that, in total war, national character, what Americans are now, today, in the 1940s is one of our principal assets, and may nevertheless become, not wisely handled, one of our principal liabilities. ... If we make war plans which seek to invoke a kind of courage which we lack, and neglect a kind of courage which we have— we will lose. If we let our generals and our statesmen involve us in international threats and reprisals which fail to bring out the strengths in our character we may lose. 3 Cultural theories have been used to examine and explain the behavior of nations in war through- out recorded history. 4 In fact, it is impossible to understand the behavior of a nation in war without some understanding of its culture. A nation is a cultural entity, a state is a political entity. The modern 2 • The American Culture of War nation-state combines these two forms of human organization to produce a single entity of enormous power. Consider the words of the anthropologist, Bronislaw Malinowski: In the terminology here adopted, we can say that the tribe as a cultural entity can be denned as a federation of partly independent and also coordinated component institutions. One tribe, therefore, differs from the other in the organization of the family, the local group, the clan, as well as economic, magical, and religious teams. The identity of institutions; their potential cooperation due to community of language, tradition, and law; the interchange of services; and the possibility of joint enterprise on a large scale— these are the factors which make for the unity of a primitive, culturally homogeneous group. This, I submit, is the prototype of what we define today as nationality: a large group, unified by language, tradition, and culture. To the division as we find it between primitive culturally differentiated tribes there correspond today such divisions as between Germans and Poles, Swedes and Norwegians, Italians and French. 5 The concept of nation takes us beyond the legal considerations of the individual as subject of states. The modern nation-state has been the most powerful historic force since the decline of the absolute monarch. The people of a given nation are connected by a common identity, a common culture, and it is these connections that create the cohesion that makes possible total effort in war. However, as Mead noted, the political entity, the state, can cause the cultural entity, the nation, to act in ways that are culturally irregular, and by doing so diminish its power to achieve objectives through war. I argue that culture decisively influences the way a nation conducts war. The difficult task is to identify the cultural tenets of a people that are operative at a given time, and which tenets exert the dominant influence. Before this identification process can take place a working understanding of cultural theory is necessary. Culture Culture has been defined in many ways. And there are a number of anthropological schools of thoughts with varying definitions of culture, and explanations of how culture is produced and reproduced. In these pages no effort is made to delineate these debates. However, a generally accepted, working defi- nition of culture, and an explanation of how it influences behavior and is reproduced in succeeding generations is required. Clifford Geertz in his work, The Interpretation of Cultures, wrote: "Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning? 6 By finding meaning in the individual fibers of the web, insight into and understanding of actions and behaviors is gained. Culture has traditionally been defined in Culture, the total pattern of human behavior and its products embodied in thought, speech, action, and artifacts [technologies] and dependent upon man's capacity for learning and trans- mitting knowledge to succeeding generations through the use of tools, language, and systems of abstract thought; the body of customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits constituting a distinct complex of tradition of a racial, religious, or social group ... a complex of typical behavior or standardized social characteristics peculiar to a specific group, occupation or profession, sex, age, grade, or social class ...J Culture . . . refers to the ways of life of people in a given society, to their social heritage. Accord- ing to the classic definition by the anthropologist Tylor, culture is "that complex whole which Culture, Genes, and War • 3 includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society." In any society there exists a body of knowledge, ideas, values (concep- tions of desirability), attitudes, customs, myths, prejudices, and the like, which make up the nonmaterial aspects of the culture at that time and place. 8 Culture refers to the socially transmitted habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operations that are more of less specific to a particular geographically based security com- munity. Culture may be qualified for more precise usage, as in strategic culture or political culture. . . . Strategic culture is the result of opportunities, of resources, of the skill with which those opportunities and resources have been managed, and of the lessons which a society de- cides its unfolding history should teach. To a considerable degree societies are prisoners of their past. Policymakers have been educated both formally and by life experiences in their particular society to expect certain relationships generally to hold true . . . . 9 While these definitions are useful, they fall short, because they fail to explain how culture influ- ences behavior. The work of Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, is useful in this regard. 10 Each individual is an agent. Agents interact in societies using accepted practices, actions that have specific objectives and meaning. Practices are based on culturally accepted strategies for operating in a particular environment at a particular time. Practice is the objectification of a selected strategy. Strategies are a function of social structures, sets and systems of norms of thought that have historical context and content. Structures help human beings make sense of their environment. When faced with a given structure people select and employ a strategy or strategies that are culturally acceptable and achieve the desired result. History, the physical environment, and technologies determine the contents of structures. Successful practices are reproduced when confronted with objective conditions, in a particular environment, that fit into identifiable structures that have been culturally learned. In the mind, the objective conditions are placed into familiar structures, which enable people to act ap- propriately; that is, to select the most fitting strategy, and then to put it into practice. However, agents do not simply reproduce practices based on the objective world, the structures they elicit, and the accepted strategies. They sometimes employ culturally unacceptable strategies, adapt strategies to nuances in the environment, and improvise new strategies, which result in new practices. Bourdieu refers to this ability to organize strategies, to adapt, innovate, and improvise as the habitus. The habitus is a cognitive process that identifies strategies and reproduces practices based on the objective perceptions of the real world. It produces variations of practices and strategies based on the variations and nuances of the objective world, the degree of individual inculcation of particular structures, the degree to which a selected strategy achieves the results desired, the willingness and motivation to improvise, and the unique makeup of each individual. However, unless one of these factors shifts significantly, agents tend to reproduce successful strategies and practices that fit the known structures. Structures are identified in the environment all around us. They operate at different levels of consciousness. Some structures form durable dispositions that cause practices that are a function of unintentional thought. Bourdieu explained: "The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices . . . while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objec- tive potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus. . . . The habitus is the source of these series of moves which are objectively organized as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention . . . ."" For example, the construct "manhood" consists of multiple structures, that operate at numerous levels of thought, which form a complex web that informs men of the expected strategies and practices, and motivates them to select the appropriate strategy and reproduce those practices that are acceptable to the society. These 4 • The American Culture of War practices and strategies are reproduced at various levels of thought. For example, one structure of the construct manhood is "honor." Bourdieu observed: "the point of honour is a permanent disposition, embedded in the agents' very bodies in the form of mental dispositions, schemes of perception and thought, extremely general in their applications . . . and also, at a deeper level, in the form of bodily postures and stances, ways of standing, sitting, looking, speaking, or walking. What is called the sense of honour is nothing other than a cultivated disposition, inscribed in the body schema and in the schema of thought, which enables each agent to engender all the practices consistent with the logic of challenge and riposte...." 12 Thus, at one level the sense of honor motivates behaviors that are automatic responses. At another level the sense of honor goes beyond bodily posture and way of speaking, to the decision-making process, to considerations of whether to fight, to considerations of peace or war. American ideas about manhood, in part, shaped the American understanding about how the nation, political leaders, and soldiers should and should not act in war. Richard Maxwell Brown in his work, No Duty to Retreat, recorded how the myth of the "old west" influenced Dwight D. Eisenhower: No one more directly stated the social philosophy of standing one's ground than President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a nationally televised speech in 1953. President Eisenhower, the leader of the "Free World" in a time of cold war . . . expressed the ethos of no duty to retreat when he informed his nationwide audience that as a boy in Abilene, Kansas, he had been reared to "prize" the code of Abilene and "our Marshal," the renowned gunfighter Wild Bill Hickok. The President still believed in that code, which, he proudly declared, was "meet anyone face to face with whom you disagree"; "if you meet him face to face and took the same risk he did, you could get away with almost anything as long as the bullet was in the front." 13 This was an honorable way to behave on the playground or the battlefield, and an honorable way for the nation to act in war or other international matters. 14 The history legends, and myths of the Old West, Civil War, American Revolution were incorporated into American culture, and passed down by individuals and institutions that, in part, shaped the personalities, beliefs, ethics, and actions (practices) of men, such as Truman, Bush, Patton, LeMay, Halsey Schwarzkopf, and other political and military leaders. In 1893 Frederick Jackson Turner advanced the thesis that, "American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, the expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnished the forces dominating American character." 15 More recently Colin Gray advanced a similar thesis: If the cultural and stylistic proclivities of Americans were not so important for the consider- ation of basic national security policy, they would be excluded from discussion here. But those policy choices are considered by an American people distinctive in its strategic culture from other security communities. The American people are geopolitically conditioned as Americans to think and feel in a reasonably distinctive American way about those choices. The roots of American strategic culture lie in a frontier tradition, an experience and expectation of success in national endeavors, experience with an abundance of resources for defense, a dominant political philosophy of liberal idealism, and a sense of separateness— moral and geostrategic — from the evil doings of the Old World. 16 Gray argues that American policy choices in matters of national security cannot be understood without some understanding of American culture. Gray concludes that "all human beings are cul- turally educated or programmed," and that "culture embraces both ideas and behavior and that it is Culture, Genes, and War • 5 :apable." 17 The word programmed implies that people have to act in accordance with their pro- lg; hence, if you understand the program you can predict the behavior. But people and nations do not always act in accordance with cultural norms. People do innovate, improvise, and create, and cultural norms frequently conflict, causing the evolution of culture. Gray too recognizes that agents "amend" culture. However, his terminology too strongly implies that people are prisoners of their culture. Culture influences behavior and thinking. History, legends, cultural inheritance, and myths influence actions in the present by creating structures and strategies for American behavior. For the purposes of this study, structures that produce consistent, durable strategies are called "cultural tenets." I am not arguing that people or nations are programmed. Political scientists also employ anthropological analytical methods to advance arguments on the causes and conduct of war, noting that there exists within Western nations a "culture of war." John Vasquez, in his analysis of the causes of war writes: The hard-liners' [agents] cognitive map of the world tends to be simple rather than complex. Hard-liners tend to be nationalistic and hold a militaristic view of the world. The hard-liner as a type is hostile toward and distrustful of the other nation, and feels unable to control events. In a crisis they are risk-takers. In personal relations they are prone to dominance. Except for the last, which is a personality characteristic, it is clear that the characteristics hard-liners share are something they have learned from their experience or imbibed from the culture around them. 18 Hard-liners are predisposed to see specific structures in the objective environment, and are incul- cated with strategies and cultural tenets that recognize war as an acceptable and possibly preferred practice. Vasquez concludes that: "hard-liners can be defined as individuals who have a personal disposition (due to their beliefs) to adopt a foreign policy that is adamant in not compromising its goals and who argue in favor of the efficacy and legitimacy of threat and force." 19 New agents mature in "webs" of culture. When confronted with objective events in the real world, agents from different cultures can see very different structures, and what they see will tend to limit them to specific strategies, which result in practices acceptable to their own culture. Agents learn multiple strategies and practices acceptable for success in the various structures of their society. They form cultural dispositions that inform and motivate behaviors at all levels of consciousness, and pass this culture on to the next generation. Again consider Vasquez's analysis on the dissemination of culture: To determine whether a domestic political context is initially more favorable to the influence of hard-liners or accommodationists, all one has to do is look at the "lessons of the past" that prevail in the national political culture. This is not a difficult task since these lessons are reflected in the popular media and the publications of the intelligentsia. The crucial question is: where do these lessons come from? It seems that in all societies these lessons are derived from the most traumatic experiences that the society as a whole goes through. For most, this is the last major war. Subsequent events, particularly more limited wars, will affect those lessons, but for the generation that lived through the traumatic experience, only another major war will lead to an opportunity for rethinking the lessons. Using a general learning model . . . one can assume that these lessons will be passed on to the next generation through socialization and will be accepted, although with less emotional attachment. 20 Culture makes the objective world comprehensible by inculcating structures and constructs. It in- fluences behavior by providing agents with strategies and establishing boundaries between the normal and the abnormal, between the permissible and the impermissible. It makes possible more complete 6 • The American Culture of War communication than is possible with language alone. Demeanor, disposition, facial expressions, dress, and other nonverbal forms of communications are culturally learned, and often communicate more than words. Culture creates cohesion between people, and barriers between other cultures, other com- munities, tribes, and nations. Culture, in part, creates the mental disposition that enables some people to sacrifice for the good of the larger cultural unit— tribe, nation, or service. Culture can be studied, and thus outsiders are enabled to better comprehend the behaviors of a particular people or nation. War is a series of structures that together form the construct of "war" in the minds of men before it is objectified as actions or practices, in the real world. It is a complex web of countless culturally regular tenets that generate specific strategies and motivate specific practices. The construct informs the various agents— men, women, the aged, and the young of what is expected of them. The construct of war involves additional complexities because it does not stand alone, but is intermingled with other constructs, such as manhood, citizenship, and other complex concepts. Obviously, it is an exceedingly difficult task to ascertain the influence of culture on war, and one that is not easily reduced to usable paradigms. However, some interpretation of culture is absolutely necessary if we are to understand the behaviors, practices, strategies, and the continuity in those practices and strategies among a given people, generation after generation. For any in-depth understanding of war, cultural comprehension is a prerequisite. Military organizations develop doctrines and technologies to employ their forces in battles and campaigns in ways that are culturally regular and achieve the desired results. Nations recruit soldiers in ways that are culturally regular and produce sufficiently effective fighting forces that produce the desired results. The strategies by which forces are employed in sustained wars that require the willing support of the people have to be consistent with the cultural norms of the society and achieve the results desired by the people. Doctrines, recruiting systems, and military strategies that are culturally regular, but fail repeatedly to achieve the desired results, motivate change. Failure motivates improvi- sation, adaptation, or innovation: the development of new, or the amendment of accepted strategies and practices. Major changes in strategies and practices are caused by major shifts in structures and constructs. During World War II, and in the postwar period, significant changes in technologies and national strategies called into question culturally regular, accepted American doctrines, national strategies, military strategies, and recruiting systems. These major constructs of the American way of war, which held two centuries of historic content, were exposed to revolutionary new technologies, a radically changed foreign policy, and a new environment that engendered constant high levels of threat. As a consequence, the American cognitive processes, the habitus, endeavored to adapt the American way of war to these changes. The result was the adoption of a new American way of war. Axioms of Cultural Theory For the purposes of this study a number of axioms deduced from cultural theory require clarifica- tion. Culture is manifested in very concrete ways that can decisively influence the outcome of war. Victor David Hanson observed that: "The culture in which militaries fight determines whether thousands of mostly innocent young men are alive or rotting after their appointed hour of battle. Abstractions like capitalism or civic militarism are hardly abstract at all when it comes to battle, but rather concrete realities that ultimately determined . . . whether Athenian cobblers and tanners could return home in safety after doing their butchery at Salamis or were to wash up in chunks on the shores of Attica." 21 Culture, Genes, and War • 7 Culture is timeless and ubiquitous, existing and influencing all nations at all times. John Lynn empha- sized the uniqueness of each nation-state: "A cultural interpretation is most likely to grant individuals and peoples their full personal, social, and cultural character." 20 Each nation is unique, with varying abilities to adapt, adopt, and learn. Geography and history insure that no two nations have identical constructs of war, that no two nations comprehend war in exactly the same way. Hanson advanced the argument that there exists a uniquely Western way of war, born of the campaigns of the ancient Greeks, and that the superior performance of Western nations in war over centuries is the primary reason for the dominance of Western culture and Western civilization on Earth. He identified the attributes of Western culture that produced superior performance in war: The Greeks fought much differently than their adversaries and that such unique Hellenic characteristics of battle — a sense of personal freedom, superior discipline, matchless weapons, egalitarian camaraderie, individual initiative, constant tactical adaptation and flexibility, prefer- ence for shock battle of heavy infantry— were themselves the murderous dividends of Hellenic culture at large. The peculiar way Greeks killed grew out of consensual government, equality among the middling classes, civilian audit of military affairs, and politics apart from religion, freedom and individualism, and rationalism. 23 The American way of war is an outgrowth of the Western way of war. Hanson's thesis supports that of Russell Weigley, who noted: "The frontier interpretation of American history applies only mini- mally to war; American ways of war were offshoots of European ways of war, and American strategic thought was therefore a branch of European strategic thought." 24 Weigley disagrees with Turner, Gray, and others on the influence of the frontier on American culture, and he and Hanson have identified the contributions of Europe to American thinking and conduct of war. 25 The frontier experience, the Western military tradition, and numerous other factors influenced the American way of war. While common elements can be found in the American and German ways of war, a complete description of the attributes of each nation would create a way of war unique to each of them because of their individual histories, military experiences, geographic circumstances, long-held political institutions and objectives, roles in world affairs, and the specific evolution of each culture. Again, these theories are not limited to Western culture. Norvell De Atkine, in an essay titled, "Why Arab Armies Lose Wars" and Kenneth Pollack, in a comprehensive study, Arabs at War, concluded that Arab culture decisively limits the military effectiveness of Arab states. Atkine wrote: "Mindful of walking through a minefield of past errors and present cultural sensibilities, I offer some assessment of the role of culture in the military training of Arabic-speaking people. ... It may well be that these seemingly permanent attributes result from a culture that engenders subtlety, indirection, and dissimu- lation in personal relationships [that, in part, explains] why Arab armies lose wars." 26 Atkine should have specified: "lose conventional wars." And Pollack wrote: "certain patterns of behavior fostered by the dominant Arab culture were the most important factors contributing to limiting the military effectiveness of Arab armies and air forces from 1945 to 1991 . . . I' 17 Conversely, it can be argued that tenets of Arab culture enhance the ability of Muslim peoples to fight insurgency war, and to employ terrorism. Pollack later wrote: Four areas of military effectiveness stand out as consistent and crippling problems for Arab forces: poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance. These complications were present in every single Arab army and air force between 1948 and 1991. All had significant and identifiable effects on the performance of Arab armed forces. These were, without question, the principal sources of Arab misfortune in war during this period of history. The lack of initiative, improvisation, adaptability, flexibility, independent 8 • The American Culture of War judgment, willingness to maneuver, and ability to integrate the various combat arms effectively meant that Arab armies and air forces were regularly outfought by their adversaries. 28 The inability of Arab nations to fight conventional wars against Western nations, and their repeated failures caused them to search for new military and political doctrines and strategies. 29 Terrorism and insurgency are alternative, unconventional strategies for war, and guerrilla warfare and terrorism are operational and tactical doctrines. These strategies and doctrines have been adopted by some Arab nations, in part because of their inability to succeed in conventional war against Western nations. Arab nations have had to adapt. Nations have varying abilities to adapt, yet they can never escape their culture. It is impossible to ignore the fact the Japanese adopted many of the attributes of the Western way of war, demonstrat- ing their mastery at Pearl Harbor, in the Philippines, and in Singapore. But, it is equally impossible to understand the suicidal Banzai and Kamikaze attack tactics — a horrendous misuse of human resources— without some understanding of Japanese culture. 30 While the Japanese adopted Western technologies and ways of fighting, they did so in a distinctly Japanese way. And while the Japanese followed paradigms provided by Western states, they ultimately could not escape centuries of cultural learning. Culture is not static, and all historical events are not equal. Certain events exert greater, more lasting, and persistent influence than others. The American way of war— like the culture that formed it— is continuously acquiring and discarding. Shy observed that the "explanatory importance of events should be reckoned not by proximity, but by priority in historical time." 31 Thus, certain battles and wars have priority in historical time, and the learning that took place during them "rippled" through time influencing behavior and decisions in the present. For example, American beliefs about war are a function of the extraordinary events that left deep scars in the nation, that required enormous sacrifices, that consumed vast resources, that produced significant casualties directly touching the lives of numerous individual families and communities. Hence, the American experience in the Civil War exerted a more comprehensive, intensive, and sustained influence on American thinking about the conduct of war than the more recent American experiences in insurgent, guerrilla warfare in the Philippines War (1899-1902) or attrition, trench warfare in World War I (1917-18). Aspects of Civil War thinking were reproduced during World War II, reinforcing tenets learned a century before. Traumatic events in the life of a nation can produce rapid changes in cultural thinking about war. The effects of Hiroshima and the Tet Offensive were felt decades later, and are still creating waves of influence. Both were reinforced, not by similar historical events, but by other cultural tenets, which strengthened their influence. Both events, in very different ways, damaged the martial spirit of the American people, and influenced subsequent decisions on war. The spirit of a nation and its attitudes and willingness to engage in war can change significantly in relatively short periods of time, particu- larly if they are reinforced by other cultural tenets. The armed forces of nation-states have to conduct significant wars, limited and total, in ways that are culturally regular. Doctrine is defined as the "authoritative fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives." Doctrine is a modern concept in military litera- ture, but it is as old as war, existing throughout most history without discussion or delineation. The vast majority of the people of any given nation cannot define or describe the doctrines that make up operational art or their armed forces. Nevertheless, these doctrines have to be culturally regular for the people to accept them. Army operational and tactical doctrines and national, strategic doctrines that deviate too far from culturally accepted norms do not retain the support of the people. Doctrines are a function of technology, resources, geography, national military strategy, historical experiences in war, service culture and traditions, individual genius, and national cultures. Doctrines are prevalent Culture, Genes, and War • 9 at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Each service of the U.S. Armed Forces has it own operational and tactical doctrine. In war it is necessary for a nation to understand the tenets, dynamic, frictions, divisions, and exi- gencies of its own primary culture to maximize its power in war. For example, because cultures vary significantly among nations and within states the martial spirit is not a constant, and the martial spirit can be diminished or enhanced by numerous factors. 32 The willingness of the people of a nation to risk their lives in battle varies from nation to nation and war to war, and it can be argued that certain cultures have maintained through the centuries a stronger martial spirit than other nations. The fre- quency of war, the type of war, geographic circumstance, the wealth of the nation, the quality of life, the political system, and numerous other factors influence the martial spirit of a nation. The martial spirit may or may not explain success or failure in war. However, it is a necessary element to fight war, and one of the factors necessary to generate combat power. Ancient Sparta, medieval Prussia, and modern Germany have historically been considered nations with a strong martial spirit. 33 While the martial spirit has not always brought these states military or political success, it was nevertheless an important constituent in their ability to fight. As long as wars are made up of battles that require men to enter the battlefield, the martial spirit will be an essential component of a nations ability to fight war. And hence, a nation needs to understand its current ability to produce combat soldiers to maximize its strategy and doctrine in war. Political leaders and governments can act intentionally and unintentionally in ways that are inconsis- tent with the accepted cultural norms of its people, thereby diminishing their capacity to make war. The state and the nation are not always in agreement. The American conduct of World War II was culturally regular, consistent with American belief, expectations, values, ethics, attitudes, and institutional norms. The state, the political entity, and the nation, the cultural entity, were in agreement. The American conduct of the Vietnam War was not culturally regular. For example, a strategically defensive ground war was not in keeping with the American understanding of war. There was a considerable divide between the state and the nation over the conduct of the Vietnam War. The problem is to identify the cultural norms exerting the greatest influence on the behavior of a people during a given war. The more limited the war, the greater the possible deviation from cultural norms. The more total the war, the more limited the possible deviations. The cultural tenets active in a given nation to some degree conflict and reinforce other active tenets. Cultural tenets operate with varying degrees of strength, and some tenets are dormant until specific events activate them. Michael Desch, in an essay titled: "Explaining the Gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization of the South, and the End of the Mass Army," wrote: ROTC programs have been discontinued at a number of elite schools, primarily in the Northeast, but many new programs have been established in other schools, primarily in the South, where 49 percent of Army, 41 percent of Air Force, and 41 percent of Navy ROTC programs are cur- rently located. . . . The net effect was to produce an ROTC cadet pool that was more Southern and more likely to produce career officers than before. There is abundant evidence that graduates of ROTC programs are very different from the rest of civilian society 34 In 200 1 the majority of U.S. military officers came from the nine states of the South. Arguably, South- erners culturally placed greater premium on military service than people from either the Northeast or Midwest. The cultural tenets that produce soldiers, conflict with other more salient tenets prevalent, for example, in the Northeast states. However, the picture is more complex. Modern Western nation- states have evolved into multicultural states, with varying values, ethics, and beliefs. Within a state there can exist multiple nations, cultural entities, and the greater the fragmentation of the political body, the state, the less able it is to conduct more total war or significant limited wars. 10 • The American Culture ofWar The former Yugoslavia was a state comprised of many nations that almost immediately went to war with one another in 1991 following the destruction of the ruling power that had kept them peaceful, the Soviet Union. Iraq is a state comprised of three major nations, the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia. The United States is also a state with many nations. Michael Weiss in his work the, The Clustered World, observed: For a nation that's always valued community, this breakup of the mass market into balkanized population segments is as momentous as the collapse of Communism. . . . Today, the country's new motto should be "E pluribus pluriba": "Out of many, many." Evidence of the nation's accel- erated fragmentation is more than anecdotal. According to the geodemographers . . . American society today is composed of sixty- two distinct lifestyle types— a 55 percent increase over the forty segments that defined the U.S. populace during the 1970s and 80s. ...These lifestyles represent America's modern tribes, sixty-two distinct population groups each with its own set of values, culture and means of coping with today's problems. . . . Increasingly, America is a fractured landscape, its people partitioned into dozens of cultural enclaves, its ideals reflected through differing prisms of experience This process has left too many Americans alienated from each other, divided by a cultural chasm. 35 The American war effort in Iraq in 2003 was not a national effort. The military cluster fought the war. This process of partitioning into clusters that form enclaves in all parts of the country has been underway for decades, and because of the great mobility of the American people, enclaves with cultural values more like those of the Northeast can also be found in the suburbs of Dallas or Houston. 36 While the breakup of America into enclaves is evident, regional and national core cultures still exert influ- ences, albeit sometimes not as much influence as the culture of a particular cluster. More traditional, core cultural tenets are held with varying degrees of significance in various clusters. Organizations with long life spans, such as the U.S. Army and Navy, possess subcultures that influenced behavior and the decision making of indoctrinated individuals. Soldiers and sailors develop identities that are in part a function of the culture and history of the service in which they are trained and indoctrinated. The officer corps of the services were, and are, required to inculcate each new genera- tion of officers in the culture of their service. The more completely new agents receive, assimilate, and personify the core culture of their service — its structures, strategies, and practices — the greater their chances for a successful career (as a rule). To maximize a nation's combat power that nation must understand the culture of its enemy. The consequence for failing to understand one's enemy's way of war can be one's own defeat. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated a total failure to comprehend American culture. The attack, while a tactical success, was strategically a major blunder. It created the cohesion necessary for the Ameri- can people to produce a total effort in war. Likewise, the American political and military leadership demonstrated little understanding of the cultural tenets that influenced the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong during the Vietnam War, nor did they understand the cultural tenets of Iraq, believing that the Iraqi people would welcome U.S. soldiers as liberators. Norvell De Atkine noted: But how does one integrate the study of culture into military training? At present, it has hardly any role. Paul M. Belbutowski, a scholar and former member of the US Delta Force, succinctly stated a deficiency in our own military education system: "Culture, comprised of all that is vague and intangible, is not generally integrated into strategic planning except at the most superficial level." And yet it is precisely "all that is vague and intangible" which defines low-intensity con- flicts. The Vietnamese Communists did not fight the war the United States had trained for, nor did the Chechens and Afghans fight the war for which the Russians had prepared. 37 Culture, Genes, and War • 1 1 A nations way of war was, and is, a cultural inheritance informing servicemen — not determining — how they ought to act in battle, and how the nation, the people, and their political leadership, ought to conduct war. Only culturally cohesive nation- states are capable of fighting total war. Conformity to accepted national strategies and doctrines for war is more important in total war, where the mobilization of enormous national resources is required, and hence public support is required, than in limited war. 36 Most of Americas small wars did not require the mobilization of significant national resources, or the support of the American people, they were carried out by the regular Army or Marine Corps, and attracted relatively little public attention. Hence, the services and political leaders conducted all types of campaigns and small wars. However, the more protracted the war, the more national resources are required, the higher the casualties, the more intense the fighting, the greater the public awareness and attention. In essence, the more total the war, the greater is the pressure to reproduce core cultural strategies and practices that have traditional produced successful outcomes. Genes and Culture Culture influences the range between the permissible and the impermissible. Genetics determine the range between the possible and the impossible. Genetics and culture combine to establish param- eters of behavior. In the lifetime of an individual, their genetic makeup will not change. However, because culture is not static, the parameters are always to some degree being redefined. Hence, the ability of nation-states to produce combat soldiers at any given time is fixed by nature/genetics and nurture/culture. The United States has been little concerned with its ability to produce combat soldiers, assuming that all American men could serve equally well. This, however, is a dangerous fallacy. All men cannot serve effectively as soldiers in combat, a fact that is contrary to the American cultural tenets about manhood, equality, and military service— tenets that had their origins in the formative period of the nation's history, when it was believed that the citizen militia possessed the wherewithal to fight and win wars against French and British regular soldiers. While geneticists have shown that 99 percent of human DNA, the building blocks for life on Earth, is the same for the 6 billion people on Earth, that 1 percent difference produces enormous variations and enormous diversity. 39 It can be argued that from this diversity individuals exhibit abilities, skills, and talents at slightly unique or slightly different levels of proficiency from other human beings. Slight differences in skills, types of intelligence, ambition, instincts, tolerance of conditions, acuity of eye- sight, reflexes, speed, musculature, height, and other human qualities produce enormously different outcomes in the physical world. These variations in human abilities can make the difference between life and death. Everyone, regardless of cultural tenets, cannot serve effectively as combat soldiers, just as everyone cannot play in the National Football League or participate in Ph.D. programs. The ability of nations to produce human beings capable of becoming combat soldiers is a function of two related factors, nature and nurture?* Which factor produces the greatest influence has been debated for decades. However, today we know that the brain is not a clean slate at birth waiting to receive structures and strategies, and that nature is greatly influenced by the quality and character of nurturing. In other words the hardwiring of the brain, like the physical development of the body, is not fixed when a child is born. The quality of nurturing influences the quality of the final product. Consider the words of the Nobel laureate, Francis Crick: The genes we receive from our parents have, over many millions of years been influenced by the experience of our distant ancestors. These genes, and the process directed by them before birth, lay down much of the structure of the parts of our brain. The brain at birth ... is not a tabula rasa but an elaborate structure with many of its parts already in place. Experience then tunes 12 • The American Culture ofWar [introduces structures and strategies] this rough-and-ready apparatus until it can do a precision job. . . . Thus the mature brain is the product of both Nature and Nurture. 39 Nurturing completes the hardwiring of the brain. Hence, the cultural norms of the civilization in which an individual is nurtured and matures influence, in many ways, his or her ways of thinking, dispositions, attitudes, abilities, and beliefs. An individual born with a brain that had the qualities of Einstein's brain, who was nurtured in a remote tribe in the Amazon, would never have developed the abilities or the disposition to produce works comparable to Einstein's theories on the makeup of the universe. The mental and physical development of human beings is influenced by the quality of nurturing, which in part, forms character, establishing the range of the permissible and the imper- missible, likes and dislikes. Given the new knowledge available through the science of genetics, it has been argued that there are genes that predispose people for certain behaviors; for example, ambition, shyness, aggressiveness, and risk seeking. It is argued that people such as Bill Clinton, Condoleezza Rice, Martha Stewart, and Oprah Winfrey possess the ambition genes. 40 Similarly it is clear that some people are willing and able to take more and greater risks than other people. The "risk-seeking genes" or "novelty-seeking genes" produce a chemical reaction in the brain that creates positive responses under conditions of risk. Risk-seeking genes produce individuals willing to put themselves in harm's way, willing to ven- ture across unexplored oceans, into space, or to the moon. Such individuals have been a necessary element in human progress. When the war trumpets sound, some individuals run toward the sound, while others run away from it. Those who run away tend to be endowed with the "anxiety-seeking genes" that create negative responses under conditions of risk. David Hackworth, a highly decorated veteran of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, in reference to the Korean War wrote: "My adrenaline was running fast and I wanted to be where the action was. I couldn't stop talking about it. Every day I'd warn Prazenka to treat me nice — I was going to Korea and I might just give him all my medals when I came back. I was ready to try out my warrior wings. I wanted to prove myself, I wanted to win the Combat Infantryman's Badge (CIB), I just wanted to go— so badly it hurt." 41 Another veteran of the Korean War, Henry G. Gole, wrote: "I left college to volunteer for the draft in 1952 because I wanted to be the Audie Murphy of the Korean War." After several months of combat experience he observed: I went on over twenty combat patrols that either were wildly exciting or stupidly executed. I did not think much of the leadership skills or guts of my platoon leader nor of the platoon sergeant, but perhaps they were told to avoid casualties. In any event, they always played it safe. In my own case, I think I was suspect for being too "gung-ho." It is my impression that some 10 percent of the troops— the Audie Murphy aspirants— shared my views. The majority of the troop, including the leadership, concentrated on survival and getting home. 42 Gole and Hackworth possessed risk-seeking genes. 43 The number of genetic risk takers in a given population is probably a constant. While the exact percentage is unknown, 10 percent appears to be a reasonable estimate. Since we are working with a sequence of genes, not a single gene, there are de- grees of risk takers. However, a certain threshold is required to take that final step onto the battlefield where people are being killed. And for that percentage of a population that stands near the boundary, culture can make the difference, pushing them to one side or the other. It is probable that throughout the long history of warfare, in the vast majority of wars, less than 15 percent of a given population took part in the actual fighting. That percentage has probably remained fairly constant among nations, and racial and ethnic groups until the nineteenth and twentieth centu- ries, when modern means of transportation made it possible for large groups of people to migrate. Those most willing to cross oceans into an uncertain world, to migrate, were the risk takers. The movement Culture, Genes, and War • 13 of people around the planet and the creation of nations comprised of many races and ethnic groups has probably altered the percentage of risk takers in some nation-states. No single ability produces good combat soldiers. More is required than the risk-seeking genes, such as the ability to live with ambiguity and uncertainty; the ability to tolerate discomfort, exposure to the weather, and harsh living conditions; and the ability to serve as part of a team. Thus, the picture is more complex than indicated above. However, the risk-seeking genes are absolutely necessary if individuals are to risk their lives in war. If modern man, Homo sapiens, has lived in tribal societies for the vast majority of his roughly 150,000 to 200,000 years of existence it can be argued that human beings are genetically predisposed to perform certain, specific functions necessary for the survival of the tribe, and by extension the survival of humanity 44 Thus, it can be argued that those with the anxiety-seeking genes are equally as important to the survival of humanity as are those with the risk-seeking genes. If it is accepted that the personalities of people are influenced by their genetic makeup, it can be argued that there is such a thing as a "natural born leader," better able to direct the energy of people; a born politician, better able to bring about compromise; a born inventor, better able to create tools; a born hunter, better able to sense and react to the movement of prey; and a born soldier, better able to risk his life in battle and to kill other men. Individuals, no matter how great their talents, could not long live without the benefit of the combined talents of the tribe. Recall the words of Rousseau: "It is man's weakness which makes him sociable. . . . Every attachment is a sign of insufficiency." 45 Humans in tribal societies had to adapt to the various roles mandatory for continued existence of the community 46 It is, thus, reasonable to conclude, given our current understanding of the origins of humanity and civilization, that people have a genetic predisposition for certain, necessary roles in communities. It is the combined talents of the members of a community that insured the survival of the tribe. An absence of toolmakers or hunters or compromisers jeopardized the survival of the tribe. Given human nature, soldiers were absolutely essential to the survival of any grouping of human beings. Genetic factors go beyond mental disposition, preferences, and capacity for certain types of skills. Professional football and basketball players are born with the physical attributes necessary to play these sports at the highest level. People without these physical attributes, no matter how hard they try, will never be basketball players in the NBA. Individuals with "fast-twitch" muscles that allow for rapid acceleration, with high tolerance for pain, a keen sense of smell, great peripheral vision, rapid response reflexes, and other such attributes make better hunters than the majority of a population. Consider these words written in 1946, just after the end of hostilities: Another personnel situation peculiar to the ground forces arose in 1943 when it became apparent that conditions under which ground soldiers trained in this country and under which they lived and fought overseas were too demanding physically for many men. AGF [Army Ground Forces] recommended that only the most physically able inductees be assigned to ground arms in the future. The system known as the Physical Profile Plan was adopted and AGF received eighty-two per cent of its personnel allocation from the top category of physically qualified inductees. 47 Combat soldiers required considerable endurance. They need to be designed to withstand extremes of heat and cold. While the range of potential soldiers is not nearly as narrow as the range of individu- als who can play in the NFL, it is a fact that not everyone can perform well as a soldier. Nurturing in a given culture influences the production of combat soldiers. In other words, society and culture can suppress or enhance the tendencies of individuals with risk-seeking genes. Individuals with risk- seeking genes can be taught and encouraged to not take risks, "to play it safe." And individuals with risk-seeking genes can be taught and encouraged to take greater risks. In other words, individual 14 • The American Culture ofWar human beings, properly motivated, are capable to some degree of overcoming nature, just as they are able to overcome culture. However, while culture influences behavior, suppressing or enhancing certain genetic predispositions, it cannot completely override the genetic attributes of an individual. Culture can influence those who are partially qualified, pushing them one way or the other. One World War II study on "war neuroses" concluded that: The individual's personality can be fortified by training, modified by experience, weakened or strengthened by leadership. But it can never be completely changed. The reaction of the individual soldier to the situation of battle will be either normal, when he carries on his du- ties regardless of fear of discomfort, or abnormal, when he develops neurosis and became a psychiatric casualty. . . . Many of the infantrymen should never have been assigned to a combat unit. Because of emotional instability, or physical defects, they were certain to crack up in battle. Medical and administrative channels were ineffective in removing these men, largely because of scarcity of replacements. 48 It would have been more precise to write, "Largely because it was culturally unacceptable to not perform one of the major functions required of the construct of manhood in Western civilization." Lord Moran in his study, Anatomy of Courage, provided the following insight: "When an army is be- ing trained to fight it must begin by weeding out those whose character or temperament makes them incapable of fighting. Ideally such men would be rejected by a recruiting board before they became part of the Service. If that is found to be impossible the army must fall back on daily observation of the recruit during training to detect signs of instability. If both fail to expose the latent weakness of the young soldier it is left to war itself to strip the mask from the man of straw, which it will do with a quite ruthless precision of its own." 49 Charles B. MacDonald, a combat veteran of World War II and student of warfare, wrote: "It's easy to get out of combat even after you're there. Lag behind in an attack; get lost on a patrol; feign combat fatigue (they're suckers for that one); or better still, just refuse to fight. What the Articles of War can do to you isn't necessarily dying. Besides, after the war, emotions will cool and you'll get off light." 50 And, Audie Murphy, the Army's most highly decorated World War II soldier, wrote: Olsen is the first to crack up. He throws his arms around the company commander, crying hys- terically, "I can't take any more." The harassed captain tries to calm him, but Olsen will not stop bawling. So he is sent to the rear, and we watch him go with hatred in our eyes. "If I ever throw a wingding like that, shoot me," says, Kerrigan. "Gladly," I reply. "In North Africa, I thought he was one tough boy." "Yeah. He threw his weight around plenty." "He seemed to be everything the War Department was looking for. He was my idea of a real soldier . . . ." "Yeah. I'll never judge a man by his appearance again." 51 Eisenhower, while he had absorbed the American beliefs about manhood and the tenet that all men were created equal, nevertheless recognized the inequality of war: "Early in the North African campaign it became evident that the emotional stamina and spiritual strength of the individual soldier were as important in battle success as his weapon and training. Combat neuroses among the troops developed on an alarming scale as the intensity of our offensives increased." He further noted that: "In the rear, hospitals and camp facilities were necessarily set aside for those suffering from self-inflicted wounds, from hysteria and psychoneuroses and from venereal disease, sometimes, according to the doctors, deliberately contracted. 52 In the weeks and days prior to the Normandy invasion thousands of men eliminated themselves, one way or another, from the invasion force. Some individuals were psychologically injured before they entered the battlefield. Simply waiting for the Normandy invasion, the ambiguity and uncertainty, caused unsustainable fear and mental breakdowns. 53 These, however, Culture, Genes, and War • 15 are not the stories people want to hear or read about. These are not the stories that form myths and legends of nations; hence, people always have a distorted understanding of war and manhood. Killing extracts something from men of conscience. And risking one's life erodes something in men. Combined, they create a disease. It can be argued that combat causes the development of a disease, currently called posttraumatic stress disorder. In the past it was called shell shock. Few men are completely immune to the disease. Others take a long time for its effects to develop and emerge, and still others cannot tolerate exposure to battle at all. Thus, the selection process should ideally eliminate those individuals with low tolerance to the disease, either for genetic or cultural reasons. Cultural norms, however, frequently preclude individuals from acknowledging low tolerance, and individuals may not fully understand their level of intolerance until they are in battle. Such was the case with Olsen. Those who recognize their intolerance find ways to avoid serving in the armed forces, or in combat arms, or in combat. As a rule, and there are exceptions, men who do not want to serve in combat find ways to avoid it. 54 From the American Revolution to the present very few men have had to serve in combat. There have always been ways to get out of serving in the armed forces during war. And if service could not be avoided, serving in the Army or Marine Corps, where typically 80 to 90 percent of the deaths and casualties took place, could be avoided by joining the Navy or Air Force. And if service in the Army could not be avoided, then there were always means to avoid serving in combat units — most occupations in the Army are not combat related. And, if for some reason an individual wishing to avoid combat was not able to avoid serving in combat units, then once in a combat zone there were always ways to avoid fighting. Finally, once in combat, there were always ways for an individual to make himself unwanted or unavailable. The process of enculturation takes place each day of an individual's life, expanding or diminishing his or her range of possibilities. The Army and Marine Corps, to produce men with the wherewithal to defend the nation, are always engaged in a process of transculturation: "a process of cultural transformation marked by the influx of new culture elements and the loss or alteration of existing ones." 55 Consider the words of Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC: "The third thing they [the American people] believe about the Marines is that our Corps is downright good for the man- hood of our country; that the Marines are masters of a form of unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented youths into proud, self-reliant stable citizens — citizens into whose hands the nation may safely be entrusted." 56 Marine Corps culture transformed individuals, developing, enhancing, diminish- ing, and eliminating certain traits and qualities. Krulak believed that the qualities the Marine Corps brought out in men were good for the nation. Army culture, while different from Marine culture, put men through a similar process. Because culture is not static, a nation's ability to produce soldiers and marines changes at the rate of significant cultural change. War and Human Nature War is primal, a function of human nature and the human condition. War is a historical force, and arguably, a necessary force in human development. War has influenced every aspect of human life. It is said that, "war is an ugly thing," but one cannot find a nation or state that was not shaped by it. The political geography of the Earth is primarily a function of war. War is a destructive force, but it is also a creative force. War has destroyed nations, states, and empires, and reformed them. War has configured and reconfigured the borders between states. War has destroyed political and social systems and created the conditions for new systems to grow and develop. War created the conditions under which the vast majority of the peoples have lived throughout recorded history, including the city-states of ancient Greece; the Empire of Rome; the imperialist systems the British and French imposed on Africa, the Middle East, India, and Southeast Asia; the Communist system of the People's Republic 16 • The American Culture ofWar of China and the former Soviet Union; the constitutional democracies of Japan and Germany; and the American "superpower" empire. Every major political, social, and economic system on Earth has been shaped in multiple ways by war. War causes adaptation. War created the conditions for great advances in technology, including ships capable of traversing oceans, buildings capable of sustaining hurricane force winds, and vehicles capable of orbiting planets. Nuclear energy, jet and rocket propulsion systems, antibiotic drugs, the Internet, and numerous other technologies are primarily a function of war. Without war men would not traverse oceans in hours, travel in space, or microwave popcorn. War is also a social force. War turned Prussians into Germans, peasants into Frenchmen, slaves into citizens, Arabs into Palestinians, and Virginians into Americans. War formulated, defined, and structured paradigms of human behavior. Constructs such as manhood and patriotism were formed and re-formed, defined and redefined through war. War placed real value and meaning on concepts such as duty, honor, freedom, and equality. War created the myths, legends, and symbols that informed and motivated the actions of people. War is a major historical force, destroying, forming, creating, re-creating, changing, and influencing almost every facet of human life. If there is one eternal force that governs the interactions of human political bodies on Earth, it is war and the constant change it creates. All people ultimately have recourse to war, and the life of every human on Earth has been, and will continue to be, influenced by war. A long view of history, a study of war, and a cold, honest look at unchanging facets of human nature and the human condition reveal a number of facts: First, as Plato has told us, "Only the dead have seen the end of war!' War is a function of human nature and the human condition. It will come to an end only when humanity comes to an end. To be sure, Western democracies will again fight more total wars, ones which will require the active, willing sup- port and participation of the people. Democracy, capitalism, and free trade have not, and will never, eliminate war. As long as there are weak and strong, and as long as people covet, there will be war. 57 The question for each nation throughout history has not been whether there will be another war, but when war came, whether the people, their government, and their armed forces were ready to face the challenges; whether there was sufficient will, spirit, cohesion, resolve, love of country, selflessness, and trained men ready to meet the crisis; and whether there was sufficient technological achievement and production capability to sustain the nation during the period of crisis. Second, nations and states rise and fall through war. The United States became a "superpower" through war, and has retained that status because of war. And it is a fact that the United States will not always be a superpower, or even the dominant power on Earth. Like Rome and Britain, it too will ul- timately be diminished, and war will be one of the major factors that cause or influence its decline. Third, man, not the machines that men make, is the dominant weapon on the planet. The human body is the most resilient, precision weapon ever produced. The human brain, spirit, will, and ability to bond with other human beings and courageously sacrifice— even one's self— for the good of the community, are the attributes that make man the dominant weapon on Earth. Humans are the most adaptable instrument and animal on Earth. The human ability to adapt — physically, psychologically, intellectually, and emotionally— has made humanity the most successful species. And while war mo- tivates men to adapt by creating and producing tools and machines, it is man himself— not his tools or machines— that is the ultimate instrument of war. Fourth, humans are social animals who form bonds of cohesion that make war possible. Political or cultural bodies make war, which is the function of the combined effort of a people. Something— some system of beliefs, common identity, or shared culture— has to hold people together to make it possible for them to fight a war. And fifth, the very nature of war causes delusion. The destructive nature of war, the pain and suf- fering it causes, the heinous act of killing, and the emotional response to death and carnage, causes Culture, Genes, and War • 17 people on both sides of the battlefield to believe and feel they are not the aggressor but the aggrieved; causes people to project unique, dehumanizing qualities onto their enemy; and causes people to seek remedies in gods, miracle weapons, "invincible technologies," laws of war, international bodies, "undefeatable doctrines," and extraordinary men. American cultural beliefs about men and war, and faith in science and technology delude them about the true nature of war, causing them to consistently prepare to fight the wrong war and to underestimate the will, tenacity, and capabilities of people in developing nation-states. In reality, even the greatest empires, the greatest leaders, the most successful armies, the most advanced weapons, and the most effective doctrines have fallen under the weight of time through war. This book argues that the most significant transformations in the American way of war in the latter half of the twentieth century— with the exception of nuclear technology— were a function of cultural change and adaptation. 2 Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War Americans hate war. But once they are provoked to defend themselves against those who threaten their security, they mobilize with unparalleled swiftness and energy. While the battle is on there is no sacrifice of men or treasure too great for them to make. Once hostilities are over, Americans are as spontaneous and as headlong in their eagerness to return to civilian life. No people in history have been known to disengage themselves so quickly from the ways of war. This impatience is the expression of a deeply rooted national ideal to want to live at peace. But tragic experience following World War I taught us that this admirable trait could lead to catastrophe. We needed to temper and adjust the rate of the demobilization of our forces so we would be able to meet our new obligations in the world. —President Harry Truman 1 The American Revolutionary War thus became in the national memory and imagination paradigmatic of how America saved itself from being like, and part of, Europe and Europe's problems. . . . Americans, never ready for war, often surprised by it, were repeatedly brought to their knees by the first battles and campaigns. At best gallant, at worst disorganized and demor- alized, they came close to complete defeat again and again. Never, however, did they give up. And beyond the humiliation of Brooklyn and the Brandywine lay Saratoga and Yorktown — or Quebec, New Orleans, Gettysburg, Missionary Ridge, Omaha Beach, Leyte Gulf, and Inchon. The Revolutionary War told the story so that all could remember and later repeat it. -John Shy 2 Truman, Shy, and others identified significant practices of the American national strategy and doc- trines that were no longer sustainable because of the new world order created by World War II, the acceptance of United States government of new political objectives, and the invention of nuclear technology. Cultural tenets, which had sustained the nation in war for two hundred years, were no longer capable of producing the expected political outcomes. Traditional Practices No Longer Worked In the post- World War II period many students of America's wars concluded that the traditional American way of war and the cultural tenets that sustained it were no longer applicable. Historians John Shy, Russell Weigley and T R. Fehrenbach; political scientists Morris Janowitz, Samuel Huntington, 20 • The American Culture ofWar Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, and Robert Osgood; Presidents Truman and Eisenhower; and soldiers Matthew B. Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor, and William Westmoreland have all endeavored to describe and explain the traditional American way of war and identify the major tenets that were no longer valid in the post- World War II era. Their arguments were motivated by what each perceived to be a failure of the United States to adapt to this new environment. Robert E. Osgood writing in the late 1950s wrote: On the one hand, the United States has demonstrated an impressive ability to defeat the enemy. Yet, on the other hand, it has been unable to deter war; it has been unprepared to fight war; it has failed to gain the objects it fought for; and its settlements of war have not brought satisfactory peace. The blame for these failures must be shared by circumstances beyond American control; but to the extent that they were avoidable, they must be attributed not to a weakness in the basic elements of national power but to deficiency in the political management of power. And this deficiency stems . . . from the faulty habit of mind that regards war as a thing in itself rather than as a continuation of political intercourse. War as something to abolish, war as something to get over as quickly as possible, war as a means of punishing the enemy who dared to disturb the peace, war as the crusade— these conceptions are all compatible with the American outlook. But war as an instrument for attaining concrete, limited political objectives, springing from the continuing stream of international politics and flowing toward specific configurations of inter- national power— somehow this conception seems unworthy to a proud and idealistic nation. 3 Osgood recognized that the Policy of Containment called for a new national strategy: a defensive strategy, sustained readiness for war, and a willingness to fight wars short of more total war. The political objectives of the American government were to stop the spread of Communism and deter nuclear war. However, permanent readiness for war, defensive national strategy and doctrine, and fighting major limited wars went against the American culture of war. Fehrenbach in his study of the Korean War, This Kind of War, wrote: The Truman Administration accepted the limitation of the war to Korea. . . . But that Adminis- tration must have wished for Frederick's legions, his forty thousand iron grenadiers — for there was never any hope that the men of the fields and the merchants of America could continue undisturbed. In addition to restraint of objective, the second necessary ingredient of limited war is a professional army large enough to handle any task. In 1950, even to fight an undeveloped nation in Asia, America had to fall back upon her citizens. And in this, above all else, lies the resulting trauma of the Korean War. The far frontier is not defended with citizens, for citizens have better things to do than to die on some forsaken hill, in some forsaken country, for what seems to be the sake of the country 4 Much of America agreed with Fehrenbachs assessment. When the nation went to war, the cultural norms for war were reactivated: many Americans rallied around the flag, many answered the call to arms, and dormant aspects of patriotism were reactivated. However, limited war looked too much like peace, and the government's actions to limit the war nullified much of the war fervor and many of the traditional practices. Limited war caused consternation and uncertainty: Were the traditional American cultural tenets for war being reactivated, or not? Were we going to mobilize for war in accordance with cultural norms or not? Were we going to invest the lives of the nation's young men to achieve strategic victory, or settle for the status quo? Major limited wars caused the development of cultural contradictions. The cultural norms for both peace and war were active at the same time, resulting in internal pressures that threatened the war effort and domestic tranquility. However, this internal pressure was only evident during hot wars, major limited wars in which Americans were Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War • 21 fighting and dying. During the cold war the internal contradictions remained, but were for the most part dormant. The Korean War was too short to cause a complete disruption of cultural norms for fighting war; however, the pressure against this new form of limited war increased during every year of fighting. Fehrenbach believed that the citizen-soldier Army was organized to defend America, not Korea or Vietnam, and that in more total war where the nation's security was directly threatened, the citi- zen-soldier Army was the correct instrument because a national effort was required. However, in more limited, defensive wars, on the "frontier," a professional Army was required. As Truman noted, Americans "hate war." The reason for this is that above all else they value the lives of the men who have to fight the war, and historically war has been an aberration. In limited war, Americans found it hard to justify the return on their investment. The direct relationship between national security and the sacrifices required in war were not evident. Truman, Shy, Osgood, Fehrenbach, and others argued that the traditional American approach to war was no longer applicable to the post- World War II environment, and that the failure to recognize and respond to the new environment was damaging America internationally and domestically. The United States was not only failing to achieve its political objectives, but in two limited wars it was creating significant divisions in the country. What was the traditional American way of war? As noted above, others have answered this question, and there is considerable consistency in their views. No effort is made here to re-create their work, but rather to develop a synthesis of these assessments. Geography, history, cultural heritage, and long-held national political objectives influenced the American conduct of war. American values, beliefs, and ethics, and philosophies of government, war, and progress, are, at least in part, an inheritance from European ancestors that have been reshaped by the experience of conquering the American continent. Westward expansion and political objectives also influenced American thinking about the conduct of war. Until World War II, the United States maintained remarkable consistency in its political objectives. These were, in part, continental sover- eignty; expansion and incorporation of the West (Manifest Destiny); prosperity, economic growth, acquisition, and trade (capitalism); security in the Americas (the Monroe Doctrine); and "the pursuit of happiness" through peace, freedom, and equality. Americans were isolationists, and armed forces were a necessary evil to be minimized to the extent possible. Two great oceans and the limitation of technology protected the United States. Because America has traditionally been unprepared for war, lacking a large body of professionally trained soldiers, it has depended on citizen-soldiers, its small, professionally trained officer corps, its wealth of resources, and its ability to improvise, adapt, and manage affairs in a crisis environment — "American ingenuity." At the outbreak of war, national strategy required a period of crisis mobilization. Mass armies were assembled from the civilian population. The U.S. Army has traditionally been a citizen-soldier Army, meaning that not only the militia or National Guard and Reserves, but also the regular Army was rapidly assembled from volunteers and draftees. As late as 1957, an Army colonel in a memorandum to the Chief of the Officer Assignment Division wrote: Since the Revolutionary War, the national defense policy of the United States has been one which calls for a small standing Regular Army as a continuous force in peace which in time of national emergency could be augmented by a large militia of citizen soldiers. The size and strength of the Regular Army Establishment is not a constant nor has it been so affixed. The Regular Army is charged, with keeping abreast of the changing concepts of war during times of peace; it forms the nucleus of the larger citizen Army in time of war. 22 • The American Culture ofWar The Reserve Force are Federal forces composed of officers and enlisted men, organized, trained, and employed by the United States Army. The role and purpose of the Reserve as announced in Section 262, Chapter II, Title 10 provides for trained units and qualified persons to be available in time of war or national emergency. The law envisions the supplementary and temporary role (on active duty) of Reserve units and personnel. 5 At the political and strategic levels, Americans have traditionally believed the following regarding the conduct of more total wars: The United States is a unique nation-state, unbound by the rules that govern other nations. War is serious business and ought not to be entered into lightly 6 Major wars are a national endeavor involving the resources of the nation. Wars ought to be conducted in a professional, expeditious, and unrelenting manner to bring them to quick and successful conclusions. War ought to be strategically and doctrinally offensive, and short. The aim of war ought to be the destruction of the enemy's main Army followed by the occupation of the country; and finally, the transformation of the defeated nation politically, economically, socially, and ultimately culturally. The objective fol- lowing a war is to change the defeated state to one that more closely resembles the United States — a capitalist democracy. Americans believe that war is fighting, that fighting ought to commence as soon as possible following the outbreak of war, and proceed continuously and aggressively until victory is achieved. Americans optimistically believe that when fully mobilized there is nothing that cannot be achieved. Americans believe that fighting ought to produce demonstrable progress and ultimately, decisive results. Compromise solutions are un-American, and do not justify the human cost of war or achieve the nation's political objectives, which tend to be more absolute. Americans believe that the exigencies of battle ought to dictate the course and conduct of war, and that political matters should not impede the efficient use of force and the expeditious prosecution of war. This is the only way to immediately minimize the loss of life. Americans believe in equality of sacrifice, that the burden of war ought to be fairly distributed among the male population. They believe that the nation's human capital is its most precious resource, and that while Americans are fighting and dying, no other re- source should be spared to bring the war to a rapid, successful conclusion. Americans thus endeavor to fight highly organized, systematic, material, and technology based wars. Americans believe that war is an aberration that upsets the American tenet that man is not a means to an end, but the end — "the pursuit of happiness." Americans believe in acting unilaterally and aggressively in the international environment. They believe that nations, like individuals, are responsible for their own status in life, and that nations and men ought to be judged on their accomplishments and failures. Americans believe a state of sustained warfare is un-American — potentially damaging to American democracy. Americans do not accept defeat. They increase effort, employ more resources, improvise, adapt, or seek new solutions. 7 While no description of a nation's practice of war is complete, these are major tenets that have traditionally influenced American thinking about the conduct of war. Osgood, Fehrenbach, Shy, and others recognized that during the nation's first limited war in its new role as superpower, the traditional American way of war was no longer valid. Something new was needed. The Culture of Equality of Sacrifice Certain cultural tenets are held with greater strength than were others. When strongly held cultural tenets conflict they create internal pressure for change. When cultural tenets no longer achieve the desired results they generate strong pressure for change. The tenet that all men were equal, that all were capable of achieving at the same level, that all could be President, that no matter who you were "the line forms at the rear" has been a staple of American culture. 8 Eisenhower in his inaugural address emphasized the importance of the tenet of "equality": Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War • 23 At such a time in history, we who are free, must proclaim anew our faith. This faith is the abiding creed of our fathers. It is our faith in the deathless dignity of man, governed by eternal moral and natural laws. This faith defines our full view of life. It establishes, beyond debate, those gifts of the Creator that are man's inalienable rights, and that make all men equal in His sight. In the light of this equality we know that the virtues most cherished by free people — love of truth, pride of work, devotion to country— all are treasures equally precious in the lives of the most humble and of the most exalted. The men who mine coal and fire furnaces and balance ledgers and turn lathes and pick cotton and heal the sick and plant corn — all serve as proudly and as profitably for America as the statesmen who draft treaties or the legislators who enact laws. This faith rules our whole way of life. 9 This tenet of equality has been a strong force in American life. It was necessary to transform Anglo- Saxons, Germans, French, Italians, Poles, Russians, and other European ethnic groups, which have historically warred with one another, into Americans and "white people"— the melting pot thesis. The tenet of equality was necessary to produce a culturally homogeneous national identity. The tenet also gave the nation an ideal toward which to strive. Over time outside ethnic groups, such as the Irish, Jews, and Poles, were incorporated into the main political body of the United States. 10 The tenet of equality was extended to all facets of American life, even the battlefield. While Americans believed strongly in equality of opportunity, including equality of opportunity to fight and possibly die in war, they did not believe in equality of outcome. In Americas competitive capitalist economy there were winners and losers. Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, in their book, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy, wrote: "As the data show, most Americans strongly — even overwhelmingly — support the notion that everyone should have the same chance to get ahead,' but they are uniformly negative toward suggestions that everyone must end up with the same economic rewards. Indeed, the distinction between equal opportunity and equality of outcomes could scarcely be drawn more sharply than it is in these data." 11 In reference to the statement: "Everyone in America should have equal opportunities to get ahead" public opinion polls showed that 98 percent of Americans "Agree" and 2 percent "Disagree." Opinion polls, to some degree, are distorted by the desire of people to demonstrate their acceptance of values and beliefs in vogue at a given period of time — "political correctness"— or their acceptance of some perceived universal truth that has not been practiced universally. 12 Nevertheless, the overwhelming affirmation of this cultural tenet, plus the historical context, supports the conclusion that Americans strongly supported the concept of equality. American beliefs about equality were deeply integrated into beliefs about the nation's conduct of war. The American military experience and tradition created tenets about manhood, military service, and war. These tenets are part of American culture and influence the ability of the nation to produce combat soldiers. Cultural tenets do not have to be objectively accurate. They can be based, at least in part, on myths and legends. The tenet that all American men could perform equally well on the battlefield was born during the formative period of the nation, the colonial and revolutionary period, and reinforced during the War of 1812, when Andrew Jackson developed his "gifted amateur" thesis, which held that American militia men, while poorly trained in the conduct of war, were better soldiers than British regulars. This tenet ever since has informed American thinking about the conduct of war. During the colonial and revolutionary periods the nation relied on militiamen to fight Indians, maintain internal security, and fight the French and British regulars. Militiamen frequently failed the test of battle, angering men such as George Washington, who wrote: "Militia, you will find, Sir, will never answer your expectations, no dependence is to be placed upon them; They are obstinate and perverse, they are often egged on by the Officers, who lead them to acts of disobedience, and when they are ordered to certain posts 24 • The American Culture ofWar for the security of stores, or the protection of the Inhabitants, will, on a sudden, resolve to leave them, and the united vigilance of their officers can not prevent them." 13 Washington's contempt for the militia may have caused him to overstate the case. Regulars too failed in battle; however, because of self-selection, a more rigorous elimination process, and better training, regulars consistently performed at a higher level of proficiency. Alexander Hamilton expressed views similar to those of Washington. Hamilton fought with George Washington at Long Island, White Plains, Trenton, and Princeton. He wrote: Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and would at all times be equal to the national defence. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence. . . . The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in course of the later war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however, great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice. 14 Nevertheless, the myth that militia won the revolution, defeating British regulars was forever embedded in American history and legend, creating the cultural tenet that all American men could serve in combat with relatively equal levels of performance. In the War of 1812, the militia was again called upon, and again in many cases they failed the test of war, but in victory only successful battles dominated the minds of Americans. Russell F. Weigley noted that: In military affairs, not Chippewa and Lundy's Lane [battles won by the regular Army] but An- drew Jackson's victory at New Orleans came to symbolize the new egalitarian attitudes. New Orleans was interpreted as a triumph of the natural American— strong precisely because he was unschooled and therefore natural— over the trained and disciplined but therefore artificial and effete European. "Their system, it is true," said one congressman of the heroes of New Orleans, "is not to be found in Vauban's, Steuben's or Scott's military tactics, but it nevertheless proved to be quite effective." Jackson himself viewed his victory in a similar light: "Reasoning always from false principles, [the British] expected little opposition from men whose officers even were not in uniform, who were ignorant of the rules of dress, and who had never been caned into discipline. Fatal mistake! A fire incessantly kept up, directed with calmness and unerring aim, strewed the field with the brave officers and men of the column, which slowly advanced, according to the most approved rules of European tactics, and was cut down by the untutored courage of the American militia." 15 During the formative period of the nation the belief that all American men could perform effectively in combat was enshrined in history and culture. A second tenet grew out of this one: If all American men fight with equal effectiveness in combat, then there was no need to maintain a large standing, professional Army, which was expensive and considered a threat to the republic. Washington, Ham- ilton, and other military leaders recognized the fallacy of these tenets. Writing a century later Emory Upton, a Civil War General and military theorist, restated their concerns: Our military policy, or, as many would affirm, our want of it, had now been tested during more than a century. It has been tried in foreign, domestic, and Indian wars, and while military Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War • 25 men, from painful experience, are united as to its defects and dangers, our final success in each conflict has so blinded the popular mind, as to induce the belief that as a nation we are invincible. . . . History records our triumph in the Revolution, in the War of 1812, in the Florida War, in the Mexican War, and in the Great Rebellion, and as nearly all of these wars were largely begun by militia and volunteers, the conviction has been produced that with us a regular Army is not a necessity. 16 This conviction was also prevalent in World War II. Consider the words published in Infantry Journal in 19 '46: Army Ground Forces found him a civilian— a clerk, a mechanic, a student — and turned him out a better fighting man than the professional Nazi or the fanatical Japanese. The American ground soldier was rushed to a maturity for which he had not planned or even dreamed. Yet, so strong were his native hardihood, his resourcefulness, his competitive spirit— and so skillfully were these American traits fostered and fashioned by Ground Forces leaders— that he conquered, on the ground, face to face and weapon to weapon, those Axis warriors whose military upbringing had been foreseen and unhurried. 17 While this sort of proclamation was good for the national ego and morale, it devalued the relatively small percentage of combat soldiers and marines who were in fact self-selected, and were ultimately the product of an elimination process that started before they entered the Army or Marine Corps and continued to the first battle. Americans grew to maturity believing that the average American man could do the job of fighting the nations wars. As a consequence of these beliefs, combat soldiers as a whole have been historically undervalued. In the American mind, if every man could perform this task there was no need to maintain professional forces or a large standing Army. However, this was a myth. The myth survived because it was rarely tested against significant states. The myth survived because of two great oceans and an absence of powerful states in the Americas. The Germans, French, and Russians have a much better understanding of the value of well-trained and equipped combat divi- sions. Hitler and Stalin understood better than Churchill and Roosevelt the relationship between the security of the nation-state and the quality and quantity of the divisions that guaranteed it. In World War II, by every measure, the Eastern Front was the major theater of war. For the Americans and British, the relationship between soldiers and security was indirect. Naval forces, and later air forces, protected their homelands. For the French, Germans, and Russians, the relationship was direct and nothing was more important to the continued existence of the state than were strong ground combat forces. In the post- World War II era, America's empire stretched across the two great oceans, radi- cally changing the security requirements of the United States. As the Korean War demonstrated, the continued existence of South Korea was directly related to the quality and quantity of divisions the United States could immediately put into battle. If it were not for the four Infantry Divisions of the Eighth U.S. Army, South Korea would not exist today. In the formative years of the nation, when brave souls crossed the Atlantic to get to the new world, it may well have been that colonial America possessed a high percentage of men and women with the risk- seeking genes, and that the ambient environment influenced culture in such a way as to maxi- mize the enculturation of men capable of performing as combat soldiers. Still, combat soldiers have never been as plentiful as American history and culture has caused Americans to believe. Culturally, a professional, or large-standing Army is considered un-American. Culturally, all American men are capable of fighting a war. These cultural tenets are false, and based on a misreading of history. Thus, culturally, Americans have undervalued the country's combat soldiers, and failed to understand their significance in war. 26 • The American Culture ofWar The cultural tenets that "all American men serve equally well in combat" and "equality of sacrifice" served the nation well in more total wars. For example, in World War II this tenet made it possible for the Selective Service System to function efficiently, producing 6.7 million ground force soldiers, from which hundreds of thousands of combat soldiers were culled. 18 Consider the analysis of Weigley: By 30 June 1945, the American armed forces numbered 12,123,455, and the Army 8,267,958 [including the AAF] . But the ground combat power of the Army resided primarily in the ap- proximately 5,000 combat riflemen per infantry division, along with similar numbers for the cutting edge of the sixteen armored divisions. Out of a population of 132,699,275 residing in the continental United States in 1940, only about 5,000 men in each of eighty-nine Army divi- sions, 445,000 men, carried the principal weight of the Army's ground combat strength at any one time, at a maximum. The country's military leadership had acquiesced in an extraordinary disproportion between the American population at large and the segment of it that had to do much of the hardest fighting. 19 Draft age men numbered 27,139,138 among the population in 1940. Thus, at any given time during one of the most total wars in American history, less than 2 percent of the draft age male population was engaged in combat, and this includes the six Marine Corps divisions. The reality was quite different from the cultural tenet and myth. All men cannot serve as combat soldiers. 20 And when war actually came and the prospect of being drafted loomed large, most men recognized this and avoided service, or avoided service in the Army and Marine Corps where the vast majority of casualties were sustained, or avoided service in a war zone, or avoided service in combat arms — infantry, armor, artillery, and combat engineers. During World War II, and every war since, a large number of the enlisted men who served in the Air Force and Navy volunteered to do so to avoid being drafted into the Army. Those individuals who did not avoid combat service but who were unfit to serve were soon eliminated. Within the U.S. Army and Marine Corps at all times there has been a secret. It is that men who are believed to be unfit for combat arms are eliminated on a regular basis. No sergeant or officer with average intelligence who has trained soldiers for war for more than six months believes that all men are created equal. The ability to observe men in difficult, strenuous circumstances over long periods of time rapidly destroys this myth. While the Army and Marine Corps cannot re-create the conditions of combat, which vary in each war, they are experts at pushing men to their limits in training to reveal many of the qualities, or lack thereof, of these individuals. The elimination of soldiers from combat arms was and is routine. The administrative means of elimination were long ago established and in- stitutionalized. The system for producing combat soldiers from the point of entry into service to the battlefield was and is a constant process of weeding out. The weeding process starts at the basic level with sergeants making the initial call for elimination or transfer to a more civilianlike occupational skill. This process was, for the most part, not spoken of outside the combat arms system, embarrassing no one and maintaining the American myth. Even in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the nation and Army were desperate to find and draft men, no matter what their intelligence, to send to Vietnam, the Army recognized that some men were "untrainable," and eliminated them. Still, men were America's most valued resource. Americans were willing to expend all other re- sources in a prolific manner, technological and material, to reduce the human cost of war. And the cultural tenet that all Americans could perform equally well on the battlefield worked to produce the mass armies required for more total wars. In the immediate post- World War II period there seemed to be no reason to change these long held tenets of the American way of war. The Culture of Inequality of Outcome Because soldiering was considered an innate ability of all American men, those who served in the Army during peacetime were considered losers, individuals incapable of succeeding in America's com- Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War • 27 petitive capitalist economy. This tenet was part and parcel of the belief that all American men could perform adequately as soldiers. In 1946, an American veteran of World War II, Warren P. Munsell, Jr., in an apt description of human nature and American attitudes, wrote: "Wars, born when man was created, exist while he exists. Even in the few moments of universal peace men plan and fashion new implements for future wars. Such were the days anteceding the globe's most recent holocaust, days when the Army was infinitesimal, when men in uniform were still thought of as guys who couldn't get a job anywhere else, when the infantry wore leggings and campaign hats — and the National Guard was a lark for men who liked to play at soldiering a couple of nights a week." 21 In 1952, the Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace Jr., in a lecture entitled, "Public Service, Present and Future" on the values of military service, particularly serving as an Army officer, given to an audience of students at Princeton University, delineated "a number of misconceptions about govern- ment service": Another misconception is that government offers fine careers for the incompetent. I suggest that it will be an eye-opening experience for those who still believe this to examine the caliber of the young men entering Federal, state, and local governments today. . . . Yet a third misconception is that government experience is a non-transferable commodity. This is patently false. The opportunity to deal with broad problems makes the man in government often invaluable to business and industry. And the final misconception has to do with loyalty and moral and ethical integrity. No matter what some sensational headlines of the day may say, the overwhelming majority of those who work in government are scrupulously honest, hard-working, loyal and normal men and women who come from every walk of life . . . . 22 Pace went on to make the case for service as an Army officer; however, he had a tough sell. The nation was in the midst of the Korean War, and the American people were growing increasing dis- satisfied with its conduct. Nevertheless, after almost two hundred years of history, the culturally held beliefs inculcated in the formative years of the nation were still in effect. In 1954, a U.S. Navy commander, D. J. Carrison, published an article titled, "Our Vanishing Military Profession," in which he argued: "Our military leaders should fight the unwise developments of present law, which encourage employers and educators to conduct rigorous campaigns to obtain exemptions or deferments for young men who aspire to a college education. A career labeled 'unworthy of superior talent' by a large influential segment of our country's leaders gives impressionable young men the idea that a commission in the Armed Forces is not a privilege but an admission of inability to face civilian competition in industry'' 1 ^ Carrison identified a set of cultural tenets that devalued military service, and resulted in policies that had significant consequences for the Army and nation. In peacetime, military service was not considered a promising career for talented young men with other options. In more total war, it was expected that all would serve when called upon. And while Americans in the 1950s came to respect and value the service and professionalism of the highly skilled Air Force and Navy pilots, Army ground combat forces occupied a particularly loathsome place. In limited war, only a small fraction of the manpower of the nation was required. Who would sacrifice? How would they be selected? Could the nation justify committing this individual, but not that individual? Could the nation justify committing its men, but not employing the full resources of the nation to bring the war to a swift and victorious conclusion? How was the nation to reconcile its tenet of equality, while committing some men literally to death and others to college campuses? What did such practices say about American nationalism, about American democracy, about the American people? What was fair? While the system for selecting and recruiting soldiers for war has never been completely fair and unbiased, it was close enough to the American expectation of equality to function with the support of the people. In limited war the inequities of the system went against the tenet of 28 • The American Culture ofWar equality, and were too obvious to ignore. Limited war created significant cultural contradictions for Americans. In limited war, which looked a lot like peace to the vast majority of Americans, the tenet of "equal- ity of sacrifice" conflicted with the tenets of "inequality of outcome" and "military service is for the least talented." In more total war the latter tenets were almost completely supplanted by the former tenet. But in limited war it became permissible for those considered to be the privileged, the talented, or the educated to avoid war by any legal means available without too much public outrage, feelings of guilt, or opprobrium. In fact, in the view of some Americans , those individuals who were able to avoid serving in a limited war, particularly Vietnam, quietly considered themselves smarter and bet- ter than those who served. 24 The cultural tenet that the talented did not serve in the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, while not the dominant tenet in all "clusters," was the dominant tenet in the United States, and while it was un-American to avoid war when called upon to fight, it was acceptable to engage in means of avoidance during limited war. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Army leadership not only expressed concern for the state of readi- ness of the Army, but also for the willingness of the American people to accept the new duties that went along with the new responsibilities of American foreign policies, and their willingness to meet the new threat presented by international Communism and Soviet expansion. Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, who commanded the 9th Infantry Division ("Old Reliable") in North Africa, Sicily, and the Normandy invasion during World War II, in an address to the Rhode Island Legislature in February 1950, expressed his concerns: Of all the instruments of policy, the United States has consistently had the least understanding of the use of armed strength. In a world where military power plays a bigger role than ever before, this Nation dare not remain on its habitual course of blindness toward the fact that, like it or not, force is the final authority of policy. . . . But how many Americans see in it an urgent demand for personal action . . . ? We still tend to seek an easy out for this military part of our obligation to humanity. . . . National policy on military matters can rise no higher than its source, and that source is the people. . . . At this early stage in allied defense planning there is one fact [for] which there is universal agreement. It is that the combined land forces of the Allies, including the United States, are far from sufficient. In air and sea power the Allies are relatively well off. On the ground they are definitely inferior. . . . The dominant military forces in Europe today are the armies of the Com- munist nations. ... As a nation, we are the greatest single force for peace in the world today. Our greatest danger will lie in any inclination to forget or dodge the responsibilities which are ours. If the philosophy of the people does not include a spirited and realistic military attitude, then there is little hope that we can live up to our obligations. 25 Eddy and other Army leaders believed the power of the United States to resist the flow of Com- munism rested primarily on the will of the American people, not simply with technology, the nation's material wealth, or even the size of the Army. This was a common theme for Army leaders during the early years of the cold war. The abstract nature of the cold war and the indirect nature of the Com- munist threat placed a new equation for the use of military force before the American people, who were accustomed to overt, blatant acts of aggression that demonstrated the need for mobilization for war. In both Korea and Vietnam, because of the indirect nature of the threat, it was difficult for the government to make the case for war and the sacrifices it required to the American people. Histori- cally, the citizen-soldier Army had been employed to secure America. Sustained readiness for war was un-American, and while it was easy to develop and construct new technologies— behavior that did not disturb the American way of life— conscription and a large, standing Army during peace were difficult to explain and justify, and culturally difficult for Americans to accept. Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War • 29 Without the willing support of the people, the Selective Service System could not function efficiently. In the latter half of the twentieth century, because of nuclear weapons, limited war became the only form of war between the major power blocs. The tenets that produced soldiers and combat soldiers in more total wars failed to function in limited war. In other words, with the birth of the atomic bomb and limited war came the slow erosion of the efficacy of the American tenets of war: manhood and equality of sacrifice. The tenets remained, but they functioned very differently in limited war. The peacetime tenet that war was for the least talented was invoked in limited war, but the American cul- tural tenet of equality of sacrifice in war conflicted with it. Many Americans strongly opposed the draft in limited war. They opposed it in peace also, but in limited war, the opposition became louder and more virulent. More total war resolved this conflict. But in limited war, the conflict was unresolved, causing distortions in the Selective Service System, erosion of support for the war, and impediments to the maintenance of efficient personnel systems to fight the war. This cultural conflict, however, was resolved in 1973 when the draft was ended and a professional Army was instituted. The Culture of Wealth and Consumption A student of the Roman way of war, Flavius Vegetius Renatus, writing during the last days of the empire wrote: "The chief strength of our armies, then, should be recruited from the country. For it is certain that the less a man is acquainted with the sweets of life, the less reason he has to be afraid of death." 26 Perhaps a more accurate assessment of human nature is that the less a man has, the greater the benefits of military service. The martial spirit is easier to implant in those individuals who are more poorly educated because they have a limited vision of the world and fewer options. Men who toil in fields or labor in industry are physically and psychologically more adaptable to the toils of war. And, the poverty of one's social and physical condition is more easily transferred to the poverty of the battlefield. In 1953, a British officer described the Chinese soldier: The vast majority of Chinese Communist soldiers are simple and illiterate peasants who all their lives have been faced with the problem of how to obtain enough food to keep alive. Therefore, when a man joins the army he is already physically tough and used to a life of hardship and poverty. Conscription in the Chinese People's Volunteers is for an indefinite period. . . . Since the majority of Chinese soldiers are illiterate, at times they are inclined to be very stupid and generally lack initiative, except in such things as field craft and improvisations, when their ani- mal instincts are of use. . . . Because of his hard upbringing, the Chinese soldier appears to be immune to the discomforts and privation of war, and he does not expect the normal amenities of life. Without being a complete fanatic, he is generally very brave, and does not reveal any fear of death. Because he is used to authority, and submits easily to discipline, he soon becomes a good soldier, and an opponent who on no account should be underrated. 27 A student of the U.S. Army in the Korean War observed: [N]o army can change entirely— either for better or for worse— the civilians to whom it issues uniforms, supplies, and rifles. As a man has lived as a civilian so can he be expected to fight as a soldier. Americans in Korea displayed prodigious reliance on the use of firepower; they became unduly concerned with putting in their time and getting out; they grew accustomed to fighting on a level of physical luxury probably unparalleled in world history to that time. In stark contrast to the American reverence for the programs of "R&R" (rest and recuperation) and the "Big R" (rotation back to the US), Chinese Communist soldiers fought— much as they had lived— with little hope of leaving the frontline until the war ended or until they became casualties. Whether the US can maintain the requisite balance between a liberal society which is the master of its armed 30 • The American Culture ofWar force and a professional soldiery which is free to preserve the military ethic is the vital question to which the American way of war in Korea offers limited but significant testimony. 1 * The affluence of much of modern America is diametrically opposed to the destitute conditions of the battlefield. Two of the things that make life most precious are the expectations from life and the finality of death. War at the edge of the battlefield where the killing takes place is ultimately a selfless endeavor. The culture of wealth, which emphasizes selfishness, is diametrically opposed to the culture of soldiers, which requires selflessness. Success in modern America's competitive, capitalist society is ultimately a selfish endeavor. Self-interest is the bedrock of capitalism. Many argue that greed is good for the economy, and hence, good for America. But, without individuals willing to act selflessly nations cannot provide for their defense. Thus, cultural tenets conflict, and it is the most significant cultural learning and the prevalent conditions that determine how those conflicts are resolved. The dominant message, while conflicting with other messages, produces certain types of individuals. The character and quality of enculturation influences the ability of a people to produce individuals with the wherewithal to act selflessly and serve during war. Wealth and the pursuit of wealth has been the dominant force in American life, directly influencing everything Americans think and believe. Consumption is necessary for human existence— food, clothing, and shelter. Consumption is a self- centered activity. America's wealth produced levels of consumption by the populace known to only a very few throughout human history. Such levels of consumption necessarily influenced culture. The American economy and marketing practices in the latter half of the twentieth century developed to produce a society in which from birth to death, people are told to consume. Americans devote a great deal of their time and energy to the self-centered endeavor of consumption, which informs people that life is about them. No people in the history of the world have been marketed to as Americans have. In the 1950s, television entered American homes. By the end of 1952, there were 19 million TV sets marketing to Americans. Two years later television was the largest advertising medium in the country, and as David Halberstam noted: "Ten years later television had begun to alter the political and social fabric of the country, with stunning consequences? 1 ' 1 Consumption influences every aspect of American life, including the ability of the nation to produce combat soldiers. Consider the words of Robert E. Osgood: Quite aside from the moral odium of war, the fear of violence and the revulsion from warfare are bound to be strong among a people who have grown as fond of social order and material well-being as Americans. War upsets the whole scale of social priorities of an individualistic and materialistic scheme of life, so that the daily round of getting and spending is subordinate to the collective welfare of the nation in a hundred grievous ways— from taxation to death. This ac- counts for an emotional aversion to war, springing from essentially self-interest motives, which is quite as compelling as the moral aversion to war. And, like the moral aversion, it tends to put a premium upon military considerations at the expense of limited political objectives in the conduct of war. 30 These words were written in the 1950s. Since that time the pace of getting and spending has greatly intensified. Americans define themselves through wealth. During the cold war, wealth was one of the primary indices Americans used to explain the difference between their democratic capitalist system and the Communist system. In 1953, Assistant Secretary of Defense, John A. Hannah lamented: "Yet ask the average person to define the struggle— the dominant fact shaping his life today— and he is likely to explain it in terms of denial of freedom of religious worship behind the Iron Curtain contrasted with the civil and religious freedoms enjoyed here. But the most common definition will emphasize, 'We're better off here. We have finer homes, clothes, food, labor saving devices, television, Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War • 31 automobiles, and so forth.'" 31 Hannah concluded that: "unless the majority of our citizens hold firmly certain fundamental convictions, there is no assurance that this Nation can continue the way of life which we calmly take for granted." American affluence grew considerably during the fifties. The value of each American life in terms of dollars grew enormously, exceeding that of all other people on Earth. Home, automobile, and television ownership increased. The interstate highway system and commercial airline system made Americans more mobile than any other society in history. Individual freedoms, freedom from needs, and the freedom of time gave Americans a standard of living new to mankind. American expectations from life grew as the state prospered, and the definition of the "good life" changed. Eisenhower noted: In 1953 we had seen the end of the Korean War. In 1954 we had won out over the economic hazard of a recession. With these problems behind us, we in the United States entered a new era of unprecedented peace and unprecedented prosperity. The slogan "Peace, Progress, and Prosperity," which was applied to the first-term years and was used in the campaign of 1956, perhaps seemed platitudinous. But compared with any years of the two preceding decades, these surely must have seemed miraculous to most Americans. Not in the lifetime of millions of our citizens — children, adolescents, and men and women entering adult life— had we previously had peace, progress, and prosperity all at one time. 32 Wealth created new cultural tenets, and those required to produce this miraculous peace, progress, and prosperity conflicted with cultural tenets required to produce soldiers for war, facilitating the transformation in American thinking about the conduct of war. Wealth in America created impor- tance and privilege, which in many affluent clusters diminished the sense of duty to the state, and the willingness and ability to perform the labors of soldiers. Those clusters with less wealth aspired for and aggressively sought the importance and privileges of those with wealth. 33 Families changed. The number of children per family declined. More children meant less wealth and less time. Arguably, in the latter half of the twentieth century more and more Americans became too "important" to fight war, particularly limited war. When measured against the lifetime earning potential of a North Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, or Iraqi soldier, the American life was worth many times more. While certain affluent clusters continued their traditional roles, other clusters scrupulously avoided service. In the American pecking order, the lives of some citizens were valued more highly than were those of others. This was an aspect of American life that was not publicly acknowledged; nevertheless, it was, and is, a fact. 34 Eisenhower further explained the transformation in American life: "One dramatic feature of the expanding middle class was the increase in the number of white-collar workers and professional people. Widespread schooling, increasing domestic and international travel . . . and reasonable prosperity had helped turn people away from becoming laborers, while technology was making many unskilled and semiskilled jobs obsolete. More and more people were working in 'services,' because more and more people could afford to pay others to do work for them— from shining shoes to surgery." This analysis cannot be directly applied to the conduct of war. However, the physical aspects of work: getting dirty, the use of muscles, the tolerance for physical discomfort, the stamina and endurance required for manual labor, and the psychological disposition of laborers were all practices that better prepared a man to become a soldier than did the paper-pushing practices performed by sedentary white-collar workers who spent their days employing only their brains, and in a narrow capacity. With each subsequent decade of the latter half of the twentieth-century the American people became physically and psychologically less capable of fighting wars. In the 1990s, ROTC departments around the country complained that new recruits couldn't run a half-mile. New physical training programs were initiated to get potential cadets up to the minimal physical condition required for service, a standard 32 • The American Culture ofWar that was far below that required in U.S. Army infantry units. Recruiters had the same problem. Too many Americans were too overweight to qualify for service. In 2002 most Americans, 64 percent, were overweight or obese. 35 The percentage of the American population capable of becoming combat soldiers was considerably lower in 2005 than in 1945. Consider the reflections of General Clark: For our high standards of living and our glorious systems of political freedom permits us the luxury of spoiling our children, or protecting them from hard knocks which children in other countries accept as inevitable. . . . [B]y devoting our every effort to making things comfortable and easy for them, we make it that much tougher when they have to fight these Communists who are inured to hardship and privation from birth. . . . The Army has to take youngsters out of these protected homes and make them tough in a short time, tough in the sense that the Com- munist soldier is tough. I remember a woman once wrote me that she hoped I would make a man of her son, who had just entered the Army, that I would develop his character. I replied to her that I would do my best, that I was sure that military service would help him, but that she should realize that we would have him for eighteen months and she had had him for eighteen years. I added that the job of developing character in our youth was primarily the responsibility of the home, the churches and the schools. 36 The Culture of Science and Technology From World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom the preferred American approach to war has been to substitute technology for manpower. Consider the words published in Infantry Journal in 1945: What the Infantryman has done in this war— what he has had to do, and done— has come as a development, unexpected not only by most of the American people, but also by some of our commanders. The people thought, back in 1940, 1941 and 1942, that there could be no need of a "mass Army." They believed that men in planes and men in tanks could do practically all the hard combat work there would be to do. Back of this belief was the hope that we could win without great cost, that American sons and husbands could fight from within machines with far more safety than they could by fighting on the open fields of battle. And there were com- manders, too, who believed at first that men in machines could handle the heaviest parts of the task. But by 1944 it was clear to all that the Infantryman would have to be there in the center of battle, in large numbers, taking the worst of it as he fought. . . . 37 These words were as applicable in 2003 as they were in 1944. The United States Army ran out of infantrymen in both years, and as a result the cost in lives was higher than it needed to be, and the outcome of the conflict was seriously jeopardized. The unnamed author of this piece concluded with a question that can now be answered: "Once again, the men of the Army are wondering whether the nation will this time, the seventh time, realize the vital and continuing need for the ablest military leaders, for the same flexible yet indomitable type of mind and spirit that has been able to go forward with utmost energy, speed and expansion, physical and intellectual, to win the war just finished." 38 A mere five years later as the U.S. Army deployed to fight the Korean War, it was evident that the nation had again failed to maintain adequate ground fighting forces, had again endeavored to substitute tech- nology for manpower, and had again suffered near defeat for want of trained infantry. When it comes to war the American cultural preference for technological solutions dwarfs all other cultural tenets; and the outcomes of the battles and campaigns have had little or no influence on that preference. The American culture of science and technology can be traced back to the formative years of the United States, and is closely link to the cultures of equality and wealth. A student of American culture and history, Alexis de Tocqueville, in his 1835 work, Democracy in America, wrote: Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War • 33 Equality begets in man the desire of judging of everything for himself; it gives him in all things a taste for the tangible and the real, contempt for tradition and for forms. ... To minds thus predisposed, every new method that leads by a shorter road to wealth, every machine that spares labor, every instrument that diminishes the cost of production, every discovery that facilitates pleasures or augments them, seems to be the grandest effort of the human intellect. It is chiefly from these motives that a democratic people addicts itself to scientific pursuits, that it understands and respects them. . . . You may be sure that the more democratic, enlightened, and free a nation is, the greater will be the number of these interested promoters of scientific genius and the more will discoveries immediately applicable to productive industry confer on their authors gain, fame, and even power. 39 The cultures of equality and wealth made possible the American addiction for advanced technolo- gies and for the biggest and most scientifically sophisticated weapon systems. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States had outspent all other states on Earth in search of the most advanced technologies for war. Americans expend hundreds of billions of dollars to replace the most advanced system on the planet with another system only slightly more advanced. Americans expend hundreds of billions of dollars on systems that don't work. Why? Science and technology held out the promise that they could be used to alleviate all human suffering, to make all men and women equal, to create a paradise where no individual wanted, needed, or suffered anything. Americans embraced this promise with a fervor equaled by no other people on Earth. Consider the words of Hugo Meier, a student of the history of technology, "Evident in the early years of the republic, this association [be- tween democracy and progress in applied science] came to emphasize the special role of technology in providing the physical means of achieving democratic objectives of political, social, and economic equality, and it placed science and invention at the very center of the age's faith in progress." 40 During World War II the pace of scientific research and technological development increased substantially, driven by the desire to reduce American casualties and the need to defeat Nazi Germany and imperial Japan. After World War II, the pace did not abate. The cold war, and later the space race, became the new driving forces. The technological advances of the Soviet Union produced fear and anxiety in the United States. After the launch of Sputnik in 1 957, the first Earth orbiting satellite, many Americans said "never again," and demanded that the United States maintain the lead in all forms of technology: military, space, medicine, genetics, physics, and all other disciplines. Technology also appeared to offer a way to eliminate the inequality of limited war, and perhaps even end the human sacrifices demanded by war — at least on the American side. In the post- World War II era, the intense search for advanced weapon technologies became a major tenet of American culture, producing ways of thinking, strategies, and behaviors and practices inde- pendent of other cultural tenets. An Air Force officer writing in 2004 concluded that, "If innovative war concepts and superior technology can win our wars, but in the process render a particular branch or service [the Army] obsolete, so be it." 41 This clarion call was heard again and again throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. Science became a religion, and Americans had ample proof of its efficacy. In less than two hundred years the United States became the richest and most powerful nation in human history. And it had ended World War II with the most significant technological development in history, the atomic bomb. These assessments, however, were a function of misreading history. Wealth in America has to be demonstrative. To receive the privileged positions, the deference, the elite status, the notoriety, others must know an individual possesses wealth, and wealth is demonstrated by extravagance, ostentation, excess, glamour, and size. American vehicles have gotten bigger, more powerful, and more luxurious over the decades, packed with every known amenity. American homes, and everything in them, have followed the same path. This tenet of American culture is prevalent in the American practice of war. No American aircraft carrier was ever constructed smaller than the 34 • The American Culture ofWar one that preceded it. No American main-battle tank was ever built lighter than the one that preceded it. No American air-superiority fighter was ever produced slower or with fewer gadgets than the one that preceded it. The American government will purchase an aircraft, or some other piece of technology that gener- ates, for example, as much combat power as two infantry squads. It expends hundreds of thousands of dollars on this system, and then employs three squads of men to maintain it. A few years later, the United States will repeat this process. However, the technology will be slightly more sophisticated, a lot more expensive, generate slightly more combat power, and will require four squads to maintain it. The American approach to war and the technologies to fight it is not utilitarian, and is not practical. Americans insist on having the best, but "the best" does not mean the most efficient or the most ef- fective. It means the biggest, the fastest, most technologically sophisticated, and the most glamorous. Common sense plays almost no part in the American acquisition of technology. One of the ironies of America at the dawn of the twenty-first century was that in the midst of the greatest wealth of war machines and advanced military technologies ever produced by man, the American people were at the lowest ebb of martial spirit and ability to fight war in the nation's history. And the American fetish for advanced technologies has devalued those men who have been willing to risk their lives and kill for the nation. Tenets of American Culture A comprehensive description of American culture is beyond the range of this study and not required for its purposes. However a summary of American thinking about the conduct of war is pertinent to this study: 1. Americans value human life, particularly that of Americans, above all else. As a consequence, Americans have been willing to spend considerable portions of the nation's wealth on technolo- gies, policies, and strategies that limit the expenditure of American lives. The most fundamental tenet of American life, written into the nations constitution, is that man is not a means to an end, but the end itself. War, which requires men to become a means of state policy, is thus an aberration, a break from the norm that cannot be sustained indefinitely. 2. Equality of opportunity, and in more total wars, equality of sacrifice, has been an important and consistent American cultural tenet from the Colonial/Revolutionary period to the Civil Rights Movement. Equality of opportunity was the primary tenet for Americans. While for some Americans equality was a dream— the American Indians, African Americans, Asian Americans, and other outside groups — over time these groups have moved closer to the dream. The move toward greater equality for all has been a significant historical force in America. 3. Equality of outcome is un-American. A persons status— wealth and quality of life— was believed to be based on his or her own talents, abilities, tenacity, innovativeness, and willingness to work hard. Inequality of outcome produced the unique American traits of individualism, unilateral behavior, and aggressiveness. 4. It is an American cultural belief that all male citizens are capable of performing effectively on the battlefield. This tenet of American life is closely connected with the tenet of equality— all men are created equal. This tenet has informed American military policy for two centuries, providing one of the arguments against maintaining a larger professional Army, and the basis of legitimacy for the Selective Service Administration. 5. Americans have tended to believe that military service in peacetime was a poor use of human ability and talent; hence, only losers served in the Army during periods of peace. The smartest, most intelligent, and most competitive Americans went into business and pursued wealth. Traditional American Thinking about the Conduct of War • 35 is covet wealth and the symbols of wealth. Americans pursue wealth with a tenacity and aggressiveness equaled by no other people on the planet. Wealth in America creates importance, opportunities, prestige, influence, access, and exception. Wealth has produced an unacknowl- edged inequality, and a psychological and physical disposition that, arguably, diminishes the nation's ability to fight war. Americans have taken considerable pride in being the most technologically advanced nation on the planet. They expect to maintain this position. This tenet of American life also supports the first tenet— the substitution of technological means for human effort. Americans also tend toward "bigness," greater power, maximum capabilities, and glamour. "Bigness" is closely con- nected to wealth. Americans are optimistic. They expect change, and prefer the new to the old. Americans expect things to always get better, and better means newer, bigger, faster, easier, more glamorous, and more powerful. Americans have tended to be isolationist and unilateral. The isolation of the United States from significant enemies by two great oceans enabled Americans to look inward until World War II. American individualism tends to cause Americans to believe that each nation ought to make it on its own, the way the United States did, and the way individual Americans did. World War II, and the advent of the cold war, required the American people to adopt a new perspective toward international relations. Still, aspects of the unilateral tenet remained and were evident in the latter part of the twentieth century in American attitudes toward the United Nations and other world organizations that it was believed were impinging on American sovereignty. Americans have accepted the position of the most powerful nation-state on the planet— mili- tarily, economically, culturally, and politically— but not all the implications that came with it. Power produces chauvinism and the wherewithal to exploit the resources of other nations and states. Americans believe in the exceptional position of the United States in the world. They believe that the United States has a unique place in world affairs, and that the rules that govern the behavior of other states are not applicable to this country. They believe the United States is a force for good. They believe that ultimately, the rest of the world will evolve to look like America, accepting American ways, values, ethics, and beliefs. Americans export American culture. Americans believe that the power of the United States can transform other nations and regions of the world through political policies, economic means, and if necessary, the use of military force. Germany and Japan were shining examples of this belief inaction. Power also produces a superior subordinate relationship. Americans expect primacy of position in world affairs. It would be folly to believe that the American culture of war could be reduced to a few pages. The objective here is much less ambitious. I am arguing that American behavior in war in the latter half of the twentieth century is incomprehensible without some understanding of American culture, and that the demise of the citizen-soldier Army and the adoption of a new American way of war were caused primarily by cultural conflicts between strongly held tenets: first, that man is not a means to an end, and second, that equality of opportunity is the natural right of human beings. Limited war, as constructed in the post- World War II period, went against these basic cultural tenets. Limited war looked too much like peace to motivate the selflessness evident in more total war. Americans have fought many wars, but war has always been an aberration, not a permanent condition. Thus, for rela- tively short periods of time, Americans have accepted becoming a means for the ends of the state, to achieve objectives that preserved and possibly spread the basic tenets of American life. Americans were capable of fighting all types of wars for short periods of time, given the state of readiness of the 36 • The American Culture ofWar nation and the exigency of the situation. However, Americans ultimately fought strategically offensive wars with offensive strategic doctrine, the aim of which was the destruction of the enemy's main forces. This was the only way to envision an end to the conflict and a return to normalcy. War based on de- fensive strategy and doctrine could not produce decisive results. Hence, the termination of hostilities could not be predicted. Protracted, strategically defensive wars were un-American. The demise of the citizen-soldier Army began at the end of World War II when the United States became a superpower and took on new political objectives, strategies, and doctrines for war. The new role of the United States created cultural conflicts that were most evident during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, but were prevalent throughout the cold war as well. The Vietnam War caused the cultural conflict to emerge into a full-blown domestic war, which ended with defeat in Vietnam and the end of the citizen-soldier Army in 1973. However, the cultural conflict is still prevalent. Many Americans believe it is wrong for the small "military cluster" to bear the full burden of war while the rest of America does nothing. Hence, there have been calls for the reinstatement of the draft. This cultural war isn't over. As the demand for U.S. forces around the world increases, which seems very likely after the attacks on September 11, 2001, the arguments and demands for reinstating the draft will also increase. At the end of 2005, the Army and Marine Corps were overcommitted, trying to do more than was reasonably possible with current troop levels. 3 The Legacy of World War II: Man versus Machine Man— the Ultimate Factor. In the nature of the Army's mission it is the soldier himself who, as a tactical entity of combat, must fight and control the battle. To wield the power of his hardware he must enter the battle personally; indeed, no means are likely ever to be developed which will permit him to control the battlefield without entering and occupying it. He is the ultimate factor in victory. The Army must therefore continuously devote substantial scientific resources to research on human factors in warfare— developing improved methods of selecting men for combat; assuring that their equipment are compatible with their innate and trained aptitudes and battle skills; devising means of understanding and influencing enemy troops and support- ing populations; and improving methods for training in the complex knowledge and skills of the soldier's profession. —Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, U.S. Army Chief of Research and Development, 1959 1 War has become vertical. We are demonstrating daily that it is possible to descend from the skies into any part of the interior of an enemy nation and destroy its power to continue the conflict. War industries, communications, power installations and supply lines are being blasted by at- tacks from the air. Fighting forces have been isolated, their defenses shattered and sufficient pressure brought by air power alone to force their surrender. Constant pounding from the air is breaking the will of the Axis to carry on Strategic air power is a war- winning weapon in its own right, and is capable of striking decisive blows far behind the battle line, thereby destroying the enemy's capacity to wage war. — General Henry Arnold, Commander Army Air Forces, 1943 2 World War II ushered in the new age of airpower, and by so doing initiated a process of transformation that would ultimately end with the elimination of ground forces as major combatants in war. Wars were to be won entirely from the air. This school of thought has dominated air war thinking since the introduction of the big, four-engine, heavy bomber in the 1930s, and the first serious effort to develop doctrine to win a war with strategic bombing. The most fundamental tenet that informs the thinking and gives life to the practices of the U.S. Air Force is that airpower technology is the decisive instrument for the conduct of war. In 2003, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, while employing the most technologically advanced aircraft, munitions, and doctrine ever produced, the basic thesis was the same: war could be won entirely from the air. However, the air war thesis, in the Army's view, has never proven successful. The Army provided the other school of thought, which held that man 37 38 • The American Culture ofWar is the decisive instrument for the conduct of war. This fundamental tenet informs the thinking and animates the practices of the Army. The Army and Air Force have never reconciled these beliefs that form the very core of their cul- tures. Not until the end of the twentieth century were serious efforts made toward joint doctrine. The inability of the Army and Air Force to produce joint doctrine damaged the ability of the nation to effectively use military power to achieve political objectives, and arguably, caused the nations first defeat in war. World War II, for four years, reinforced the cultural norms of the American way of war. At the same time, it created a new culture based on new technologies that, in the last days of the war, unequivocally informed Americans that their traditional way of war was obsolete. Airpower and nuclear weapons exerted enormous influence on American thinking about the conduct of war. These technologies seemed to offer a way to finally end the psychological and physical destruction caused by face-to-face combat. They seemed to offer an end to the mass armies that turned men into instruments of the state. And they seemed to offer an end to enormous expenditure of resources required to fight more total war. If a few men in an airplane could cause the incredible destruction witnessed at Hiroshima in a single attack, surely there was no need for mass armies! However, core cultural tenets tend to change slowly. The U.S. Army held firm to its most basic cultural beliefs that man is the dominant instrument on the battlefield; that new technologies and doctrines only enhance firepower; that war is much more than simply killing; and that, at the end of the day, when more total war had stripped a nation bare of its resources, it was the adaptability, spirit, and character of men that would make the final decision on the survival of a way of life, if not a people. World War II initiated a transformation in American thinking about the conduct of war. Culture was the driving force. In America, men were not a means to an end, but the end. In America all men were created equal. Whereas ground war with mass armies very nearly obliterated these fundamental tenets of American culture, airpower and nuclear weapons appeared to preserve them, appeared to maintain the cultural norms and cultural balance. All the technologies, doctrines, strategic thinking, and reinforcing and conflicting cultural tenets required for the demise of the citizen-soldier Army and the emergence of a new American culture of war were evident in World War II. This story starts in World War II, but it is still unfolding. World War II: Air War Doctrine vs. Ground War Doctrine While World War II was rich in new technologies and doctrines, at the end of the war, four offensive, campaign-winning doctrines claimed decisiveness in war. A study of World War II reveals the follow- ing: The U.S. Marine Corps and Navy, and the British, independently, developed amphibious warfare doctrines— the methods and principles to employ land craft and ship technologies to land combat forces on hostile shores. The British and U.S. Navies developed aircraft carrier task force doctrine— the methods and principles to use aircraft carrier technologies to project naval and air power across vast oceans against enemy forces. The Germans developed "Wolf Pack" submarine doctrine— the methods and principles to employ submarine technologies to destroy the enemy's merchant ship fleet. And the British and American navies developed Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) doctrine— the methods and principles to employ destroyers, aircraft carriers, and land based aircraft technologies to find and destroy enemy submarines that preyed on allied merchant ships. While these doctrines contributed to the outcome of the war, none of them had the potential to be decisive in war. British and Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrines created access to enemy forces and ultimately the enemy's home- land, but neither had the potential to destroy imperial Japan or Nazi Germany. Navy aircraft carrier task force and ASW doctrines created passages to the battlefields, and kept strategically important logistical sea lanes opened, but neither could destroy the enemy's main forces. Once the passage had The Legacy of World War II . 39 been made and access to the battlefields achieved, either the Army Air Forces or the Army Ground Forces had to complete the destruction of the enemy's main forces. The U.S. Army employed two offensive campaign-winning doctrines in World War II, Infantry and Armor. The pioneering work of the Germans in armor warfare was copied by all major nations that fought in World War II with variations that were a function of their own culture, industrial and technological capabilities, the paucity or abundance of their resources, geographic circumstances, and the disposition and intellect of their leaders. The Army's primary doctrine for fighting the war was its traditional infantry doctrine, which in World War II was a strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine. The U.S. Army planned to win the war by fighting successive, successful, offensive infantry battles that produced successful campaigns of strategic importance, the cumulative effect of which would produce victory. "The Arnold vision" of war from the air was first articulated in World War I: "the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centers on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate." 3 The German bombing campaign against England caused many observers to conclude that airpower could be decisive by destroying the will of the people or enemy industrial centers. 4 However, the technology in aircraft and munitions did not exist in 1917 to greatly influence the outcome of the war. Still, the idea was born, and Giulio Douhet, the Italian airpower theorist and author of the influential book Command of the Air, and Hugh Trenchard, the first Chief of the Royal Air Force, insured that it survived the interwar period. While many consider Douhet the "Father of Strategic Air Power Doctrine," it was Trenchard who fought successfully for the survival of the RAF, in part, by maintaining the vision of the potential of airpower to break the stalemate of attrition and exhaustion warfare that produced the then unprecedented carnage of the First World War. By the 1930s advances in aircraft and muni- tions technologies had made possible new strategic bombing doctrines. The dominance of the Army's ground warfare doctrine was challenged by these new doctrines. The air forces of Britain and the United States pioneered two different "Strategic Bombing" doctrines that they believed had the potential to produce victory independent of a ground war. The British Stra- tegic Bombing doctrine was based on the theory that the civilian population was the center of gravity, the point of decision. British Bomber Command believed that bombing people would break their will, the moral effect, and that as a consequence they would rebel against their government or stop work- ing. In either case, the war would come to an end because the people were no longer producing the machines, equipment, and supplies necessary for war. American strategic bombing doctrine was based on the theory that it was possible to destroy the enemy's means of production, the materiel effect, by the concentrated bombing of major production nodes; that is, a system or industry the destruction of which would cause the breakdown of the entire industrial system. Both British and American airmen believed their own doctrine to be decisive. While most students of the air war in Europe have concluded that airpower did not in fact de- cide World War II, it is acknowledged that airpower contributed greatly to the outcome of the war. It is further argued by some that had it been employed more effectively— more closely in line with doctrine — it could have produced victory. With the employment of the atomic bomb, and the de- velopment of jet aircraft and missile technologies, the theory of airpower became firmly inculcated in the minds of Americans. In the postwar period, most Americans believed Army ground forces and doctrines were obsolete. Infantry doctrine particularly was considered an old and unnecessary practice of war. Ever since, the Army has been on the defensive. Airpower appealed to the American imagination. It was new technology. It was glamorous. It was continuously changing, continuously offering revolutionary transformation. Airplanes were sleek, sexy, and beautiful, and, they offered is promise for a better future. 40 • The American Culture ofWar The Army's Way of War The history of the U.S. Army in World War II is well documented. 5 No effort is made in these pages to summarize this extensive body of work. The objective here is to identify a number of core cultural tenets of the Army that influenced Army thinking in the post- World War II period. In World War II, technologies greatly influenced the Army's conduct of war. Army Ground Forces integrated new technologies into its traditional doctrine of war, and developed a separate armor warfare doctrine. It also developed airborne infantry, mechanized infantry, and Ranger infantry 6 Still, the Army retained core cultural beliefs that went back to the Civil War and the formative years of the nation. The Army's way of war prior to the invention of the tank was based on historical experiences. Infantry battles won all of America's wars prior to World War II. The primary instrument for the conduct of battles until World War II was a soldier armed with an individual weapon. The principal mission of the Army was to fight the nation's wars by closing with the enemy and destroying his main Army in battle. 7 This was the way the most traumatic events in the nations history— the American Revolution, Civil War, and World War II, were ultimately fought and brought to a conclusion. Because the United States typically entered war unprepared, its initial strategy, doctrine, and pursuit of battle were con- strained by paucity of resources, training, and skilled leadership. 8 However, once mobilized, the Army tended toward the employment of offensive strategy, operations, and doctrine. War was to be fought in a continuous, unrelenting manner. 9 Wars were to be won by a series of offensive campaigns. And campaigns were won by a series of primarily offensive battles. The two most fundamental tenets for the U.S. Army's approach to war were that successful battles and campaigns win wars, and that man is the dominant instrument on the battlefield. It can be argued that both are tenets of the "Western Way of War." Nevertheless, the way they were executed was uniquely American. FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (May 22, 1941, contained the principal Army doctrine for the conduct of World War II. (Arguably, it also contained the cultural inheritance of the Army from the American Revolution to World War II. Doctrine is a function of culture and technol- ogy, and technology, as a norm, changes faster than culture. Culture is thus constantly adapting to new technologies.) The thinking delineated in FM 100-5 was reflected in other Army doctrine manuals, such as, FM 31-5 Landing Operations on Hostile Shores. The U.S. Army in World War II was primar- ily an infantry Army. The infantry divisions were the primary instruments for the destruction of the enemy's main forces. And the Army's most senior leaders were primarily infantry officers. FM 100-5 stated, "No one arm wins battles. The combined action of all arms and services is essential to success." Still, the emphasis was on the infantry. Of the eighty-nine divisions organized to fight World War II, seventy- four were fundamentally infantry (66 Infantry, 5 Airborne, 1 Mountain, 2 Cavalry). Only sixteen armored divisions were formed, and they typically contained as many infantry battalions as tank battalions. 10 While infantry divisions were combined arms organizations containing tank and artillery units, their primary means of destroying the enemy was intended to be the infantry. FM 100-5 outlined the basic thinking of the Army: The Infantry is essentially an arm of close combat. Its primary mission in the attack is to close with the enemy and destroy or capture him. . . . Infantry fights by combining fire, movement, and shock action. By fire, it inflicts losses on the enemy and neutralizes his combat power; by movement, it closes with the enemy and makes its fire more effective; by shock action, it com- pletes the destruction of the enemy in close combat. Infantry is capable of limited independent action through the employment of its own weapons. Its offensive power decreases appreciably by an organized defensive position. Under these conditions or against a force of the combined arms, the limited firepower of Infantry must be adequately reinforced by the support of artil- lery, tanks, combat aviation, and other arms. . . . The principal weapons of Infantry are the rifle The Legacy of World War II • 41 and bayonet, the automatic rifle, and the machine gun. Other weapons include mortars, pistols, grenades, light antitank weapons, and antitank guns." Battles were to be won primarily by the infantry, supported by artillery, tanks, air power, and naval gunfire. FM 100-5 emphasized that: "Man is the fundamental instrument in war; other instruments may change but he remains relatively constant. ...In spite of the advances in technology, the worth of the individual man is still decisive The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle'.' 12 This was an immutable cultural tenet of the U.S. Army. FM 22-10, Leadership, published during the Korean War, restated this tenet: "Man is the fundamental instrument of war. Other instruments may change, new weapons may be created and new modes of defense may be devised, but man, the fundamental instrument, remains constant." 13 In 1959, General Trudeau restated these words. And a reading of World War I manuals reveals similar wording. No tenet was more basic to the mission and purpose of the U.S. Army. This tenet has been heard again and again in numerous wars in numerous ways on numerous battlefields. It is repeated in after actions reports, training memorandums, doctrinal publications, and other forms of communications. In March 1943, Major General Walter B. Smith, Chief of Staff Allied Forces Headquarters, pub- lished a Training Memorandum for all Army Forces in the North African-Mediterranean Theater, which, in part, stated: War is a dirty business, and anyone who engages in it must face the facts. It is simply a question of killing or being killed. It cannot be impersonal. To wage successful combat there must be a burning desire to come to grips with the enemy, and to kill him in mortal combat. There is no other way to win against a determined enemy. . . . Battles, large and small, cannot be won entirely by maneuver, or by artillery or air action. Well trained troops cannot be shot or bombed out of a position. They can be "softened" by such action, but it remains for the Infantry; conversed by its supporting arms, to close with the enemy and by use, or threatened use, of the bayonet to drive him from his position. . . . There is no other formula. ... A weakling or unskilled soldier simply will not stand up to it. The required physical conditioning and skill can only be developed by training. . . in the same manner that a football team is developed, or a boxer prepares for a fight. He must be particularly proficient with the bayonet. . . . And when accompanied by battle cries they have seemed to strike terror to his heart. The object of war is to kill the enemy. . . . And the more ruthlessness with which that object is pursued the shorter will be the period of conflict. 14 This memorandum contained Army cultural beliefs about war and American cultural beliefs about manhood and honorable behavior. Ground warfare required men to close with the enemy on relatively equal terms and kill him. American superiority was seen in the quality of its men, not the quality of its weapons. War was still the ultimate test of manhood. Smith's memorandum was a reflection of American history and culture, "The Indian war cry" or "The Rebel Yell," beliefs about equality (with the proper training all American men can perform well in combat), meeting the enemy face-to-face, team spirit, physical battle, the bayonet, and the fight to the death. War, according to Americans and its principal instrument for war, the U.S. Army, meant closing with the enemy and killing him much the way it was done in the American Revolution and Civil War. Smith recognized that the uniquely American game of football was the quintessential reflection of American thinking about the conduct of war: two teams with an equal number of players, under the relatively equal conditions, lined up to face one another on an agreed upon field for physical battle. Human attributes, not technological sophistication, made the difference. Victory was based on talent, skill, physical strength, tenacity, the will to win, and intelligence— all character traits highly valued in American competitive, capitalist society. 42 • The American Culture ofWar Between doctrine and reality there is always a gap between what an army believes war should look like and what it actually is, between the expected performance of men and their actual performance, and between cultural standards of manhood and human nature a gap is always in existence. Throughout history, advances in technology brought about by science and engineering have in- creased the range, accuracy, rate of fire, reliability, and lethality of weapons; and thus, the carnage of war. Since the invention of the first gunpowder weapon the capabilities and complexities of weapons have increased with no apparent limitations in sight. The optimal scientific approach to war, then, is to employ the most advanced technologies available, to kill the enemy as efficiently as possible, while sustaining as few casualties as possible. The Army, as a subculture of the larger American culture, was imbued with tenets that, in some ways, conflicted with the most basic tenet of the Army, which held that man was the dominant instrument on the battlefield. One of the greatest strengths of American culture is its adaptability. The American capitalist system and the extraordinary freedoms enjoyed by Americans create the uniquely American individualism and adaptability that produces exceptional performance. However, it can also be argued that Americans have a preference for the way they adapt, and that the single-minded preference for adaptation using technology is in fact a weakness. Americans place enormous faith in the ability of science and technology to solve the problems of humanity, including war. The technological solution has tended to be the best solution for Americans, who also place the highest value on the lives of their young men. The logical conclusion of the convergence of technological trends and American cultural tenets is the elimination of man from the battlefield, using technologies that make possible the engagement of targets from beyond the limits of the battlefield. This is the ultimate solution for which Americans have invested trillions of dollars. At times the Army has confused firepower, which simply kills, with combat power, which achieves battlefield objectives in specific environment. While arguing for the primacy of man, the Army also developed technologies and ways of fighting designed to reduce the number of men required on the battlefield. The Army relied heavily on firepower to win battles, considering it a substitute for manpower. Throughout World War II in the European and Mediterranean Theaters, the Army increased its use of firepower from artillery, armor, naval gunfire, and airpower, and similar developments took place in the Pacific Theater. There were multiple reasons for this shift toward greater use of firepower, but the primary reason was to reduce casualties and save lives. And the American people would have expected nothing less. Still, there were other reasons for the continuous increase in the use of firepower. In the initial days of fighting, the Army had to go through a shakeout. Everyone cannot serve in combat, and, until initial exposure, the fighting qualities of individual soldiers are unknown. Tactically, American company and platoon size infantry units lacked the firepower of comparable German units. German squads and platoons were capable of generating greater firepower than equivalent American formations. Joseph Balkoski wrote: U.S. Army field manuals emphasized the importance of fire superiority, but in truth, the Yanks found it difficult to achieve without supporting artillery. American infantrymen simply were not provided with enough firepower to establish battlefield dominance. Each 29th Division [basic U.S. Army infantry division] rifle company of 193 men had only two machine guns, both of which were in an independent weapons platoon. On the other hand, a German infantry com- pany of only 142 men had fifteen machine guns. The German company's firepower was further enhanced by its twenty-eight submachine guns. The 29ers had no weapons of this type. The American rifle company was dependent on its nine BARs for rapid fire, but these weapons could The Legacy of World War II • 43 not stand up to the MG 42s. Instead of forcing the Germans to keep their heads down with a large volume of Ml and BAR fire, as the American manual demanded, it was usually the Yanks who got pinned. . . . The MG 42 s rate of fire was three times as fast as comparable American machine guns . . . [and] could expend ammunition more freely than an American BAR man, since the rest of the German squad was devoted almost entirely to feeding the ravenous MG 42. 15 And Russell Weigley observed: "The inadequacy of the battlefield power generated by the standard infantry division accounted for the custom of attaching one of the separate tank battalions to almost every infantry division. The attached tank battalions were to prove essential to the forward advance of the infantry against recalcitrant opposition. . . ." 16 Because of superior German firepower at the small unit level, and the failure of senior Allied leaders to adequately consider terrain, U.S. Army infantry tactical doctrine typically did not work; new doctrine had to be worked out as the situations changed and experience was gained. The Army had to adapt, and it did so primarily with technology. It came to rely on artillery and armor to overcome deficiencies in firepower at the squad and platoon level. Training also influenced the ability to generate combat power. The German squads and platoons were not only capable of generating greater firepower; they were also better trained than most American formations. For example, the 29th Infantry Division (ID) entered battle for the first time on June 6, 1944. It fought its first battle against the veteran 352nd Division at the water's edge at Omaha Beach. German soldiers and formations had fought for five years at that point. Tactical doctrine had been refined on the Eastern Front in hard-fought campaigns. German soldiers well understood how to fight and survive on the battlefield. The shortage of infantry divisions and the Army's individual replacement system, as opposed to unit rotation, also damaged the ability of the infantry to generate combat power. Typically, 90 percent of casualties were in infantry units. The Army organized, equipped, and trained too few divisions to rotate them in and out of combat. As a consequence, units stayed in line long after they should have been rotated out. The 1st ID, between D-day, June 6, 1944 and the end of the war in May 1945, suffered 29,630 total casualties, almost twice its authorized strength. The 9th ID suffered 33,000; the 29th ID suffered 20,620; and the 28th 16,762. Many other divisions suffered casualties one and one- half times their authorized strength. The 1st ID was in combat in Europe for 317 days; the 2nd ID for 303 days; the 9th ID for 304 days; and the 82nd Airborne Division for 422 days of combat. The Texas 36th NG Divisions saw 400 days of combat; the 45th Oklahoma NG Division, 511 days; and the 29th Maryland and Virginia NG Division, 242 days. This type of sustained combat brutalized men and caused psychological trauma. It also caused divisions to go through performance peaks and valleys, but overall diminished combat effectiveness. Late in 1944, the U.S. Army was desperately short of infantrymen. Eisenhower converted tank- destroyer units, antiaircraft units, cooks, drivers, clerks, and other rear-echelon personnel into infan- trymen. He even took measures to partially integrate the Army, creating black rifle platoons to serve in white infantry companies. Training again became a problem for veteran units. The shortage of infantry caused an increase in the use of artillery and airpower. Finally, a paucity of well-trained and selected small unit leaders diminished the ability of the Army to generate combat power at the edge of the battlefield. Leadership was developed through on-the-job training. It must be remembered that when World War II started in Europe in 1939, the U.S. Army numbered 187,893 soldiers. The U.S. Army that fought in World War II was an emergency-assembled citizen-soldier force that adapted and fought well given its lack of prewar preparation. As a consequence of the disparity in firepower, training, leadership, and other factors at the small unit level, the Army depended on greater firepower from artillery and airpower. An intelligence report from Army Group B outlined the German impression of the U.S. and British Armies: 44 • The American Culture ofWar Strong use of equipment, preservation of manpower. . . . Exceptionally strong massing of artillery, lavish expenditures of munitions. Before attacks begin, systematic, lengthy artillery preparations. Infantry and tanks advance behind a heavy curtain of mortar and machine gun fire. The artillery is divided into three groups. The first supports the attack with a rolling barrage; the second fires in support of individual calls-for-fire from the infantry in the main battle area; the third conducts counterbattery fire (with effective use of aerial observers). Multiple smoke screens obscure the attack zone in order to obscure defensive weapons and observation posts; in some cases a smoke screen is placed immediately forward of the front at the beginning of the attack. Little massing of infantry; mostly battalion or regimental strength. . . . Tanks attack in support of the infantry. . . . The infantry attack only after the strongpoints have been neutralized. . . . The attack goes according to a well-timed and organized plan. Piece after piece of the defensive line is broken. Less value is placed on initiative than on coordinated fire support. 17 Senior Army leaders became airpower enthusiasts. Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley accepted many of the claims of airpower advocates. In their operations it was clear that they placed great faith in the destructive power of air forces. In Operation Neptune, the Normandy invasion; Operation Goodwood, the attempted British breakout from Caen; and Operation Cobra, the American breakout from St. Lo, as well as other major battles, they relied heavily on airpower to generate the combat power needed to succeed. 18 In World War II, the Army acquired a new offensive ground warfare campaign-winning doctrine. The tank was developed in World War I. However, it did not prove decisive in war until World War II. In May 1940, the Wehrmacht decisively defeated the French Army in a short, intensive war em- ploying combined arms, maneuver warfare doctrine, frequently called "Blitzkrieg" — the methods and principles for employing tanks, mechanized infantry, artillery, and close air support (CAS) as an integrated combat team, that relied on speed, maneuver, communications, and audacity to break into the enemy's rear areas to destroy his command, communications, and logistic centers and to encircle his forces. 19 Armor technology and doctrine appeared to be a form of warfare that had the potential to replace the Army's infantry campaign-winning doctrine. Consider the thinking of Lieutenant General Crittenberger, who wrote during the final days of the Korean War: Today everyone realizes that war is a national effort in which the Armed Forces, of necessity, must base their effectiveness on the country's national resources and capabilities. In the United States that means we must capitalize on our outstanding position in industry, including design and manufacture. In particular it means that we must capitalize on our predominant position in the automotive field, in the sphere of aviation and in electronics. And that is where and why American Armor comes into the picture, for Armor puts a premium on certain distinctive American characteristics. . . . Here in the United States the spirit and the entire concept of Armor is American in character. It is an arm of opportunity. If conforms to the American principle of moving in fast and getting the job done. . . . Looking at Armor objectively, it is alive, it is vital, it is modern. . . . Armor is characteristically a weapon of the young man. In design, manufacture concept, it is modern — just as the young man is modern in outlook. It is also a weapon of opportunity. That, too, personifies youth. ... It is not an arm of centuries of tradition. Instead, it is the vital, growing contemporary of American fighting men. It does not live in the past. It looks to greater opportunities and ac- complishments, to new ideas and further prestige. And it will be more decisive, more effective as time goes on. In tempo and spirit, American Armor has moved forward as dynamically in its development as it moved decisively in combat. A spirit of change and constant improvement has been its The Legacy of World War II • 45 motivating force. In ten or fifteen years, we have gone from .30 and .50 caliber machine guns for tanks on up to 90-mm and 120-mm, guns. . . . Advances in electronics, ballistics, and com- munications . . . have greatly enhanced Armor's effectiveness. Advancements ... in techniques for full utilization of television and radar are all of vital c These words reveal virtually all the cultural tenets noted in the previous chapter, and other tenets of American life: change, optimism, bigness, faith in technology, faith in American power, equality, and others. In many of the claims outlined here for armor, the Air Force and Navy could have substi- tuted "aircraft." The tank had many of the same appeals to the Army as aircraft had for the Air Force and Navy. If it can be argued that the Army had a glamour weapon, it was the tank. A technological means of killing, the tank had greater range, speed, firepower, cross-country mobility, survivability, shock effect and protection than any other instrument of land warfare. It made war more destruc- tive, increasing the intensity and pace. The tank thus had the potential to bring about a more rapid conclusion to war than traditional infantry warfare. While all the attributes of the tank had great appeal to American thinking about the conduct of war, the tank tended to make the Army act more like the Air Force and Navy. The Air Force and Navy fight machines with machines. They endeavor to perfect their performance in the employment of technology. The Army traditionally fights men. It endeavors to perfect men and teamwork, to im- prove the human skills that facilitate the killing of other men: As General Smith noted "It cannot be impersonal." The kinds of courage required by soldiers and marines is very different from the kinds of courage required in the Navy and Air Force, which is why the culture of the Army has to be very different from that of the other services. Nevertheless, the tank gave the Army another subculture that emphasized technology in much the same manner of the Air Force. While the Army emphasized the decisive role of man and closing with the enemy, it substituted firepower for manpower at every opportunity. Firepower reduced casualties and reduced the number of frontline soldiers required to achieve tactical objectives. The urgency of war, the available technolo- gies, the American preference for cutting- edge weapons, and the value Americans placed on human life caused the Army to seek technological solutions. However, firepower is only one aspect of combat power. 21 And, it is combat power, not firepower that wins wars. The Army has at times been at war with itself. While recognizing that it had to produce a certain type of soldier to enter the battlefield and come face-to-face with the enemy in order to kill him, at the same time, it pursued ways of war that removed men from the battlefield, diminished their exposure to the enemy, and used technology to kill from afar. In the 1 950s this internal contradiction caused the Army to engage in counterproductive competitions with the Air Force, caused it to assume missions that were better left to the Air Force, caused it to use its limited funds on weapons systems that did not enhance the conduct of ground warfare, and caused it to move away from its primary mission of ground combat. Airpower : A New Way of War Airpower dominated postwar thinking about the conduct of war. There were two accepted theories for the employment of strategic air forces, and one unofficial, unspoken theory. The first theory stated that the primary objective of airpower was the destruction of the will of the people, the bombing of cities and towns to destroy the willingness of people to work and support the government. The destruction of the will of the people, it was argued, destroyed the productive capacity of the state by psychologi- cally removing the manpower required to run the nations industries. The second theory stated that the primary objective of airpower was the destruction of the means of production; that is, destroying the enemy's ability to make war by bombing key industries essential to the operation of a modern industrial economy. The third theory, extermination warfare, was never officially acknowledged. 46 • The American Culture ofWar However, it has been argued that it was evident in the bombing campaigns of both Britain and the United States during World War II. The bombing of people, first, had a second objective, to affect the will of political leaders. The intent was to kill enough of the people to convince their political leaders to surrender. In the war against Japan, the atomic bomb ultimately achieved this end. However, there is a fine line between bombing to destroy the will of the people, and bombing to destroy people. At what level of carnage does bombing to destroy the will of the people become bombing to exterminate people? The potential end result of targeting people themselves was genocide. Other reasons for bombing people included retaliation, revenge, anger, racism, the desire to demonstrate the efficacy of strategic airpower, shifting values and ethics caused by prolonged exposure to carnage, the desire to bring the war to a rapid conclusion to save lives, friction between allies, and other uniquely human factors, as well as technological limita- tions and resource constraints. The stated, official objective of the British strategic bombing campaign was the destruction of the will of the people. The stated, official objective of the American strategic bombing campaign was the destruction of the enemy's means of production. Consider first the British approach. In 1919, Trenchard proclaimed that: "At present the moral ef- fect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the material effect in a proportion of 20 to l." 22 Trenchard had no evidence upon which to base this conclusion; nevertheless, the concept had considerable staying power. The 1928 RAF War Manual ("Operations" section) stated: "Although the bombardment of suitable objectives should result in considerable material damage and loss, the most important and far-reaching effect of air bombardment is its moral effect." The RAF and other services discussed vari- ous theories of air war during the interwar period, but without the funding to build aircraft and test doctrine, all their theories were academic. In the 1930s, when the post- World War I agreements began to break down, Britain started to rearm to compete with the growing military strength of Germany. Technology, however, limited what was possible. The British tried both accepted theories, ultimately deciding on the destruction of the will of the people, which, as the war progressed, moved inexorably toward extermination warfare. In May 1940, airpower was one of the factors that saved Britain, by persuading Churchill, the Royal family, and the nation to continue to fight. After the Fall of France, Britain faced the Nazi juggernaut alone. Given the development of the previous five years and the collapse of the French army, Britain had few reasons to believe it could prevail. At this juncture, some in Britain believed it wise to consider some form of peace with Germany that might save the Empire. A number of factors influenced the decision makers in Britain: the "miracle at Dunkirk," which saved more than 300,000 British soldiers and perhaps more importantly, British military leadership; the English Channel and the Royal Navy, which had historically saved Britain; the belief, fate, and personality of Churchill; the belief that the "New World," the United States, would come to the rescue of the old world; and faith in the new technology of airpower. On May 17, 1940, a report to the Cabinet from the Chiefs of Staff Committee on "British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality," asserted that the combined bombing of Germany and German-controlled Europe with a vigorous naval blockade could create the con- ditions for a revolt against Germany 23 Churchill lifted all restrictions on bombing noting that: "an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers upon the Nazi homeland" was the only way to defeat Hitler. Churchill accepted this vision of war from the air. In a "memorandum" to the Minister of Supply written on September 3, 1940, the Prime Minister outlined his thinking: The Navy can lose the war, but only the Air Force can win it. Therefore, our supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery in the air. The Fighters are our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory. We must, therefore, develop the power to carry an ever-in- creasing volume of explosives to Germany, so as to pulverize the entire industry and scientific The Legacy of World War II . 47 structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depend, while holding him at arm's length from our island. In no other way at present visible can we hope to overcome the immense military power of Germany, and to nullify the further German victories which may be apprehended as the weight of their force is brought to bear upon African or Oriental theatres. The Air Force and its action on the largest scale must, therefore, subject to what is said later, claim the first place over the Navy or the Army. 24 Churchill adopted the vision of victory through airpower, in part, out of an absence of other options. On the defense, the Navy, Army, and fighter command could save Britain by not losing the war, but only through offensive actions could Nazi Germany be defeated. And at this juncture, an amphibious invasion and ground war were far beyond the capabilities of Britain and its empire. While Churchill believed airpower offered the potential for victory, his major objective was to get new allies. In June 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, and in December, Japan attacked the United States. These events totally changed the strategic situation, yet Churchill retained his faith in airpower. To explain why Britain was willing to invest its fate in the unproven doctrine of airpower, Marshal of the RAF Arthur Harris, commander-in-chief of Bomber Command wrote: "The idea was a natu- ral one for a country which had never maintained an Army of Continental proportions, has a large empire which must be defended as cheaply as possible, and has in the past largely won its wars by the strategic use of sea power working as an independent weapon; the same principle of strategy that made England a sea power in the past had only to be applied to the new weapon which had rendered obsolete the old one, the battleship." 25 From this assessment, it can be deduced that ground forces were the equivalent of the "battleship." Throughout the war, senior British airpower leaders believed that strategic bombing alone could win the war and that the heavy bomber was the dominant weapon in the conduct of modern war. In 1940, when the British initiated the strategic bombing campaign, the ability to hit small targets at altitudes of 20 to 25,000 feet did not exist. Hence, the ability of Bomber Command to destroy German production facilities was severely limited. The British also lacked the resources in bombers, trained crews, intelligence on German production facilities, and bombs with sufficient explosive power to do long term damage. Other problems, such as weather, the exigencies of naval and ground war, friction over the allocation of resources, and most important, German defensive measures, impeded the efforts of Bomber Command. The British were forced to bomb at night, and had great difficulty finding designated targets. As a consequence, and perhaps out of a sense of urgency to show results and some desire for revenge, the British emphasized the destruction of the "will of the people" through the killing of civilians. In April 1942, Churchill wrote the Secretary of State for Air: "We are placing great hopes on our bomber offensive against Germany next winter, and we must spare no pains to justify the large proportion of the national effort devoted to it. The Air Ministry's responsibility is to make sure that the maximum weight of the best type of bombs is dropped on the German cities by the aircraft placed at their disposal. Unless we can ensure that most of our bombs really do some damage it will be difficult to justify the pre-eminence we are according to this form of attack." 26 Churchill was convinced that the destruction of German cities would produce results, and, technologically, Bomber Command was incapable of doing anything else. British targeting reveals a desire to kill as many people as possible as opposed to killing those members of the state whose death and suffering was most likely to produce the desired political outcome: Early in 1 942 he [Frederick Lindemann, Baron Cherwell, and a member of the cabinet] produced a cabinet paper on the strategic bombing of Germany. ... It described, in quantitative terms, the effect on Germany of a British bombing offensive in the next eighteen months (approximately 48 • The American Culture ofWar March 1942-September 1943). The paper laid down a strategic policy. The bombing must be directed essentially against the German working-class houses. Middle-class houses have too much space round them, and so are bound to waste bombs; factories and "military objectives" had long since been forgotten, except in official bulletins, since they were much too difficult to find and hit. The paper claimed that — given a total concentration of effort on the production and use of bombing aircraft — it would be possible, in all the larger towns of Germany (that is, those with more than 50,000 inhabitants), to destroy 50 percent of all houses. . . . Strategic bombing, according to the Lindemann policy, was put into action with every effort the country could make. 27 As the war progressed moral qualms evaporated. And, it must be remembered that the British war started two years before the American war. It was known that "working-class houses," particularly at night when the British attacked, had people in them — families, women and children. The British terminology, "de-housing," was deceptive. The British sought to maximize the number of casualties per bomb. In July 1943, the British carried out incendiary night attacks against the urban center of Hamburg, Germany killing an estimated 45,000 people. Was this extermination warfare? 28 In November 1944, the United States Secretary of War directed that a major study be carried out to evaluate the effects of bombing. The study resulted in The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, which found that: The mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained. The power of a police state over its people cannot be underestimated. 29 "Ruthless Nazi control" was not the primary cause for the behavior of the German people. 30 The assessment of the "surprising resistance" of the German people also applied to the people of Britain, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. What other option did they have? Bernard Brodie concluded that: From at least the beginning of 1944 the average German had become disillusioned with the Nazi leadership, increasingly frightened by war's toll and its potential threat to himself and his family, and persuaded with growing certainty that all would end in defeat. Yet he stuck to his job and his machine for as long as it was physically possible to do so, and in so doing kept a disastrous war going to its ultimate ruinous conclusion. Why did he do so? The answer is to be found in need combined with habit, in coercion, and propaganda — in descending order of importance— all adding up to the plain circumstance that the German worker had no real alternative open to him. 31 Another student of strategic bombing, Robert A. Pape, noted: The citizenry of the target state is not likely to turn against its government because of civilian punishment. The supposed causal chain— civilian hardship produces public anger which forms political opposition against the government— does not stand up. One reason it does not is that a key assumption behind this argument — that economic deprivation causes popular unrest — is false. As social scientists have shown, economic deprivation does often produce personal frustra- tion, but collective violence against governments requires populations to doubt the moral worth The Legacy of World War II . 49 of the political system as a whole, as opposed to specific policies, leaders, or results. Political alienation is more important than economic deprivation as a cause of revolutions. 32 The British strategic bombing doctrine did not destroy the will of the people, and it did not destroy the will of the government. In the mind of Hitler and his senior leaders who accepted Nazi ideology, people existed only to serve the state — particularly working-class people. After the horrendous battle of Stalingrad in which the Germans lost between 250,000 and 300,000 men, Hitler stated: "What is life? Life is the nation. The individual must die any way. Beyond the life of the individual, is the nation." 33 Still, the British airpower historian, Richard Overy, concluded that the "impact of bombing was profound." Overy wrote: "Industrial efficiency was undermined by bombing workers and their housing. . . . [I]n the Ford plant in Cologne, in the Ruhr, absenteeism rose to 25 per cent of the workforce for the whole of 1944. ... A loss of work-hours on this scale played havoc with production schedules. Even those who turned up for work were listless and anxious." 34 Thus, the bombing campaign killed workers and their families, caused absenteeism, and lowered the morale of those who continued to work, all of which reduced productivity. Bombing did in fact lower morale, diminish hope, create pessimism, and traumatize the people, but the vast majority of survivors continued to work. Overy also concluded that: "The naive expectation that bombing would somehow produce a tidal wave of panic and disillusionment which would wash away popular support for war, and topple governments built on sand, was exposed as wishful thinking." 35 The British strategic bombing campaign was not decisive. However, this fact did not mean that it lacked the potential to be decisive. The U.S. Army Air Corps, later Army Air Force (AAF), also concluded that airpower was the decisive instrument for the conduct of war. However, it pursued and developed a uniquely American strategic bombing doctrine— precision bombing. In its struggle to separate itself from the U.S. Army, and in its battle to remain separate from the RAF's Bomber Command, the AAF argued that recision bomb- ing alone was a war-winning doctrine. General Arnold stated: "The Army Air Forces' principle of precision bombing. . . aimed at knocking out not an entire industrial area, nor even a factory, but the most vital parts of Germany's war machine, such as the power plants and machine shops of particular factories. ..." This doctrine greatly preceded the development of the technologies required to carry it out. At 25,000 feet, at 150 mph, using the Norden bombsight, flying flat in box formations, the B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers were totally incapable of destroying "the power plants or machine shops of particular factories." In fact, the AAF was incapable of consistently hitting factories themselves. In 1918, the US. Army Air Service conducted an independent study of the British World War I bombing campaign, in which they criticized the RAF for "the lack of a predetermined program care- fully calculated to destroy by successive raids those industries most vital in maintaining Germany's fighting force." While American investigators accepted the theory that the "moral effect" of bombing was of strategic importance, they concluded that: "the enemy's morale was not sufficiently affected to handicap the enemy's fighting force in the field . . ."; that, "The policy as followed out by the British and French in the present war of bombing a target once or twice and then skipping to another target is erroneous. . ."; and that, "Bombing for moral effect alone. . .which was probably the excuse for the wide spread of bombs over a town rather than their concentration on a factory, is not a productive means of bombing." 36 The objection was not with the theory of bombing to destroy the will of the people, but with the method. In the 1930s at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field in Alabama, the doctrine of precision bombing was advanced by an inspired group of young airmen. Donald Wilson, Harold George, and Robert Webster produced much of the pioneering work on precision bombing. 37 The Air Force's official history noted that: 50 • The American Culture ofWar The Air Corps Tactical School proceeded to preach that offensive air operations offered the most direct avenue to victory. The ACTS faculty taught its 1934-35 class that "loss of morale in the civilian population is decisive" in war and that air power alone could directly affect this key factor. The instructors played down the advantages of population bombing because inter- national sentiment opposed this method and because air officers believed destruction of an adversary's industrial base, raw materials transportation system, and energy supplies would be a more efficient way to induce peace. The ACT s "Air Force" text was a bit uncertain whether the foe's air force should be wiped out before launching a campaign against his economy, but it eventually resolved that if the hostile air arm was a threat it must first be neutralized. The text nevertheless made it clear there were no air missions more important than these two in bring- ing about the enemy's defeat. 38 Thus, in the interwar years the Army Air Corps officers learned lessons that would hinder their abil- ity to work with the rest of the Army. They learned that close air support, interdiction, and supporting ground forces operations were the least productive use of airpower. The Army Air Corps all but ignored the War Department's policy that the airpower was to operate "as an arm of the mobile Army," placing such missions low on the list of priorities. The uncertainty about air superiority combined with the drive to demonstrate the decisive role and perceived defensive capabilities of the new heavy bombers caused costly doctrinal mistakes in the initial phase of the air campaign. And, while the Air Force text gave priority to bombing for material effect it did not eliminate bombing for moral effect. A year before the outbreak of war in Europe, the 1938 text for the "Air Force" confirmed the thinking of American airmen: "the economic structure of a modern highly industrialized nation is characterized by the great degree of interdependence of its various elements. Certain of these elements are vital to the continued functioning of the modern nation. If one of these elements is destroyed the whole of the economic machine ceases to function. . . . Against a highly industrialized nation air force action has the possibility for such far reaching effectiveness that such action may produce immediate and decisive results." Historians disagree on the extent to which the AAF deviated from its official doctrine of precision bombing in the European Theater. However, out of necessity the AAF did bomb for "moral effect," that is, area bombing, in concert with its precision bombing campaign. The AAF's basic instincts for material bombing were at times overcome by technological limitations, weather conditions, enemy antiaircraft systems, the urgency to produce results, and competition with the British. In the Pacific Theater, difficulties in initiating the campaign, anger, racism, some desire for revenge, and a general loosening of moral restraints, moved the Air Force to adopt the British practice of bombing city centers. Still, in reference to the air war in Europe, Conrad Crane concluded: "most AAF airmen did live up to the spirit of [precision-bombing] . [The] USSTAF did resist the temptation to attack morale directly and to kill civilians to attain that end." 39 The AAF initiated its strategic bombing campaign with a number of assumptions that proved to be false. The AAF assumed that the heavily armed B-17s and B-24s flying in tight formations could penetrate German air space and defend themselves against German fighters and antiaircraft defense systems. It assumed that the Norden bombsight could produce a high degree of accuracy. It assumed that once a target was attacked it was destroyed, rendered inoperable. It assumed that the vital centers of an industrial society could be determined and systematically destroyed. And, it was assumed that escort fighter aircraft were unnecessary. The AAF failed to examine objectively the lessons learned from the British experiences in the first two years of the war. The fear of amalgamation into the British bombing program and the compulsion for independence from the Army drove the AAF to establish itself as a unique, decisive instrument of war. Its doctrine became dogma, and in its initial daylight raids the bombers suffered heavy losses. On September 5, 1942, the Eighth Air Force attacked the Rouen-Sotteville marshaling yard. Eighty percent of its bombs fell outside the marshaling yard, killing The Legacy of World War II . 51 as many as 140 civilians and wounding another 200. A student of the air war, W. Hays Parks, wrote: "Eighth Air Force's claims of precision bombing were not particularly appreciated by the French, who were justifiably skeptical about the ability to bomb accurately from 25,000 feet. It was a problem that would plague US heavy bombers striking targets in proximity to friendly civilians or Allied ground forces throughout the war; high-altitude formation bombing was not a precision tool." 40 Parks concluded that: "The USA leadership underwent a philosophical change of heart in October 1943," because of the difficulties in destroying point targets, the heavy losses suffered in daylight deep penetration bombing of Germany, perceived British success in area bombing of German cities, and advances in radar technology. On November 1, 1943, General Arnold ordered the heavy bomber forces to carry out radar assisted bombing attacks against selected targets, typically rail yards located in cities, when it was not feasible to bomb point targets visually. This was in essence area bombing. The AAF took part in the bombing of Hamburg, Dresden, and twenty-five other German cities. Still, Hays's conclusions are a bit off the mark. The AAF retained its belief in daylight precision bombing of selected strategically important targets, and throughout the war conducted precision bombing attacks. By the end of 1943, adjustments were being made that facilitated precision bombing. New tactics and technologies were employed. Fighter escorts accompanied the bombers. The range of fighters was extended, enabling them to penetrate deep into Germany. New fighters were put in service. And the size of the Eighth Air Force increased. In February 1944, the AAF was capable of putting 1,046 bombers in the air over Germany. Six months later it almost doubled this capability, putting more than 2,000 in the air. By concentrating on the destruction of German aircraft industry, oil production facilities, and air defense systems, air superiority was gained. By the end of 1944 the Army Air Force and Bomber Command could fly wherever they wanted, whenever they wanted. With air superior- ity the strategic air forces were able to concentrate destructive power on key industries, such as, oil production facilities or the German national railway system. How effective was the American strategic bombing campaign in damaging the ability of Germany to make war? The authors of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey wrote: Because the German economy through most of the war was substantially undermobilized, it was resilient under air attack. Civilian consumption was high during the early years of the war and inventories both in trade channels and consumers' possession were also high. These helped cushion the people of the German cities from the effects of bombing. Plants and machinery were plentiful and incompletely used. Thus it was comparatively easy to substitute unused or partly used machinery for that which was destroyed. While there was constant pressure throughout for German manpower for the Wehrmacht, the industrial labor supply, as augmented by foreign labor, was sufficient to permit the diversion of large numbers to the repair of bomb damage or the clearance of debris with relatively small sacrifice of essential production. 41 German production rose throughout most of the war, and only in late 1944 did it start to decline as a result of the strategic bombing campaign. National industrial economies were not easily brought to the point of collapse by bombing. The resilience of the German economy disproved the AAF s axiom that: "air force action has the possibility for such far reaching effectiveness that such action may produce immediate and decisive results." Excess capacity, greater efficiencies, extended hours of operation, increased labor, the shift in production from civilian to military goods, the substitution of products, the ability to repair damaged facilities, and numerous other factors precluded the AAF from achieving the decisive victory it sought. A student of the German economy, Alfred C. Mierzejewski, concluded that the Allies concen- trated their efforts on the wrong target late in 1944. He noted that, "Oil was not crucial to German industry . . . assault on Germany's petroleum resources could not have harmed the Reich's basic 52 • The American Culture ofWar industrial economy." 42 German industry was fueled by coal. Mierzejewski concluded that, given the geographic divisions in the German economy the national railway the "Reichsbahn," was essential to the continued survival of Nazi Germany. He wrote: "the Reichsbahn distributed the economy's life blood— coal. The coal/transport nexus was the very core of the division of labor. As long as it functioned, the mechanism could continue to produce. If it were severed, then the economy would necessarily, though not immediately, crash to the ground." Thus the final collapse of the German economy was delayed by the failure to identify the decisive target. Mierzejewski's work demonstrates the difficulty in determining what was decisive in a modern industrial economy. It can be argued that modern industrial economies were extremely resilient and flexible, adapting quickly to numerous difficulties, and that the destruction of the Reichsbahn would have caused further adaptation. In addition, the system of production in each state was differently organized. Hence, what was decisive in one state was not necessarily decisive in another. While it cannot be argued that either the British or the American strategic bombing doctrines proved decisive, strategic bombing contributed mightily to the war effort. The heavy bombers destroyed large parts of the German aircraft industry and thereby helped the Allies gain air superiority. They carried out the "Transportation Plan" that destroyed key junctions in the French transportation system that supported the movement of forces into and out of Normandy. They attacked the V-l "Buzz Bomb" sites, stopping the terror bombing of London. They assisted the tactical air forces in the destruction of the German ground forces. And, they destroyed large parts of Germany's ability to produce fuel, ultimately causing their tanks to run dry in the Battle of the Bulge. While it cannot be argued that the strategic bombing destroyed the will of the German people, it can be argued that, albeit late in the war, it damaged the morale of the German people, creating pessimism and loss of hope. Still, air- power was not decisive in World War II. The offensive ground war in the east and west destroyed the German Army. Airpower facilitated the ground war. However, the cost of precision bombing in men and aircraft was high. At war's end 40,000 airmen had been killed in combat— more men than killed in the entire Marine Corps in World War II— and 6,000 aircraft had been destroyed. The bombing practices of the British and Americans were not static during the war. Bomber Com- mand moved closer to the American practice of precision bombing, improving its ability to hit small targets in darkness and daylight. And the AAF adopted British practices employing radar bombing against targets in the heart of German cities— area bombing. 43 Still, the AAF held tenaciously to the doctrine of precision bombing of selective targets, and in regard to the future of warfare, it was this doctrine that had the potential of making the greatest contribution to the conduct of war. However, when the war ended, the AAF was still incapable of the precision it claimed. To explain the differences in the American approach to the strategic bombing of Japan, Crane wrote: "Yet it is undeniable that for a number of reasons strategic-bombing principles and precedents from Europe contributed to 'the slide to total war' in the bombing of Japan." 44 In both theaters, the AAF fought total wars, employing all its resources to bring the war to an end, and sought a total war objec- tive, the destruction of the enemy government. However, the air war against Japan reached new levels of destruction, and new levels of carnage. On the night of March 9-10, 1945, 325 B-29 Superfortresses from the AAF's Twenty-first Bomber Command dropped 1,665 tons of incendiary bombs into a ten-square-mile target area in Tokyo, Japan. 45 The napalm and magnesium created a huge hurricane of fire that killed an estimated one hundred thousand people. Ninety percent of the structures in Tokyo were constructed out of wood, which greatly intensified the fire. Many people were completely incinerated. Entire families disappeared. Tornadoes of fire sucked the oxygen out of the air, causing people to suffocate. Those individuals who found shelter underground or in hardened structures were baked to death. One account went as follows: The Legacy of World War II . 53 The entire building had become a huge oven three stories high. Every human being inside the school was literally baked or boiled alive in heat. Dead bodies were everywhere in grisly heaps. None of them appeared to be badly charred. They looked like mannequins, some of them with a pinkish complexion. . . . But the swimming pool was the most horrible of all. It was hideous. More than a thousand people, we estimated, had jammed into the pool. The pool had been filled to its brim when we first arrived. Now there wasn't a drop of water, only the bodies of the adults and children who had died. 46 The success of the attack on Tokyo motivated similar attacks on other Japanese cities. As the months went by, General Curtis LeMay's air forces grew stronger in men and bombers. By the end of the war he was capable of putting nearly a thousand B-29s in the air, and more than sixty Japanese cities had been attacked, many of them repeatedly. Cumulatively, this power was more destructive than the atomic bomb. Still, a student of the fire bombing campaign and the decision to employ the atomic bomb concluded: "There might seem to be some solace from the million aggregated horrors of this night in Tokyo to believe that it played some significant role in persuading the Emperor that the war was not only lost but must be halted soon. The story of the events to follow [the event that led to the dropping of the atomic bombs and the final surrender], however, admits of no such ready consolation." 47 In his book, Mission with LeMay, LeMay explained his thinking: General Arnold needed results. Larry Norstad had made that very plain. In effect he had said: "You go ahead and get results with the B-29. If you don't get results, you'll be fired. If you don't get results, also, there'll never be any Strategic Air Forces of the Pacific— after the battle is fi- nally won in Europe, and those ETO forces can be deployed here. If you don't get results it will mean eventually a mass amphibious invasion of Japan, to cost probably half a million more American lives.... 48 Let's see . . . Could use both napalm and phosphorus. Those napalm M-47's. . . . They say that ninety per cent of the structures in Tokyo are built of wood. That's what Intel- ligence tells us, and what the guidebooks and the National Geographic and things like that So if we go in low— at night, singly, not in formation— I think we'll surprise the Japs. . . . But if this first attack is successful, we'll run another, right quick. . . . And then maybe another.. . . Of course magnesium makes the hottest fire, and it'll get things going where probably the napalm might not. But the napalm will splatter farther, cover a greater area. We've got to mix it up. We're not only going to run against those inflammable wooden structures. We're going to run against masonry too. That's where the magnesium comes handy. . . No matter how you slice it, you're going to kill an awful lot of civilians. Thousands and thou- sands. But, if you don't destroy the Japanese industry, we're going to have to invade Japan. And how many Americans will be killed in an invasion of Japan? Five hundred thousand seems to be the lowest estimate. Some say a million. . . . We're at war with Japan. We were attacked by Japan. Do you want to kill Japanese, or would you rather have Americans killed . . . ? I hope you're right Curt. . . . Crank her up. Let's go. 49 These passages offer insight into LeMay's thinking about the conduct of the air war. LeMay's stra- tegic bombing campaign had four main objectives: first, to prove the effectiveness and dominance of strategic bombing over ground and naval forces; second, to destroy the will of the government of Japan to continue the war; third, to destroy the ability of the Japanese to make war by destroying its industry; and fourth, to destroy the Japanese people who made possible the production necessary for war. While the stated objective of the fire bombing campaign was to destroy the ability of the Japanese to make war and to destroy Japanese industry, LeMay's words and actions indicate that the objective was also to destroy the will of the Japanese government. 54 • The American Culture ofWar Killing Japanese facilitated the accomplishment of both objectives, and was possibly a separate objective. Unlike the American strategic bombing campaign in Europe that emphasized the target- ing of specific industries, the air campaign against Japan targeted cities— "industrial cities." Precision bombing was abandoned. LeMay essentially adopted the British approach to the strategic bombing of Germany— area bombing. He, however, had bigger, more capable aircraft and munitions. Facto- ries and other production sites are typically made up of concrete and steel. Napalm would have little effects on such targets. High-explosive bombs would have performed better against industrial sites containing heavy machinery. Hence, even if we accept the argument that "cottage industries," "the feeder industries" that provided the components for the major industrial sites existed throughout Tokyo and other industrial cities, LeMay's interest in the construction material used in Japanese homes reveals his purpose. This was the same thinking that motivated the British to target the houses of working-class families in Germany. The campaign was designed to kill large numbers of Japanese, and by doing so, destroy the will of the Japanese. While publicly, Arnold stated he abhorred "terror bombing," he told his subordinate airmen that "this is a brutal war and . . . the way to stop the killing of civilians is to cause so much damage and destruction and death that the civilians will demand that their government cease fighting." 50 Ideas of racism, social Darwinism, and imperialism; emotions of hate, anger, and revenge; and strong desires to limit American casualties and demonstrate the dominance of airpower mixed with the limitations of men, aircraft, and munitions to produce the strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese. John Dower noted: Prejudice and racial stereotypes frequently distorted both Japanese and Allied evaluations of the enemy's intentions and capabilities. Race hate fed atrocities, and atrocities in turn fanned the fires of race hate. The dehumanization of the Other contributed immeasurably to the psychological distancing that facilitates killing, not only on the battlefield but also in the plans adopted by strategists far removed from the actual scene of combat. Such dehumanization, for example, surely facilitated the decisions to make civilian populations the targets of concentrated attacks, whether by conventional or nuclear weapons. In countless ways, war words and race words came together in a manner which did not just reflect the savagery of the war, but contributed to it by reinforcing the impression of a truly Manichaean struggle between completely incompatible antagonists. The natural response to such a vision was an obsession with extermination on both sides— a war without mercy. 51 While Dower's argument does not adequately take into consideration the influence of Japanese culture — the inability to surrender and the willingness to die for the emperor— he identified Ameri- can cultural norms that motivated behaviors and influenced the conduct of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. Race mattered. Americans drew sharp distinctions between their Japanese enemy and their German enemy. An article published in Marine Corps Gazette in November 1944 made the following distinctions: The savageries committed by Nazi Germans throughout Europe show that even the most civilized people can relapse into barbarism within a short time. But while German "rebarba- rization" is a recent phenomenon produced by the Hitler madness and may be expected to pass with it, Japanese savagery is deep and primordial, and an integral part of the Japanese character through the ages. It is no newly acquired characteristic, but a product of inheritance which has been carefully nurtured and preserved by Japanese religion, tradition, and political indoctrination Yet beneath the trappings of modernity the Japanese have remained what they always were— barbarians. . . . Japan's conduct is the result of savage, warlike racial traits shaped to a code of barbarism 52 The Legacy of World War II . 55 The author believed that racially: "the average Japanese soldier embodying the characteristics of his nation is a savage, dirty, and treacherous, but also tough and fanatic— and at times a wholly fantas- tic—fighter. . . ." Still, this was only one of many factors, and it was not the major factor that motivated the decisions to carry out the fire bombing campaign and to employ the atomic bomb. By war's end, LeMay's B-29s had produced 2.2 million casualties, 900,000 of whom were killed, a figure that exceeds Japanese combat casualties. Sixty-eight of Japan's largest cities were attacked, scorching 178 square miles, or 40 percent of urban areas. This unparalleled destruction caused Ar- nold and LeMay to conclude that the strategic bombing campaign had effectively destroyed the will of the Japanese: "the Japanese acknowledged defeat because air attacks, both actual and potential, had made possible the destruction of their capability and will for further resistance." The question that was never answered is: at what level of killing does the effort to influence the will of the people become mass murder, genocide? 53 Cultures in which hereditary rulers are considered gods could suffer horrendous loss without revolt. The Japanese people were culturally, psychologically, and emotionally disposed to accept genocide. Brodie wrote: "In Japan there was no more tendency than there was in Germany for the low morale to find expression in any organized popular movement to revolt, or in manifest pressure upon the government to surrender. On the contrary, the Emperor's announcement of the surrender was appar- ently greeted by a majority of the population with stunned disbelief and dismay." 54 In Japanese culture, it was considered an honor to die for the emperor, and a dishonor to surrender. A Japanese soldier explained: "When a Japanese surrenders ... he commits dishonor. One must forget him completely. His wife and his poor mother and children erase him from their memories. There is no memorial placed for him. It is not that he is dead. It is that he never existed." 55 Unconditional surrender meant the occupation of the nation-state by foreign troops, the destruction of the accepted government, and the complete subjugation to the will of a foreign people and culture — an intolerable situation for most of humanity. People, once hostilities have started, tend to have few options in total war, except to support the leaders in power. The argument that LeMay 's objective was to destroy the will of the people is only partially correct. The objective was also to destroy the will of the Japanese political leaders with the belief that the hope- lessness of the situation, the systematic destruction of their homeland, and the suffering and deaths of their people would influence their decision making. Conventional bombing, however, had very little potential to influence the will of political leaders who believed that people are nothing but instruments of the state. The British bombing of German cities and the American fire bombing of Japan did little to influence the will of Hitler or the Emperor and ruling oligarchy in Japan. Rather than surrender, they would have accepted the deaths of millions of their people. Pape, concluded: The evidence shows that it is the threat of military failure, which I call denial, and not threats to civilians, which we may call punishment, which provides the critical leverage in conventional coercion governments are often willing to countenance considerable civilian punishment to achieve important territorial aims [or to survive]. Consequently, coercion based on punishing civilians rarely succeeds. The key to success in conventional coercion is not punishment but denial, that is the ability to thwart the target state's military strategy for controlling the objec- tives in dispute. 56 Pape's work has been controversial. He argued that neither the fire bombing, nor the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender: "In comparison to the Soviet entry, the atomic bomb had little or no effect on the Army's position." 57 He further argued that it was the American victory at Okinawa and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria that caused Japan to surrender. The argument that the atomic bomb did not influence the decision making in Japan does not stand up under scrutiny. Premier Suzuki in 56 • The American Culture ofWar December 1945 wrote: "They [the Army] proceeded] with that plan [Ketsu-Go to defend Japan] until the Atomic Bomb was dropped, after which they believed the United States . . . need not land when it had such a weapon; so at that point they decided that it would be best to sue for peace." 58 Frank, in his comprehensive study, concluded: "the Soviet intervention was a significant but not decisive reason for Japan's surrender. . . . [T]he atomic bomb played the more critical role because it undermined the fundamental premise that the United States would have to invade Japan to secure a decision." 59 Still, the conclusion that the firebombing of Japan had little affect on the ruling oligarchy is correct. The tenacity of political leaders, and their willingness to accept human losses, is not something that can be measured. Human nature, cultures, history, ideologies, the political systems, and the personali- ties of the rulers influence the ability of a people and government to sustain bombing. The percentage of a people that would have to be killed to destroy the will of a government or a people varies with each nation. And modern nationalism has been a strong force in motivating the actions of people. To base the outcome of war on the numbers of civilian men, women, and children one can kill is not only inhumane, it is impractical. This doctrine of war taken to its extreme is genocide. In the latter half of the twentieth century, with the doctrines of "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union adopted a doctrine of mutual extermination. But, no side wins such a war. The strategic bombing doctrine carried out by the British and the Americans in World War II was a version of this thinking, and was limited only by the technology of the time. Had the British and Americans possessed limitless supplies of atomic bombs in World War II, there is little doubt that they would have used them. Truman addressed the nation shortly after the employment of the first atomic bomb: Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. . . . The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many folds. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are now in production and even more powerful forms are in development. It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power had been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East. . . . We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every produc- tive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japans power to make war. 60 Truman's words were poorly chosen. They created the impression that the atomic bomb was used for revenge, when in fact it saved hundreds of thousands of lives, possibly millions. Truman's words have provided too many shortsighted historians with the data they needed to charge him with racism, and the unnecessary destruction of more than 200,000 Japanese lives. As a consequence, too many Japanese and Americans fail to understand that the atomic bomb saved lives, and was absolutely the best outcome the Japanese could have expected or achieved in 1945. The results of the strategic bombing campaign in World War II mattered little to American beliefs about the future potential of airpower. America's belief in airpower was so strong and so infectious that it drove post war developments. This vision of airpower was reinforced by fundamental cultural tenets, specifically the tenet that man was not a means to an end, but the end. Ground war upset this tenet. Airpower offered a means to diminish this misuse of humanity. Hence, the effectiveness of the British and American campaigns in World War II was only of secondary importance. The dream, the vision had been created. And there was no turning back. The Legacy of World War II . 57 The Navy and Marine Corps The missions of the United States Navy in World War II were not too dissimilar from those of the Athenian Navy during the Peloponnesian War or those of the British Navy during the Napoleonic Wars: to seek out and destroy the enemy's navy; to seek out and destroy the enemy's merchant fleet; to control strategically important sea lines of communication; to seize advanced bases, which made it possible to project power deep into enemy space; and to deploy, support, and sustain land forces. During World War II, the U.S. Navy also adopted a vision of war dominated by airpower. After the impressive Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the battle of Midway in June 1942, the aircraft car- rier became the dominant platform for the conduct of naval warfare, replacing the battleship. Navy aircraft carriers task force doctrine made possible the Central Pacific campaign, which gave the Army Air Force and Army access to the main Japanese islands. (The final Campaign, Operation Downfall, never took place. The atomic bomb rendered the invasion unnecessary.) The aircraft carrier also made it possible for the Navy to move beyond its traditional wartime missions. Air superiority, close air support, air interdiction of land forces, air reconnaissance, and even strategic bombing became naval aviation missions, extending the Navy's reach well beyond coastal regions and deep into the interior of enemy nations. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, reported: Our fleet in World War II was not solely engaged in fighting enemy fleets. On numerous occa- sions a large part of the fleet effort was devoted to operations against land objectives. A striking example is the capture of Okinawa. During the three months that this operation was in progress our Pacific Fleet— the greatest naval force ever assembled in the history of the world — was engaged in a continuous battle which for sustained intensity has never been equaled in naval history; yet at this time the Japanese Navy had virtually ceased to exist — we were fighting an island, not an enemy fleet. 61 Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Central Pacific Theater, added his prestige to this expanded vision of the role of naval aviation: "Fleets do not exist only to fight other fleets and to contest with them the command of the sea. Actually, command of the sea is only the means to an end. Wars cannot be concluded by naval action alone or by air action alone. Wars are conducted and concluded by the combined action of sea, land, air, diplomatic, and economic effort...." 62 Aviators ultimately came to dominate the Navy. The Navy's efforts to expand its role in war were in part out of the necessity, the desire to employ all resources available to bring the war to a rapid conclusion. However, the long-range strategic bomber presented new institutional challenges to the Navy. Alexander P. De Seversky in his work, Victory Through Air Power, published in 1942, wrote: "Clearly the time is approaching when even the phrase 'sea power' will lose all real meaning. All military issues will be settled by relative strength in the skies. At that time, I dare to foresee, by the inexorable logic of military progress, the Navy as a separate entity will cease to exist. The weapons it represents will have atrophied to the point where it is, at best, a minor auxiliary of air power." 63 The atomic bomb that ended the war strengthened the argument that airpower provided by the Air Force could replace the need for naval forces. As a result, the Navy was put on the defensive shortly after the war ended, and to insure its continued existence, the Navy sought new missions and roles, specifically part of the nuclear strategic bombing mission that the Air Force claimed exclusively for itself. Thus, before the war ended, the conflict between the Air Force and Navy that would last into the twenty- first century was framed. 58 • The American Culture ofWar During World War II, the Marine Corps became the Navy's primary army for fighting the Central Pacific campaigns of Admirals King and Nimitz. Prior to World War II, the Marine Corps had a rich tradition in fighting Americas "small wars" south of the U.S. border. 64 However, its experiences in World War II exerted the dominant influence on Marine culture. The U.S. Marine Corps is first and foremost a light infantry force. The most fundamental tenet of Marine culture is that man is the dominant instrument on the battlefield. The second most fundamental tenet is that marines are better fighting men than soldiers. The primary reason for this permanent disposition was survival as an organization in the U.S. military establishment. The Marine Corps has always felt the need to justify its existence. The Army has at times argued that the Marines were unnecessary, that the Army itself performed the same functions. The Marine Corps by asserting that marines were better fighting men established itself as the anti-Army. During World War II, the Marine Corps established itself in opposition to the Army, as a better alternative to the Army. The Marine Corps constructed and cultivated an image of an elite fighting force. To be elite, it had to compare itself to some norm, some point of reference against which elite status could be determined. The U.S. Army was that norm and point of reference. Never comprising more than two corps, Marine Crops thinking was confined to the operational and tactical levels of war. At the strategic level the Navy dominated Central Pacific planning. 65 The Central Pacific campaign was strategically significant in providing access to Japan making possible the strategic bombing campaign, the employment of the atomic bomb, and had it been necessary, the invasion of Japan. 66 Besides fighting the Central Pacific campaign, the Marine Corps' greatest strategic contribution to World War II was the development of an amphibious warfare doctrine in concert with the Navy. 67 The doctrine developed by the Marine Corps and Navy made possible the Central Pacific campaign, and became the type of warfare for which the Marines were best known. While the Marine Corps influenced the outcome of battles and campaigns, it has never been the decisive element in the conduct of war. The outcomes of World War II, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom would have been the same with or without the Marine Corps. To be sure, the Marine Corps facilitated the conduct of these wars, but the Marine Corps is a tactical and operational force. Marine forces are light infantry, with integrated close air support. Marine divisions were not de- signed, organized, trained, or equipped to fight Western armies.. The Marines maintained no infantry divisions capable of fighting on the World War II European battlefields, no armor or mechanized divisions, and no airborne and Ranger forces. 68 Marine divisions lacked the artillery, engineer, air defense artillery, armor, transportation, and supply and logistical units common to Western armies, and had no capability to conduct mechanized, maneuver warfare. For example, Marine force could not fight a German Panzer Division, or any other mechanized force. And had it reorganized to do so, it would have looked too much like a heavy Army division, and there would have been no point in maintaining a separate service. Hence, the preferred "Western way of war" was not the Marine way of war. This situation continued throughout the Cold War, and existed in Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. Marines have little experience in fighting other Western cultures. If it can be argued that military forces learn from their experiences, learn from the most traumatic battles in the life of the service, then it can be argued that the Marine way of war has multiple influence, but is less a function of the Western way of war, and more a function of its experiences against the Japanese. In some ways the Marine way of war mirrored the Japanese way of war. In World War II, Marines fought Japanese forces, who tended to fight to the last man, who used direct banzai charges and suicidal Kamikaze attacks, but who lack the mechanization and logistical resources to fight maneuver warfare against Western armies. The war in the Pacific was more primitive and visceral than the war in Europe. Geography also influence the Marine way of war. During World War II, geography, in part, dictated the character of Marine operations. Marines fought in one theater of war, across a vast expanse of eight The Legacy of World War II . 59 thousand miles of ocean. Marine operations were typical short, intense, hard-fought, bloody affairs. 69 The 2nd Marine Division that opened the Central Pacific Campaign fought for Tarawa for five days, from November 20 to 24, 1943. It did not see combat again until June 15, 1944, the campaign for Saipan, which lasted twenty- five days. From Tarawa to the end of the war the 2nd Marine Division fought a total of 38 days. Including the fight for Guadalcanal it was in combat for 208 days. 70 The 3rd Marine Division, activated on September 16, 1942, saw a total of 45 days of combat. It fought at Guam from July 12 to August 15, 1944, 21 days, and at Iwo Jima from February 21 to March 16, 1945, 24 days. The 4th Marine Division fought in four battles and saw a total of 70 days of combat. 71 The 5th Marine Division was in combat just over a month, 35 days, and the 6th Marine Division saw less than three months of combat, 82 days. These operations influenced the Marine culture of war. Short, direct, intense, bloody combat came to characterize the Marine way of war. The short duration of and recov- ery time between battles diminished the psychological trauma of war. It was easier for marines to put forth a maximum effort for short periods of time, armed with the knowledge that battle would last a few days or a few months, at the most, and that the enemy was isolated and could not be reinforced. Consider Navy and Marine Corps Central Pacific operations. The Navy isolated the battlefield, the island, and naval gunfire provided the firepower required for the marines to get ashore. Following an intensive bombardment, the Marines conducted a direct frontal assault supported by naval gunfire and marine and naval aviation. Battles were based on the principles of mass, firepower, and speed. As the war progressed, the Japanese defensive doctrine evolved. To compensate for the enormous firepower superiority provided by naval gunfire, the Japanese moved their main defensive line inland, away from exposed beaches, and underground. Throughout the war, the Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine changed little. As Japanese defensive doctrine adapted to Navy and Marine Corps offensive doctrine, the latter became less effective. With the exception of continuously strengthening firepower, an attribute of American culture, there was little adaptation to changes in Japanese defensive doctrine. A study of Marine and Navy amphibious doctrine reveals that both the number of ships and the length of the bombardment increased throughout the war. The Naval gunfire fleet at Peleliu consisted of five battleships, eight cruisers, and fourteen destroyers— a fleet more than twice the size of that employed to support the 1st Infantry Division at Omaha Beach. At Iwo Jima the naval bombardment went on for more than three days. At Omaha Beach it lasted thirty minutes. While the Marines fought some very difficult and bloody battles at places such as Tarawa and Iwo Jima, there was in fact, no way for them to lose. The Japanese had no way to reinforce, no way to resupply, no way to retreat, no way to evacuate, no way to equal the firepower of the U.S. Navy, and frequently no airpower. The Japanese literally had no way to win or survive. (To this date, there is no good, objective, analytical history of Marine Corps/Navy doctrine and operations in the Central Pacific in World War II. The major problem is that Marine campaigns were shrouded in myth, legend, and politics before an objective study could be carried out and published.) The Japanese recognized their fate. They well understood the futility of their situation. However, their objective was not to achieve victory in the traditional sense. Their objective was to inflict as many casualties as possible on American forces, to hold out as long as possible, and to prolong the war. The Japanese believed they could destroy the will of the American people. They concluded, partly on the basis of their own racism, that Americans lacked the tolerance to fight a long, bloody war, and that at a some undefined level of attrition they would negotiate a settlement. 72 This strategy was also based on the assumptions that the Germans would defeat the Russians and the British, leaving the United States isolated and alone; and that the primary interests of the United States were in Europe. 73 Faced with this situation and a protracted bloody war of attrition, the Japanese believed the United States would negotiate a favorable peace, making it possible for them to focus all their resources on the most dangerous threat, Nazi Germany. In the Pacific the Japanese fought a limited war for limited objectives. Given the in- evitable outcome of these battles for Central Pacific islands, the major problem facing the Navy and 60 • The American Culture ofWar Marine Corps was determining which islands had to be taken to continue the advance and how best to secure an island and limit casualties. At Iwo Jima, Peleliu, and Okinawa the Japanese inflicted sufficiently heavy casualties to convince senior Navy leaders in the Pacific that an assault on the main Japanese islands would produce un- sustainable casualties. Nimitz argued against the operational and tactical doctrines that he had used repeatedly in the Navy's advance across the Central Pacific. He noted that, "it would be unrealistic to expect that such obvious objectives as a southern Kyushu and the Tokyo Plain will not be as well defended as Okinawa. . . . Unless speed is considered so important that we are willing to accept less than the best preparation and more than minimum casualties, I believe that the long range interest of the U.S. will be better served if we continue to isolate Japan & to destroy Jap forces & resources by naval and air attack." 74 Nimitz was slow coming to this conclusion. Still, the Japanese had partially achieved their strategic objective, by convincing Nimitz that the strategic bombing and the naval blockade campaigns ought to be continued and the invasion postponed, at least until further attrition of Japa- nese forces took place. However, Generals MacArthur and Marshall rejected this view. 75 The Army in the Southwest Pacific had suffered fewer casualties than the Marine Corps. As a percentage of total forces deployed, the Army had achieved its objectives at Leyte, Luzon, and other Pacific battlefields with considerably fewer casualties.. This fact influenced Marshall and Mac Arthur's decision. Had it not been for the atomic bomb, the invasion of Japan would have taken place. Marine Corps casualties can be explained in part by the types of operations it fought. Operations in the Pacific frequently left Navy and Marine planners with no choice: On islands such as Tarawa, the entire campaign was necessarily one continuous assault. However, Peleliu and other campaigns show that the Marine way of war also tended to produce the bloodiest solution. 76 General Holland Smith, USMC, characterized Marine thinking, "The way to beat these bastards is to hit them hard. Gain contact all along the front and then never let go. Keep after them all the time, give them no chance to rest or reorganize and they can't take it. . .." 77 He later wrote: Since I first joined the Marines, I have advocated aggressiveness in the field and constant offensive action. Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting. Give the enemy no rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces and hit back at you. ... I stressed the need for heavy and concentrated support from naval gunfire, a subject I cannot refrain from mentioning time and time again because of its vital bearing on the success of amphibious warfare The stronger the defenses the heavier, more prolonged and more effective should be the bombardment, over periods as short as three days and as long as ten days. 78 Marine general O. P. Smith characterized the operations of Colonel Chesty Puller, who at Umur- borgol Ridge on Peleliu rejected the opportunity to attack the enemy's flank and instead decided to attack the enemy's strength: " [Puller] believed in momentum; he believed in coming ashore and hitting and just keep on hitting and trying to keep up the momentum." Later, while surveying the battlefield, Smith stated: "there was no finesse about it, but there was gallantry and there was determination." 79 The Marine culture of war emphasized firepower, speed, offensive operations and tactics, the direct approach, aggressiveness, endurance, and tenacity. At Peleliu these attributes of the Marine way of war caused the 1st Marine Division to hammer itself to death in frontal attacks against well-established Japanese defenses. The division was ultimately rendered combat ineffective after thirty days in battle , and had to be relieved. However, these same qualities of character displayed by Chesty Puller at Umur- borgol Ridge saved the 1 st Marine Division at the Chosin Reservior in North Korea in the winter 1950, from certain defeat at the hands of the Chinese Communist Forces. 80 There is a place for doggedness in war. And, these qualities were not unique to the Marine Corps. The Japanese also displayed them, The Legacy of World War II . 61 as did the U.S. Army. The 1st Infantry Division at Omaha Beach, and the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, when completely surrounded by German Panzer Divisions during the Battle of the Bulge, demonstrated similar behaviors. And no one doubts Marine courage, will to win, and aggressiveness. What is sometime doubted in Marine common sense. There were two major problems with the Marine conduct of battle at Peleliu, only one of which was part of the Marine way of war. The division commander at Peleliu, Major General William H. Rupertus, after permitting Puller to hammer his Marines against the front door time after time, should have ordered him to try the side door, which later proved to be easier to open. Every division commander needs bulldog regimental commanders such as Puller. The problem arises when you have two bulldog characters in the immediate chain of command. In this situation common sense can be lost. This was one of the problems at Peleliu. In Korea Major General O. P. Smith did a much better job in manag- ing his bulldog, Puller, than did Rupertus. The other and more serious problems was the preference of the Marine Corps to go it alone, to reject assistance from the Army, to seek solutions that did not involve the Army. This tenet of the Marine way of war would continue in to the twenty-first century, and it caused Marines to use their forces in ways for which they were not designed. Marines preferred to operate independently of the Army. 81 Craig Cameron in his book, American Samurai, a study of Marine attitudes, beliefs, and culture, wrote: "The largest and most serious in- terservice conflict developed between the Army and Marine Corps over their different approaches to the conduct of ground operations in the [Central] Pacific theater. These invidious comparisons have continued to this day and remain, at best, thinly disguised'.'" 2 This disposition was a function of the perceived inferiority of Army soldiers, and the Marine claim to elite status. This disposition aggravated relations between the two services making it difficult for them to communicate and achieve synergy on the battlefield. According to the Marine historian, Allan Millett, Marines believed that "the Corps embodied standards of bravery, success, and economy not found in the Army." 83 Another Marine noted "My answer as to why the Marines get the toughest jobs is because the average leatherneck is a much better fighter. He has far more guts, courage and better officers. . .." 84 The presence of the Army in the Pacific Theater distorted the Marine conduct of battle, in part, because it threatened Marine independence, and perhaps, in the minds of Marines, its existence. Cam- eron noted, "resentment and animosity toward the Army were deeply ingrained . . . and from the outset of the planning, he [Rupertus, ] wanted the capture of Peleliu to be solely a Marine venture. . . . [H]e wanted no support from the 81st Infantry Division." 85 In other words, Marine disdain for the Army, at times, went beyond rational behavior, to the point where leadership would rather expend Marine lives than depend on the Army. These same attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions have been evident in every major war since World War II, including current operations in Iraq. During World War II, they hardened into cultural tenets that influenced the relationship between the Army and Marine Corps to the presence making it impossible for the two services to fight with synergy on the same battlefield. Animus between the services distorted their approach to war and damaged the ability of the United States to achieve political objectives and maintain the support of the American people. The allocation of the nations human and material resources for total war reveals American thinking about war. In March 1945 the Army reached its peak strength of 8,157,386 men. Of these forces, the Army Air Force accounted for 2,290,573, and Army Service Forces accounted for 1,644,141. Army Ground Forces accounted for 3,147,837 men. However only 1,968,500 of these were combat soldiers, and of these forces all did not participate in combat. Only 55 percent of Army divisions were com- bat soldiers, when limited to men in companies, batteries, and troops of the combat arms. 86 Russell Weigley observed: 62 • The American Culture ofWar In some ways, to be sure, the United States actually fought World War II with the wealth of resources implied by the country's overall abundance and by the American popular perception of the war. The Army Ground Forces were thin in combat strength partly because so much of the Army's manpower occupied logistical and administrative positions intended to assure plentiful supplies and as high as possible a standard of living for the troops. . . . Nonetheless, the picture remains one of the allocation of a remarkably thin share of World War II wealth and manpower of the United States to ground combat. The contrast with another of the aspects of the war, upon which American wealth was in fact brought to bear, is stark, while the Army stag- gered through much of the war in Europe with barely enough divisions, the Navy in the Pacific enjoyed by 1944 and 1945 a wealth of aircraft carriers and other warships that formed carrier task groups to create more than enough strength to overshadow and overwhelm the Imperial Japanese Navy several times over. 87 Americans preferred to fight wars with technological and material abundance. Therefore, American national strategy and national military strategy reflected these tenets of American culture. American strategic planners sought to minimize the contribution of the Army's ground combat forces to the war effort. Roosevelt's "Arsenal of Democracy" and Lend-Lease strategy kept the allies, the British, Russians, and Chinese, fighting. The emphasis on airpower and naval forces consumed enormous resources. Robert R. Palmer noted: The ability of the United States to conduct ground operations overseas was limited in World War II by a number of factors: by the amount of national resources needed to control the sea and the air, by policies of allowing resources to strategic bombardment and to support of al- lies, by the need of maintaining long supply lines with streams of personnel and equipment constantly in transit over immense distances, and by the effort to provide American soldiers with something corresponding to the American standard of living. The strength of American ground forces is likely always to depend on the degree to which economy in these limiting fac- tors is achieved. 88 Palmer concluded: "If the United States, with 12,000,000 men in its armed services, including those under the Navy Department, can produce less than 100 divisions including those in the Ma- rine Corps, this fact must be considered by all concerned in a future global war, and will certainly be considered by any possible enemies." It was a well thought-out policy to employ other resources as substitutes for ground combat forces. The policy was a function of cultural tenets and was reflected in all aspects of American strategy 89 While the Army's most basic tenet was that man was the ultimate weapon on the battlefield, ground combat was the least desirable American way of war. American beliefs about manhood, battle, and war were at odds with the value placed on young American lives, a value that compels Americans to expend every resource, almost unconditionally to remove man from the battlefield. While the Army has consistently affirmed the cultural tenets that man is the ultimate weapon on the battlefield and that battle is the primary means to victory in war, the American people for the most part relegated these tenets to history, myth, and legend. In the post- World War II era, new options existed that made possible adherence to the more basic, more deeply held tenets of American life, principal among them, that man is not a means to an end, but the end itself. War for centuries has upset this tenet of American life, making American citizens a means to an end. Airpower and other ground war technologies offered new alternatives that the Army could not ignore. 4 Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine In an instant many of the old concepts of war were swept away. Henceforth, it would seem, the purpose of an aggressor nation would be to stock atom bombs in quantity and to employ them by surprise against the industrial fabric and population centers of its intended victim. Offensive methods would largely concern themselves with the certainty, the volume, and the accuracy of delivery, while the defense would strive to prevent such delivery and in turn launch its store of atom bombs against the attacker's homeland. Even the bombed ruins of Germany suddenly seemed to provide but faint warning of what future war could mean to the people of the earth. —General Dwight D. Eisenhower 1 You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life— but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do it on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud. — T. R. Fehrenbach 2 In August 1945, the most significant innovation in the conduct of war in human history was revealed to the world. Two relatively small atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to an abrupt end. The war ended not with the destruction of the Japanese main army on the field of battle, not with the clash of mighty armies, but with two small nuclear devices and two lone B-29 bombers. These technologies caused many military thinkers to believe that armies were obsolete, that their value in future wars would be to mop up after airpower destroyed the enemy, and that a revolution in warfare had taken place, forever transforming the conduct of war. General Maxwell D. Taylor recalled discussing this new technology with Generals Marshall and Patton near the end of World War II, when he and Patton were first informed of the existence of the atomic bomb. Taylor wrote, "General Patton and I looked at each other in silence, both meditating upon the awful significance of Marshall's words. . . . What if we had had such things to clear our way across Europe? Think of the thousands of our brave soldiers whose lives might have been spared. Now, indeed, I thought, we have a weapon which can keep the peace and never again will a Hitler or a Mussolini dare to use war to impose his will upon the Free World." 3 Thus, before the atomic bomb was used against the Japanese, it had created hopes and dreams for saving lives, for winning wars without ground combat, and for deterring war. Eisenhower wrote, "All the develop- ments in method, equipment, and destructive power that we were studying seemed minor innovations 63 64 • The American Culture ofWar compared to the revolutionary impact of the atom bomb. . . . [E]ven without the actual experience of its employment, the reports that reached us after the first one was used at Hiroshima on August 6 left no doubt in our minds that a new era of warfare had begun." 4 In this new era, the role of armies was uncertain, and whatever part they played in future wars, their status would never again equal that achieved in World War II. Truman, the Policy of Containment, and National Strategy President Truman is the only human being in history to order the employment of nuclear weapons against human beings. Truman was President during one of the most momentous and traumatic periods of world history. The events that took place, and his actions, laid the foundation not only for U.S. foreign and military policy, but also for the structure of world politics, and war in the latter half of the twentieth century. During his presidency, World War II came to an end and the cold war began. The Soviet Union became a nuclear power, and China became a Communist nation aligned with it. Under Truman's leadership, the strategic vision of the Policy of Containment and the strategic doctrine of massive retaliation were advanced. NATO was formed, the Marshall Plan enacted, and the Truman Doctrine of military and economic assistance to nations fighting Communist insurgencies implemented. Truman initiated the reorganization and attempted unification of the Armed Forces, Figure 4.1 President Harry S. Truman signs the Armed Forces Day Proclamation making May 19 Armed Forces Day for 1951, during a brief ceremony in the White House. Among those present for the signature ceremonies are Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall (seated at the President's left). Rear row, left to right: Lieutenant General Merwin H. Silverthorn, Assistant Commandant of Marine Corps; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr.; Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews; Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter; General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. U.S. Army photography, April 2, 1951. Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine • 65 which resulted in the creation of the Air Force, Department of Defense, and CIA. Truman, thus, exerted greater influence on the political and military affairs of the planet in the latter half of the twentieth century than did any other human being. However, he did not create the world in which he made the critical decisions that had such far-reaching and long-range effects. He accepted the world as it was, and instituted policies and strategy to preserve the American way of life and that of other Western nations. He too, however, fell prey to impossible dreams and irrational hopes that ultimately cost American lives. What did he inherit? For most of its history, the United States had looked inward, focused on incorporating the landmass between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. However, at the end of the nineteenth century the United States stretched into the Pacific, acquiring an overseas empire, which included the Philippines. In 1917, the United States entered the Great War to help preserve Europe's capitalist democracies. After the First World War, Americans again turned inward, becoming isolationists, eschewing military involvement in European affairs. Witnessing the rise of Nazism, President Franklin D. Roosevelt concluded that this isolationism had been a mistake. He believed that World War II was, at least in part, caused by the failure of the Great Powers to act in world affairs. He advanced the formation of the United Nations, and in 1941, together with Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, in a document known as the Atlantic Charter, committed the United States to the defeat of Nazi Germany. The purpose of this action was to preserve European capitalist democracies, and for the United States to take an active part in world affairs until such time as mankind had reached some new level of political organization that guaranteed peace and security for all states, large and small: [T]hey believe that all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-lov- ing peoples the crushing burden of armaments. 5 Churchill interpreted this objective as follows: "Finally, not the least striking feature was the real- ism of the last paragraph, where there was a plain and bold intimation that after the war the United States would join with us in policing the world until the establishment of a better order? 6 In the Atlantic Charter Roosevelt committed the United States to maintaining the world order that had previously been maintained by Britain and France, but also to improving that order through the United Nations and the export of "Americanism." Roosevelt was a strong advocate for the UN., pressuring Stalin to support the new organization. Following Roosevelt's death, President Harry S. Truman accepted the new role for the United States in world affairs — the special place of America among nations, the dominance of the power of this country, and the burden of leadership it created. In 1945 he told the American people: Whether we like it or not, we must all recognize that the victory which we have won [World War II] has placed upon the American people the continuing burden of responsibility for world leadership. The future peace of the world will depend in large part upon whether or not the United States shows that it is really determined to continue in its role as a leader among na- tions. It will depend upon whether or not the United States is willing to maintain the physical strength necessary to act as a safeguard against any future aggressor. Together with the other United Nations, we must be willing to make the sacrifices necessary to protect the world from future aggressive warfare. In short, we must be prepared to maintain in constant and immediate 66 • The American Culture ofWar readiness sufficient military strength to convince any future potential aggressor that this nation, in its determination for a lasting peace, means business. 7 Truman, while accepting this new responsibility for the nation, was slow to fully understand the duties that went along with it. Historically, the United States had not maintained large standing forces immediately ready for war. This new level of commitment of national resources to the defense of foreign shores marked a major change in U.S. foreign policy and national strategy. The rapid collapse of the British Empire, the advance of Communism, and the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb placed expanding new demands on the United States. However, not until North Korea attacked South Korea did Truman fully comprehend and accept the new duties placed upon the United States; even after the start of hostilities the American people were uncertain about their country's new duties in world affairs. The fight that was the cold war created the environment and the conditions for the transforma- tion in American thinking about the use of military force and the conduct of war. The cold war (1945-90) was a period when the two most powerful nation-states on the planet, the United States and the Soviet Union, continuously prepared to go to war with one another, and indirectly fought wars through surrogate, peripheral, nonaligned states. It was a period when these two superpowers formed strategic mutual defense alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to strengthen their ability to defend themselves and destroy their opponents. It was a period of global turmoil, when the exertions of World War II caused the collapse of European imperialism, and nationalism spread to India, Pakistan, China, Indo-China, Africa, the Middle East, and other parts of the world. It was a period of great suffering and carnage in developing states racked by wars as they tried to achieve state- hood, establish legitimate political systems, reconcile borders that were drawn based on the concerns of European imperialist powers, redress racial and ethnic discrimination, and recover and reorganize after decades and centuries of European rule. It was a period during which the extinction of humanity became a real possibility, because each superpower acquired the wherewithal, several times over, to destroy the other, and ultimately civilization. It was a period when the superpowers employed armies of scientists and engineers in a race to develop the most destructive weapons and invincible delivery systems. It was a period when the two superpowers competed for allies to make their blocs stronger, and fought political, diplomatic, and espionage wars to undermine and weaken their opponent's bloc and alliances. It was a period when the world expended vast resources on armies, navies, and air forces, and militarism invaded the social and political fabric of nations. It was a period when America maintained armies, navies, and air forces forward deployed in nations around the world, influencing their economies and internal politics, and Americanizing their cultures. It was a period of distrust, uncertainty, and anxiety, punctuated by moments of high fear and tension; a period of ideological entrenchment, when paranoia invaded governmental institutions and American society, and the police state threatened democracy and individual freedoms. It was also a period of great prosperity in the United States, during which Americanism spread around the globe, and American culture adjusted to the norms of being in a perpetual state of preparing for war or fighting a war. The cold war was ul- timately a fight over the political, economic, social, and cultural systems that would dominate the planet. During this long, costly, and difficult fight, all parties were transformed, politically, geographically, socially, culturally, economically, and militarily. The cold war is much studied, and no effort is made here to reintroduce in a comprehensive manner the history of its origins; however, it is necessary to delineate basic ideas and policies that prevailed throughout the latter half of the twentieth century In 1947, George E Kennan, a Russia analyst at the State Department, published an article that would help shape American foreign and military policies and decisions for the next four decades. Kennan Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine • 67 delineated the Policy of Containment adopted by the Truman Administration, and every subsequent Administration, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. Kennan wrote: In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. ... It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power. Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm contain- ment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. 8 There were three important axioms in the Kennan thesis: first, Communism is not a status quo oriented ideology. Marx, Lenin, and others believed that they had identified a universal truth about the human condition, and that ultimately all nations would go through the same sequence of trans- formations. Communist ideology thus predicted the collapse of capitalism. Many advocates of Com- munism pursued change with the zeal and tenacity of religious conviction, willing to expend resources to transform other states. Second, Russia, which was much older than Communism, was historically an expansionist state, as indicated by its large geographic boundaries and the diversity of its racial and ethnic groups. Finally, Communist ideology contained internal contradictions that could not be reconciled with human behavior; therefore, it would ultimately collapse under the weight of its own ideas. Kennan correctly concluded that ultimately Communism would implode, but when? This nei- ther he nor anyone else could predict. As a consequence, he called for a specific type of containment: "a long-term but firm and vigilant containment." Kennan also presented the American Administration with a problem of interpretation. What did "unalterable counterforce at every point" mean? Did this mean the United States had to go to war to stop every type of incursion? Nations have many types of power: political, geographic, diplomatic, economic, military, creditability of political leadership, and others. One type, or any combination, of powers could be employed in a given situation. But, when was military power justified? And what constituted the necessity for war? Containment destroyed the centuries old determinants for major American wars, and put in place a new set and system of determinants. While changing the determinants for war, the United States left in place its traditional system for fighting war, its citizen-soldier Army. No one asked whether the cultural tenets upon which the citizen- soldier Army functioned were still applicable given the new set and system of determinants for war. The Korean and Vietnam Wars were fought under this new equation of determinant factors. And, each Administration had to figure out what "every point" meant to it. However, beyond their size, the questions on the quality and character of ground forces required to police the world were never seriously discussed. The Policy of Containment meant intellectually that the Armed Forces of the United States had to remain in a permanent state of military readiness to provide the counterforce required to maintain the peace or fight war until the Soviet Union collapsed from its "deficiencies." The Truman Administra- tion and the Congress, however, opposed spending the money required to maintain American forces 68 • The American Culture ofWar at the state of readiness the service Chiefs believed was necessary given the Soviet worldwide threat. Memories of the Great Depression ran deep, and in the aftermath of World War II, given the totality of that war, it was difficult to imagine a ground war that would not escalate into nuclear war. Strategic airpower had become the decisive doctrine for the conduct of war. It appeared to offer the United States the means of maintaining a high state of readiness without wrecking the economy or placing an enormous burden of debt on the American people. Airpower and the atomic bomb gave the nation a deterrent to war, and in the event of total war, a means of devastating the enemy's homeland. Truman also believed that American security was enhanced by diplomatic offensives and economic support to allies. Collective defense agreements, such as, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and The Military Assistance Program were means of enhancing the security of the United States without maintaining a large standing army. On March 12, 1947 the Truman Doctrine was promulgated. This was only the first installment of various military assistance programs that expanded into tens of billions of dollars. Specifically, Truman requested funds from Congress to provide military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey with the objective of helping them defeat Communist guerrillas supported by the Soviet Union. In a larger sense, though, Truman committed the United States to "help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes." The Military Assistance Program (MAP), part of the Truman Doctrine, was a derivation of Roosevelt's Arsenal of Democracy, the Lend-Lease Program of World War II, a program that provided military aid and assistance to nations fighting Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Roosevelt effectively substituted America's material wealth for its human wealth. Truman too accepted this policy, and all subsequent Presidents adopted similar MAPs. In September 1949, Army Chief of Staff, General Bradley, before the House Foreign Affairs Com- mittee outlined the nation's military strategy: These factors are the foundation of a sound strategy for collective defense. ... In our approach to this arms aid program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have followed the principle that the man in the best position, and with the capability, should do the job for which he is best suited. Further, our recommendations for this program have been predicated upon this basic principle, and upon the following assumed factors: First, the United States will be charged with the strategic bombing. We have repeatedly recognized in this country that the first priority of the joint defense is our ability to deliver the atomic bomb. Second, the United States Navy, and the Western Union naval powers, will conduct essential naval operations, including keeping the sea lanes clear. Western Union and other nations will maintain their own harbor and coastal defense. Third, we recognize that the hard core of the ground-power-in-being will come from Europe, aided by other nations as they can mobilize. Fourth, England, France, and the closer countries will have the bulk of the short-range attack bombardment, and air defense. We, of course, will maintain the tactical air force for our own ground and naval forces, and for United States defense. Fifth, other nations, depending upon their proximity or remoteness from the possible scene of conflict, will emphasize appropriate specific missions. The essence of our overall strategy is this: There is a formidable strength, and an obvious economy of effort, resources, and manpower in this collective strategy, when each nation is capable of its own defense, as part of a collective strategic plan. 9 Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine • 69 This strategy allocated no major role for Army ground forces. European ground forces were to defend Europe. Bradley was arguing for the Military Assistance Program, which passed Congress late in 1949. The Congress appropriated $1,314,010,000 for military assistance to North Atlantic Treaty countries, to Greece and Turkey, to Iran, Korea, and the Philippines, and to the general China area. This program, along with the Marshall Plan, was to get Western Europe back on its feet after World War II so it could defend itself. American airpower and nuclear capabilities would provide deterrence. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson supported the program of aid to European allies, while at the same time advocating further cuts in the budget for the Armed Forces of the United States. Johnson, in an appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee states: The three fundamentals of military preparedness are: manpower, materials— and suitable posi- tions from which to employ them in the event of attack. The Western European members of the North Atlantic Pact generally have substantial manpower resources. They also have positions of self-evident strategic importance to the defense of the North Atlantic community, including the United States. However . . . they lack the equipment. . . . Under this program, no United States troops will be sent abroad to employ the equipment we will provide. This Military Assistance Program is solely an equipment and a technical and training assistance program. The only United States personnel involved will be a strictly limited number of technical and training specialists to assist and advise the participating countries. 10 Truman substituted America's material wealth for its human wealth. But, how far could the Ad- ministration take such a program, and what degree of control did it give the President to influence events around the world? Technological wealth, primarily in the form of airpower, was also a means of defraying the human cost of war. Throughout the period from 1945 to 1950, Truman reduced the size of the Army. Bradley and other senior Army leaders did not accept this part of the President's national strategy. Bradley argued for a combat-ready Army that was immediately deployable: Because too many Americans are searching for an easy and popular way to armed security through top-heavy trust in air power at the sacrifice of our remaining arms, we are in danger of reckoning our safety on fantasy rather than fact. I do not . . . deny that the threat of instant retaliation through air offensive is our greatest deterrent to war today. But I must part company with those enthusiasts who ascribe to air power limitless capabilities in winning an instant decision. . . . However crippling air attack can be, I am convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that, should this Nation be forced into still another conflict, we shall once more be forced to gain the inevitable victory over our dead bodies— those of our soldiers on the ground. If I did not believe that war in the future will still thrust its eventual burden on the soldier who fights on the ground, then I would readily recommend abolition of the Army. ..." Bradley found it necessary to respond to attacks on the Army: "Because the Army cannot subscribe to the thesis that air power is a self-sufficient power capable of single-handed victory in a global war, I am dismayed that those who dare question it should be tagged as ox-cart soldiers in an atomic age. And I am alarmed that the Army's insistence on a combined defensive force should be distorted in the minds of some Americans as stubborn opposition to the strengthening of air power." 12 For the next decade the Army was on the defensive, ultimately fighting a losing battle. 70 • The American Culture ofWar Strategic Airpower and National Military Strategy In 1947, the President established an Air Policy Commission to develop recommendations on the employment of airpower in future wars. Following an intensive five-month study, the commission presented a 166-page report, which emphasized the importance of airpower, the concept of massive retaliation, sustained readiness and modernization, and the willingness to discard the old ways of war: Relative security is to be found only in a policy of arming the United States so strongly (1) that other nations will hesitate to attack us or our vital national interests because of the violence of the counterattack they would have to face, and (2) that if we are attacked we will be able to smash the assault at the earliest moment. This country, if it is to have even relative security, must be ready for war. Moreover, it must be ready for modern war. It must be ready not for World War II but for a possible World War III. To realize this double-barrelled policy will be as difficult a task as this country has ever taken on. Nothing less than a reversal of our traditional attitudes towards armaments and national sovereignty can make it succeed. Heretofore the United States has been able to make most of its preparations for war after war began. This will not be the case in a future war. . . . This means an air force in being, strong, well equipped and modern, not only capable of meeting the attack when it comes but, even more important, capable of dealing a crushing counteroffensive blow on an aggressor. 13 The authors of the report recognized that the way the people of the United States thought about war had to change, and that the pre- World War II national strategies no longer worked. They believed that the U.S. Air Force had to be ready for war on January 1, 1953. It was believed that other nations would have a sustained nuclear weapons program by the end of 1952. Hence, they argued for an in- tensive effort: "The United States must press most energetically and immediately its basic and applied research and development programs in aerodynamics, power plants, electronics, and related fields with a view to developing at the earliest possible date the most effective piloted aircraft and guided missiles and the defenses against them." The commission recommended that the counteroffensive force be constructed around fleets of bombers, accompanying planes, and long-range missiles. They also recommended the construction of a radar defensive system that would create a protective ring around North America. Recognizing that these recommendations would be enormously expensive, the authors cautioned against the continued investment in World War II technology and outmoded thinking: "We view with great anxiety the pressures from many sides directed towards the maintenance of yesterday's establishment to fight tomorrow's war; of unwillingness to discard the old and take on the new; of a determination to advance the interest of a segment at the sacrifice of the body as a whole. All this is understandable. For it comes in large part from loyalty of each Service to its traditions. But we can no longer afford the waste it involves." 14 The recommended strategy and doctrine were clear. Airpower was the future of warfare. Ground forces were the past. Technology had rendered them obsolete. Airpower was new and modern, and eliminated mass armies and the casualties they produced. Joint doctrine was not considered. The report stressed again and again that: "We must have in being and ready for immediate action a coun- teroffensive force built around a fleet of bombers. . . .The strength of the counteroffensive force must be such that it will be able to make an aggressor pay a devastating price for attacking us." Common usage of the term massive retaliation started during the Eisenhower Administration, but the ideas were born during the Truman Administration. In 1948, General Carl Spaatz, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, rendered a report to the Secre- tary of the Air Force, delineating his thinking, which was in concert with the assessments of the Air Policy Commission: Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine • 71 The primary role of military air power is to attack— not other aircraft, but targets on the ground that comprise the source of an enemy's military strength. In the main, those targets are indus- trial: oil refineries, steel mills, engine factories, electric power plants, aluminum smelters, or whatever may be important to military effort. From them flow the arms and weapons, the fuel and ordnance— in short, everything necessary to maintain a fighting force in the field, on the sea, or in the air. Because air power can cut off the flow of the enemy's military strength at its source it can be decisive in war. Because such decisive action should be the foremost aim of air power in war, the area in which those targets lie and over which that attacking aircraft fly to reach them could rightfully be termed the world of air power. 15 In "the world of air power" Spaatz envisioned, the bomber was the primary aircraft, and its targets were the "eight great industrial areas in the world today of sufficient productivity to be significant fac- tors in a full-scale war"— Japan, central Siberia, the Ural Mountains, Moscow, the Don Basin, western Europe, the British Isles, and the northeastern United States. Spaatz concluded that: In World War II, it was clearly shown that a determined attacking force cannot be stopped short of its target. . . . While defensive air power can do much to minimize the effectiveness of an aerial attack, the present capabilities of air weapons do not alter this World War II lesson. . . . The ultimate defense available [as a consequence] to the United States for protection from aerial attack from over the top of the world lie in the maintenance of a striking- force-in-being that could answer aerial aggression with a smashing retaliatory attack. . . . The fact, accepted by all military thinkers, that a future major war would commence with an aerial attack is given par- ticular importance because, if such an attack were carried out with atomic bombs, its results might well be decisive. 16 The Air Power Commission and Spaatz's vision of the future of war were accepted by Truman. Limited conventional wars and Communist insurgencies in peripheral regions were minor consider- ations. Truman wrote, "I was firmly committed to the position that, as long as international agreement for the control of atomic energy could not be reached, our country had to be ahead of any possible competitor. It was my belief that, as long as we had the lead in atomic developments, the great force would help us keep the peace." 17 To maintain this lead, Truman had to increase investment in the production and development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, which in the late 1940s and early 1950s meant strategic bombers. Between May of 1945, the end of the war in Europe, and May 1947, the Air Force dropped from 2,253,000 men to only 303,614. Force modernization lagged, and for the fiscal year 1952, only forty-two air groups were planned. Interservice rivalry in an environ- ment of declining budgets hindered the modernization of all the armed forces. In July 1949, a Special Committee of the National Security Council argued that, "production of atomic weapons should be stepped up." It also recommended that, "the newly developed B-36 bomber be given a priority second only to atomic weapons." The B-36 was the delivery system, a long-range intercontinental bomber capable of dropping the latest atomic weapons. The Air Force was also de- veloping a new command for its strategic bomber, Strategic Air Command (SAC). In this vision of the future of wars what role would the Army fulfill? On March 25, 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal addressed the Senate Armed Services Commit- tee. He delineated his views of the type of military forces necessary to keep the peace: I abhor war, as do all Americans. Because of that abhorrence, I propose today a specific program which is solely designed to achieve one great objective— to avert war.... [W]e cannot afford to sit by while these countries [Hungary and Czechoslovakia] fall, one by one, into the Soviet orbit, until we are left virtually alone and isolated in a Communist world. ... If we make it plain 72 • The American Culture ofWar and clear that the United States will not tolerate the destruction of the Western civilization of Europe we shall have peace. . . . We need a strong Air Force, capable of striking sustained blows far beyond the peripheral bases which we now hold; an Air Force capable of the air defense of homeland and our protective bases, and capable of seeking out and destroying an enemy that might impose war. . . . We need ground forces to protect our air bases from hostile attack, which it takes much more than airplanes to resist. We need ground forces to seize and hold more distant bases, should the attack fall upon us, in order to take the war to the enemy and not suffer its ravages here in America. Such bases, as well as our great cities here at home and our key production centers, require antiaircraft protection, which is provided by the Army. And a strengthened Air Force will require enlargement of those Army elements which service and support its operations. 18 Thus two of the Army's primary missions were to seize advanced bases from which air attacks could initiate, and defend America's cities from air attacks. The Army was to become, at least in part, the Air Forces' "Marine Corps." At the end of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Navy was the primary service for projecting American power across the oceans. The Navy recognized that to protect the newly acquired American empire across the vast Pacific it required advanced maintenance and sup- ply bases to service and protect the fleet. From these advanced bases the Navy could project power around the world and into the enemy's home waters. To secure these bases the Navy needed ground forces, and in the event of war it need ground forces to seize and secure advanced bases from which the fleet could further project power. This mission gave new life and purpose to the Marine Corps, and initiated the development of Central Pacific amphibious warfare doctrine. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, many believed that the Air Force had become the primary service for projecting power. However, the limited range of aircraft and the inability to refuel in the air created a problem for the Air Force similar to that faced by the Navy fifty years earlier. Hence, the Army was to become the "Marine Corps" of the Air Force. The Army was no longer the decisive instrument of war, but an auxiliary tool designed to facilitate the accomplishment of the primary instrument for war, the Air Force. Some argued that the Army should recognize its new role and become subordinate to the Air Force, forming a relationship similar to that of the Navy and Marine Corps. Army leadership accepted the new role of air power, and the missions delineated for the Army by the Air Force. In January 1947, in an address titled "The Postwar Military Establishment and its Man- power Problems," Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, "Lighting Joe," who landed his VII Corps on the beaches of Normandy on June 6, 1944, delineated his understanding of the threats to the security of the United States and his vision of the future of warfare: I think, personally, that the outstanding military lesson gained from the past war is that airpower is the dominant factor of present day warfare We believe that the next war may come with a heavy surprise attack against us and will come by air I would like to picture for you one man's concept of the possible pattern of a war that might be launched against us. . . . With seapower as the chief means of transporting men and supplies, wars of the past have always gone East to West or West to East around the world. We believe that the development of airpower will alter the latitudinal direction of future wars and causes them to be fought "longitudinally" over the "top" of the world. . . . From Siberia, for example, you could take an airplane with a range of 5,000 miles and cover the whole of the United States. . .. 19 Collins also outlined the types of weapons that the United States might have used against it. Before discussing what might be the possible targets for an atomic attack I would like to cover briefly some of the other scientific developments which might be employed in a future war. Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine • 73 The possibility of biological warfare must be considered since it has the capability of destroy- ing people without destroying buildings or other facilities. Biological warfare could be used not only against our armed forces but also against the great mass of people in our large cities. It is also possible that some long-range guided missiles with a range of up to 3,000 miles and one-ton pay load may be developed. However, the outstanding weapon of mass destruction at the present time is the atomic bomb. 20 Collins, like many others, was incapable of clearly seeing the future of war. However, while accepting the Air Force's vision of the future of warfare, Collins concluded that balanced forces were required, that armies and navies were still necessary, that the demobilization of the Army had gone too far, and that to meet future requirements the size of the Army had to be increased. He told his audience: "So when you think in terms of disarmament remember that we have already largely disarmed. Our Army had demobilized 90 percent." The Army also argued for the maintenance of a tactical air force capable of supporting ground operations. The Air Force had almost eliminated its Tactical Air Forces, envisioning little need to support ground forces. A number of crises between 1947 and 1949 caused serious reflection on the state of readiness of the Army. In February 1947, the blatant Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia shocked the Western World. The U.S. Army in Europe under General Lucius D. Clay could only watch. The Army numbered less than 1.4 million soldiers deployed across the planet. Five of the Army's 16 remaining divisions were in Europe — three in Germany, one in Austria, and one in Italy. Bradley and Blair noted: "The Army had almost no combat effectiveness. . . . The Army was thus in no position whatsoever to backstop a get-tough policy of containment vis-a-vis the Soviets. Actually, the Army of 1948 could not fight its way out of a paper bag." 21 On March 30, the Soviets imposed a blockade of all land transportation into and out of Berlin. Through diplomacy the Soviets relented, but in June they again imposed the blockade. The Berlin airlift made it possible for the United States and Europe to sustain the inhabitants of the city during the two-year crisis. On May 12, 1949, the blockade ended with 277,804 sorties that delivered 2,325,809 tons of food and supplies over a twenty-six month period. While the crisis was managed and viewed as a victory for Truman, the status of the Army continued to decline. On April 14, 1948, Army Chief of Staff General Omar N. Bradley addressed the House Armed Services Committee. He presented his views of the Army's role in national defense: Success in modern war can come only through a carefully planned employment of balanced land, sea, and air forces operating as a team. Air bases will unquestionably be necessary. These bases are defensive, to prevent attack on our homeland, and offensive, to permit the air effort to be carried to the enemy. This being so, the land forces — the Army— will be responsible for seizing and holding bases from which the air effort may be most effectively launched. . . . The Army will also play a large part in preventing the enemy from holding bases from which he can attack our bases and the United States itself. . . . At the outbreak of an emergency, or before it takes place, the Army must be prepared: to oc- cupy those areas from which air attacks could be launched against our industrial cities; it must be prepared to give protection against bombing, sabotage, and fifth column attacks to the most vital installations, including the atomic energy plants; and, it must be able to seize the overseas areas of vital importance to our communications and to our Air Forces. The units for this job must be in being, up to strength, fully equipped, and trained. Advanced bases are essential to an enemy if he is to bomb our cities The only certain and safe guarantee against enemy air attack is to seize and hold the bases from which his aircraft would fly. 22 Bradley argued unsuccessfully for an increase in Army strength from 542,000 soldiers to 822,000. He wanted a Mobile Strike Force of 223,000 soldiers to perform the missions outlined above, and he 74 • The American Culture ofWar recognized that the Army was fully employed carrying occupation duties in Germany and Japan. In the nuclear age, Bradley too accepted the advanced base strategic airpower doctrine as the primary mission for the Army. Bradley, however, did not lose his focus on the traditional Army role: "we anticipate many vital objectives, such as scattered guerrilla forces, against which the air weapons will not be effective. Only trained land forces can reduce such opposition. Furthermore, there will unquestionably be situations wherein the full effect of air power will be felt only in conjunction with land forces which can dominate enemy land forces." When Bradley was making his argument, the term limited war had not entered the lexicon of strategic analysts; yet, Bradley was arguing for a force to fight small-scale conflicts in disputed regions of the world. After the Korean War, the first major limited war in the nuclear age, the Army formed the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) to rapidly re- spond to limited wars in peripheral regions; however, again, commitments in Europe and Asia and instabilities in Army manpower made it difficult to sustain a three-division corps at a high state of readiness for deployment. Other Army leaders joined Bradley to make the case for the Army. Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain believed the next war would take place in three phases: "First, the blitz— using all modern means," which might be decisive; second, the softening up phase, the bombardment of bases, industries, and ports; finally the fight between complete teams— air, sea, and ground. 23 The Army recognized that in the battle for resources between the services it was at a disadvantage given the new faith in nuclear weapons, airpower, and advanced technologies. American faith in technology in essence devalued the role of men in war. By arguing for balanced forces, a joint officer education system, joint training, and joint operations, the Army sought to maintain combat ready forces to meet emergency situations. McLain concluded: "To meet the 'blitz phase it would be necessary to have a relatively small, highly efficient, highly mobile Regular force, that could move rapidly to the critical points, seize bases and expel invaders. When this has been done, however, it is the reserves of manpower, resources, and willpower that will determine the outcome of the war. This means that the citizen soldier must play the dominant role in any major war." The Army argued that even if nuclear weapons were employed in the next war, the clash between nations would still take place, and only a citizen-soldier Army could meet the threat. Still, the belief that war could be fought and won with airpower and nuclear weapons alone had entered the public imagination so firmly that the Secretary of Defense in December 1948 felt the need to caution Americans and the President in the "First Report of the Secretary of Defense." Forrestal wrote: "If the Army is to function as an effective member of the national security team, there must be a clear public understanding that land forces will continue to be indispensable as a primary fight- ing arm. This fact has been obscured since World War II by a host of collateral functions which have precluded the Army from preparing itself for an emergency. The Army's fighting role should not be overlooked or underrated as a result of a public misconception that air power replaces land power." 24 Forrestal was considered a Navy man, but he argued for a balanced force. At this point, however, Bradley and Forrestal were fighting a losing battle. American faith in airpower was firm. The Navy too had suffered under the new vision of war. However, Forrestal had managed to maintain the Navy at a reasonable level of combat readiness at the cost of his job. Truman, doubting his loyalty and perhaps angered at the continuing budget debates, requested his resignation on March 1, 1949. On March 28, Forrestal resigned. 25 Louis A. Johnson replaced him. In this atmosphere, charged with expectations of the miracles to be performed by airpower and the money to be saved by cutting ground forces, the Army argued for Universal Military Training. Collins, as Army Chief of Staff, outlined the type of Army that was needed: [Tjhere is a recurring tendency to believe that the advance of science and its application to warfare have decreased the requirement for manpower. We are ever mindful of the need for Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine • 75 young scientists both in civil life and in the armed forces. But I should like to emphasize that wars are still tough slugging matches. Korea has proved once again that we still need men as well as the implements with which they fight. The core of our ability to fight is trained manpower. I cannot stress too strongly the fact that democracies must be defended by citizen-soldiers. It seems to me there is only one solution, dictated by the lessons of the past. ... It is the program of Universal Military Training designed to provide a steady flow of trained men. . . . Universal Military Training would necessarily require some sacrifices by all of us But if we are to con- tinue our own free way of life we must be prepared to accept sacrifices. If we are to continue as leaders of free men we cannot shirk the responsibilities that go with leadership. . . . We face a future in which our military needs cannot be met by voluntary means alone. 26 The debate on Universal Military Training (UMT), a plan that would require that all men of a given age receive some military training, had been in progress since the end of World War II. Congress had rejected it several times. However, the realities of the Korean War caused the Army to once again advocate for the program, which was supported by President Truman, George Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mark W Clark, Omar Bradley, Henry L. Stimson, and James Forrestal. The Army had sought to avoid the poor state of readiness it faced in 1940, but in 1950 it was again unprepared for war. Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Problem of Military Manpower Bradley stated, "If this country is to survive, our citizens will have to face the hard fact that the conditions under which we labor [the Cold War] may persist for 10, 15 or 20 years and that our only sensible military answer to these conditions is to have our citizens adequately prepared and organized to take up our defense. This is the cold and unalterable fact." 27 UMT, however, was enormously unpopular with the American people. Civilian educational, religious, labor, pacifist, and farm groups opposed it. Compulsory military duty in peacetime was unacceptable to large parts of America. 28 Even in limited war the draft was hugely unpopular. And because airpower was considered the decisive instrument of war, what Americans felt was needed, was not ground forces but a "seventy-group" Air Force. 29 Technology was substituted for manpower. Prior to the Korean War, Collins and Bradley argued futilely that war was still the dirty, nasty business that it had been in World War II, the Civil War, and the Revolutionary War. However, they were fighting an idea with considerable appeal to any people, but especially to the American people who viewed war as an aberration, possessed enormous faith in science and technology, and disdained the idea of man becoming a permanent instrument of the state. Since no one could predict an end to the cold war, in essence, the Army was asking the American people to become a means to an end for the foreseeable future. In February 1950, months before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Chairman of the National Security Resource Board and former Secretary of the Air Force explained America's security situation at Baylor University in Texas: It is our belief that if any democracy attempted to maintain in peacetime a comparable regular armed force, the free economy of that democracy would be wrecked. . . . Here are three facts which every American should know because this is the world in which we live. Behind the Iron Curtain there has been an atomic explosion. Behind that curtain is the air equipment capable of delivering a surprise atomic attack against any part of the United States. And, we have no sure defense against such an attack. . . . Would any of us like to forfeit either the capacity to defend ourselves as best possible against sudden atomic air attack, or the strategic air capac- ity necessary for instant effective retaliation against those who would make a surprise move against this country? It is a basic dilemma of our time that those who menace our way of life may force arms expenditures of a magnitude [that would] cripple our economy and imperil 76 • The American Culture ofWar our free institutions. . . . If reports received from behind the Iron Curtain are correct, in a short time Russia will be at its strongest position in armaments, and under its present program that position will increase steadily year by year. 30 The Secretary's message was clear: the United States could not afford to maintain conventional forces to counter those of the Soviet Bloc. To do so would bankrupt the country, wreck the economy, and imperil our free institutions. The only logical solution was, therefore, airpower and nuclear weapons. Still, events of 1949 gave new life to the argument for increased funding for the Army and Navy, and the need for substantial ground forces. On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb, ending the American monopoly 31 And in October, the Chinese Communist Forces of Mao Tse Tung defeated the Nationalist Forces of Chiang Kai Shek, creating the People's Republic of China (PRC). 32 The Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and the creation of the PRC gave a further boost to U.S. proponents of airpower and nuclear weapons. In January 1950, Truman authorized accelerated research and development on the "Super Bomb," the hydrogen bomb. (On November 1, 1952, the United States tested the first hydrogen bomb at Eniwetok atoll in the Marshall Islands. On November 27 1955, the Soviet Union tested its first hydrogen bomb.) In the early months of 1950, National Security Council document NSC-68, a classified policy document, advanced by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Paul H. Nitze, its primary author and Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, was discussed at the highest level of government. The policy paper and "long-range plan" in summary stated: The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. . . . With conscience and resolution this government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions. . . . One of the most important ingredients of power is military strength. In the concept of "containment," the maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security and (2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of "containment." Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of "containment" — which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion— is no more than a policy bluff. . . . We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental aspects of "containment." In the face of obviously mounting Soviet military strength ours has declined relatively. . . . [W]e must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and mili- tary strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. These were strong, prophetic words. NSC-68 was designed to be a blunt instrument to move Truman and his Secretary of Defense to increase defense spending to $35 billion, $5 billion above that requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and $20 billion more than Truman and Congress planned to spend. The President requested $14,241,000,000, divided almost evenly between the services. 34 The events of 1949 convinced the NSC that the Soviet Union had the initiative around the world, that American nuclear and conventional forces were inadequate and had to be built-up rapidly to deter nuclear war, and that the United States had to be able to fight wars short of nuclear war. NSC-68 divided the world into good and evil. 35 It was a simplistic formulation designed to be easily understood. Undiscriminating Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine • 77 global anticommunism became the major force in American foreign and military policy. Kennan's tenet of "counter- force at every point" was denned in NSC-68. In April Truman discussed and ana- lyzed NSC-68 with his principal advisers. Still, budget concerns and the economy dominated the thinking of the President and the new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson. The President wanted additional information. He wanted a second committee formed to study the implications of NSC-68 on the economy. The committee was to report its findings in August. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK). And Truman committed the nation to a war the services were ill prepared to fight, even the Air Force. The Air Forces emphasis on strategic bombing left it in a poor state of readiness to carry out conventional missions such as air superiority— fighter- to-fighter— close air support of forces on the ground, interdiction, and strategic and operational air mobility. The Army had fewer than 600,000 men and ten active divisions, and its primary missions were: (1) participation in occupation and civil and economic rehabilitation of Germany and Japan; (2) maintenance offerees in the United States to support occupation; and (3) provision of the U.S. component of the United Nations security force. 36 In other words, the Army was little more than a police force responsible for the lives of 125 million former enemy peoples. Training for war was a secondary mission. All the services went to war in Korea with World War II equipment, much of which was obsolete. As a result of the lack of foresight, the failure to understand the threats, concerns about the economy, and the overreliance on airpower and nuclear weapons, the Armed Forces of the United States, particularly the Army, were not prepared to fight the war in Korea, and men died as a result of these failures. General Curtis LeMay, U.S. Air Force, lamented: "In 1945 we had possessed the largest and best trained and most experienced and most effective Army and Navy in our history. In 1948 we were go- ing around explaining to the world that we really didn't mean it; we were so sorry; and our bazookas had all been taken to the city dump, and our airplanes had been smashed into junk. And Gus had gone back to the diner, and George had gone back to the real estate office. . . . And please forget that we ever tried to be soldiers, sailors, and airmen. It was the prevailing psychology of the year. The maintenance of a puissant force was regarded as a national aberration." 37 LeMay 's words and tone expressed his frustration and anger, and that of other senior military leaders who questioned the extent of the disarmament in the face of a growing Soviet military threat and bellicosity. Still, LeMay identified an important aspect of American thinking about the conduct of war. The maintenance of powerful military forces was an aberration. The tradition of maintaining a small standing Army, with the Navy as the first line of defense, secure behind the vast Pacific and Atlantic oceans was again put into practice after World War II, with the new dimension of airpower. "The dispatch of the two divisions to Korea," Secretary Acheson noted, "removed the recommen- dations of. . . NSC-68, from the realm of theory and made them immediate budget issues. ... I urged that the President ask for an immediate increase in authorized forces of all services, for substantial appropriations— too much rather than too little — for increased military production and powers to allocate and limit uses of raw material, and state that this was to increase the capabilities not only of our own forces but of allied forces as well. The President agreed...." 38 A few days after the outbreak of the Korean War the President went to Congress to get approval for increased military spending and authorization to increase the size of the Army. In a message to Congress, Truman explained his actions: "The attack on the Republic of Korea . . . was a clear challenge to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and to the specific actions taken by the United Nations in Korea. If this challenge had not been met squarely, the effectiveness of the United Nations would have been all but ended and the hope of mankind that the United Nations would develop into an institution of world order would have been shattered. Prompt action was imperative." 39 Truman called for a rapid increase of the Armed Forces and a partial call-up of reserves to support MacArthur, to strengthen strategic ti the United States, and to assist the armed forces of allied nations. 78 • The American Culture ofWar When war came, the Army was too small, with too many missions, dispersed in too many parts of the world. The U.S. Eighth Army in Korea faced one humiliating tactical defeat after another, until it was surrounded in the Pusan Perimeter, facing strategic defeat. Few Americans back home suffered during the Korean War. It was a limited war, and few people were asked or required to sacrifice. But soldiers died who should not have died because the Army was unprepared for the war they had been asked to fight. Ridgway noted: "We were, in short, in a state of shameful unreadiness when the Korean War broke out, and there was absolutely no excuse for it. The only reason a combat unit exists at all is to be ready to fight in case of sudden emergency, and no human being can predict when these emergen- cies will arise. The state of our Army in Japan at the outbreak of the Korean War was inexcusable." 40 The U.S. Congress shares with the President responsibility for the state of the Armed Forces. General Collins recalled a report by the House Appropriations Committee on the Army's budget: The committee's careful scrutiny of the estimate of manpower, equipment, and missions to be performed leads to the conclusion that the estimates of funds required are out of proportion to the actual needs on the basis of the Army's predictions of requirements. While the commit- tee does not propose to reduce the size of the Army below numbers estimated by the military authorities as requisite or the amount of equipment and supplies necessary to maintain such an Army, it is well aware of the fact that it is the habit of the services to estimate their fund re- quirements generously in order that they may be able to meet all contingencies. This is a sound policy to follow during actual warfare and the Congress at that time approved it but there is no sound reason why the Army cannot be administered in peacetime with more regard for dollars than apparently is their custom or intent. 41 Neither Congress nor the American people understood the cost in treasure and blood the cold war was to extract. While there had been warnings, the nation was caught unprepared. The Congress voted authorization of $13,222 billion for the entire Department of Defense, $1 billion less than that requested by the frugal Truman Administration. The services lack of preparedness dictated American strategy and doctrine for the conduct of the Korean War, initiating the chain of events and creating the conditions for the major strategic decisions that brought the United States into war with the People's Republic of China. The entry of Chinese Communist Forces into the Korean War in November 1950 triggered an expanded mobilization resulting in twenty active divisions, temporarily reversing the move toward almost exclusive reliance on airpower and nuclear weapons. Considering the decisions made by Truman, Congress, the American people, and the Armed Forces, it can be argued that they all were responsible for the sorry state of the Armed Forces in June 1950, which needlessly cost so many American lives. The Truman Administration had placed its trust in nuclear weapons and strategic bombing, in mutual defense treaties, and in military aid and assistance to nations fighting Communism. The Congress had cut the budget of the Armed Forces beyond that recommended by the Truman Administration, the American people had opposed Universal Military Training and were dissatisfied with conscription under the Selective Service System in times of peace. Army demobilization was completed on June 30, 1947 with the discharge of the last nonvolunteer forces. The total strength of the Army on July 1 was 989,664, including 364,000 Air Forces personnel who would form the U.S. Air Force. Congress and the American people also had not supported the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) and National Guard (NG). The ORC consisted of 68,785 officers and 1 17,756 enlisted men at the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. In 1945 the Army had planned for a force of 1,750,000 organized into twenty- five divisions. Ground NG Divisions were at roughly 50 percent of their go to war TO&E (table of organization and equipment — manpower, weapons, vehicles, and other equipment) strength, and averaged only 46 percent of their TO&E equipment. 42 Finally, the Armed Forces had not helped themselves. In the postwar period, without the exigencies of war, the Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine • 79 ompeted in a zero-sum game for resources. This system motivated behaviors that damaged the integrity of the services. The so-called Revolt of the Admirals was only one such episode of a service placing its own interests ahead of those of the country, as articulated by elected officials. 43 The inability of the services to develop joint strategy and doctrine eroded their influence with succeeding Administrations. This situation became critical during the Vietnam War, when Kennedy, Johnson, and McNamara virtually ignored the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, if, instead of looking at the decisions made by the various agents as decisions based pri- marily on the exigencies of the time, they are looked at through the prism of strongly held American cultural tenets, then those decisions are coherent. They make sense because they follow traditional, culturally imbued strategies and practices. This is probably the best explanation for American behavior at the dawn of the cold war. Cultural learning can be unlearned; however, the more basic the tenets, the more difficult the unlearning. America's political leaders learned little during the Korean War regarding the future of warfare. The war was too short and unpopular to cause the type of reflection required to change deeply held patterns of behavior. President Eisenhower, like his predecessor, had enormous faith in airpower. By the latter half of the 1950s, the increased range and speed of bombers, more lethal nuclear weapons, the forward deployment of American airpower to bases in the United Kingdom and Europe, and the technology to refuel in the air, had greatly increased the capabilities of airpower, and by so doing diminished the apparent need for ground forces. While a conventional sustained bombing campaign still required advanced bases, few military theorists at the time con- templated such a campaign. With conventional bombs, numerous sorties were necessary. Such a campaign could not be carried out from the borders of the United States. The logistical, maintenance, and human requirements necessitated bases in foreign countries. The Army's advanced bases mission died without having ever been used. Army Opposition The Army never fully accepted the theory of strategic airpower. Starting in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, Army Chiefs of Staff and ground combat commanders argued against the new vision of war from the air with nuclear weapons. In defense of the Army, leaders such as D wight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Mark W Clark, Matthew B. Ridgway, Maxwell D. Taylor, James M. Gavin, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Manton S. Eddy, Bruce C. Clarke, and others argued for the retention of significant ground combat forces to meet the growing Communist threat. Ironically, in 1948, Eisenhower, in his final report as Army Chief of Staff, was one of the first to raise the alarm. Eisenhower had witnessed the Army's decline from 6 million men in 1945 to 552,239 men as of July 1, 1948, and from eighty-nine to ten divisions. 44 Eisenhower reported: The Army phases of a balanced air-sea-ground organization require special stress at a time when many voice the opinion that land forces have been made obsolete by the advance of avia- tion, the development of rockets, and the atomic bomb. Today the only element of the military establishment that can hold a defensive position, seize for exploitation a major offensive base, exercise direct complete control over an enemy population— three fundamental purposes of armed effort— is, as always, the foot-soldier. The introduction of the plane and the atomic bomb has no more eliminated the need for him than did the first use of cavalry or the discovery of gunpowder. 45 Armies exist for two basic purposes: first to generate the combat power necessary to destroy enemy forces and thereby win wars; and second, to deter war through their demonstrative ability to generate combat power. Eisenhower recognized that the Army was primarily performing occupation 80 • The American Culture ofWar duty, and hence, was not ready to fight. He further noted that the Army's lack of preparation for war invited war: The budget of the Army and its numerical strength are devoted largely to the consequences of victory. Occupation is both worthy and necessary, but it must be seen as preventive rather than as positive security. Moreover, its physical magnitude and manifold problems demand such concentrated effort that relatively few men and little time are left for the Army's primary job. The purely security mission— organizing, training and sharpening for national defense — has necessarily taken second place. By no stretch of the facts can the United States Army, as it is now manned, deployed, and engaged, be considered an offensive force. It is not ready to respond to an emergency call because its global distribution not only leaves it weak in every sector but prevents the concentration of anything beyond the merest handful for possible tactical use. This virtually complete dispersion of our ground strength cannot be permitted to continue over any considerable period, because there are elements in both the world situation and our own strategic position that demand the constant availability of respectable land forces . . . , 46 Eisenhower then assessed the readiness of Army equipment: "Even our existing Regular Army is under-equipped with such modern weapons. The occupation mission, consuming more than two bil- lion dollars of the Army's annual budget, plus other budgetary limitations, has left almost no money for current procurement. Unless this defect is remedied we will shortly have to acknowledge that in weapons and equipment our ground troops may prove inferior to a modern offensive force." 47 The Army was ill equipped and trained to perform either of its offensive, campaign-winning doctrines— infantry doctrine, or armor-warfare doctrine in a major war. In 1 948, Eisenhower and other senior Army leaders told the Secretary of Defense and the President that the Army was incapable of generating sufficient combat power to win a major war, and, as a con- sequence, was failing in its mission to deter war. The Truman Administration, by its military policies, communicated to the world that the United States would not defend the new Republic of Korea. It signaled to the world that it was disarming, and hence, would only defend occupied countries. The Truman Administration had an accurate assessment of the Army's state of readiness, and the potential dangers. A few months after the initiation of hostilities in Korea Bradley wrote: It is now apparent that the aggression in Korea was well planned and well prepared and the militant international Communism inspired the northern invaders. It is also apparent that Com- munism is willing to use arms to gain its ends. This is a fundamental change and it has forced a change in our estimate of the military needs of the United States. [W]e have finally drawn the line. . . . We may in this way succeed in forcing the respect which we now know conciliation, appeasement and weakness can never bring. The cost will be heavy— but not as heavy as the war which we are now convinced would follow our failure to arm. ... [I] t is now evident that we must have an even greater flexibility of military power in the United States itself— not only for our own protection, but also to give us a ready, highly mobile standby force which we can bring to bear at any threatened point in the minimum time. . .. 48 These were strong words, uncharacteristic of Bradley. The term appeasement was loaded with memories of the failures of British and French foreign and military policies in the 1930s, and knowledge of the sacrifices of World War II. Bradley, however, had good reason to stress this point. Truman and his advisors ignored the warnings, and as a consequence, share as much of the blame for the causes of the Korean War, as the British for the causes of World War II, which, many people believe, was the result of their policy of appeasement. Bradley had argued for a rapid deployment force before the war in Korea, and he knew that sacrifices were again being made by servicemen in Korea — sacrifices Truman and the Evolution of National Military Strategy and Doctrine • 81 that might have been avoided had the Army retained the "respect" it had at the close of World War II. Now, he hoped that events in Korea would convince political leaders to reverse the policies of the last five years that had so devastated the Army, the national will, and the nation's ability to protect its interests around the world. Bradley could have also noted that it was geography that saved South Korea. The proximity of the four U.S. Army divisions in Japan to the battlefield is all that made possible the continued existence of South Korea. The Army did not have significant rapid deployment force, and airpower could not stop the advancing North Korean Army, nor could the Navy and Marine Corps. Had U.S. forces deployed from the west coast they would have arrived too late to save South Korea. General Fredrick J. Kroesen observed: "I have never read a comprehensive survey of why and how the deterioration of the World War II Army was allowed to happen. I was in it and I had no idea of how bad it was and only much later came to the realization that the destruction of the force could not have been accomplished more thoroughly if it had been deliberate— in fact being a government program, a deliberate attempt at destruction could not possibly have been so successful." 49 Clay Blair in his work, The Forgotten War, answered General Kroesen's question. Blair believed that Truman deliberately gutted the Armed Forces because the Army, and then the Navy, had rejected him. He was refused admittance to West Point and Annapolis in his youth, primarily because of his bad eyesight. Blair used Truman's own words to make the point: "You always have to remember when you're dealing with generals and admirals, most of them, they're wrong a good deal of the time. . . . They're most of them just like horses with blinders on. They can't see beyond the ends of their noses. . .." Half to three quarters of all generals were "dumb." Besides that, he said, "No military man knows anything at all about money. All they know how to do is spend it, and they don't give a damn whether they're getting their money's worth of not. . . . I've known a good many who feel that the more money they spend, the more important they are...." The basic fault of both generals and admirals was the education they received at West Point and Annapolis: "It seems to give a man a narrow view of the things." 50 Blair concluded: "By June 25, 1950 Harry Truman and Louis Johnson had all but wrecked the conventional military forces The fault was Truman's alone Truman's trench-level military outlook combined with his fiscal conservatism and contempt for the generals and admirals had led him to weaken gravely the armed forces. . .." Blair's words are caustic and inflammatory; nevertheless, beyond the personal attack on Truman, he was correct. It was Truman's policies that so damaged the ability of the Armed Forces to deter and fight war. And his reductions in the strength of the Armed Forces were not accompanied by commensurate reductions in missions. Truman, however, along with the rest of America, had suffered through the Great Depression, and this was probably his primary motivation. Between 1945 and 1950 the Army tried to increase the combat power of its divisions through new developments in training based on lessons learned in World War II, and by the limited acquisition of more lethal weapons. The Army maintained its traditional system of basic training, small unit training, combined unit training, and finally field training. Field training, combined unit training, and joint training with the other services had typically been neglected. The cost of large maneuvers and the problems of coordinating with the other services typically precluded such training. However, in Janu- ary 1950, General Clark, Chief, Army Field Forces, could report: "The most extensive and diversified peacetime maneuver training program in our history is now under way." Clark noted the following benefits from the training: "There are many features of maneuver training that can be obtained by no other means. Realism of training, the introduction of non-combatant functions, the test of our combat doctrine and the development of new doctrine — in varying degrees each large-scale exercise offers all of these. In addition each provides for testing our equipment. . .." 51 Some of the stateside units were, in 82 • The American Culture ofWar fact, well trained. The 11th Airborne Division at Camp Campbell and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg were two such units. Clark's words rang with an air of confidence and assurance that the Army was on the right track. However, the majority of the Army was not prepared for war. All the reductions in the size of the Army, all the missions and responsibilities, all the overseas deployments, and all the budget cuts made it impossible for the Army to train in a comprehensive manner. The Army, with all this turbulence, had difficulty maintaining cohesive combat units. Speaking during the war, the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, endeavored to remind the American people of the many duties their Army was carrying out at that moment: This Army . . . is deployed over the face of the world— with sizable forces located in forty- nine countries on six continents. In addition to the men of our great Eighth Army fighting in the mud and mountains of Korea, soldiers are keeping watch along the iron curtain in Berlin and Vienna, are participating in atomic tests in the Nevada desert, are standing guard along our northern approaches in Iceland, Greenland and Alaska, are assisting in the defense of Japan, are protecting our essential outposts in Panama and the Caribbean and on islands of the Pacific, and are providing advice and military assistance to our friends along the periphery of the So- viet empire in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Within the continental United States, Army antiaircraft units are deployed to defend our cities and key industrial facilities and other Army forces are stationed in all of the forty-eight states. 52 It is also useful to understand what unpreparedness actually meant. General Parks writing in 1953 endeavored to describe what it meant: In spite of these repeated examples of the hazards of unpreparedness [World Wars I and II], our people have yet to appreciate the near tragedy that developed at the outset of the fighting in Korea. . . . What were some of the specific results of this latest lapse in preparedness? Early in 1952, we ordered the withdrawal from Korea of the 24th Infantry Division, the first American outfit to be sent against the Communists. Those most familiar with the Division estimated that only two men remained of those who originally were rushed to the aid of the South Koreans. The rest were dead, wounded, prisoners or had been rotated back to this country. These men, together with units of the 2nd and 25th Infantry and the 1st Cavalry Divisions, later reinforced by the Marines and 7th Infantry Division, represented the total armed might of the United States at the outset of the Korean action. Many who never lived to tell the tale had to fight the full range of ground warfare from offensive to delaying action, unit by unit, man by man. . . . [T]hat we were able to snatch victory from defeat . . . does not relieve us from the blame for having placed our own flesh and blood in such a predicament. 53 Army leaders believed the Korean War proved the fallacy of the argument that nuclear weapons and airpower alone could keep the peace and advance American interests around the world. They retained their belief that man was the ultimate weapon on the battlefield, and advanced the concept of limited war. 5 The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 Conditions today are sufficiently turbulent that war might be visited upon the world without the impetus of planning or deliberate policy. One isolated action might precipitate conflict, and, once started in a critical area, war leaps across new borders and quickly involves other na- tions whose whole desire is for peace. Our future security depends on American willingness to combat unceasingly the conditions that provoked war and on our readiness to defend America and its principles should war break out despite preventive measures. Our task is to convince any possible aggressor that he can choose war only at the risk of his own destruction. A grim outlet it may be, but it is inescapable. — D wight Eisenhower, 1948 The Korean War meant entry into action "as is." No time out for recruiting rallies or to build up and get ready. It was move in— and shoot. This put the bulk of the burden on the G.I. The story of the infantry soldier is an old and honorable one. He carries his home with him— and often his grave. Somehow, he has to bring along the whole paraphernalia of fighting, as well as domesticated living: the grocery store, the ration dump; the hospital, the Medical Corps; the garage, the motor pool; the telephone, the Signal Service. He must sleep and eat and fight and die on foot, in all weather, rain or shine, with or without shelter. He is vulnerable day and night. Death has his finger on him for twenty-four hours, in battle, going toward it, or retreating from it. It is a wonder that the morale of those uniformed gypsies never falters. — Douglas Mac Arthur 1 The Korean War was an infantry war. All the advances in technologies, airpower, nuclear power, naval power, missiles, and other machines of war contributed, but they were not decisive, nor did they have the potential to be. Short of extermination warfare, they could not deter or stop the advance of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). It took soldiers and marines, infantrymen, fighting a primi- tive war in the heat, stench, rain, mud, and frigid conditions of the Korean peninsula with individual weapons, to stop the NKPA and the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), and save the new Republic of Korea (ROK)— the CPV are also known as the Chinese Communist Forces, or CCE With all the billions of dollars invested in technologies, with all the intellectual energy focused on airpower and nuclear weapons, with all the human capital invested in the search for new weapons of war, the ROK would not exist today if it were not for the exertions and sacrifices of the American soldier. And, as is 84 • The American Culture ofWar the American tradition, the Army received the least attention, the least money, and was maintained at the lowest possible manpower. In the immediate post- World War II period, Army leaders argued repeatedly for "a balanced force structure," believing that no one arm dominated the battlefield, that modern war required joint forces, and that the Army was not obsolete as a result of airpower. 2 Yet, incredibly, in the midst of the Korean War in 1952, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, cognizant of the sacrifices that were being made, felt compelled to remind the American people that: Because Americans prefer quick and easy solutions to difficult problems, we are very vulner- able to any theory of defense which catches our imagination. It is the will-o'-the-wisp call of air and sea power projected from this hemisphere, which is a military concept popularly known as the "Gibraltar theory." This concept unbalances our strength by placing reliance mainly on our Navy and our Air Force. . . . Air power is the mighty weapon of the Twentieth Century. Coupled with the atomic bomb it is the most violent weapon of retaliation and attack that the world has known. . . . But all know that air power and the A-bomb are not enough. ... In the event of war, Americans will have to fight on the ground three thousand miles from home if we are to provide ultimate protection to New York, St. Louis and Pasadena. . . . This Gibraltar concept is a selfish and a defensive one. The American spirit would tire of it right after the first atomic bomb dropped on an American city. . . . There is no guarantee that air power in any of its dimensions would be decisive. 3 The majority of the Army's overseas units were undermanned, dispersed throughout the occupied countries, poorly trained and equipped, and intellectually and psychologically unprepared for war. To some degree, the size and state of the U.S. Army influenced the thinking of Soviet leaders, expanding the range of permissible behavior of its client states. Knowledge of American airpower and nuclear capabilities did not deter them from limited wars in peripheral regions. Clearly the Truman admin- istration sent the wrong signals in the immediate post- World War II period. Eisenhower concluded that: "Military weakness on our part cannot be hidden. The transparency of our governmental process, the public discussion of military matters, the information our citizens must have to arrive at a sound public opinion — all these assure to any nation that seeks it a factual knowledge of our day-to-day military position. Moreover, they afford great advantage to a conspirator against the peace, since he is given full notice of our intentions and ample warning of any decision in the international sphere." In Korea the Army and the nation rose to the challenge, but the cost of unpreparedness was high, and, as always, soldiers paid the highest price. The Korean War also demonstrated that a small developing state could place such a heavy burden on the Armed Forces of the United States that they were unable to respond adequately to threats in other parts of the world. During these periods the nation was vulnerable to diplomatic, political, and military setbacks in other parts of the world. During the Korean War a significant but unnoticed transition in the American way of war took place. In 1951 as the war became a stalemate, the American citizen- soldier Army stopped employing of- fensive strategy, stopped employing the Army's traditional campaign-winning doctrines. The Army assumed a strategic defense, and airpower became the primary offensive arm. The citizen-soldier Army of the United States would never again fight a major war with offensive strategy and doctrine. In 1951, major limited wars came to mean a strategically defensive ground war in which the Army was not supposed to produce victory. The situation would remain this way until the end of the cold war. Airpower became the primary and only strategically offensive arm, and it was employed to achieve The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 85 essentially negative objectives; that is, to convince the enemy they could not win. The next time the Army employed offensive, campaign-winning doctrine, the burden of war rested on the military "cluster," a relatively small group of military professionals, and airpower was still considered the dominant instrument in war. This new approach to war, initiated in Korea, was culturally un-American. Strategically defensive wars of attrition in a ground war would never be acceptable to the American people, particularly with a citizen- soldier Army. And, the demonstrated nuclear capabilities that ended World War II, the impressive array of aircraft and technologies, the claims of airmen and enthusiastic political leaders, the billions of dollars of tax payer money expended on airpower, and the strategic doctrines of the Truman and later Eisenhower administrations told the American people that armies were obsolete, or auxiliaries of the Air Force. In the age of nuclear weapons, jet aircraft, and missiles, conscription made little sense; as a consequence, the ground wars in Korea and Vietnam made little sense. It was inexplicable to the American people to possess all this power and not use it. Thus, the American citi- zen-soldier Army, which depended on the support of the people, could not adapt to this new strategy and doctrine, particularly in nation-states with no cultural affinity with the American people. The Korean War, however, ended before the cultural conflict reached the critical point. The Korean War In 1905, the Japanese defeated the Russians in a short, bloody war and occupied Korea. In 1910 Korea was annexed and became a province of Japan. For thirty-five years, Japan ruled Korea. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Two days later the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. This declaration made it possible for the USSR to intervene in the war in Asia, to take the surrender of the veteran Kwantung (Japanese) Army in China, to support the Com- munist Chinese under Mao Tse-Tung, and to take part in the postwar reorganization in the region. On August 9, the United States dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, bringing World War II to an end, and initiating the cold war. Had there been no atomic bomb, there would have been no South Korea. The rapid surrender of Japan made the assistance of Soviet forces unnecessary, creating the conditions for U.S. forces to enter Korea. On August 15, 1945, U.S. General Order Number One called for the U.S. Army to take the surren- der of Japanese forces south of the 38th parallel in Korea, while the Armed Forces of the USSR took the surrender of Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel. The division of the Korean peninsula was to be a temporary expedient; however, as relations between the United States and the USSR deterio- rated, and political divisions in Korea moved toward civil/revolutionary war, the border at the 38th parallel became militarized, a point of contact between the Communist left and the Western-oriented capitalist right. 4 On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formed in Seoul, Korea under the leadership of President Syngman Rhee. Less than a month later, on September 9, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formed in Pyongyang under the leadership of Kim II Sung. Geography greatly influenced the conduct of the Korean War, facilitating the ability of the United States, United Nations, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union to contain and limit the war to a relatively small geographic area. Korea is a peninsula, roughly 600 to 650 miles long from its northern border with Manchuria to its southern tip. It varies in width from 125 miles to 200 miles and covers 84,000 square miles. Korea is funnel shaped in the northern half, and has contigu- ous borders with the PRC and the former USSR in the north. The Yalu and Tumen Rivers delineate Koreas 450 miles of border with the PRC. Japan lies just over a hundred miles to the southeast across the Korea Straits. Thus, Korea is strategically situated in the center of a triangle between three tra- ditional rivals. As a consequence, Korea has been both the spoils of and an invasion route for these larger, more dominant states in their competitions. Koreas common borders with the PRC and USSR » The American Culture ofWar MONGOLIA '•• u.s.s.r. fl^Li \ MANCHURIA * (JL ■^^ TOKYO ■ ^H j^m JB B ^■r jHlillBB^B Figure 5.1 Korea, Area of Operations. made it possible for these states to intervene directly in the Korean War with supplies, equipment, and conventional or insurgency forces for the North Korean Communist. Geography thus eliminated exhaustion and annihilation strategies. Short of war with the PRC or USSR, there was no way to isolate the battlefield, to stop the flow of supplies, equipment, and other materiel into North Korea. Geography also enabled the NKPA to cross the Yalu into China, thus precluding their complete destruction. These forces could rest, refit, and reenter Korea when ready to continue the war. The PRC or USSR could also intervene at will, with so-called volunteer forces, advisors, or with their regular forces. Hence, in a war in which the PRC and USSR participated, passively or actively, there was no way to complete the destruction of the enemy's army— annihilation strategy. In addition, the resources, population, and geographic The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 87 NATURE OF THE TERRAIN (2A^n N*^: -!r- '^CHONGJIN /PYONGYANG* iwONSAN SEA OF JAPAN Figure 5.2 Korea, Nature of Terrain. 88 • The American Culture ofWar proximity of the PRC and USSR made it possible for them to provide manpower almost indefinitely. In a limited war with the slow drain of resources, the United States and the UN could not match the combined resources of the two Communist giants in this part of the world. It was not possible to exhaust or annihilate Communist forces in Korea, leaving only one strategy — attrition. Given these geographic circumstances, from a military point of view, the United States should not have fought the Korean War. Because Korea is a peninsula, the U.S. Navy could dominate three sides of the fields of battle. And once forces were stretched across the waist of the peninsula certain forms of maneuver with signifi- cant forces became impossible. Without airborne or amphibious forces it was not possible to conduct envelopment/ flanking movements, or turning movements. Offensive operations were necessarily front attacks, penetrations, or infiltrations; thus, the geography of Korea favored defensive operations. These restrictions on the forms of maneuver caused by the narrowness of the peninsula and the dominance of the US. Navy made it possible for the United States to employ limited manpower to control the peninsula and balance the superior numbers of the enemy. The Korean War was more primitive than World War II. In 1950, Korea lacked the infrastructure of modern Western states. There were few large cities, and little industry. Lines of communications, rail and road, were generally poor, and cross-country movement by vehicle, tracked and wheeled, was difficult. There was no space in Korea for the heavy armor and mechanized divisions that character- ized World War II in Europe. This was an infantry war. Mobility in some parts of the country was restricted to foot movement. One main road and one main rail system linked the entire country. Korea has a spine of mountains running almost its entire length. The mountainous terrain was primarily in eastern parts of the country, and was excellent for defensive and infiltration tactics. The flat areas were covered with rice fields that channeled vehicular transportation. The terrain in most parts of Korea reduced engagement ranges, and diminished U.S. technological advantages. The climate went from one extreme to the other. During the winter months, October to March, the weather was severe, approaching arctic conditions. The summers were hot, with temperatures reach- ing over 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The mountainous terrain, heat, and heavy loads carried by soldiers and marines combined to produce heat casualties and to erode the mobility and combat power of the Eighth Army. In the summer months, a stench emanated from the ubiquitous rice fields fertil- ized with human waste. Ridgway wrote: "There is one feature of Korea that every fighting man will remember — the smell. The use of human excrement— night soil— to fertilize the fields, the husbanding of that commodity in pails and barrels, and in leaky wagons, give to the atmosphere of the country a fragrance so overpowering that the soul at first rebels." 5 War in Korea made enormous demands on the human body and spirit. Yet, Korea was a beautiful country, with 30 million people (roughly 20 million in the South and 10 million in the North) who culturally ranked among the most industrious, adaptable, and enterprising on Earth. The character and tenacity of the Korean people contributed mightily to the survival of the Republic of South Korea. In the early months of 1950, Kim petitioned Stalin and Mao to support the invasion of South Korea with the objective of reuniting the peninsula. Stalin was deeply concerned about U.S. intervention, and would only "consent" with Mao's approval of the plan. To convince Stalin and Mao, Kim argued that the United States would not intervene, that his forces would achieve strategic surprise, and complete the destruction of South Korean forces in three days, that there would be an uprising of 200,000 Communists against the Rhee government, that his guerrilla forces had penetrated into the southernmost provinces of South Korea and were in position to support the invasion, and that if the United States did decide to react they would encounter a fait accompli. 6 The Korean War was, at The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 89 least in part, the function of miscalculations on all sides. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had in fact indicated publicly that South Korea did not fall within the defensive perimeter of the United States, drawing the line at Japan. At 0400 on June 25, 1950, the NKPA, with the approval of Stalin and Mao, attacked across the 38th parallel, executing a well-developed invasion plan, achieving tactical and strategic surprise. The NKPA numbered roughly 120,000 men, and was organized into ten divisions, five separate infantry brigades, and one armor brigade with 120 Soviet-made T34 tanks. North Korean forces also included a large, well-equipped, well-trained guerrilla force that had infiltrated into South Korea to instigate an insurgency 7 Substantial numbers of Soviet advisors assisted the NKPA. The ROK was taken by surprise, and its armed forces were ill equipped to halt the invasion. The ROK Army was organized into eight divisions with approximately 98,000 soldiers. U.S. military assistance to the ROK had been intentionally restricted to defensive weapons, in part, to preclude South Korea, under the aggressive leadership of Rhee, from attacking North Korea. The ROK Army had no combat aircraft, tanks, or heavy artillery. The ROK Air Force and Navy were insignificant. In response to the attack, the United Nations Security Council immediately convened. The Secu- rity Council approved a U.S. sponsored resolution calling for "all members of the United Nations to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." On June 27, President Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE) to use air and naval forces to assist the ROK and slow the advance of the NKPA. At the same time, he ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, to blockade Korea and defend the Formosan Straits— placing the United States between the Chinese Communists on the mainland and the Chinese Nationalists on the island of Taiwan. Truman also accelerated military assistance to the French forces and "Associated States" fighting the Communists in Indo-China (Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam). By ordering the Seventh Fleet into the Straits of Formosa, the United States intervened directly in the Chinese civil war, an act interpreted by the PRC as "armed aggression" and a "blatant violation of the United Nations Charter." The Chinese could legitimately argue that US actions were an act of war. That same day, in a news conference, Truman informed the American people of his actions and explained why they were necessary: In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. 8 This was the first use of the UN to give U.S. actions legitimacy. The day following Truman's an- nouncement, Seoul fell to the NKPA. MacArthur flew to Korea to assess the situation. He wrote: The South Korean forces were in complete and disorganized flight. We reached the banks of the Han just in time to be caught up in the last rearguard action to defend its bridges. Seoul was already in enemy hands. Only a mile away, I could see the towers of smoke rising from the ruins of this fourteenth-century city. I pushed forward toward a hill a little way ahead. It was a tragic scene. ... I watched for an hour the pitiful evidence of the disaster I had inherited. In that brief interval on the blood-soaked hill, I formulated my plans. They were desperate plans indeed, but I could see no other way except to accept a defeat which would include not only Korea, but all of continental Asia. 90 • The American Culture ofWar The scene along the Han was enough to convince me that the defensive potential of South Korea had already been exhausted. There was nothing to stop the Communists from rushing their tank columns straight down the few good roads from Seoul to Pusan at the end of the peninsula. All Korea would then be theirs. Even with air and naval support, the South Koreans could not stop the enemy's headlong rush south. Only the immediate commitment of ground troops could possibly do so. The answer I had come to seek was there. I would throw my occupation soldiers into this breach ...? While MacArthur's account is a bit dramatic, and Ridgway has challenged the accuracy of his recollection of these events, three key points are irrefutable: Seoul had fallen to the NKPA, the ROK Army was in retreat, and incapable of reversing the situation; U.S. air and naval power had not and could not stop or reverse the rapid advance of the NKPA; and therefore, the only way to preclude a Communist victory was to employ ground forces. 10 MacArthur's words also indicate the significance he placed on actions in Korea. Not only was Korea at stake, but "continental Asia." Upon returning to his headquarters in Japan, MacArthur sent Truman an urgent message, which concluded with: "The only assurance for holding the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground is through the introduction of United States Ground Combat Forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our air and navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive. . . . Unless provision is made for the full utilization of Army-Navy- Air teams in this shattered area, our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst, it might be doomed to failure." 11 A day later, Truman authorized the use of U.S. ground forces in Korea, without a Congressional declaration of war, or a joint resolution of support or authorization from Congress. In fact, in Truman's Memoirs, he never questioned whether he had the authority to order MacArthur to use air, sea, and ground forces for war in Korea. However, MacArthur in his Reminiscences, noted that: "I could not help being amazed at the manner in which this great decision was being made. With no submission to Congress, whose duty it is to declare war, and without even consulting the field commander involved, the members of the executive branch of the government agreed to enter the Korean War." 12 Truman acknowledged that: "This was the toughest decision I had to make as President. What we faced in the attack on Korea was the ominous threat of a third world war." 13 The Policy of Appeasement that many believed had caused World War II was on the president's mind as he made the decision for war. Truman's initial strategic objective, and that of the UN, was to restore the status quo on the Ko- rean peninsula and prevent World War III. "I wanted to take every step necessary to push the North Koreans back behind the 38th parallel. But I wanted to be sure that we would not become so deeply committed in Korea that we could not take care of such other situations as might develop." 14 Truman planned from the very outbreak of war to fight a limited war, even if that meant the loss of South Korea. Still, the Army started the Korean War the way it started World War II, World War I, and the Civil War, unprepared, with all resultant loss of life. The Korean War can be divided into three strategic and six operational phases. Each strategic phase represented a change in strategic objectives. The first objective was to restore South Korea, to kick the NKPA out of South Korea — a limited war objective. The second objective was to reunite Korea and roll back Communism, in essence to destroy North Korea— a total war objective. After the PRC intervened, the objective was once again to restore and defend South Korea — back to the limited war objective. Operationally the war can be divided into six phases, each designed to achieve strategic objectives, delay and defend (the Pusan Perimeter); the offensive turning movement (the Inchon Landing); pursuit and exploitation (the advance to the Yalu); retreat, delay, and defend (war with China); attack to regain the 38th parallel (Ridgway's offensive); and negotiating while fighting (the static war of attrition). The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 91 The Opening Phase: Walker's Battle for Pusan MacArthur's initial strategic objective was to secure the port of Pusan, on the southeast tip of the peninsula. To do this, he had to stop the advance of the NKPA. 15 If the port of Pusan were lost, the war between North and South Korea would be over. If Pusan were lost, the restoration of the situation would have required the mounting of a major amphibious operation that would have taken years to prepare, given the poor state of readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces. And, once the entire peninsula was in Communist hands, the President and the United Nations might have accepted the loss of Korea, as they had the loss of China, a year earlier. Hence, holding Pusan was of strategic importance. In Japan, MacArthur, now Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) had available Lieutenant General Walton "Johnnie" Walker's Eighth Army. It consisted of four of the Army's ten divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division (an Infantry Division), and the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions (ID). Walker was a well-respected, highly decorated, and experienced soldier. In 1944 and 1945, his XX Corps had frequently led Patton's Third Army in its campaigns across Europe. To Walker, Patton stated: "Of all the corps I have commanded, yours has always been the most eager to attack and the most reasonable and cooperative." 16 Walker, however, was from the European Theater. He was not one of MacArthur's chosen few, which created some friction. Walker had assumed command of the Eighth Army in September of 1948 with the mission to improve its combat readiness. One student of Army training wrote: "the Eighth Army experienced a paradigm shift in its basic responsibilities Figure 5.3 Arrival of General Collins and General Vandenburg: L-R: G/A Douglas MacArthur, C in C FEC; Col. Laurence E. Bunker, Aid-de-Camp to General MacArthur; and Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Commander of the Ground Forces in Korea, await the arrival of General J. Lawton Collins. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and General Hoyt S. Vandenburg, Chief of Staff, USAF at Haneda AFB, Tokyo, Japan. General Collins and General Vandenburg will confer with General MacArthur regarding the situation in Korea. U.S. Army photography by Sgt. Girard, July 13, 1950. 92 • The American Culture ofWar in 1949. The change of focus from constabulary functions to combat readiness reflected Army- wide trends, accelerated throughout 1949 and the first half of 1950 . . . '.'" Still, Walker and his Army faced numerous obstacles that impeded their ability to improve combat effectiveness. 18 The divisions were considerably below wartime strength in personnel and had a high turnover rate that damaged con- tinuity and stability. On June 30, 1950 the 24th ID had 757 officers (OFF) and 11,398 enlisted men (EM), and was over a 1,000 men short of its authorized strength. The 25th ID had 836 officers and 14,113 enlisted men, and was more than 500 men short of its authorized strength. The 1st Cavalry Division had 689 officers, and 1 1,605 enlisted men, and was more than 100 men short of its authorized strength. Finally, the 7th ID had 818 officers, and 12,970 enlisted men, and was almost 1,000 men short of authorized strength. 19 The authorized strength of each division was well below wartime strength of 18,900 officers and enlisted men. Each regiment had eliminated one of its three battalions, with the exception of the all black 24th Infantry Regiment. This meant the divisions could not fight in accordance with estab- lished doctrine. The divisions lacked equipment, supplies, space, and time to train. The divisional tank battalions had been reduced to tank companies, and artillery battalions were short one bat- tery. And while the focus and quality of training had improved, many units were psychologically unprepared for battle. General Roy K. Flint, observed: "For young soldiers . . . life in Japan was an adventure. Not only were they learning to live in the Army, but a new and strange culture beck- oned just outside the camp gates. [M]any young privates lived with Japanese women just outside the camp Their only natural enemy was venereal disease Heavy drinking was a problem in all units and all ranks." 20 In war-torn Japan a sergeant was a wealthy man, and a private could supplement his income by black market trading. Japanese "houseboys" (servants) performed many of the routine duties of soldiers, providing them with additional free time. Still, with all the impediments to training, the Eighth Army was better trained than most historians and soldiers have recognized. Under Walker, the military training program had progressed from individual training through squad, platoon, and company training to battalion, and in some units to regimental training. Still, Walker was well aware of the state of his army. He understood that his Army was not prepared to fight as divisional teams, and many were not prepared to fight as regimental teams. The Eighth Army possessed a few very good units and leaders; however, the quality of training had been uneven. Overall, the Eighth Army would have required another six to twelve months of training to reach a sufficient level of readiness. To bring the other divisions to approximate fighting strength, the 7th Infantry Division was stripped of personnel and whole units. MacArthur informed Truman that individual replacements and entire divisions were needed. MacArthur also cautioned Truman that his request was based on war with North Korea alone, and that if the Chinese or Soviets intervened, "a new situation would develop which is not predictable now." Truman and the Pentagon were initially slow to respond to MacArthur s requests. They were uncertain about what they faced. Was the invasion an isolated conflict, or part of a general war, with the Korean invasion simply a feint to draw U.S. forces into the region, and away from the major theater in Europe? Truman, after further analysis and discussion, released the 2nd ID, the 3rd ID (the latter of which had fewer than 5,000 men), and the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 187th Regimental Combat Team of the 11th Airborne Division; however, their deployment would take time. And, MacArthur needed still more forces, requiring a call-up of National Guard forces and conscription. On September 1, 1950, the Oklahoma's 45th and California's 40th National Guard Divisions were federalized. 21 These eight Army divisions along with one Marine Division, the ROK Army, and Korean augments to the U.S. Army (KATUSAs) fought the Korean War. The first Army unit deployed to Korea was Task Force (TF) Smith— a composite unit based on the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, of the 24th ID— commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. (Brad) The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 93 Smith. The Commanding General (CG) of the 24th ID, Major General William F. Dean, wrote: "No commander likes to commit troops piecemeal, and I'm no exception, but Smith was definitely the man for the job if it had to be done. He had a fine World War II record in the South Pacific and was a natural leader. So he and his 406 riflemen, plus a few artillerymen, were on the way to a landing field outside Pusan on July l." 22 Task Force Smith was to move north by train, and then, based on intelligence from the ROK Army, put in a defensive position on the main road to block the advance of the NKPA. On July 5, 1950, Task Force Smith engaged a superior enemy force in the vicinity of Osan, and in an uneven battle it was destroyed as an organized fighting force. It delayed the enemy only a few hours. The 24th ID deployed piecemeal. Units from the division advanced as far north as possible and then fought desperate delaying actions without the support of tanks and adequate artillery and antitank weapons. One account written during the war read: Some 10 days after the initial elements of the United States 24th Infantry Division were commit- ted in Korea, the remainder of that understrength division was engaged with the enemy . . . every battalion was attempting to defend a front greater than that normally allocated to a full-strength division. Artillery was spread so thinly that it frequently could reach the flanks of its supported unit with only one or two pieces. Engineers were employed as infantrymen. . . . This inadequate force suffered many defeats, but still managed to regroup, pull together, and fight again over the long road from Osan to Taejon. 23 The NKPA used envelopment tactics, finding the flanks of the American line, moving around them, and thereby forcing the unit to retreat to another defensive position along the main arteries, where this process started again. As more American forces entered the theater, a defensive perimeter was formed. The opening phase of the war was a race for time and space. The Eighth Army's objective was to deploy and build up sufficient forces to stop the NKPA as far north as possible, to establish a defensive line from which the situation could be stabilized, and finally to conduct offensive operations to retake the Korean peninsula up to the 38th parallel. In the initial phase, at a minimum, the Port of Pusan had to be retained. To do this, forces had to be deployed piecemeal. The Eighth Army could not wait to ready itself for war. The NKPA's objective was to complete as rapidly as possible the destruction of the ROK Army, and push U.S. Forces back into the sea before significant U.S. forces could be deployed. On July 13, Walker formally took command of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), estab- lishing his headquarters in Taegue. On July 15, President Syngman Rhee placed ROK forces under MacArthur's command, extending that command to Walker. By July 20 Walker had deployed the 25th ID and 1st Cavalry Division, and redeployed the ROK Army, which consisted of the 1st, 3rd, 6th, 8th, and Capital Divisions. In late July, the 1st Marine Brigade joined the battle bringing the Eighth Army forces into rough parity with the NKPA. By early August, the Eighth Army's troop strength had risen to 92,000 (45,000 U.S. and 47,000 ROK). At the same time the strength of the NKPA had declined to an estimated 75,000 troops. South Korea would continue to exist, but the enemy still held the initia- tive, and Walker was unaware of enemy troop strength. By the end of July, the Eighth Army had withdrawn into a position that became known as the Pusan Perimeter. It was engaged on two sides with its back to the sea, forming a rectangular area on the southeast tip of the Korean Peninsula, stretching roughly one hundred miles from the vicinity of Taegue south along the Naktong River to the Korean Straits, and east, roughly fifty miles, to the Sea of Japan. Walker initially lacked the manpower to establish a continuous defensive perimeter, or fight in accordance with Army doctrine. He used a system of strong point defenses and counterattack tactics to maintain the perimeter. The timely arrival of Army regiments and the 1st Marine Brigade provided 94 • The American Culture ofWar needed reserves for counterattacks. Walker used these forces as "fire brigades," plugging holes in the defense where enemy breakthroughs threatened. On July 31, Walker ordered, "There will be no more retreating, withdrawal, readjustment of lines or whatever else you call it. There are no lines behind which we can retreat. This is not going to be a Dunkirk or Bataan. A retreat to Pusan would result in one of the greatest butcheries in history. We must fight until the end. We must fight as a team. If some of us must die, we will die fighting together." 24 Figure 5.4 Attack of North Korean Forces. The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 95 Figure 5.5 South Korea, The Pusan Perimeter. Throughout the month of August Walker rushed troops from one threatened sector to another; how- ever, he had a number of advantages. The Eighth Army's troop strength increased steadily as more United Nations forces arrived. A railway system and road network gave him interior lines, the ability to reinforce his separated units faster than his enemy was able to reinforce. Tactical communication intelligence provided Walker with the locations and time of almost every major attack, enabling him to start the movement offerees to the threatened area before the attack took place. Air reconnaissance provided detailed information. U.S. control of the air, close air support, and the ability to interdict the 96 • The American Culture ofWar enemy's supply lines, which extended from North Korea, diminished the enemy's combat power. In addition, North Korean generalship was unimpressive: Instead of concentrating the combat power of the NKPA against a single front and focal point, the generals dispersed it. Still, soldiers and marines fought desperate battles to retain or retake hilltops. Communication between positions was frequently broken by enemy penetrations. Navy and Marine aviators became the heroes of the close air support war. They assisted soldiers and marines in plugging holes in the line and fighting off breakthrough attacks. Marine and Navy aircraft, because of their proximity to the battlefield, also had a longer loiter time over the battlefield than Air Force aircraft. Flying off aircraft carriers or from within the perimeter, they could answer urgent calls more rapidly. They were effectively integrated into the battle as forces continued to arrive from the United States and other United Nations countries. In regard to air interdiction General Almond wrote that: "despite concentrated air efforts by the Marines, the Navy, and the Air Force thus far in the fighting, it had been impossible to prevent the North Koreans from moving tremendous quantities of supplies to the support of their forces then some 300 miles south of the 38th parallel. The interdiction of roads, railroads, and bridges had no decisive effect on their overall movements." 25 Airpower was not decisive, but it was important. By the end of August, the Eighth Army, with the support of the Far East Air Force (FEAF) had stabilized the situation. In September, MacArthur was ready to go on the offense. Walker's delay and defend operation had succeeded in stopping the advance of the NKPA. The performance of the soldiers of the Eighth Army had in too many cases been poor. Some units exhibited "bug-out fever" when under enemy attack. The Eighth Army had been thrown into battle psychologically, emotionally, physically, and materially unprepared to fight. Units had been pieced together in an effort to get them up to strength. Some leaders took command the week they went into battle. To compensate for the lack of trained infantry, firepower from artillery and airpower was used extensively. In Training Bulletin No. 1, it was noted: General Van Fleet has stated many times that one of our major advantages over the Reds is our ability to mass supporting fires rapidly on any target. In X Corps in late 1950 and early 1951 we found that ability primarily in the artillery; the infantry was not making maximum utilization of the weapons available. For example, we found attack after attack where the recoilless rifles were never placed in position because it was too much of an effort to hand-carry the guns and ammu- nition up the rugged mountains. Our company and platoon orders too often merely mentioned the attachment of support of crew-served weapons— no targets or areas of fire were assigned, with the consequence that many infantry weapons were never used in the attack. To reduce casualties and add effectiveness to our attacks, we must get the crew-served weapons 100 per cent into the game. We are often too anxious to get the job over with as soon as possible; consequently, we tend to tackle the job with comparatively little time spent in planning. . . . Full utilization of all weapons requires considerable time for planning and movement of weapons. 26 The Army improved as it gained combat experience, and as more cohesive, better-trained units arrived from the United States. However, when it met its most severe test against the CPV it was still not proficient in many of the skills required to succeed on the battlefield. Many units were simply incapable of fighting as teams. They lacked the unit training required to perform essential combat operations. Too much of the Army was in a poor state of physical readiness, incapable of sustained marches carrying the fifty to sixty pounds of weapons and equipment necessary to fight. The result was higher casualties and decreased combat effectiveness. 27 The Marine brigade was qualitatively a better fighting force than most Army units deployed from Japan. The Marine Corps had fewer missions and less responsibility than had the Army. In in the aftermath of World War II the Army had literally become the governments of Japan and German, two devastated countries with people that had to be feed, housed, and redirected. The Army had been The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 97 preoccupied with the forming of new governments and policing occupied countries. In addition, the reckless demobilization of the Army had damaged its ability to fight. Still, the majority the blame for poor showing of too many Army units lie with the Army itself. Too many senior Army leader forgot, why the Army existed. In the mid to late 1950s this would happen again. The small size of the Marine Corps allowed it to focus more narrowly on its combat missions. It benefited from the experience of a relatively large number of veteran leaders and infantrymen who had seen combat in World War II. It benefited from greater stability and hence more consistent training . Marines were simply bet- ter trained and more physically fit than most of the soldiers of the Eighth Army that deployed from Japan. Marines also deployed as cohesive units, and came with their own air support. Finally, Marine culture was a factor. In its long struggle against the Army for survival, marines became infused with a strong desire to perform demonstrably better than soldiers in combat. This disposition had its pluses and minuses; nevertheless, in the opening days of the Korean War the Marine Brigade consistently performed better than too many Army regiments. In 1950, the Armed Forces of the United States were still segregated. While many Army units had "bug-out fever," a tendency to turn away from the enemy and flee, the criticism of the all black 24th Infantry Regiment was particularly severe. Given the racial climate at the time and the prevalence of Jim Crow, objective consideration was impossible. Nevertheless, the inferior status of the 24th Infantry placed burdens on the unit that were difficult to overcome. As a consequence, some elements of the 24th did in fact perform poorly, though others fought well. 28 The Eighth Army achieved its first strategic objective. It retained control of the port of Pusan. And, given the suddenness of the deployment and the poor state of the Army, Walker and his soldiers and marines deserve great credit for their conduct of the defense. Walker, however, has received consider- able criticism for his conduct of operations in Korea, particularly the initial "delay and defend" phase. Clay Blair wrote: "Walker made many mistakes, especially in the early days of the war. The first was to underestimate vastly and even to ridicule his enemy. That led to the second mistake: the decision to commit the green 24th Division, battalion by battalion, well forward of the Kum River. The ensu- ing decision to defend Taejon in the hope the 1st Cav Division could reach there in time was another mistake." 29 Blair concluded: "it was the mistakes of NKPA generals and squad-level courage rather than superior American generalship that "won" the Battle of the Pusan Perimeter." Another historian argued that: "The Americans' lack of imagination in their scheme of maneuver and their failure to employ existing doctrinal concepts cost them heavily in both lives and lost opportunities." 30 It has also been argued that given Eighth Army's overall superiority in forces, by late August Walker should have taken the offensive. There were, in fact, numerous defects in the Army's performance. However, context is important. The psychological shock of being thrown into battle; the knowledge of having inadequate equipment, training, and forces; the lack of comprehension about why they were there, why they were fighting; and a lack of affinity for the nation they were trying to save damaged the ability of soldiers to gener- ate combat power. Before an army that has been defeated and has retreated can take the offensive, the minds of the men who have to do the fighting must first make the transformation to the offense. Both the ROK Army and U.S. Army had received severe blows that damaged their fighting spirit. The transformation required could not take place overnight. In Korea, Americans did what they do best; adapted, improvised, and advanced. And while, arguably, Walker may not have been the best general for the job, he did what was most important, he won. The Inchon Landing On July 23, 1950, MacArthur cabled Washington: "Operation planned mid-September is amphibious landing of a two division corps in rear of enemy lines for purpose of enveloping and destroying enemy forces in conjunction with attack from south by Eighth Army. I am firmly convinced that early and 98 • The American Culture ofWar strong effort behind this front will sever his main lines of communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and expensive campaign." 31 This was classic MacArthur. He had used similar maneuvers against the Japanese. He always preferred going in the backdoor if possible. The operation was a deep turning movement designed to land forces in the enemy's rear, sever his lines of communication, and force him to fight in two directions. The X Corps summary noted: The plan boldly called for the committing of the GHQ Reserve and the 1st Marine Division in an amphibious operation to seize the Inchon-Seoul area and cut the main line of the enemy commu- nications and supply to his armies in the south. In conjunction with this seaborne envelopment, Eighth Army was to launch a major offensive from the south, and driving in a northwesterly direction along this axis Taegu-Taejon-Suwon, to effect a juncture with the amphibious forces at Seoul. (2) The Navy (3) and the Air Force had important roles of transportation, security, naval gunfire support, carrier aircraft support, and strategic bombing. The tactical air cover was to be furnished by the 1st Marine Air Wing . . . and some naval carrier aircraft support. The objective of Plan 100 B was the destruction of the North Korean Army. . . , 32 The Joint Chiefs, initially opposed MacArthur 's invasion plan, fearing it was too risky 33 The Navy and Marine Corps presented the strongest arguments against it. Speaking to Colonel Donald H. Gal- loway, one of MacArthur's staff officers, the Navy's amphibious expert in the Far East, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle stated: "Don, if you think a plan like that would work, you ought to have your head examined." 34 Doyle believed that MacArthur was "oblivious of the enormous technical hazards," and sought to inform and dissuade the Supreme Commander. Navy amphibious doctrine identified seven criteria for landing on a given piece of terrain: (1) ability of naval forces to support the assault and follow-up operations; (2) shelter from unfavorable sea and weather; (3) compatibility of the beaches and their approaches; (4) offshore hydrography (i.e., water depths and bottom configuration); (5) the extent to which antiship mines could be employed; (6) conditions that may affect the enemy's ability to defeat mine-clearance efforts; and (7) facilities for unloading shipping. After an analysis of MacArthur's Inchon plan, a member of Doyle's staff concluded: "We drew up a list of every natural and geographic handicap — and Inchon had em all." General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., Commander Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and General Oliver P. Smith, Commander 1st Marine Division, also registered their objections to the plan. They concluded that there was "a complete lack of understanding at GHQ concerning the manner in which amphibi- ous operations were mounted out." And in fact, the amphibious doctrine envisioned for the Inchon Landing did not accord with Navy and Marine Corps World War II Central Pacific amphibious doc- trines, which were based on firepower. Surprise was to be the decisive factor in the Inchon landing. The Navy and Marines wanted and recommended a less ambitious plan. At a meeting on August 23, attended by Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest Sherman, Admiral Doyle presented the Navy's arguments against the In- chon invasion. He delineated all the problems that could cause disaster. The littoral and hydrographic conditions at Inchon were considered too dangerous for an amphibious assault. The tidal range at Inchon, among the largest in the world, varied so greatly (33 feet) that the Navy's ability to support the landing, and, if necessary, evacuate the assault force was severely limited. 35 The tides dictated the date and time of the landings. With the ebb and flow of the tide came strong currents up to eight knots that hampered the ability to maneuver ships and equaled the maximum speed of some small landing craft. The channel to the port was so narrow, a single deepwater lane, that the movement of ships was severely restricted, particularly during low tides. Wolmi, a small, fortified island with a long narrow causeway, protected the port. It had to be secured before the landing could take place. Instead of attacking onto a The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 99 beach, marines at one landing site had to attack over a fifteen-foot protective seawall, which required ladders to traverse. Additionally the marines were attacking into urban terrain, the city of Inchon, with a population of 250,000. Each house was a potential fighting position. The invasion site was not in supporting distance of the Eighth Army (180 miles from the Pusan Perimeter), and if the element of surprise were lost, the X Corps might find itself surrounded and alone. In addition, Walker's Eighth Army was to be reduced in strength by the removal of the 5th Marine Regiment, which was to land at Inchon. These and other factors caused the Navy and Marines to conclude that MacArthur's plan was fatally flawed. The Navy, thus, proposed an alternate landing site further south. MacArthur, after listening to the Navy's presentation, spoke: "Admiral, in all my years of military service, that is the finest briefing I have ever received . . . you have taught me all I had ever dreamed of knowing about tides. ... I have a deep admiration for the Navy. From the humiliation of Bataan, the Navy brought us back. I never thought the day would come, that the Navy would be unable to support the Army in its operations." MacArthur continued: The bulk of the Reds are committed around Walker's defense perimeter. The enemy, I am con- vinced, has failed to prepare Inchon properly for defense. The very arguments you have made as to the impracticabilities involved will tend to ensure for me the element of surprise. For the enemy commander will reason that no one would be so brash as to make such an attempt. Surprise is the most vital element for success in war. . . . The Navy's objections as to tides, hydrography, ter- rain, and physical handicaps are indeed substantial and pertinent. But they are not insuperable. My confidence in the Navy is complete, and in fact I seem to have more confidence in the Navy than the Navy has in itself. The Navy's rich experience in staging the numerous amphibious landings under my command in the Pacific during the late war, frequently under somewhat similar difficulties, leaves me with little doubt on that score . . . . 36 MacArthur's appeal to the Navy's pride probably had little influence in changing Admiral Sherman's assessment of the plan. Saving the Navy, particularly Navy aviation, and the Marine Corps were probably the major incentives for Sherman's reversal. One student of the Inchon Landing, Ronald Carpenter, wrote: "For an ostensible age of atomic war, the Air Force received major budgetary sup- port under Truman. The Navy had 'its back to the wall, while the Marine Corps was literally fighting for existence. . . ' Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson cut 'fat out of the Armed Forces' with 'most of his trimming on the Navy and Marines'" While the Army had taken more substantial cuts, Johnson's attitude and approach to the Navy had been particularly hostile. Just a year earlier, he had cut the Navy's supercarrier from the defense budget, initiating the "Revolt of the Admirals." And Truman, in a letter to a Congressman, wrote: "The Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's." 37 Truman later apologized. Still, the Marine Corps at 97 percent strength at the outbreak of the Korean War numbered only 64,279 men. The 1st Marine Division (Fleet Marine Force [FMF] Pacific) numbered 7,779 men, and the 2nd Marine Division (FMF Atlantic) numbered 8,973 men. The go-to-war strength of a Marine Division was 22,000 men. 38 To form a full division, the Marine Corps had to reassign units from the 2nd Division to the 1st Division and called up Marine Corps Reserves. Sherman viewed the Korean War and the Inchon landing as an opportunity for Navy aviation and the Marine Corps to prove that the nation still needed them. Carpenter concluded, "MacArthur need not prove to Sherman what the Navy could do, but Sherman could prove to Washington what the Navy and its Marines could do. . . . Along with defeating North Korea, success at Inchon could restore Navy and Marine Corps prestige and ensure their stronger position in the U.S. defense establishment." 39 It cannot be argued that the Navy or the Marine Corps suffered more substantial cuts than the Army in the postwar period, nor can it be argued that since the battles of Midway or Iwo Jima the prestige of 100 • The American Culture of War the Navy and Marine Corps had been damaged. All the services, even the Air Force, were ill prepared for war in Korea because of the austere budgets of the Truman Administration and the concentration of spending on strategic forces, long-range bombers and nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, success in war had the potential to restore service budgets, demonstrate capabilities, regain the attention and affection of the nation, and thus, prove that these forces were still necessary. It took someone of Mac Arthur's stature, prestige, and confidence to overcome the opposition to his plan. Short of Eisenhower, there was not another general or admiral in the Armed Forces who could have gotten this plan approved. At Inchon, MacArthur gambled and won. The landing, Operation Chromite, was an unmitigated success. On September 15, Major General Edward M. (Ned) Almond's X Corps, consisting of the 1st Marine Division, which led the assault, and the 7th ID, conducted an amphibious assault at the Port of Inchon. The amphibious assault phase of the operation was under Navy command. Strategic surprise and operational surprise were achieved. The NKPA had no major forces in position to oppose the landing or counterattack. UN forces enjoyed enormous naval gunfire and air superiority. The bombing, which started on September 10, precluded tactical surprise; however, this level of surprise was not necessary. Resistance was light. Some landings were unopposed, and the NKPA fought without determination. The official history of the Marine Corps concluded: It was obvious that the North Koreans had abandoned Inchon in haste during the night [of D- Day] .... Communications were destroyed, so that NKPA defense force fought or fled as isolated units. Adequate reserves were not at hand initially, with the result that stop-gap detachments were fed piecemeal into battle, only to be flattened by the Marine steamroller. In short, the North Koreans lost control. And when they attempted to regain it, time had run out. . . . Resistance on the [Inchon] peninsula proved negligible, although once again the capture of prisoners and materiel revealed enemy potential unused. 40 On D-Day the Marine landing force suffered twenty killed in action, one missing in action, and 174 wounded. 41 MacArthur had been right, and everyone else had been wrong. The Inchon landing facilitated destruction of the NKPA, and restored South Korea to its prewar geographic borders. The Inchon Landing has not escaped controversy, however; Robert Debs Heinl, a Marine veteran of the campaign at Iwo Jima, in his work, Victory at High Tide, advanced what has become the tra- ditional interpretation: "The operation which MacArthur had in mind was, above all, a naval opera- tion; without the Navy's ships and support, without the Marines' amphibious troops, and without the professional know-how of both Navy and Marines, the landing at Inchon . . . could never become reality." 42 Stanley Sandler advanced the idea that the Inchon Landing was unnecessary and that the risk of failure has been exaggerated: "If X Corps had been combined at the perimeter with Eighth Army it seems unlikely that the North Koreans could have contained UN forces for much longer. Furthermore, even had the NKPA been forewarned of the landings, or had the working out of the tide tables gone awry, given UN absolute control of the air over the landing sites it is difficult to see how the North Koreans could have done much more than harass the landing. A beached UN armada on the Inchon mud flats would have been an embarrassment but hardly a disaster." 43 The low casualty count supports Sandler's assessment. While getting to Inchon required considerable knowledge, skill, and talent, the assault phase of the operations was relatively easy. At Inchon the NKPA was unprepared to defend, and UN firepower was overwhelming. At Pusan UN forces had won the buildup race, and it was simply a matter of time. The Inchon Landing damaged the confidence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior military leaders. Their willingness to challenge MacArthur was destroyed at Inchon. In reference to MacArthur's plan for a second amphibious landing at Wonsan, Ridgway observed that, "Had he suggested that one battalion walk on water to reach the port, there might have been someone ready to give it a try" 44 The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 101 MacArthur's perceived infallibility and the diffidence of the Joint Chiefs ultimately led to the debacle in North Korea and the relief of MacArthur. Operationally the X Corps was not placed under Walker's command. MacArthur retained com- mand, and this arrangement violated the principle of unity of command. However, given Walker's preoccupation with the defense of and breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, the geographic separation Figure 5.B South Korean, Inchon Landing and the Breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. 102 • The American Culture of War of the forces, and the location of the planning in Tokyo, there was initially justification for this chain of command. The day after the invasion, Inchon was secured and the Eighth Army initiated its breakout attack. The NKPA fought tenaciously, not fully realizing its lines of communication (LOC) were in danger. Three days after the attack began, MacArthur was growing concerned at the lack of progress. He started developing plans for a second amphibious landing. 45 However, this proved unnecessary. The NKPA soon broke: Its lines of communications had been severed, causing it to run low on ammuni- tion and supplies. The morale of many NKPA units, which had been sustained by success and savage discipline, collapsed. One observer wrote: "Many conscriptees were sent into combat unarmed, with instructions to pick up weapons on the battlefield. In the attack, these draftees were forced into the leading elements by North Korean regulars who followed behind and shot them if they faltered or attempted to desert. Under such circumstances, it is natural that a large number would desert at the first opportunity" 46 Walker endeavored to use envelopment tactics to capture and destroy the NKPA. Both U.S. and ROK forces, "were ordered to destroy the enemy by penetrating deeply and, through enveloping and encircling maneuvers, getting astride of his lines of withdrawal to cut his attempted retreat." 47 MacAr- thur, however, wanted Walker to move faster. He pushed Walker to advance as rapidly as possible. As a consequence, enemy forces were by-passed, and many survived to fight another day. Speed in the advance is not always the best approach. On September 26, the X Corps captured Seoul and linked up with the Eighth Army in the vicinity of Osan. On September 30, the city of Seoul was formally restored to the ROK, and UN forces had recaptured most of the territory of South Korea, and were "mopping" the final resistance. The same day MacArthur returned control of Seoul to President Rhee, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the PRC, warned that, "The Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbor being savagely invaded by the imperialist." Total casualties as reported up to September 30, were 19,474. The total strength of the UN force, including EUSAK, USAF, British Army, Korean Augmentation, and Republic of the Philippines, was 102,372. ROKA strength was 174,465. Crossing the 38th Parallel and the Chinese Intervention By the end of September 1950, the UN forces had achieved Truman's initial political objective of restoring the prewar situation in Korea. Success, however, caused Truman to change the political objective to rolling back Communism and the reunification of the Korean peninsula. In 1949 Truman had been charged with the "loss of China." The Communists defeated the Nationalists, exiling them to the island of Taiwan. Now was Truman's opportunity to advance democracy and capitalism. The decision to cross the 38th parallel was a search for a total solution to the problem in Korea. It was a decision in keeping with the traditional American way of war. The advance across the parallel was what Americans expected — unconditional surrender and the complete destruction of the enemy's army. The achievement of a unified non-Communist Korea would justify the cost in American lives, the way that maintenance of the status quo would not. From the American perspective, it made little sense to go to war and leave in place the same situation that caused the war. Truman's generals in the Far East Command and and the Joint Chiefs supported the move. They argued that it was necessary to complete the destruction of the enemy's army, and that "from the point of view of the military operations [the 38th parallel] . . . has no more significance than any other meridian." 48 It was, in fact, an artificial barrier, but politically it held great significance. Still, in the minds of the Joint Chiefs the military objective of completing the destruction of the enemy's main forces became the primary objective. Thus, for political and military reasons, the decision was made to cross the 38th parallel The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 103 into North Korea. The euphoria and optimism of the Inchon landing and America's natural political and military inclinations overrode Americas global strategy, established international priorities, and common sense. Euphoria and opportunism motivated new instructions to MacArthur from the Joint Chiefs. On September 27 he received the following authorization: Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective, you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings and ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Commu- nist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian or U.S.S.R. borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of the 38th Parallel will not include air or naval action against Manchurian or against U.S.S.R. territory 49 Given these instructions, UN Forces should have never crossed the 38th Parallel. The PRC had already issued warnings to the United States and the UN. In addition, the Army had numerous re- ports of the movement of substantial Chinese forces into Manchuria. Mac Arthur's intelligence officer estimated that a Chinese army totaling 246,000 troops had moved into the provinces bordering North Korea. 50 As UN Forces approached the Chinese border, the warning intensified, and Chinese People's Volunteers moved across the Yalu into North Korea. Truman was concerned about starting World War III. He had considerable respect for Soviet forces, and took measures to insure that U.S. forces did not become engaged with them. Commanders in the field were informed that "if major USSR combat units should at any time during military operations in the Korea area of hostilities engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.S. and/ or friendly forces, the U.S. should prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare to execute war plans." The USSR was an Asian and a European power. War in Korea with the USSR might also mean war in Europe. Truman was unwilling to start a total war in Korea. He was willing to give up his limited commitment to Korea if the USSR intervened. Truman and his military advisors did not have the same respect for the PRC. It was believed that the People's Liberation Army (PLA), was the most effective "oriental" fighting force, but that it was not up to "western standards." 51 Hence, Truman amended the Joint Chiefs' initial directive to MacAr- thur, "Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success." 52 Following these instructions was a note from Secretary of Defense Marshall: "We want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel." 53 On October 1 the ROK Army's 3rd Division crossed the 38th parallel. Two days later Chou En-lai again warned the United States and UN that, "American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese Resistance." On October 7, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that changed one of the major political objectives of the war. The resolution called for: "All appropriate steps [to] be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea. All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign State of Korea . . . ," 54 In other words, the UN sought the unification of the peninsula with military force. It authorized the use of UN forces north of the 38th parallel. That same day, before the completion of mopping-up operations, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea. Next day, Mao Tse-tung ordered 104 • The American Culture of War Figure 5.7 Korea, Exploitation across the 38th P£ The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 105 Chinese "volunteer forces" to "resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism." And on October 9, UN forces initiated an offensive to complete the destruction of the NKPA. The operation was exploitation and pursuit. The NKPA was broken. It was now time to exploit the success already achieved by destroy- ing the remaining enemy forces before they could reorganize and establish an effective defense. The advance of the ROKA toward Wonsan had precluded the NKPA from organizing a coherent defense. The Eighth Army attacked toward the capitol of Pyongyang. Meanwhile the X Corps moved to con- duct an amphibious landing at Wonsan on the west coast. At Wonsan the X Corps joined with ROKA forces and advanced north. On October 15, Truman and MacArthur met at Wake Island. MacArthur informed the President that, "We are no longer fearful of their [Chinese] intervention. . . . If the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter." 55 It can be argued that rational, intelligent analysis of relative combat power informed the decisions of MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs that in regard to force structure, technology, leadership, and training U.S. forces were superior to the PLA. However, a quick head count and some memory of recent operations, such as the performance of Task Force Smith, should have caused them to reconsider. Western arrogance, racism, flawed analysis of intel- ligence, and faulty assumptions caused the U.S. and UN leaders to disregard their strategy and plans for precluding World War III, to disregard the Chinese warnings, to underestimate the capabilities of the PLA, and to therefore, cross the 38th parallel and deploy Eighth Army and X Corps in a manner that limited their abilities to defend themselves. The Far East command and Joint Chiefs concluded that the Chinese would not enter the war because they feared war with the United States, and an alliance between the United States and the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan. The PRC had also missed the best opportunity to influence the situation in Korea. If they had planned to intervene, it was reasoned, they would have done so before the total collapse of the NKPA. Still, there was no excuse for the deployment and disposition of American and UN forces in October 1950 in the face of a superior enemy. Fear did in fact motivate the Chinese: It motivated them to fight. The Eighth Army and X Corps raced up the Korean peninsula separated by a spine of mountains, the X Corps on the east and the Eighth Army on the west. There was no unity of command. MacAr- thur denied Walker's request to place the X Corps under his command, and to slow the advance until the supply situation had improved. O. P. Smith, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, was also uneasy about the pace and organization of the advance. The Eighth Army and X Corps advanced at their own speed with little regard to the disposition of its neighbor. They were directed and coordinated by the FEAF in Tokyo, Japan. The Eighth Army consisted of three corps: Major General Frank W. Milburn's I Corps consisted of the American 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th ID, ROK 1st Division, and 27th Commonwealth Brigade, a primarily British command with one Australian battalion. The ROK II Corps consisted of the 6th and 8th Divisions. Major General John B. Coulter's IX Corps consisted of the 2nd ID and 25th ID, and the ROK 7th Division. Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond's X Corps on the western half of North Korea consisted of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th ID, and the ROK 3rd Division. On October 16, Chu Teh, commander of the People's Liberation Army, ordered the People's Vol- unteer Army, under the leadership of Generals Peng Te-huai, Lin Piao, and Chen Yi, to secretly cross the border into North Korea. 56 UN forces continued their advance and on October 26 the ROK 6th Division reached the Yalu River, where it was attacked by the CPV. On November 1 , U.S. forces arrived in the vicinity of the Yalu River. They were attacked that night. The lead elements of the 1st Cavalry Division suffered heavy casualties. "I heard a bugler," said a lieutenant from the Cavalry, "and the beat of horses' hooves in the distance. Then as though they came out of a burst of smoke, shadowy figures began shooting and bayoneting everybody they could find." The initial CPV attacks were warnings. 106 • The American Culture of War The CPV broke off the attack and vanished into the mountains. Thus, Walker and MacArthur had the opportunity to reevaluate the disposition of the Eighth Army, the command structure, and current operations. Walker understood that he was facing a new enemy. He understood that this was not the broken NKPA, but the organized, disciplined CPV. He also understood that his LOC stretched almost the entire length of the Korean peninsula, and that his Army had exposed flanks because of the fun- nel-shaped geographic configuration of the peninsula, the separation between the Eighth Army and X Corps, and the pursuit mission. On November 6, MacArthur concluded, "A new and fresh army now faces us, backed by a possibility of large alien reserves. Whether and to what extent these reserves will be moved forward to reinforce units now committed remains to be seen and is a matter of greatest international significance." 57 Still, the decision was made to continue the attack on North Korean forces up to the border of the PRC. On November 24, 1950, the Eighth Army advanced. And as darkness fell the following day, the CPV launched a powerful, full-scale, coordinated attack. The size and ferocity of the attack caught the Eighth Army and X Corps by surprise. MacArthur reported to the Joint Chiefs: "All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese forces are committed in North Korea in great and ever increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under the guise of voluntarism or other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an entirely new war." 58 There was no military justification for the disposition of the Eighth U.S. Army, given the repeated warnings from China, the considerations of geography and terrain, and the intelligence on the size and capabilities of enemy forces in the border regions. North Korea is funnel-shaped. At the narrowest point of the funnel, the area roughly from Pyongyang to Wonsan, the Eighth Army, in a well-devel- oped, deliberate defense, could have held. At the narrowest point, the Eighth Army possessed sufficient forces to stretch across the peninsula from sea to sea. No matter how large the Chinese Army, on the offense the funnel shape geography forced it into a narrow frontage where the only option was frontal attacks. U.N. forces controlled the sea and the air. The Eighth Army, in a good defensive posture at the narrowest point on the peninsula, with airpower, possessed the firepower to stop the attack of hundreds of thousands of Chinese. In the Pusan Perimeter, in a hasty defense, with fewer personnel, the Eighth Army demonstrated the wherewithal to defend a one hundred and fifty mile front. In a deliberate defense it could have held a similar front against a Chinese force three or four times as large. However, this was not possible in the northern most provinces. In this region, the top of the funnel, the Eighth Army would have had to cover an area more than three times larger than the Pyongyang to Wonsan corridor, to form a continuous defensive line. Given the size of the Eighth Army, this was beyond its capabilities. The more mountainous terrain in the northern-most provinces also increased the manpower requirements. North Korea was lost because of the disposition of the Eighth Army, not because of its manpower, training, or equipment. MacArthur's operational decisions strategically and politically shaped the destiny of the Korean people and the security needs of the United States into the twenty-first century. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly the Chairman, Omar Bradley, were derelict in their duties. They tolerated a chain of command that damaged the ability of the Army and the other services to fight. They watched MacArthur divide his forces in the face of a numerically superior enemy and said nothing. They allowed him to advance into the indefensible border regions, and into terrain that soaked up manpower. They were silent when he bypassed the most defensible terrain and geographic region without constructing a fallback defensive position. They permitted him to advance without opening up more reliable supply lines, and without building up sufficient supplies to fight the threatening Chi- nese. All of this was sacrificed for the sake of speed. The Joint Chiefs bear considerable responsibility for the subsequent failures in Korea. W Averell Harriman, advisor to President Truman during the The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 107 crisis in Korea observed, "General Bradley and the Chiefs of Staff were afraid of General MacArthur, I think; they were very timid about it." 59 On November 30, UN forces initiated a general retreat. Thousands of UN soldiers became casual- ties, prisoners of war, or went missing in action. The CPV used infiltration and envelopment tactics. Once in the rear of UN forces they set up roadblocks, forcing the surrounded units to fight their way through while simultaneously fighting rearguard actions. When major units, whole regiments, were incapable of breaking through they abandoned their vehicles and equipment and tried to escape through the mountains in smaller units of squads and platoons. Many were captured. Major units became combat ineffective. The objective of the CPV was not to push UN forces back to the 38th parallel, but the total destruction of the Eighth Army. On December 3, MacArthur informed Washington that twenty-six Chinese Divisions had been identified and that another 200,000 enemy soldiers were in the vicinity to support the attack. He wrote: "This small command, actually under present conditions, is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war, and unless some positive and immediate action is taken, hope for success can- not be justified and steady attrition leading to final destruction can be reasonably contemplated." The following day on December 4, the CPV recaptured Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. By the 15th, UN forces were back in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. Washington had no intention of initiating a general war in Korea. On December 29, the Joint Chiefs directed MacArthur to hold in Korea, informing him that: "We believe that Korea is not the place to fight a major war. Further, we believe that we should not commit our remaining available ground forces to action against the Chinese People's Volunteers. . . . However, a successful resistance to the Chinese-North Korean aggression at Figure 5.8 North Korea, Chinese Appear in North Korea. » The American Culture of War Figure 5.9 Korea, Eighth Army and X Corps Retreat. The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 109 some position in Korea and a deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Com- munists would be of great importance to our national interest." 60 MacArthur responded with his own proposal: Should a policy determination be reached ... to recognize the state of war which has been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities and to take retaliatory measures within our capabilities, we could (1) blockade the coast of China; (2) destroy through naval gunfire and air bombard- ment Chinas industrial capacity to wage war; (3) secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa to strengthen our position . . . ; and (4) release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action, possibly leading to counter-invasion against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland. 61 The Joint Chiefs, after "careful consideration," rejected MacArthur's proposals, and concluded with: "Should it become evident in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe losses of men and material you will at that time withdraw from Korea to Japan." 62 The Army, because of the talent, tenacity, character, and professionalism of General Matthew B. Ridgway, never faced the ignominy of evacuation. Ridgway Takes Command: The Ground War On December 23, General Walton H. Walker was killed in a vehicle crash. He was succeeded by Gen- eral Matthew B. Ridgway, who had commanded the famed 82nd Airborne Division in the Normandy invasion, and the XVIII Airborne Corps in the Battle of the Bulge. Ridgway, responding to a reporter in 1952, outlined his approach to command: "When you get a new job to do, spend most of your time discovering exactly what your new mission is. Then break it down into workable units. Establish an organization that will enable each unit to accomplish its particular mission. Then try to find good men to fill the key spots. Give them full authority for individual action, but check them relentlessly to see they speed the main job. And if they don't produce, fire them." 63 He further noted that, "The one thing I demand in a man is loyalty," and that, "I am a soldier and a soldier's job is to obey orders." When Ridgway met with MacArthur on December 25 he was given command of the entire Eighth Army: "The Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think is best. ... I will support you. You have my complete confidence." 64 The following day Ridgway flew to Korea and issued his first General Order: "I have with little notice assumed heavy responsibilities before in battle, but never with greater op- portunities for service to our loved ones and our Nation in beating back a world menace which free men cannot tolerate. It is an honored privilege to share this service with you and with our comrades of the Navy and Air Force. You will have my utmost. I shall expect yours." 65 Thus, Ridgway 's first ac- tion as Commander of the Eighth Army was to tell his soldiers why they were fighting. In a limited war in which the president's decision for war did not enjoy the full support of the American people, Ridgway found it necessary to keep telling soldiers why they were fighting. He had to compete with dissenting opinions that made their way into the newspapers and other sources of information read by soldiers. Ridgway arrived in Korea just in time for the CPV offensive across the 38th parallel. As the CPV advanced, their LOC grew longer and more vulnerable to attack from the air. Seoul was captured on January 3, and the Eighth Army continued its retreat. Ridgway faced one of the most difficult mili- tary tasks in war, assuming command of a defeated, retreating, broken army, in the face of a superior force. Ridgway had to halt the retreat, establish a defense, reinvigorate his army, and then attack to restore South Korea and achieve the political objectives of the United States. Ridgway 's first task was 110 • The American Culture of War to assess the situation, his subordinate commanders, and the status of troops— mentally, physically, and in equipment: My concern in this conference [with corps commanders] was to devise every means we could to make an immediate improvement in the Eighth Army's combat potential, for I was determined to return to the offensive just as quickly as our strength permitted. . . . But before the Eighth Army could return to the offensive it needed to have its fighting spirit restored, to have pride in itself, to feel confidence in its leadership, and have faith in its mission. These qualities could not be assessed at secondhand, and I determined to make an immediate tour of the battlefront to meet and talk with the field commanders in their forward command posts and to size up the Eighth Army's spirit with my own eyes and senses. Fighting spirit is not something that can be described or spelled out to you. An experienced commander can feel it through all his senses, in the posture, the manner, the talk, the very gestures of the men on the fighting front. 66 Ridgway's ability to assess "fighting spirit" was a function of cultural learning, of understanding what an effective soldier looked like. Ridgway visited frontline positions in an open jeep to talk with corps, division, battalion, company, and even platoon commanders. "I rode in an open jeep, and would permit no jeep with the top up to operate in the combat zone. Riding in a closed vehicle in a battle area puts a man in the wrong frame of mind." Ridgway's inspections gave him an understanding of the quality and character of the defense, the status of equipment and morale, and an assessment of lead- ers. Reporting to General Collins, Ridgway wrote: "I have so far found only one or two cases where a division has shown any appreciable resourcefulness in adapting its fighting tactics to the terrain, to the enemy, and to conditions in this theater." 67 He found that too many units of the Eighth Army lacked the know-how to carry out their missions and duties and were deficient in small unit operations; that too many leaders were not fulfilling their responsibilities; and he also found that the fighting spirit was too low to generate the combat power needed to reverse the situation: I must say, in all frankness, that the spirit of the Eighth Army as I found it on my arrival there gave me deep concern. There was a definite air of nervousness, of gloomy foreboding, of uncertainty, a spirit of apprehension as to what the future held. ... It was clear to me that our troops had lost confidence. I could sense it the moment I came into a command post. I could read it in their eyes, in their walk. I could read it in the faces of their leaders, from sergeants right on up to the top. They were unresponsive, reluctant to talk. I had to drag information out of them. There was a complete absence of that alertness, that aggressiveness, that you find in troops whose spirit is high. . . . [T]hey seemed to have forgotten, too, a great many of the basic, unchanging principles of war. They were not patrolling as they should. Their knowledge of the enemy's location and his strength was pitifully inadequate. There are two kinds of information no commander can do without — information pertaining to the enemy, which we call combat intelligence, and information on the terrain. Both are vital. ... All intelligence could show me was a big red goose egg out in front of us, with 174,000 scrawled in the middle of it. Ridgway immediately initiated actions to improve the welfare and morale of soldiers, to retrain them, and to restore their fighting spirit. He ordered immediate and aggressive patrolling to gain knowledge of the terrain, maintain contact with the enemy, and restore fighting spirit. He removed commanders who exhibited defeatism or who lacked the physical stamina to serve in combat units, cautioning others that "heads would roll if my orders [are] not carried out." He insured that soldiers had everything they needed to fight in the harsh Korean winter, and enforced supply discipline rules. He increased the firepower of the Eighth Army by requesting that the Pentagon expedite the deploy- ment often battalions of artillery. He requested thirty thousand Korean laborers from President Rhee The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 .111 to dig and string barbed wire in order to add depth to his defense. He also requested that the ROK National Guard be organized and equipped as a Civilian Transportation Corps for logistical support of the frontline units. Nine companies were available by March 26, 1951 to haul ammunition and sup- plies to the front using the traditional Korean "A" frames. By mid- June, eighty-five companies, 30,589 carriers, were assisting the Eighth Army to move supplies over the rugged terrain and rain-soaked roads. 68 Ridgway initiated programs to retrain soldiers. He rotated units out of combat for training and rest, and then back into combat. He led by personal example. He looked and acted like a soldier, wearing a web belt and harness with a hand grenade attached. Ridgway later noted: "I held to the old-fashioned idea that it helped the spirits of the men to see the Old Man up there, in the snow and sleet and mud, sharing the same cold, miserable existence they had to endure." 69 Ridgway did a lot of talking. He explained to his subordinate commanders what he expected: Then I talked a little about leadership. I told them their soldier forebears would turn over in their graves if they heard some of the stories I had heard about the behavior of some of our troop leaders in combat. The job of a commander was to be up where the crisis of action was taking place. In time of battle, I wanted division commanders to be up with their forward battalions, and I wanted corps commanders up with the regiment that was in the hottest action. If they had paper work to do, they could do it at night. By day their place was up there where the shooting was going on. The power and the prestige of America was at stake out here, I told them, and it was going to take guns and guts to save ourselves from defeat. Id see to it they got the guns. The rest was up to them, to their character, their competence as soldiers, their calmness, their judgment, and their courage. 70 Ridgway also issued a lot of orders communicating his intentions to attack, to go on the offen- sive, "I skinned Eighth Army staff officers individually and collectively many times to have them do as I wanted . . . ." He informed all that, "I am going to attack. . . . We are interested only in inflicting maximum casualties to the enemy with minimum casualties to ourselves. To do this we must wage a war of maneuver— slashing at the enemy when he withdraws and fighting delaying actions when he attacks." 71 Ridgway soon recognized he had another problem. The Korean War was the subject of debate back home, and the soldiers knew it. The president's policies in Korea did not have the quality and character of support that was prevalent in World War II. And press coverage of the war was damag- ing the morale of the forces fighting in Korea. Ridgway acted to counter the negative effects of the press coverage and the debate in the United States. He sought to explain to soldiers what it was they were fighting for: To me the issues are clear. It is not a question of this or that Korean town. Real estate is, here, incidental. It is not restricted to the issue of freedom for our South Korean allies. . . . The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dignity of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual rights are sacred; whether we are to survive with God's hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existence of a Godless world. . . . This has long since ceased to be a fight for freedom for our Korean Allies alone and for their national survival. It has become, and it continues to be, a fight for our own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, independent national existence. The sacrifices we have made, and those we shall yet support, are not offered vicariously for others, but in our own direct defense. In the final analysis, the issue now joined right here in Korea is whether Communism or individual freedom shall prevail, and— make no mistake— whether 112 • The American Culture of War the next flight of fear-driven people we have just witnessed across the Han River shall be checked and defeated overseas, or be permitted step by step to close in on our homeland and at some future time, however distant, to engulf our own loved ones in all its misery and despair. These are the things for which we fight. 72 Ridgway echoed concerns prevalent in the Army since the outbreak of the cold war. In limited war, the connections between the sacrifices that soldiers were required to make and the security of the United States were indirect and difficult to perceive. In limited war, it was more difficult to produce the national consensus that was the norm in more total wars, and the press tended to gravitate toward the most extreme incidents, frequently portraying them in the worst manner. Limited wars required the Army to acknowledge and understand the national debate and the affects it was having on the motiva- tion of soldiers. Limited war required the Army to actively, tenaciously work to counter the negative influences of the press and the national debate on the morale and discipline of soldiers. Ridgway 's words were an acknowledgment of this problem, and a palpable example of his efforts to maintain the fighting spirit of his army. Ridgway believed in the American soldier. He knew what was possible, and was thus able to reignite the fighting spirit of the Eighth Army, turn it around, and attack. The enemy the United States fought in Korea was unlike the enemy it had fought in Europe. Army infantry operation and tactics doctrine had to adapt to new conditions and a new enemy: In Korea, Americans encountered unfamiliar enemy tactics along with rugged terrain that hampered full employment of the World War II mechanized doctrine. North Korean tactics, and those of the Chinese, differed from the European-style warfare to which Americans had grown accustomed. The more fluid enemy tactics in Korea resembled aspects of guerrilla warfare, notably in extensive use of infiltration and night attacks. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, had become conditioned to European battlefields, orienting doctrine, organization and weaponry in that direction. American soldiers had grown road bound and dependent upon extensive artillery support, elaborate communications, and endless supplies. Koreas rugged mountains, few roads, and harsh climate helped obstruct the effective employment of superior American military power. 73 The engagement ranges in Korea were shorter than were those in Europe, and the enemy developed tactics to mitigate the effectiveness of American superior firepower and control of the air. Darkness and adverse weather conditions favored the enemy. Captured North Korean and Chinese documents emphasized the desirability of night attacks noting "the ineptness and distaste" of U.S. forces for ac- tions during darkness. 74 The Chinese used camouflage and concealment to close within two hundred meters of American lines, when possible, before initiating the attack. They were poor marksmen with individual weapons, but excellent with the use of the 7.62 mm light and medium machineguns, 60 and 82 mm mortars, "Chinese stick" grenades, and satchel and pole charges. CPV armor units were equipped with T34 tanks, and initially few artillery units were deployed. CPV attacked in echelons, concentrating on specific sectors of the defense, after probing attacks found the main defensive line. All their major weapons were in the first echelon. When a soldier fell, another soldier in the second or third echelons would pick up his weapon and continue the attack. One third of the attacking unit was held in reserve to exploit breakthroughs. The much discussed human wave tactics were not the norm for CPV, but they did take place. Once penetration was made, Chinese forces expanded to the flanks to enlarge the breach. They fought with great tenacity and zeal, using bugles and horns to confuse, intimidate, and terrorize the defenders, and to control their formations. 75 The Korean War: The Opening Phases, 1950-51 . 113 To regain the initiative, restore confidence, and ultimately retake lost territory, Ridgway planned a series of limited offensives. However, first he had to stop the retreat, and gain an accurate picture of the enemy's disposition. In late January 1951, he ordered aggressive patrolling, and ordered the 2nd Infantry Division to turn around and advance north. On the night of the 13th and 14th of February, the 23rd Infantry "the Tomahawk Regiment," of the 2nd ID fought desperate battles against Chinese human wave tactics to stop a major Chinese advance. 76 One assessment of the battles and Chinese tactics read: Now, while the entire perimeter of Chipyong-ni was under pressure, the main CPV blow fell against weakened George Company. George was piling up the dead by the hundreds, but too many of the enemy were getting in close with explosives and hand grenades. The artillery fired star shells and HE [high-explosives ammunition] alternately, riddling the Chinese, but still they came on. The Chinese washed up on the low ridge again and again, fighting a determined battle for each foxhole. Little by little, against violent resistance, they were chipping the ground away from the American defenders. . . . The Chinese kept pressing in. They did not try to overwhelm G with one rush, but continued to creep through the night, knocking out hole after hole. The 1st Platoon, near three o'clock in the morning, was pushed back out of position. . . .The 23rd's perimeter was broken. The Chinese had a pathway into the vitals of the regiment. All they had to do was to exploit it. . . . The Chinese now demonstrated what would be proved again and again upon the Korean field of battle: they could crack a line, but a force lacking mechanization, air power, and rapid communications could not exploit against a force possessing all three. . . . [A]ir, armor, artillery, and redeployed infantry had plugged the hole. 77 At daylight, the 23rd Infantry counterattacked, reestablishing its perimeter. The successful defense led to a sequence of offensive operations, "Thunderbolt," "Roundup," "Killer," and "Ripper," which started the Eighth Army back up the peninsula. 78 On March 14, Seoul was recaptured. By the end of the month, UN forces were back in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. At this juncture, Truman changed the political objectives for the third and final time. The political objective reverted back to that of September 1950 — the restoration of the Republic of South Korea. This decision caused the Eighth Army to halt major offensive operations and establish a defense. Both armies dug in and the war entered its final phase— a fighting stalemate, a defensive war of attrition. Once the line was solidly drawn across the peninsula, and both armies were in well-established deliberate defenses, offensive ground operations were for limited gains, such as the next ridgeline. Airpower became the major source of UN strategi- cally offensive combat power. Still, the Eighth Army reached its peak performance under Ridgway in the spring of 1951, regaining the initiative against the formidable People's Liberation Army 79 During the strategic defense phase of the Korean War, the Army relied primarily on firepower to destroy enemy forces and break up planned offensives. Huge artillery parks were constructed, with the abil- ity to mass tremendous fires almost immediately. Maneuver warfare had come to an end, and greater reliance was placed on artillery and airpower. An Army Training Bulletin noted: "Under cover of our artillery fire, units could move with relative ease from a LD [line of departure] to the assault position; however, numerous failures occurred after artillery fire lifted or shifted — particularly covering the final fifty yards. Chief reason for this was failure to use all available weapons that could fire during this period, such as rifles and hand grenades, machine guns, recoilless rifles, flame throwers, tanks and smoke. . . . There is not enough aimed shoulder fire." 80 From World War II until the end of the century the Army's reliance on firepower from sources other than those of the infantry increased. In hindsight it can be argued that it was a mistake to stop the forward progress of the Army. The war continued for two more long years, while negotiations were carried out. By assuming the defense, the Eighth Army surrendered the initiative, and political leaders robbed themselves of their most important 1 14 • The American Culture of War negotiation tool —success on the battlefield. During this "negotiating while fighting phase," 40 percent of the total casualties of the war were sustained. Geography, the battlefield situation, the president's promise, and the credibility of the United States should have influenced the political decisions of the president. The president had made a commitment to the Korean and American people. The prestige and credibility of the People's Republic of China and the United States were engaged in the struggle for Korea. The outcome of the war would affect world opinion for decades, diminishing or expanding influence. The most defensible geographic locations and terrain were a hundred miles to the North. And, both Ridgway and Van Fleet believed that forward progress was still possible. Therefore, within the range of limitations established by the president — to fight a war within the confines of the Korean Peninsula with American forces no greater than eight American divisions— there was still room for action. There was still the potential to achieve a better outcome. However, by no means did the Eighth Army possess the combat power to push to the Yalu River. Geography, the size of China's population, along with the People's Liberation Army, and the combined resources of the PRC and Soviet Union precluded military victory on the Chinese border, short of total war. Truman, who probably regretted his decision to cross the 38th parallel, sought what he believed was the most expeditious means to end the war. However, by stopping the Eighth Army, he actually prolonged the war, and in the process, created a new, major power, the PRC, which had demonstrated to the world its ability to fight the U.S. to a stalemate. This new prestige would influence future wars. The American way of life with all its abundance produces cultural arrogance that diminished the ability of soldiers in Korea to identify with the people they were trying to save. Americans believe they live in the greatest country in the world, which means all other countries are somehow less. Power to some degree produces contempt. The behavior of too many American soldiers in various parts of the world has reflected poorly on the United States, contributing to the alienation of the same people. Some soldiers exhibited considerable contempt for Koreans and their way of life. Rene Cutforth, a Korean Catholic priest, gave his impression of American soldiers: "Do you know that if you held a plebiscite in South Korea, the Communist vote would be more than seventy- five percent? We are sick of war and ruin. . . . Your armies have not behaved well to the people, and we dislike you all cordially. It is impossible to keep these great theories of freedom in front of the eyes of simple people. They are afraid of the bombs and the burning and the raping behind the battle line. The Chinese understand us much better, I'm afraid. Your cause is good, but you have lost our good will, and though you all appear to despise us, that is a big thing to lose. In this country, manners count for everything." 81 The assumption of the strategic defense marked an important change in the American way of war. Two hundred years of American warfare came to an end. An Army that retained significant offensive combat power in the midst of a shooting war where Americans were fighting and dying voluntarily went on the strategic defense. Political leaders decided not to pursue victory. The citizen-soldier Army of the United States would never again employ the Army's traditional offensive campaign-winning infantry doctrine. Once the Army went over to the defense, a psychological transformation started, not only in the Army, but also in the United States. A static war of attrition was not the type of war Americans expected. Support for the war deteriorated. And as soldiers came to realize that victory was no longer sought and that there was no way to bring the war to an end through ground combat operations, through their own efforts, other priorities rose in importance. A decade later, the prec- edents established in Korea were reenacted in Vietnam. The threat of direct intervention by the PRC caused the United States to fight a strategically defensive war of attrition, a war that from the start the Army could not win. 6 The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 When they [the B-29s] got back to their base— Here was a case of man bites dog. A communi- cation had just come in. . . . The message said to the B-29 people: "Our congratulations and our thanks. The First Cavalry Division is now across the Naktong River." What they had done was to completely erase the enemy artillery concentrations on those hills west of the Naktong. With all their people and artillery . . . destroyed . . . there was no possibility of the enemy's resisting. . . . This was the old Attack technique . . . and the original dream of Army [ground force] command- ers who saw in the new-fangled airplane only an extension of ground firepower. "Flying Artil- lery" once more. It worked. . . . But that wasn't what B-29s were trained for, nor was it how they were intended to perform. The B-29s were trained to go up there to Manchuria and destroy the enemy's potential to wage war. They were trained to bomb Peking and Hankow. . . . The threat of this impending bombardment would, I am confident, have kept the Communist Chinese from revitalizing and protracting the Korean War. ...The great tragedy is that even these 157,000 [American] casualties were mostly unnecessary. That war. . . could have been terminated almost as soon as it began. I will always believe this [emphasis added}. —General Curtis LeMay 1 LeMay was confident that strategic bombing alone could have won the Korean War, and saved thousands of American lives. He believed that the United States possessed the technology to dictate the course and conduct of war, and that it was a waste of precious American lives to engage in an unnecessary ground war. He believed that it was a mistake to employ strategic airpower, a limited resource, in support of ground tactical operations. General Curtis LeMay commanded Strategic Air Command (SAC) throughout most of the 1950s, and it was his belief that airpower was the decisive instrument for the conduct of war, all wars; the Army, however, disagreed. The Army argued that in the early days of the war airpower had demonstrated that it was incapable of stopping the advance of North Korean People's Army (NKPA) and that the employment of ground forces had been necessary to achieve this objective. Both arguments were a function of the service culture from which they were derived. However, in the new age of nuclear weapons, jet aircraft, and missiles, the argument that best fit the American vision of war, was that of the Air Force. The actual conduct of the war meant little in this environment. The American people would ultimately consider the Korean War a mistake, a dirty little infantry war in which the United States did not achieve its strategic objective of total victory. The Korean War, however, foretold the future of warfare, and restated the history of warfare. 115 116 • The American Culture of War World War II strategic bombing doctrines did not have the potential to achieve decisive results in limited wars, where airpower was restricted to a single geographic region and the enemy's means of production and population centers that produced war materials were outside of that region. By Sep- tember 15, 1950 General George E. Stratemeyer, Commander Far East Air Force (FEAF), was able to report: "Practically all of the major military industrial targets [in North Korea] strategically important to the enemy forces and to their war potential have now been neutralized." 2 In the official history of The USAF in Korea, Robert Futrell concluded that the strategic bombing of North Korea "made an appreciable contribution to the United Nations victory south of the 38th parallel," but he hastened to add that, "the campaign lacked decisiveness." 3 Without a willingness to fight a more total war, the strategic bombing doctrines of the Air Force could not destroy the enemy's means of production, will to fight, or people, all of which were outside the confined theater of war. The Air Force well understood this, but LeMay was willing to expand the war to the cities of the People's Republic of China (PRC). He, like MacArthur and other senior military leaders, was willing to fight a more total war. World War II strategic bombing doctrines also did not work because developing countries such as North Korea lacked a large working- or middle-class population to bomb into submission. Hence, the ability to win the war by destroying the will of the people was almost nonexistent. Peasant based, poorly educated, near subsistence level societies were unaccustomed to the rights of citizens in the Western tradition — unaccustomed to revolt, to challenging the government, to recognizing any rights, except the right to exist. Of all the people on the planet, they were the least likely to be bombed into submission. And, extermination warfare could not be justified. In limited war none of the World War II strategic bombing doctrines were capable of producing decisive results. Strategic airpower and nuclear weapons did provide the deterrent power that precluded limited wars from developing into a more total war, and, it was hoped, the deterrent power to keep other nation-states from entering the localized war. But henceforth, it was in limited war and in missions restricted to specific geographic areas, and by the political parameters set in Washington, that the Air Force endeavored to prove the decisiveness of airpower. This was not the type of war the Air Force envisioned or planned to fight. A student of the air war in Korea wrote: "It was a phony war, too, because the United Nations Air Forces always fought with one hand tied behind their back." 4 Another student of strategic airpower noted: "The three years of FEAF Bomber Command operations in Korea were rich in ironies. A plane designed to carry all-out war to the industrial heart of enemy nations served in a limited, localized, peripheral conflict." 5 Most of the American people would have agreed with LeMay. Artificially imposed restrictions were difficult to explain and accept when Americans were fighting and dying. Given the limitations imposed, the Air Force searched for targets, doctrine, and technologies that might prove decisive. For the remainder of the twentieth century the Air Force fought campaigns circumscribed and constrained by political leaders. Still, while not decisive, airpower made significant contributions to the survival of South Korea. The Air War General LeMay, observed: "This may come as a surprise to the reader: we never lost a single man on the ground to enemy air action in Korea. ... No ground soldier is known to have lost his life during enemy air action. Not one." 6 The U.S. Air Force controlled the skies over battlefields on which UN ground forces fought. Not since World War II had American ground forces suffered a significant air attack. As a consequence of dominance in the air and at sea, naval and air forces devoted greater efforts to fighting the ground war either independently or in concert with ground forces. Airpower greatly influenced the situation on the ground in Korea; however, the same driving forces that precluded The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 117 the Army and Army Air Forces from cooperating and achieving synergy at places such as Sicily and Normandy, precluded them in Korea. The Air Force entered the Korean War unprepared to fight the type of war required of it by political leaders. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) was too low on the Air Force's list of priorities to adequately prepare for a limited war; in fact, by January 1949 the TAC had been demoted to a planning head- quarters stripped of its units and absorbed into the Continental Air Command. Army protests and the arguments within the Air Force, caused the restoration of the TAC in July of 1950. 7 Nevertheless, the Strategic Air Command had been the primary focus of the Air Force, receiving the majority of resources— energy, intellect, budget, talent, and prestige. By experience, training, doctrine, technol- ogy, and culture the Air Force was geared and oriented toward strategic bombing and more total war. In limited wars, the Air Force could not fight the way it was designed or had planned. The Air Force, thus, had to adapt its strategic bombers and other technologies to conduct tactical missions. Early in the war came the first restrictions from Washington. Major General Emmett O'Donnell, commander of Bomber Command, and a veteran of the air war against Japan, developed the initial strategic bombing plan for the Korean War: "It was my intention and hope . . . that we would be able to get out there and to cash in on our psychological advantage in having gotten into the theater and into the war so fast by putting a very severe blow on the North Koreans, with an advance warning, perhaps telling them that they had gone too far in what we all recognized as being an act of aggression . . . and [then] go to work burning five major cities of North Korea to the ground, and to destroy completely every one of about 18 major strategic targets." 8 The area, fire bombing of North Koreas five major industrial cities and other industrial complexes, was not approved. Washington was concerned that the Communists would exploit the fire raids for propaganda purposes. And henceforth, limiting civilian casualties and the destruction to civilian property would be a legitimate concern in war. Ultimately this requirement pushed the Air Force to develop precision guided munitions. Arguably, the develop- ment of these technologies was delayed more than a decade because of the narrow focus on strategic bombing and nuclear war. The future employment of airpower would be measured to correspond to the limited political objectives sought. In the initial phase of the war the exigencies of the situation dictated the employment of airpower. Because of the urgency of the situation on the ground MacArthur would not approve the use of the twelve available B-29s in a strategic bombing campaign. They were needed to destroy targets that facilitated the conduct of the ground war. However, the Air Force was eager to initiate the strategic bombing campaign, and deployed additional air resources, medium and heavy bombers, to the FEAF. SAC deployed the 22nd and 92nd Bombardment Groups and the 31st Strategic Reconnais- sance Squadron from the United States to back up the FEAF's own 19th Bombardment Group. Together they formed the FEAF Bomber Command (Provisional). On August 8, General George E. Stratemeyer, ordered O'Donnell to initiate the strategic bombing campaign. However, once the Air Force determined that its civilian political bosses would not permit it to win the war by employing its strategic bombing doctrine, it sought a new campaign-winning doctrine to win the war without the Army. Allan Millett, noted: On the day he assumed command [of the FEAF] Weyland wrote Vandenberg that Korea offered an unparalleled opportunity to show how tactical air power could win a conventional war. The Air Force, therefore, should "fully exploit its first real opportunity to prove the efficacy of air power in more than a supporting role . . . ." The Korean War experience might provide positive guidance for the USAF force structure and help formulate concepts for the defense of Western 118 • The American Culture of War Europe, but that experience should come in a massive commitment to interdiction, not to close air support. 9 In limited war tactical airpower doctrine became the Air Force's primary campaign-winning doctrine. The Air Force concluded that air attacks on enemy forces, lines of communication, and logistical centers had the potential to produce decisive results. In limited war many of the missions that the Army Air Force believed were the least productive in World War II became the only way for airpower alone to prove decisive. After gaining its independence from the Army, the Air Force was still determined to prove it could win wars without the Army. The Air Force and Army also labored against attitudes and perspectives that were the legacies of World War II. The Air Force viewed close air support as its least productive mission in World War II, believing that the Army should rely on its own artillery out to its maximum effective range. Millett, noted: "the Army saw artillery as dominant within its range, and air power the principal weapon outside artillery range. In Korea, for example, the 'bombline,' the geographic limit upon air strikes not under positive control, tended to coincide with the outer limits of the effective range of corps artillery. ... In sum, the Army did not expect integrated close air support, and the Air Force did not intend to deliver it except under carefully circumscribed conditions . . . ." 10 Army tactical commanders believed the Navy and Marine Corps provided more timely and accurate close air support system than the Air Force. This was a function of greater cooperation, and service cultures. Consider the words of Admiral Charles D. Griffin: It was interesting to observe that the Army liked to get ground support from the Navy and Marine Corps, much in preference to getting it from the Air Force. My Army friends, many of them who were over there in Korea, would comment very forcibly on this particular point. They felt that the Navy- Marine Corps system was a system that was developed to bring out the best in the total military effort. The Army and the Air Force seemed to have grown steadily separated, rather than having a closely-knit organization. The Army would make a request for some air support. However, in many cases they had no way of knowing whether theyd ever get it or not. In many respects, it wasn't very satisfactory 11 Because of the Air Force's long struggle to separate itself from the Army, the two services had in fact "grown steadily separate," and this was much more than procedural, it was attitude. 12 Airpower was integrated into Marine Corps battles. Marine aviators were marines first. They were dedicated to fighting the ground war. And the glamour and glory of Navy aviation was not strategic bomb- ing. After achieving the air superiority mission, they too were dedicated to assisting marines on the ground. The Air Force did not develop this attitude during the Korean War. The Air Force wanted to fight its limited war campaigns unencumbered by Army demands. Marine aviation was a resource the Army greatly envied. In addition, the Air Force/ Army system for requesting and directing tactical air support, which was based on systems developed in the European Theater of Operation, was slow and cumbersome. 13 The Navy and Marine Corps entered the war with a system that provided greater flexibility and more rapid response. Marine Corps and Navy aviation also did not suffer from the shortages in personnel and equipment, particularly radios and radio operators that plagued the Army. The Army could not support the communication nets required by doctrine. During the years of occupation duty many of key components of the system had been eliminated. The Army had to reestablish significant parts of the system. Many Army units had to rely on the Air Force's tactical air control parties' radio net to request air support, which caused problems because it bypassed the approving authority. After many of the initial shortages were overcome, some senior Army commanders still believed that the tactical The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 119 air control system was unresponsive. 14 General Almond, Commander of the X Corps, outlined the problem: The chief objection I had to the support that we received in Northeast Korea was the fact that the Air Force's high command desired notification of tactical air support requirements 24 hours in advance. I explained to General Partridge, the 5th Air Force Commander . . . that this was impossible. Our requirements for immediate air support were not always predictable 24 hours in advance; we needed an Air Force commitment to respond to unplanned tactical air sup- port requests within 30-50 minutes of the initial request so that the enemy located by ground units could not be moved to a different place and probably better concealed. This was my chief complaint and my constant complaint. The Air Force required requests for the support too far ahead of the use to which it was to be put . . . . 15 In the early days of World War II the Army encountered similar problems. Not until late in 1944 was the Army Air Force capable of the responsiveness the Army required in unplanned tactical situ- Air forces flew out of bases in Japan, Okinawa, and Korea, and the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula. The size and capabilities of the FEAF increased throughout the war, particularly in the first year of the war. From the outbreak of war to the signing of the armistice the FEAF grew from 33,625 officers and airmen to 112,188. At war's end it consisted of 70 squadrons, including seven Marine and three foreign squadrons, having grown from 44. When the war started the FEAF possessed 657 aircraft, and 1,441 when it ended. It employed a wide range of aircraft, from World War II B-29 and B-26 bombers, to the most technologically advanced jet aircraft, including the F-80 Shooting Star and F-84 Thunderjet fighter-bombers, and the F-86 Sabre air-superiority fighters. 16 Because the Korean War was the first jet aircraft war, many lessons had to be learned. The Korean War gave the Air Force its first opportunity to manage and coordinate all the air assets in a theater of war. The FEAF in Japan consisted primarily of Bomber Command (Provisional) and the Fifth Air Force. The Twentieth Air Force in Okinawa and the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines were subordinate commands. The Navy's Seventh Fleet air resources consisted of the 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW), and Task Force 77, composed of the Navy's carrier air groups, which typically had two to three carriers conducting operations. Foreign air forces from Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa provided additional resources. The FEAF operated under the command of Far East Command. MacArthur, Ridgway, and Clark each placed different demands on the FEAF; however, each faced different situations. While the FEAF commanded and directed the overall air effort, priorities had to be worked out with the Army, and agreements made with the Navy and Marine Corps. The priori- ties and agreements were negotiated and then renegotiated during the war, and each service had the option of appealing up the chain of command, all the way to Washington if necessary. Millett noted: "The interservice compromise, finished on July 15 [1950] to no one's complete satisfaction, gave FEAF operational control of all land-based aviation in the theater but limited Stratemeyer to coordination control' of carrier aviation in the war zone." The Navy believed that the Air Force was incapable of treating it fairly. Admiral John J. Hyland, Jr. observed that the Air Force tended to, "give the Navy the poorest and least important strikes and take the most profitable ones for themselves. So the Navy has always been worried about getting itself under somebody else's control and not be able to operate the Navy to its best effectiveness" 17 It was also difficult for the Air Force to communicate with the Navy. Navy and Air Force communications and encryption procedures were dissimilar and incompatible, and the Navy tended to maintain radio 120 • The American Culture of War silence during operations. 18 The FEAF, thus, exerted little operational control of Navy aviation, and the United States in effect fought two air wars. The services preferred to fight their own separate wars, to perfect their own technology and doctrine independent of the other services, cooperating only on the periphery. Marines believed that Marine Corps aviation was there to support their operations. When they did not get the support they believed necessary (because of Army requests or utilization) they went up both of their chains of command, bypassing the Army. These efforts usually produced the desired results. 19 The Air Force objected to the employment of strategic bombers in tactical support of ground forces (a repeat of the World War II argument between the Army and Army Air Force). They believed that such missions were better left to the Fifth Air Force, the Tactical Air Force, commanded by Major General Earle E. "Pat" Partridge, employing fighter-bombers, light bombers, and fighters; and that the heavy bombers were best used for the modified, confined strategic bombing campaign. The Air Force won the argument, and after the crisis of the Pusan Perimeter and the Inchon landing, the heavy bombers were primarily devoted to strategic bombing. Bomber Command began the systematic attack on the enemy's supply lines, Operation Strangle, flying 54,410 interdiction sorties between January and June 1951. Air power, however, failed to stop the flow of men and materiel out of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Soviet Union and down the Korean peninsula. In Vietnam, the Air Force faced a similar problem trying to stop the flow of resources down the Ho Chi Minh trail. On December 17, 1950, in the northern-most sector of North Korea, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Hin- ton in a North American F-86 Sabre shot down a Soviet MiG-15 piloted by a Russian, initiating the air superiority campaign. This was the first jet air-to-air combat, and according to the U.S. Air Force (USAF), the Sabres won. According to the Soviet/Russian Air Force the MiGs won. General William W Momyer, USAF noted: "Our Fifth Air Force contained the North Korean Air Force (NKAF). Of course the NKAF was not all Korean, but basically Chinese with Russian and Polish pilots as well. Further, there is substantial reason to believe that most of the fighter squadrons actively engaging the F-86 s were Soviet squadrons . . . ." 20 Stalin was slow to provide Communist forces fighting in Korea with Soviet airpower; however, in November he acquiesced to the pleas of Mao and Kim, sending Rus- sian air and ground forces to defend the PRC border regions. At the same time, a Russian diplomatic offensive, which charged the UN air forces with violations of Chinese air space, kept Washington focused on containing the war. Sabre pilots of the 4th Fighter Interceptor Group and MiG pilots of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps both fought defensive campaigns. Soviet/Chinese air bases located in Manchuria were off-limits to UN forces. The Sabres officially had to wait for the enemy to attack across the Yalu River into North Korea to engage. Similarly, for most of the war, the MiGs were restricted to the air space over North Korea. Unofficially the air campaign took place over both sides of the Yalu. A major part of the aerial campaign was fought in a well-defined air space in the northeast corner of North Korea that became known as "MiG Alley." According the Air Force's official history, in aerial combat the FEAF claimed to have destroyed 900 MiGs, 792 of which were MiG- 15s; to have damaged 973; and to have "probably" destroyed another 168 Soviet aircraft. The FEAF claimed to have suffered only 139 aircraft destroyed of which 78 were Sabres. 21 American pilots tended to believe the Sabre was the superior aircraft. The MiG had a faster rate of climb than the Sabre, but was not as responsive and maneuverable. The canopy of the Sabres permitted greater visibility than the MiG, making it possible for Sabre pilots to detect and engage targets faster. Some U.S. Air Force pilots judged the two aircraft "roughly equal," attributing the higher kill ratio to the superior skill and aggressiveness of American pilots. More recent scholarship challenges the official assessment of the U.S. Air Force. Xiaoming Zhang, in his work, Red Wings Over the Yalu, wrote: The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 121 [RJecent revelations of Soviet involvement in Korea [following the collapse of the Berlin Wall] offers a contrary picture: It was the Soviet air force, not the PLAAF [People's Liberation Army Air Force], that went head-to-head with UN air forces from the beginning of the Chinese military intervention. The Soviets claimed the destruction of more than a thousand UN aircraft against only some three hundred losses of their own. . . . The 64th IAK claimed that its fighter units were responsible for 1 , 1 06 enemy planes destroyed, and antiaircraft artillery units were credited with 212 planes downed. In return it acknowledged the loss of 335 MiGs and 120 pilots, plus sixty- eight antiaircraft gunners killed in action. 22 American and Soviet/Russian figures cannot both be right. Stalin's deployment of the 324th and 303rd Interceptor/Fighter Air Divisions (IAD) in April 1951, it is argued, reversed the trend toward UN dominance in the air over North Korea. These fighter divisions consisted of veteran World War II pilots who had amassed considerable experience in the MiG-15s. The Russians believed that the MiG-15 was superior to the Sabre. The Soviets also rotated their air divisions, and because of uneven training and skill, some divisions performed considerably better than did others. Zhang wrote: When the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, Moscow had rotated twelve fighter air divi- sions (twenty-nine fighter air regiments), ranging from 150 to three hundred fighter planes, throughout Korea. More than forty thousand Soviet troops . . . served in Korea, with a peak figure of twenty-six thousand from July 1952, to August 1953. The Communist air force flew more than ninety thousand sorties, of which more than two-thirds were made by the Soviets, and the rest were by Chinese and North Korean pilots. 23 Later in the war Stalin pushed the development of the Chinese PLAAF, and in the last years of the war, they took a more active role in the air war. Zhang concluded: "the most productive Soviet contribution to the air war in Korea involved the creation of the Chinese air force . . . ." The Chinese air forces became the third largest air force on the planet. The Air Force performed numerous missions during the war that made it possible for the UN to achieve its ultimate political objectives. The Air Force dropped 476,000 tons of bombs on Korea. Airpower interdicted lines of communications (railroads, marshaling yards, roads, and bridges), destroyed supply and equipment depots, troop concentration, industrial areas, and airfields. Almost half of the Air Force's sorties (47.7 percent) were interdiction missions. Airpower limited the ability of CPV to conduct offensive operations. The FEAF flew close air missions that facilitated the conduct of ground operations, and maintained pressure on the CPV and NKPA by attacking "sensitive" targets, com- mand and control facilities and headquarters, and carrying out a sustained campaign that ultimately influenced, at least to some degree, the CPV decision to sign the armistice. In addition, it provided operational and strategic intelligence through aerial reconnaissance, conducted emergency transport of American personnel out of and into Korea, and carried out psychological warfare operations; for example, dropping leaflets. Since the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, the U.S. Navy has been unchal- lenged in surface warfare. The U.S. surface fleet no longer fought other fleets. It has dominated the waters around all battlefields on which the U.S. ground forces have fought since 1945, and participated in the air and land battles with naval aviation and gunfire. The Navy and Marine Corps conducted 41 percent of the air sorties flown during the Korean War, and dropped 202,000 tons of bombs (Navy 120,000 and Marine Corps 82,000). This included 40 percent of interdiction missions and more than 50 percent of all close air support. 24 (Navy aircraft could not carry the bomb load of Air Force aircraft.) 122 • The American Culture of War They also suffered the loss of 1,248 aircraft, 564 of which were downed by enemy action. Admiral Andrew Jackson, who joined Task Force 77 in January 1952, described naval operations: Task Force 77 was furnishing air cover and air support for the Marines in particular. We were also attacking targets in the north, North Korea, mostly logistic lines of supply, the main one, of course, being the railroad that ran down the east coast of North Korea, which we tried to keep out of commission. And we did keep it out of commission to a large extent. . . . [W]e would go in one afternoon and tear up the railroad track line, take pictures of it, and come back. The next morning wed send a photographic plane in and take pictures, and the line had all been repaired during the night. What the North Koreans did was keep supplies right alongside, or close alongside, rails and ties and so forth, and they had a bottomless supply of coolies who would repair the lines during the night, and what they could do was unbelievable . . . The other thing that was our prime target was locomotives. . . . We frequently had night operations because this was when the trains would run. They wouldn't run in the daytime, theyd stay in the many tunnels. . . . We would let them have a few nights off to get running and then we would gear up and do a lot of night flying and try to catch them. 25 The Navy operated from privileged sanctuaries with no threat from the air or sea. MiGs did not venture out to confront American carriers. The Korean War was credited with reestablishing the utility of the aircraft carrier. In the aftermath of the Korean War, the Navy got its supercarrier. 26 CPV and NKPA forces responded to American air dominance by moving underground and into the mountains, by transporting supplies at night, by camouflaging and concealing facilities and resources, by moving forces and attacking under the cover of darkness, by digging World War I type defensive positions that could withstand bombing attacks, and by pouring their ample supply of manpower into the fight. The advantages of having privileged sanctuaries, logistical and other bases, just across the border in China, facilitated CPV operations. The Communists were able to sustain themselves throughout the war, in the face of vastly superior American airpower. One observer concluded: "The Korean conflict thus showed that the prevailing modern concept that air superiority is a necessary prerequisite to the launching of an offensive is not always true. . . . The United Nations air forces could never entirely stop the movement of the opposing land forces in spite of having what was tantamount to complete air superiority." 27 Americans, however, would not learn this lesson. For America this conclusion only meant that better technology was needed. The Korean War made new, unanticipated demands on the Air Force, and it endeavored to adapt and improvise, always with the objective of showing the decisiveness of airpower in war. General Weyland wrote: It [the Korean War] has been a laboratory study of limited military action in the support of a very difficult political situation. Furthermore it has provided the air forces in particular with an opportunity to develop concepts of employment beyond the World War II concepts of tactical and strategic operations. ... It is most important for us to understand that the last two years of the war were fought to secure favorable terms under which to cease hostilities. With this kind of objective the door is open for completely new patterns of air employment. The war to date has represented a short step in the direction of using air power as a persuasive force to attain limited objectives. 28 With the emphasis on Massive Retaliation during the Eisenhower presidency, the Air Force had returned to its old patterns of behavior, the focus on strategic airpower at the expense of tactical air- power. By the time the United States entered the Vietnam War, the learning had to start anew. The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 123 Censorship, the Media, and Public Opinion Public opinion is formed, molded, and continuously reshaped by what people read, hear, and see. News organizations operate under the ethic of "the public's right to know," and the belief that "the freedom of the press" safeguards the freedom of individuals and democratic forms of government. Of course these axioms are based on the assumption that news agencies are unbiased, objective, and detached from special interests, including the influence of the owners. This is never quite the case. News organizations operate under the influence of their owners and the stress of competition. They seek to be first, with the most sensational information, stories, and images for their audience. The reporter's job is to get the latest news to his audience before his competitor "scoops" him. Accuracy has often been sacrificed for the sake of being first, and retractions rarely receive the attention of the initial story. In addition, individual reporters tend to lean toward the right or the left, the Republicans or the Democrats. Artificial limited war, in which the unity characteristic of more total war was ab- sent, greatly intensifies partisanship in reporting. The news, which influences public opinion, at times constricted the range of actions of political and military leaders. Hence, what is best for the country can be, and has been, restricted and obscured by the news. General William T. Sherman recognized this friction between the services and the media when he stated: "I hate newspapermen. They come into camp and pick up their camp rumors and print them as facts. I regard them as spies, which in truth, they are. If I killed them all there would be news from Hell before breakfast." Given the objec- tives of the Armed Forces and their need for operational security, and the objectives of the media, and their need for access and openness, a natural antagonism exists at all times between them. However, the relationship does not have to be a win/lose situation. And, because world and American opinion is of strategic importance, the relationship between the services and press is vital to achievement of political objectives. On June 26, 1950 the Secretary of Defense designated the Department of the Army as the executive agency responsible for maintaining and coordinating the briefing for the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense operated under the belief that: "No matter how large or how skilled the Defense Department's staff of military and civilian specialists, they must be supported by an enlight- ened citizenry, fully aware that they are partners in the overall organization for national defense." 29 Major General Floyd L. Parks, the Army's Chief of Information, was in charge of the program. In both Tokyo and Washington the Army endeavored to take the initiative in public relations, greatly increasing the number of Public Information Officers, creating new centers to distribute news, and establishing objectives and guidelines. The Department of the Army's Office of the Chief of Informa- tion delineated the following objectives: 1. To foster public pride in the United States Army and to bolster the soldier's pride in himself and the Army. 2. To broaden the impact area of Army public information by providing publications, radio, and television with information about the Army which they do not receive through news services. 3. To support and explain the personnel actions of the Department of the Army with particular respect to civilian components, rotation from Korea, assignments and world-wide commit- ments. 4. To explain and support the Army's procurement program, including the Salvage Rebuild Pro- gram and the Cost Consciousness Program. 5. To support the training program. 30 124 • The American Culture of War The Army actively sought the cooperation and good will of the press. It communicated with the public through the media by issuing "news releases"; "immediate releases"; official communiques (official comments from senior leaders); the distribution of thousands of pictures and newsreels; mo- tion pictures, such as, Go For Broke, Battleground, Breakthrough, and Force of Arms; television film series, such as, The Big Picture; the official monthly Army magazine, Army Information Digest; the Home Town News Center, and Public Information Offices. 31 The Army established Public Informa- tion Offices in New Jersey, Missouri, and California, to distribute news and stories to newspapers, radio, and television. In addition, the Army responded to requests from television personalities such as Edward R. Murrow, whose program See It Now was broadcast on CBS and Dave Garroway, whose program Today ran on NBC; and assisted radio writers in the production of programs, such as, Report from the Pentagon, You and the World, Mutual Newsreel, Time for Defense, The Kate Smith and Mary Margaret McBride Show, Cavalcade of America and others. The Army also assisted in the production of feature films. In the opening days of the war MacArthur decided against formal censorship. The Pubic Informa- tion Office of the Far East Command (FECOM) in Tokyo introduced a "voluntary code" of censorship to the press and radio representatives. The code delineated specific information that was not to be made public, including troop movements, names and locations of units, names of commanders, and other specific information that might provide the enemy with usable intelligence. However, within two weeks of promulgating the code, MacArthur was charging correspondents with failing to adhere to it; specifically, exaggerating casualty figures, insisting that the Army figures were inaccurate, and disclosing the locations of units. He also believed that some of the stories published were prejudicial to the UN Command and the war effort. Still, MacArthur resisted censorship, fully realizing it had been used throughout World War II. He noted: "There is probably no more misused or less understood term than press censorship. Contrary to what many believe, no precise rule can make it effective, nor were any two military censors ever in agreement on detail." 32 MacArthur well understood the power of the press, and sought to use it to gain support for the war effort, maneuver political leaders in Washington, and gain recognition of the sacrifices being made by UN forces. Public support for the war— particularly in a citizen-soldier army— had a direct influence on the morale of soldiers, and thus, on combat effectiveness. MacArthur took measures to insure that his chain of command reported accurately all significant changes in the situation: "casualty records now flow swiftly to Army headquarters in Korea, then to Tokyo and on to the Adjutant General's Office where they are made ready for the Department of Defense to disseminate to news media after the emergency addresses have been notified." 33 With the President's decision to commit U.S. forces to war in Korea, reporters from all parts of the world converged on Tokyo. They came from Australia, Bel- gium, Canada, Formosa, Cuba, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Norway, the Philippines, Turkey, from all parts of the United States, and from numerous other nations. From June 25 to late August 1950, the number of accredited reporters grew from 77 to 330, and the number continued to rise for the remainder of the year as dramatic events such as the Inchon Landing and the attack of Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) captured the attention of the world. By late August 1950, 206 reporters were in the combat zones, the Pusan Perimeter. These reporters had the power to influence world opinion, and world opinion had the power to influence the quality, type, and quantity of support in material and manpower resources. For better or worse, world opinion created parameters for actions. In the twentieth century all major wars were coalition wars. Nations needed other nations if they were to conduct a war. The Army provided reporters with travel orders, post exchange (PX) cards, authorization to buy field clothing, courier airplane reservations, and numerous other accommodations. Reporters accom- panied divisions into action, typically attaching themselves to the division headquarters where they The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 125 waited for briefings, listened for reports of major actions, requested transportation to those actions, and requested to visit particular areas or units. The Army assigned a Public Information Officer to guide, direct, and respond to informational requests from reporters. They also arranged billets, mess facilities, communication lines, interviews, and other logistical matters. In the opening days of the war there were a shortages of everything — transportation, telephone lines, time, and patience. To get stories out of Korea reporters sometimes flew to southern Japan where lines were available. Others entrusted their stories to pilots flying between Korea and Japan. From Tokyo stories were transmitted to major cities around the world. The combat zone was a dangerous place and after six months of war there were twelve reporters confirmed killed, twenty-three had received wounds, two were listed as missing, and two were confirmed captured. By mid- July 1950, General Walker's headquarters was established in Taegu. A schoolhouse in close proximity was requisitioned to house reporters. The Signal Corps installed telephone lines and two teletypes, and a mess hall was established nearby. At peak volume, copy over the teletypes in Radio exceeded 80,000 words, of which roughly one third was edited and filed by the public information staff on behalf of reporters. 34 As the Army moved so too did reporters, and the accommodations in Taegu were not matched until the Army again stopped. Thus, after the Inchon Landing reporters followed the Eighth Army north. At Seoul Walker established his headquarters, and the Army re-created the conditions in Taegu. When the Army crossed the 38th parallel so did reporters. Reporters found it difficult to adhere to the voluntary code. In December 1951, when General Walker was killed, the news of his death was flashed immediately around the world — a significant violation of Army security at a critical time in the fighting. A censor in Far East Command, Major Karl A. Von Voigtlander wrote: "Then and there, after six months of trial and error, voluntary censorship ended and compulsory censorship began. There was no mourning for the voluntary code. Most correspondents agreed that it had failed to do an effectively consistent job of safeguarding vital information." 35 Both MacArthur's headquarters and the Eighth Army headquarters carried out censorship. They used approximately the same criteria. The Press Advisory Division in Tokyo and Korea read and cleared the stories of correspondents. Many reporters were pleased to get rid of the temptation the voluntary code caused. However, with censorship came an added benefit to the Army. In addition to eliminating material and stories that might provide the enemy with usable intelligence, censors eliminated stories that, "would cause embarrassment to the United States, its allies or neutral coun- tries, as well as those [stories] of a critical nature which might bring our forces or those of our allies into disrepute . . . ." 36 Such stories obviously should not have been censored. The purpose of censorship was not to permit the services to disguise unpleasant facts, mistakes, criminal behaviors, or setbacks. Censorship based on this criterion defeated the purpose of an open, free press. The Army, at times, was not completely honest with reporters, and thus, the American people. Still, a high level of trust was maintained between the services and reporters throughout the war. All the services provided censors to safeguard their information. The press Advisory Office worked around the clock. Each story was assigned a serial number and logged into a registry with a note on actions taken. This enabled censors to go back and check what they had released against what was published. Reporters could be kicked out of the country for trying to get around the censors. While censors could not make changes, only deletions; however, they could, and did, recommend revisions. Reporters were allowed to make the necessary changes and resubmit. Photographers, newsreel cam- eramen, and radio broadcasters with tape recorders created additional problems, as they were subject to the same restrictions. No military censorship of the mail or of commercial wire or radio facilities was imposed. However, few reporters tried to circumvent the system. War is the most complex human endeavor. Reporters frequently don't know what they are looking at, and unlike the new, young soldier who has never seen war, there is no senior NCO or officer there to 126 • The American Culture of War explain it to them. The result is that the people back home are being educated by novices. The st thus, had to take an active role in telling their story. When things were going well reporters were quick to predict the end of war. When the CPV entered the war, reporters were quick to call the Army's retreat a "rout" and doom and gloom became the front-page story. There was a tendency to exaggerate the good and the bad. This was not malicious behavior; it was ignorance, and human nature. Probably the worst reporting of the war took place in December 1950, as the Eighth Army withdrew under pressure. The situation was fluid and uncertain. The location and status of some units were unknown. The 1st Marine Division and elements of the 7th Infantry Division of the X Corps were cut off and fighting their way out. The reporters' demand for information and the public's right to know conflicted with operational security, amplifying the tensions that were normal between reporters and services. In war, it takes time for the situation to develop; however, the reporters' imperative of getting the story out as quickly as possible did not allow them the time to fully understand what was taking place. A tactical defeat, the loss of a battle, might be reported as the destruction of an Army — a strategic debacle. Tactically, in fact, for some units, the Chinese offensive was a major catastrophe, a demoralizing rout; however, too often reporters portrayed the story as a rout of the Eighth Army, which was inaccurate and unfair. Simple things like unit size and type, equipment, and types of op- erations were wrongly reported. The big picture was difficult to grasp even for the Army Reporters observing the situation and conditions of one tactical unit, company or battalion, could not possibly comprehend what was happening. Public opinion continued to be of strategic importance and the services could not leave it to re- porters to educate the American people on the course and conduct of the war. To get the big picture reporters had to rely on the Army, which was constantly receiving reports from all units engaged in combat. Only the Army could present the big picture. No single reporter could collect sufficient data to portray the war accurately. Trust between the services and reporters was of the utmost importance. General Parks, in a message to Army commanders, wrote: We of the Armed Forces should frankly recognize that we have something to sell— service to the Nation. ... It is an axiom that you must have complete frankness and a reputation for hon- esty in dealing with news media. I learned early that newsmen were smarter individually than I was, and collectively I could not hope to compete in the same league. I wanted no battle of wits with them; the only logical course of action was to be straightforward, honest and to tell the truth. Therefore if the story is bad, I admit it; if it is good, I try to see that the good points are known — and speedily 37 During the Korean War, in Washington, Tokyo, and Korea the Army took the initiative to get the story right, but still, public support declined during the last year of the war. There were many reasons for this. A stalemated, limited war that imposed restraints on the use of force was not what Americans expected in war. Korea was an undeclared war, more than 8,000 miles from American shores. There was no direct threat to the security of the United States. One had to use abstract reasoning to find justification for the war. Americans knew little about Koreans, and there was a lack of cultural affinity with them. These, however, were factors out of the control of the Armed Forces. Finally, there was another side to the equation of democracies at war — the active participation of the people. On January 22, 1953 in an address to the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, Major General Julius Ochs Alders, USAR, Commanding General of the 77th Infantry Division, and Vice President and General Manager of The New York Times, concluded that: As a nation we [Americans] are not well informed. One could make a strong case for the thesis that there is more ignorance than information prevalent today among our fellow citizens. Let The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 127 me cite one or two examples from a typical opinion poll. Three thousand persons were asked, "What do you know about the Bill of Rights?" Thirty-one percent said they had never heard of it or were not sure what it was. Only 21 percent had reasonably accurate answers. Another group was asked what was meant by "balancing the Federal budget." More than half did not know. ...It does not suffice for us to be strong and well-intentioned if we, as a people, are hazy about the important events now occurring throughout the world and if we do not understand the issues and principles at stake and their relationship to us.... Unfortunately, citizenship in a free society is not that easy. Democracy throws the ball to us. It asks us to make up our own minds independently on the basis of the facts as we know them. How much more simply they arrange those matters in Russia. 38 The Relief of General Douglas MacArthur On April 1 1, 1951 President Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Power, Commander in Chief United Nations Command, and Commander in Chief, Far East. MacArthur learned of his relief from his wife, who was informed by an aide, who had heard the news on a radio broadcast. 39 Ridgway later stated: "As a soldier, I do not question the right of the President, as Commander in Chief, to relieve any officer with whose views and actions he disagrees. ... I do feel that this dismissal could have been handle with more grace." 40 Four days earlier Truman had sought the advice and recommendation of his primary advisors: Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, Averell Harriman, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Omar N. Bradley. In the initial discussion Acheson and Harriman recommended relief; Marshall and Bradley recommended "against such action." Bradley believed the matter could be dealt with without the ex- treme and public measure of relief of the popular general. 41 The president, who had probably already made up his mind, directed Bradley to seek the opinions of the Joint Chiefs. They too recommended the relief of MacArthur, and delineated their reasoning: By numerous official communications and also by public statements, he had indicated that he was in opposition to the decision to limit the conflict to Korea. In the very complex situation created by the decision to confine the conflict to Korea and to avoid the third World War, it was necessary to have a Commander-in-Chief more responsive to control from Washington. He failed to comply with directives requiring that speeches, press releases, or other public statements concerning military and foreign policy be cleared by the appropriate department before being issued, and for officials overseas to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States. He had proposed direct armistice negotiations with the enemy military commander in the field, and had made a public statement in connection therewith, after being informed that a Presidential announcement on the same subject was being planned. There was also discussion to the effect that General MacArthur's independent actions were publicly derogating control of the military by the constituted civil authorities. 42 These discussions and further reflections convinced Marshall and Bradley that the relief of MacArthur was in the best interest of the United States. With the unanimous support of his senior advisors the president directed Bradley to assist in preparing the necessary relief statement and press releases. The arguments outlined by the Joint Chiefs can be summarized into three major reasons: General Ma- cArthur disobeyed the president's directives governing public statements, took measures to undermine the president's foreign policy initiatives, and was incapable of conducting the war with the limitations 128 • The American Culture of War imposed upon him. However, all of the reasons delineated were a function of one more basic reason: The Truman administration was not conducting the war in accordance with the traditional American way of war, and MacArthur knew only one way to fight war. MacArthur in his speech before Congress after his relief explained his actions: While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat the new enemy as we had de- feated the old. Apart from the military need as I saw it to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of war made mandatory: 1. The intensification of our economic blockade against China; 2. The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; 3. Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and of Manchuria; 4. Removal of restrictions on the force of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistic sup- port to their effective operations against the common enemy. 43 MacArthur intended to fight more total war, one that would have moved the United States closer to direct confrontation with the PRC, and possibly the Soviet Union. MacArthur believed the conflict with the PRC had already started and that more total war was unavoidable. It is important to understand that the PRC also fought a limited war. It employed a subtle but essential subterfuge to keep the war limited. Its forces in Korea were designated "volunteers." This lie precluded official war between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the U.S. Army. In other words, the U.S. Army and the People's Republic of China Army had never officially engaged each other in war. Unofficially, however, they had killed each other in large numbers. MacArthur sought a total solution to the problem in Korea that would have upset the balance that Truman and the PRC and Soviet Union were trying to maintain. MacArthur believed that sufficient means were available to achieve total victory, and that those resources ought to be fully applied, as they had been in other wars. MacArthur saw Communist China as a threat to Western democracies. He believed that the failure to liberate all of Korea was a betrayal of a promise made to the Korean people by the United States and the United Nations. He believed that Chiang Kai-Shek and the National- ist Chinese (Kuomingtang) on Formosa were the United States' natural allies, and that those forces available on Formosa should be armed and equipped, and launched directly at the PRC. He believed that airpower should be used to attack military targets in China to destroy privileged sanctuaries just over the border and to attack lines of communication in China. He believed that the United States possessed air, land, and sea forces it was not fully employing, and that as long as American soldiers were fighting in battle it was unconscionable to deprive them of these resources. MacArthur stated: "I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. . . . Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer." 44 MacArthur believed that he understood the "Asian mind" better than anyone in Washington. He had spent decades in the Asian Pacific realm, as a boy, as a soldier and general, and even in his first retirement. He felt that because of his superior knowledge and understanding the government in Washington should defer to his judgment. MacArthur also believed that he understood war better than any man alive. He had greater experience in war, in leading soldiers, in winning battles and wars than any other American at that particular point in history. MacArthur sought decisive actions, not "prolonged indecision." And, in fact, until the Chinese entered the war the United States had fought a traditional American war. It had fought the way Americans expected: War to MacArthur and the American people meant the employment of all the means necessary to bring the fighting to a quick and The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 129 decisive end; loyalty to soldiers demanded nothing less. MacArthur was convinced that he had acted professionally in making his requests. They would save American lives and those of other UN forces. MacArthur concluded that: "once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory. ... In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory" 45 MacArthur forgot, or did not understand, that war is a political act, and that the conduct of the war should not take precedence over the political objectives of war. He also forgot that in the United States elected political leaders establish the political objectives of war. It should be remembered, however, that MacArthur was over 70 years old, he was the product of his generation, and incapable of the transition required by the realities of a new world created by nuclear weapons, superpowers, and the cold war. After the CPV intervened, the Truman administration's political objective was no longer victory. The American way of war, practiced by MacArthur, was replaced by the new reality of limited war, of fighting for limited objectives, compromise solutions, and employing limited means. In the age of nuclear weapons, limited war was the only rational approach to war. Still, the question was how limited a war to fight? The Truman administration, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Chiefs, and the Army Chief of Staff, were largely at fault for the civil-military crisis that led to MacArthur's relief. The natural inclination of Truman, and all Americans, was to fight a more total war, a war that concluded with a clear victory. The natural inclination of Americans was that when soldiers are fighting and dying in war, the nation owed it to them to apply all its resources to bring the war to a quick and decisive end. American nationalism demanded nothing less. Truman, by authorizing U.S. /UN forces to cross the 38th parallel was using the traditional American approach to war. He was making a commitment to the American people that the war would end in a clear victory. He was also making a commitment to the Korean people that the peninsula would be reunited. Truman, too, sought a total solution to the Korean War. Truman and the Joint Chiefs repeatedly gave MacArthur the go ahead to fight a more total war. After the Inchon landing they did not restrain or question MacArthur's actions, even when he sent two independent American columns racing toward the Chinese borders in violation of the principles of war and common sense; and in violation of the Joint Chiefs' directives to use only South Korean forces in the regions bordering the PRC. Thus, it was in the midst of the Korean War that the American government learned that it had to fight a new type of war that required compromise solutions and the application of limited means. The problem was: how could such a war be explained to the American people? American beliefs about the conduct of war were more in accord with those of General MacArthur and most senior leaders in the U.S. Army. Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, the commander of X Corps in Korea, stated: "I am against war until we get into it. When we get into it, I think we ought to fight it with everything we have in the best possible manner." 46 This is what most Americans believed. Nevertheless, limited war was the future of warfare. Responding to MacArthur, Truman outlined his thinking: But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor? Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops [from Formosa] to land on the mainland of China? If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent. If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world . . . . 47 Ridgway replaced MacArthur, and General James Van Fleet replaced Ridgway Ridgway was also a true professional. He adopted the president's vision of limited war. 48 Van Fleet tended more toward 130 • The American Culture of War the MacArthur vision of war. These conflicting visions created some friction, resentment, and harsh feelings. MacArthur's defiance of the president was wrong. His behavior was unprofessional, and the presi- dent took the appropriate actions to defend and preserve the Constitution. MacArthur, however, was the wrong man for the job. On January 26, 1950 when he became 70 years old, Truman and the Joint Chiefs should have retired him, or created a new command, a ground force commander, to conduct the war. However, MacArthur's arguments indicate that he understood one important aspect of war that was partially lost in the following decade. He understood that loyalty down the chain of com- mand was just as important as loyalty up the chain of command. He understood that when you asked men to commit their lives to an endeavor the nation not only owed them the best it could provide, but it ought to have clear, firm political objectives of strategic importance to the nation, a strategy to fight the war, and the will to fight. MacArthur failed to understand that the "best" had to be limited by the political objectives sought, and that the president established the objectives. However, political objectives achieved through war are measured in lives, and political leaders, to maintain an effective citizen-soldier army in the field, must be able to explain to soldiers and citizens that the objectives of the nation are worth the sacrifices they are required to make. Presidents too need to understand loyalty down the chain of command. New Personnel Policies: The Results of Transformation Why were the American people willing to use their citizen-soldier Army to fight for a poor, under- developed state thousands of miles from Americas borders, with no cultural affinity or economic significance to the United States? In 1950, the nation was gripped by fear. It appeared that the future belonged to Communism, that the American way of life was threatened. Fear and uncertainty were created by: the size and capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces; the loss of China; the theory of the Communist Monolith; the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb; the capture of Soviet spies; the paranoia in Washington that Communists had infiltrated the government; the descent of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe; the advances of the Communist insurgencies in developing nations such as Vietnam; and finally, the blatant attack against an American sponsored government. Going to war was in many ways a release for pent-up frustration, anxieties, and feelings of haplessness that were caused by watching these events unfold and doing nothing to prevent them. The United States had finally come to grips with the Communist menace, and was actively engaged in stopping the spread of this heinous ideology. However, as the shock of 1949 diminished and the war in Korea dragged on, American support for limited war declined, and that diminishing support influenced the citizen- soldier Army. The Army and nation adopted new personnel policies to conduct the Korean War, and through- out the war the Army faced severe personnel problems. Truman did not mobilize the nation for war — contrary to the practice in World War II. There was a limited call-up of National Guard and reservist personnel and units, but for the most part manpower requirements were met through the Selective Service System, the draft. In 1947 the Selective Service System went out of existence. In 1948 Army strength dropped to less than 600,000 soldiers. To stop the decline in troop strength, on March 15, 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the immediate reenactment of the draft. 49 This legislation had the support of the president, and on June 24, 1948, Congress passed the Selective Service Act (SSA). The SSA had been out to existence a mere fifteen months before it was determined that the nation could not maintain its defense establishments without conscription. Still, in June 1950 the SSA was about to go out of existence again. The Joint Chiefs again made an argument for retention of the system. Col- lins argued: "A Selective Service Act . . . would be a deterrent to aggression. It would demonstrate the The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 131 determination of the people of the United States to maintain peace and stability by standing behind their commitments and encouraging the free people of the world to defy aggression." Bradley argued that, "Selective Service machinery in operation . . . will probably save four or five months in a critical period of preparation for any future war." 50 These arguments may have garnered the necessary sup- port; however, on June 25, Truman committed the United States to the defense of South Korea, and on June 27, Congress acted to continue the SSA. Under the 1948 SSA, the term of service was less than two years, twenty-one months (later increased to twenty- four months), and the object was to provide for an Army of 837,000 soldiers to maintain twelve active divisions.. 51 Congress, however, failed to increase the Army's authorized strength and allocate the funds for the increase in personnel. As a result, no one was drafted in 1949. The draft did, however, motivate young men to volunteer for service, making it possible of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to meet their manpower requirement without conscription. Still, the Army entered the war in Korea with 591,487 soldiers, only slightly better off than in 1948. After deciding to go to war, Truman "authorized the Secretary of Defense to exceed the budgeted strength of military personnel for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and to use the Selective Service System to such extent as required in order to obtain the increased strength we must have." At the outbreak of war, the Army rushed soldiers and equipment to Korea and undertook various means to rectify its personnel problems. The General Reserve and the continental Armies were stripped of men, companies, battalions, and regiments in order to get experienced and trained personnel into the theater. 52 The Army experienced a severe reduction in combat effectiveness as units were patched together in Korea, and poorly trained units entered combat. In 1952, the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, addressed the situation: We had to strip units remaining in the zone of interior [continental United States] in order to strengthen the units in Korea. At one time there remained in the Regular Army in this coun- try only one division, the 82nd Airborne, in readiness to fight. We dared not reduce our last divisions to impotency even though the Eighth Army in Korea still was desperately in need of men. To meet further pressing needs, we had to order more than two thousand company-size National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps units into the active military service. But these reserve component units also were short of trained men. The only sources of manpower to fill them were the Selective Service System. . . . The dreadful experience of rushing understrength units into action, of early emergency recalls for combat veterans with family responsibilities, of long delays in training our citizen-soldiers— all these stark deficiencies hold for us a solemn warning which we must not ignore 53 On December 16, 1950 Truman proclaimed a state of national emergency, which allowed the ser- vices to refuse to accept resignations, and suspend any statutory provisions prescribing mandatory retirement or separation of regular Army officers. This made it possible to some extent to stabilize units. Still, by the end of 1951 roughly one third of enlisted men were "regulars" and two-thirds were "inductees." The authorized strength of the Army was increased several times during the war; on July 1, 1950 to 1,081,000; in September to 1,263,000; and by the end of 1951 to 1,552,000. With a two-year term of service this meant that in 1953 in an Army of a little more than 1,500,000 men, almost 750,000 men would leave the service. The Selective Service was to provide the Army with another 750,000 new inductees as replacements. 54 Collins explained this turnover in personnel in civilian terms: "What would the average business and professional man do if he were suddenly asked to release half of his trained employees in less than one year's time— workers, accountants, skilled technicians and the like — and to hire new personnel, train them and, at the same time, continue to conduct an efficient, economical operation in the face of keen competition which did not have those 132 • The American Culture of War problems? That is exactly what the Army must do." 55 He might have added that the lives of soldiers, the ability of the Army to generate combat power, and, as a consequence, the security of the nation were directly affected by the turbulent nature of the nation's policies for manning the Army. Cultural learning had exerted a greater influence on the nation, than cold, pragmatic estimates of the threats prevalent at the dawn of the cold war. Throughout the war the Army used an individual replacement system. Soldiers were sent to Korea through a poorly organized pipeline that had a negative affect on their morale. 56 One study noted: "Chief factors thwarting the delivery of replacements to their destinations in good physical condition were the necessity for speed in processing and moving them and deficiencies in transportation facili- ties; and long periods of time in a casual status without knowledge of future assignments, the many stations along the way in the replacement system, and numerous other inconveniences lowered the morale of replacements." At a number of these stations in the early days of the war, there was limited ability to provide soldiers with basic subsistence. The Korean War soldier was younger than the World War II soldier had been. In World War Ilm the average draftee was 26, and approximately 10 percent of the Army was 21 or under. In the Korean War 50 percent of soldiers were 21 or under, and had two years of high school. Of the Korean War draft, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., wrote: "Our Army in Korea was not a cross section of America. ... At first, because they were members of an all-volunteer Army, and later, due to the inequities of a draft that facilitated the exemption of members of the more educated classes. . . . Korea was the first, though not the last, case in my lifetime in which we chose to believe that American troops could fight a major conflict while large sectors of the home front made no material sacrifices or moral commitment to the struggle." 57 Charles C. Moskos, Jr., in his study, The American Enlisted Man, noted: "because of the operation of the Selective Service System and the manpower allocation policies of the armed services, the bulk of ground combat forces was mainly drawn from lower socioeconomic groups. Also, at home, things went on pretty much as usual." 58 The argument for deferments was based on the World War II experience. The science community, with the support of a number of skilled politicians, argued that too many of the nation's best and brightest had been sent off to war, hurting the nation's ability to produce the scientists needed to construct the new technologies needed, such as atomic bombs. This argument convinced Congress. Equality of sacrifice was subordinated to the inequality of talent and intelligence. In the wake of Sputnik, the world's first Earth orbiting satellite, launched by the Soviet Union, the idea of protecting the nation's best minds and deploying them to advance science took hold. The questions then were: What type of talent? What types of intelligence?What fields of study? And, how many should be exempt or deferred from conscription? The most important questions, however, were probably never asked, what does this mean to the American sense of equality of sacrifice, the American experience, and the cohesions of the nation? On July 9, 1 950 Collins notified General Mark W Clark, Chief of Army Field Forces, to be prepared to recommend National Guard units for deployment. He recommended a corps size organization of three divisions. Collins indicated that the president was anxious to avoid the mobilization of the Guard units, but given the situation, he concluded that a limited call-up was necessary 59 National Guard units belonged to the States, but they were available to the president during national emergencies. State governors, U.S. senators, and representatives were always willing and ready to personally intervene and argue on the behalf of their units, particularly in limited war, creating political problems for the president and the Army. The National Guard Association also exerted political influence. Truman also did not want to create the impression of a state of emergency in the United States. The call-up of the National Guard was an indication that the regular Army could not handle the situation in Korea, and perhaps that the president had erred in judgment. Nevertheless, on July 19, Truman announced a partial mobilization for twenty-one months, later extended to twenty-four months. The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 133 National Guard divisions had difficulty mobilizing and training. They too were stripped of trained, experienced personnel who were sent directly to Korea to fill existing units. 60 The Army would have saved time and resources had these divisions been deployed as cohesive units. Not until the winter of 1952 would two National Guard divisions enter combat in Korea: the Oklahoma 45th Infantry Division and the California 40th Infantry Division. And within months of arriving in Korea some guardsmen were on their way home having reached the end of their active service duty. The Selective Service System provided replacements. On September 5, 1950, the 28th Infantry Division from Pennsylvania, the 43rd Infantry Division from Rhode Island, Vermont, and Connecticut were federalized. They were rushed to Germany to strengthen NATO. Later the 31st Infantry Division, "the Dixie Division" from Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, the 37th from Ohio, the 44th from Illinois, and the 47th from Minnesota and North Dakota were also called to active duty; however, they were never deployed to Korea. They were used to maintain a strategic reserve, until the end of the war when they were demobilized. In February 1951, General Biederlinden, the General Staff (Gl) Personnel Office for Far East Com- mand in Japan, summarized his efforts to produce more combat soldiers: Combat divisions still remain 3,000 (the equivalent of one regiment) understrength. . . . [S]ince October, despite the development of a planned program, the Department of the Army has con- sistently failed to meet promised monthly quotas. . . . The failure to provide adequate replacement support had a deleterious effect on the entire Korean operation. Every expedient was employed to close the gap and maintain combat divisions at effective fighting strength. Thousands of service enlisted men had to be reclassified and sent to combat units without retraining. Wounded men were returned to the front lines again and again without sufficient recuperation to assure full recovery. Combat units were combined, stripping personnel from one to fill another. Republic of Korea, UN forces, indigenous personnel, and incapacitated limited service— all were exploited to the maximum. . . . The end result of such personnel planning must inevitably be reflected in extended frontages, the inability to develop full combat effectiveness, all resulting in adjustments in tactical planning combined with abnormal casualties. 61 This unwillingness to call upon the American people in sufficient numbers to provide for a more equitable personnel system that would have improved combat effectiveness and thereby reduced casualties, without some understanding of American culture, was inexplicable. That same month MacArthur sent General Collins a message, again, protesting the paucity of manpower: The continuous lack of combat replacements for the seven months of combat is a matter of grave concern to me. The expedients of local conversion of Service personnel and attachment of ROK'S [Korean Augmentations to the U.S. Army] have been fully exploited. There is no acceptable substitute for trained combat fillers and no compromise measure will equal the effectiveness of a full strength unit. Furthermore, no rotation is permitted. To date, Army divisions have been fighting from 20% to 50% below authorized strength in infantry and artillery units. . . . Necessary extended frontages are susceptible to infiltration, exposing combat elements as well as supply and communication lines, resulting in abnormal rear area casualties. 62 Due to this critical personnel shortage the Army could not fight according to its doctrine, and could not achieve its personnel objectives vital to the retention of good soldiers. 63 To make up for the shortage MacArthur decided to assign large numbers of South Koreans to the ranks of the Army. In August 1950, thousands of Korean Augmentations to the U.S. Army (KA- TUSA) were integrated into the 24th, 25th, and 7th Infantry Divisions, and later into other divisions. 64 KATUSAs ultimately made up approximately 36 percent of the Eighth Army's strength, totaling 134 • The American Culture of War thirty thousand soldiers with roughly 7,800 per division. South Koreans fighting in American units contributed mightily to the war effort. KATUSAs, however, were only a partial solution to the Army's personnel problems. As a result of this personnel trauma and the advent of limited war, the Army enacted two major personnel policies that were part and parcel of the transformation of American thinking about war, and that had long-term effects on the nation, and the Army's ability to generate combat power and fight wars. In February 1951 the decision was made to rotate personnel in Korea. The rationale for the rota- Although relief of combat veterans from the pressure of long duty on the line generally has been regarded primarily as a means of conserving manpower, it also has been considered as a form of morale service, a matter of humanity, and a question of military expediency. World War II experience indicated that after periods of sustained combat, soldiers sometimes became careless, sometimes overly careful, and sometimes even indifferent to their personal safely; in any event, an infantryman's chance of survival after six months in combat was about 30 percent. FEC, working on the basis of World War II experience, pioneered in the field of wholesale rotation. 65 Department of the Army studies on World War II casualties indicated that a soldier reached his peak performance in the fourth or fifth month of combat. 66 Numerous studies from World War I and World War II concluded that combat soldiers had a relatively short life span that could be extended by a rotation system. An Army Ground Forces study of casualties explained what happens to soldiers over time: While it is true that the infantry soldier will eventually wear out in combat, it being simply a question of length of time determined by how he is used, the thoughts and feelings of the in- fantryman at battalion level may provide a key to his more efficient use. First and foremost, the infantryman feels he is hopelessly trapped. He wants a "break." Under present policy, no man is removed from combat duty until he has become worthless. The infantryman considers this a bitter injustice. ... He feels that the command does not distinguish between him and the base area soldier, and is actually less concerned for his welfare. . . . After some months in combat ...the infantry rifleman feels he has "done his share? Around him are new faces; his old comrades in arms have thinned out . . . and the old tie is gone. He has proved his courage. More and more, he feels that it is not a question of IF he gets hit but of WHEN and HOW BAD. There is no escape. 67 In World War II the Army fielded 89 divisions. In the initial Victory Plan it was estimated the United States had the manpower potential to field 215 divisions (10 percent of 140 million people, 14 million) without eroding the industrial base. 68 Not a few Army divisions sustained over 100 percent casualties during the war. The flow of replacements through the division exceeded the authorized strength of the division. Some Army divisions were under combat conditions for more than 365 days. An effec- tive rotation system undoubtedly would have improved the combat effectiveness of divisions, and prolonged, and perhaps saved, the lives of soldiers. However, not even in a total war where the nation was united in a common cause could the U.S. government institute an equitable, effective system of military service. And as noted, some soldiers came to recognize that they had "done their share" and that the system was unjust. While they sacrificed, others sat safely at home. The 1st Infantry Division that landed at Omaha Beach had also landed in North Africa and Sicily. Samuel A. Stouffer in his study, The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath, revealed: The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 135 At the time a survey was made of the combat veterans in ten rifle companies of the 1st Division, just arrived in England after successful campaigns in North Africa and Sicily. The study showed that these veterans, while exhibiting a rather fierce pride in their outfit, were more embittered than perhaps any other soldiers who had been studied by the Research Branch. The majority felt that they had done their share as compared with other soldiers— a few of them repeating a mot current in the division. "The Army consists of the 1st Division and eight million replace- ments." 69 Soldiers were inculcated with the American sense of equality and fairness— the line starts at the rear — and understood the burden of war was falling on relatively few. In limited war the problem of manpower procurement was magnified many times. Nevertheless, it was proven in two World Wars that the longevity of soldiers was improved by rotating them. The questions were: what type of rotation system best met the needs of the Army and how best to implement it? And could the Army implement a rotation system without the support of the Truman administration and Department of Defense? And could the administration implement such a policy without the support of the American people, which in limited war was not consistently united behind the war effort? Collins, speaking in 1953, explained the Army's thinking: Of course our rotation program contributes to the difficulties, but we must continue it for the sake of our men. Too often in past wars most of our front-line soldiers had to continue fight- ing until killed or wounded. In times past, they envied the airmen who knew that they could return home after a certain number of missions. ... In Korea, our combat soldier knows that after a certain number of months of front-line duty he can go home. To date we have returned more than a half million men from the Far East. . . . We are literally rebuilding it [the Army] in the face of the enemy for the third time. 70 Thus, in three years of war the United States deployed three different armies. The objective for rotation was for no combat soldier to serve more than one winter in Korea: After six months with a combat division or a similar unit in Korea, or twelve months in Korea in a supporting unit, a man was eligible for rotation, if a suitable replacement had arrived. This last criterion was the most difficult to achieve. The first ship of combat rotated personnel departed for the United States on April 22, 1951. A "point" system was developed. It was revised several times but soldiers in combat units received more points per month than did soldiers in support units. Infantry soldiers received more points per month than did artillery soldiers. Once a soldier had accumulated the required number of points he was suppose to go home. The American forces of the Eighth Army consisted of six regular Army divisions, two National Guard divisions, and one Marine division. The continuous rotation of troops in the Army, that in January 1951 numbered 23 1 , 1 25 soldiers, required between 20,000 and 30,000 fresh Army personnel per month, the equivalent of almost two Army divisions. The Army was too small, and too committed in other parts of the world, to fully support the rotation system, causing discontent and anger among those soldiers who anticipated rotation, but because of the shortage of personnel, were forced to remain in Korea beyond their time. Even with the Army's efforts to massage the system, combat units remained under strength throughout the war. In other words, the Army implemented a manpower program it could not support. General Mark Clark, who had an intimate understanding of the problem, wrote: During two terrible wars I, as a commander of American ground troops in action, was obliged to face up to the manpower problem which is an ever- increasing threat to the security of our nation. In Italy and again in Korea I was obliged to scrimp and save, to "cannibalize" rear area outfits in order to beef up our front-line combat units so as to make them more effective. During 136 • The American Culture of War an all-out war, such as World War II, there could be no thought of rotation. Men had to be put into uniform for the duration, and the combat infantryman had to fight for the duration. Our enemy in Korea fought like that. There was no rotation for a Chinese or North Korean except in a wooden box or without a leg. But rotation for us in Korea meant that we no sooner got a team working effectively than key men were through with their part of the war and were sent home, to be replaced by recruits from the United States or, at times, by Koreans 71 While the rotation system did improve the morale of individual soldiers, the replacement system that made it possible damaged combat effectiveness. 72 What were the objectives of rotations? Was it to improve the fighting ability of the Army, the combat power of the Army, through developing higher levels of morale? Or was there another reason? With a little imagination a system of rotating units could have been put into effect. Such a system would have maintained unit cohesion and fostered teamwork, resulting in increased combat effective- ness. Units — cohesive, trained companies or battalions or regiments— could have been rotated in and out of combat, maintaining the basic core of the formations for years without degradation of combat effectiveness. The individual rotation system was not designed to increase combat effectiveness, and it was well known that it did not. The reasoning behind rotation was more fundamental to American cultural beliefs. How does a nation in limited war, employing a draft system, decide whose lives will be risked with the full knowledge that men are going to die? What do National Guard forces contrib- ute? Should they be called up before men are drafted who have made no commitment to the service? What is fair? What is equitable? Fundamentally, how do democracies decide who will live and who will die in a limited war effort? While acknowledging that the rotation system eroded combat effectiveness, Clark identified the more fundamental reason for the system: "Rotation was necessary for the kind of limited war we fought in Korea. It was necessary because it would have been unthinkable to call on a tiny percentage of young American manhood to carry the entire burden of the Korean War. The rotation system made it possible for us to achieve some degree of equalization of sacrifice." 73 The rotation system gave the impression of equality. It was supposed to insure that the burden and sacrifice of war was distributed fairly across the male population of the United States of a certain age group. In February 1951, Collins and MacArthur entered into a serious discussion on the rotation of personnel. They determined that: "such a program was imperative in order to relieve the men who had endured the rigors of the severe winter of 1950-51. Such a program was simple justice. A small group of men could not be required to carry the whole burden of combat." 74 A working rotation system, however, could not simply be an Army program, it had to be a national program. It required the support of the president, Congress, the Selective Service Administration, and the American people. The war ended before the system received the kind of support required to function effectively, and it was unlikely that the Army would have ever received the political and public support required to make the system work in a limited war. There was another reason for the new personnel policy, perhaps not fully perceived. The Army's rotation policy went into effect when the Army shifted from strategically offensive operations to de- fensive operations. On the strategic defense the United States Army was going to deteriorate. Neither the Truman administration nor the Army could explain to soldiers why an American Army that retained significant offensive combat power was sitting on the defense. It was inexplicable, unless sol- diers determined and accepted that their lives were expendable, that they would in fact remain a tool of the state for an indefinite period of time. Limited war was never limited to the American soldiers who fought — enemy weapon systems killed just as efficiently in limited war as they did in total war. When they were on the offense, soldiers could envision a termination point: One way or another they knew the war had to come to an end. Soldiers who are moving forward have the moral high ground. They know that when it was on the offense, the United States was seeking positive objectives, and The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 137 as a consequence, was willing and able to pour more manpower into the war to hasten its end. On the defense, the Army lost the initiative. The Army could not predict victory, and in fact, it was no longer being asked to win the war: . On the strategic defense, it was only possible to not lose the war. For the Army to decisively win the war, it had take strategically offensive actions. The defense bred doubt and uncertainty and caused soldiers to ask, "Why am I here? If we are at war why aren't we fighting it? Why aren't we trying to get it over with?" Strategically defensive war was un-American, particularly with a conscripted Army. The American citizen-soldier Army could not fight indefinitely a limited, strategically defensive war. It created an untenable cultural contradiction. Rotation gave soldiers expectations of an end point. Rotation had unforeseen influences on soldiers. It communicated to soldiers that winning the war was a secondary consideration. If the Army and nation were willing to sacrifice combat effectiveness for the principle of equality, then soldiers too could downgrade the importance of the war. 75 To be sure, survival, minimizing risks, has always been of the utmost importance to soldiers in combat, but this was different. Because soldiers were not committed for the duration of the war, their primary objective changed. No longer was the objective to achieve victory, to end the war as quickly as pos- sible by destroying the enemy's main army, which meant that everyone got to go home. The objective under a rotation system was to survive a specified tour of duty, be it six months, or twelve months. An Army study found that: "For the combat man enduring the rigors of Korea, the rotation criteria on an individual basis gave him something to look forward to— a goal to be reached. To him rotation was a very personal thing, and one in which he, as an individual, had a vital interest." 76 The Army introduced to combat a system that was based on self-interest. Soldiers were no longer vested in the outcome of the war, and their attachments to their units and buddies were degraded. S. L. A. Marshall, in his classic study of men in battle in Korea, observed: Upon arriving in the Theater I began to hear pessimistic reports about how gravely our musical chairs rotation policy had down-graded the fighting spirit of the average young American in the combat line. Worried senior officers expressed the view that if the war's pace changed and the pressure rose suddenly, troops might be found lacking in the old drive and guts. Line captains told me that morale had so far deteriorated that when units came under full attack more men died from taking refuge in the bunkers than from fighting their weapons in the trenches. 77 Anthony B. Herbert, a veteran of the war, wrote: "With the peace talks going full swing, a rotation system was instituted, and with that, there came a chance that I might make it home. I had given up on the idea long before, and the possibility was like a new lease on life. Like others, I began to fight a little more cautiously, to take fewer chances than I had before." 78 The personal nature of war was changed. Of course, all soldiers want to win the war to see victory achieved, but it did not matter in their personal lives. The United States was not going to be attacked. Their homes and families were not directly threatened, and, they were going to go home after a certain period of time no matter what, whether the war was won or lost. Unit cohesion was also damaged. Soldiers form buddy teams, a relationship of mutual dependence. One or two soldiers rotated out of the unit, leaving their buddies, who were forced to find new buddies. In a short period of time these relatively new relationships too were dissolved. Thus, relationships that could be the most important in an individual's life, or death, were formed and dissolved in a matter of weeks or months. Combat units were in a constant state of turbulence, forming and dissolving. Within infantry units the system resulted in the continued presence of new, untested men. 79 Combat effectiveness declined, and men died that should not have. An Army study found that: For the commander in the field individual rotation and replacement brought many headaches. The rapid turn-over of men within their units and their subsequent replacement with men largely 138 • The American Culture of War only basically trained presented many problems in maintaining combat efficiency. Supervision and discipline suffered because of a lack of unit training; feelings of "aloneness" and a "cog in a machine" attitude developed among the troops. Frequently the top level personnel required to replace the key men rotated out of units to the U.S. were siphoned off before reaching the lower echelons. If a commander allowed a key man to rotate, he had no assurance of receiving a comparable replacement. Conferences with regimental, battalion and company command- ers of the 25th and 2nd Infantry Divisions disclosed a general desire for replacement on a unit Under the individual rotation system, soldiers became interchangeable parts in a large machine. One soldier was as good as another in the eyes of the system, but the system did not understand how long it took to train and develop a good machine gunner, one of the most important men in a squad, or how long it took to find good men with the strength and endurance to hump and fire antitank weapons, or how long it took to find men with the sharpness of vision, aggressiveness, and the re- flects to consistently walk point, or to find a soldier who had an intuitive ability to read maps, judge distance, and determine location. Men in small units naturally gravitate to positions in squads and platoons that maximize the combat power and chance of survival. The loss of one key individual can throw the entire workings of the squad out of sync, as positions shift to accommodate the loss. The rotation system, however did not understand this. Unit cohesion at the small unit level was difficult to maintain. An officer who fought in Korea observed: "You can't maintain Squad, Platoon, Company, Battery, Battalion and Divisional teams with constantly- rotating personnel. . . . There was no knitting of a mutual confidence in one another through association in strife and danger, through fire and movement, such as one gets in realistic peacetime field work or actual combat. Without that mutual confidence and trusting interdependence all the way, up and down, there are no truly aggressive and effective units." 81 In Korea the Army allowed the norms of American society to design a personnel system that, while achieving some degree of equality of sacrifice, ultimately damaged combat effectiveness. The reduction in combat effectiveness meant a higher expenditure in American lives, increased use of firepower to substitute for the loss in effectiveness, and as a consequence, greater destruction and deaths in South Korea. 82 The Army had argued for Universal Military Training and for increases in its strength. The Congress decided against its recommendations. In Korea, Americans started to view war as a national endeavor carried out by a system that functioned independently of them, a system that functioned without their support. The resources of the United States were so vast that limited war could be car- ried out by only a fraction of the nations manpower. Writing in 1953, an American journalist who had recently traveled the country observed: "In Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force installations all over the country, chaplains, noncommissioned officers and psychologists told me the same story: 'The biggest trouble we have is that so many men do not want to serve. In a dozen different ways they all say the same thing— let somebody else serve. Why me?'" To explain this attitude he wrote: In the first place, most men resent having military service break into the progress of their lives from school to jobs to marriage to children. ... In time of all-out war men are willing to accept this interruption, but in times of half- war or Cold War they resent it. They resent it because they are not convinced the sacrifice they make is necessary. When Pearl Harbor was bombed every American felt immediately, desperately threatened — and overnight everyone wanted urgently to do whatever he could. But the Korean attack was farther away and the threat was not to United States homes, but to United States ideals, and to the idea that the free nations must all hang together or they would all hang separately 83 The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 139 Americans questioned the need for service in limited wars. And the questioning grew in intensity when the nation's most precious resource started coming home in flag draped coffins. The Army was at a particular disadvantage, as General Parks noted: "There is nothing glamorous about training in the mud, much less being shot at in the same eternal element." 84 In the "Womble Report on Service Careers" published immediately after the Korean War in 1954, it was noted that: Public Respect for Constituted Authority has Declined. There is ample evidence of a lack of understanding on the part of the people concerning the necessity for implementing our pres- ent national military policy. It appears that a portion of this unfavorable attitude stems from the recent conduct of hostilities in Korea. Certainly these hostilities were conducted without the degree of support afforded to two preceding world -wide conflicts. Continued operation of Selective Service is equally distasteful. Until the public is made to understand and accept a public responsibility of military service, the situation is not likely to improve. 85 The situation never improved. The public never understood or accepted its responsibilities for military service in limited war, where the threats were indirect and ambiguous. American distaste was not for Selective Service that had proven successful in two World Wars, but for the lack of substanti- ated need. Clausewitz postulated: "Will this always be the case in the future? From now on will every war in Europe be waged with the full resources of the state, and therefore have to be fought only over major issues that affect the people? Or shall we again see a gradual separation taking place between government and people?" 86 In Korea the "gradual separation" was initiated. The second major personnel policy instituted was the integration of the U.S. Army. During the Ko- rean War the U.S. Army became the first major institution to integrate. Blacks, after fighting for two hundred years in segregated units with white officers, were finally accepted as almost equals in ground warfare. Why? What caused one of the nation's most conservative institutions, an institution that was traditionally decades behind the larger American society in social change, to take the lead and jump a decade ahead of the country? The change was motivated by military effectiveness. The shortage of manpower was eroding the ability of the Army to fight. Blacks were a source of manpower. General Ridgway explained: While I was still in command of the Eighth Army I had received from Major General William B. Kean, then commander of the U.S. 25th Division, an earnest and thoughtful recommendation for the integration of white and Negro troops. Kean had had full opportunity to observe Negro troops both in peacetime, at Fort Benning, and in Korea, where the all-Negro 24th Infantry Regiment was part of his command, and he felt that, both from a human and a military point of view, it was wholly inefficient, not to say improper, to segregate soldiers this way. This coincided precisely with my own views and I had planned in mid-March to seek authorization from General MacArthur, who would in turn sound out Washington, to commence integration at once. 87 Ridgway, surprisingly, made no mention of Truman's July 1948 Executive Order 9981, which stated: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and op- portunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible . . . ." 88 This directive for the integration of the Armed Forces was virtually ignored by all the Armed Forces. 89 "Rapidly as possible" was ill defined, and thus, could be interpreted to mean decades. Eisenhower had argued against its implementation, "In general, the Negro is less well educated than his brother citizen that is white and if you make a 140 • The American Culture of War complete amalgamation, what you are going to have is in every company the Negro is going to be relegated to the minor jobs . . . because the competition is too rough." 90 The fact that the Army waited until it was in the midst of the Korean War, facing severe personnel problems, explains much. Military effectiveness was the primary reason for the adoption of this new personnel policy. Ridgway continued: "It was my conviction, as it was General Kean's, that only in this way could we assure the sort of esprit a fighting army needs, where each soldier stands proudly on his own feet, knowing himself to be as good as the next fellow and better than the enemy. Be- sides it had always seemed to me both un-American and un-Christian for free citizens to be taught to downgrade themselves this way, as if they were unfit to associate with their fellows or to accept leadership themselves." 91 American culture did in fact educate black people to believe that they were inferior to white people. Inferior people could not stand up to their supposedly superior opponents on the battlefield. (Of course, the Chinese, like the Japanese in World War II, were not considered the equal of the Germans.)This argument was used for centuries to preclude or limit the number of black people in combat units. However, the personnel shortage in Korea made integration necessary. When decisions were being made on the integration of blacks, South Koreans had already been integrated into the Army in large numbers, KATUSA. It was hard to justify the continued segregation of black Americans when foreigners were granted equal status. In July 1951, three years after Truman's Executive Order was promulgated, the Eighth Army in the midst of war in Korea became the first major command in the Armed Forces to integrate. Proportionately more blacks saw combat duty in Korea than in World War II, constituting 13 percent of all U.S. forces. 92 Approximately 40 percent of all blacks assigned to Korea served in combat units; however, of the 131 Medals of Honor awarded The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 141 only two went to blacks. The acceptance of blacks as soldiers initiated social changes that profoundly influenced the nation. The first black men in powerful positions in the United States were officers in the Army and Air Force. It is interesting to note that American racism was exported to Korea and Japan where Koreans and Japanese adopted many of the same prejudices, based on what they learned from white soldiers. The Final Phase of the War: Defensive War of Attrition Lieutenant General James Van Fleet, the new commander of the Eighth Army, took command of American forces that numbered 253,250 soldiers; UN forces 28,061; and ROK forces 260,548, in ad- dition there were 12,718 Korean Augmentations to the U.S. Army (KATUSA). 93 Van Fleet was given the following orders from Ridgway: Your mission is to repel aggression against so much of the territory (and the people therein) of the Republic of Korea as you now occupy and, in collaboration with the Government of the Republic of Korea, to establish and maintain order in the territory. In carrying out this mission you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings, as well as ground operations in Korea north of the 38th parallel, subject to the limitations. . . . In the execution of this mission you will be guided by the following prescriptions: (1) Advance of major elements of your forces beyond the general line: Junction of IMJIN and HAN Rivers— CHORWON— HWACHON RESERVOIR— TAPEPO—RI, will be on my orders only. [This was the WYOMING LINE.] (2) You will direct the efforts of your forces towards inflicting maximum personnel casualties and material losses on hostile forces in Korea, consistent with the maintenance of all your major units and the safety of your troops. 94 Ridgway believed he was giving Van Fleet, "the latitude his reputation and my high respect for his ability merited," given the limitations of the directives of the president. Van Fleet, however, working from the perspective of World War II, believed his prerogative, as commander, had been severely re- stricted, and that the Eighth Army could have driven Chinese from the Korean peninsula. 95 Ridgway, by drawing a line across the peninsula, beyond which the Eighth Army was not to advance, had taken away the initiative of his field commander. This, however, was a political decision. Van Fleet fought a defensive war of attrition restricted to operations within the confines of the geographic boundaries of South Korea. This decision eliminated other forms of strategy. On the defense it was impossible to destroy the enemy's army, the will of its people, or its government. In other words there was no way to win. On the defense the only option was to not lose, to fight defensively until the other side decided to negotiate a settlement, or offensive airpower produced a decision. The Korean peninsula, the geographic configuration of the battlefield, limited both armies to frontal attacks. The confinement of the peninsula, the restrictions imposed by geography, made this strategy manageable. Still, surrendering the initiative eliminated the possibility of a quick solution to the war. The most important incentive to motivate the PRC to compromise at the peace table was voluntarily given up. Robert Osgood speculated that: "Perhaps . . . American policy- makers and military planners incurred a kind of paralysis of reason and will, which led them to magnify the risk of measures short of massive retaliation beyond the objective indication of existing military conditions." 96 Ridgway, how- ever, gauging American support for the war, was convinced that the right decision had been made. He reflected, "The seizure of the land between the truce line and the Yalu . . . would have lengthened our own supply routes, and widened our battlefront from 110 miles to 420. Would the American people have been willing to support the great army that would have been required to hold that line?" 97 He concluded the answer was "no." 142 • The American Culture of War Figure 6.2 Korea, the Last Battle. By early summer 1951 both armies were well entrenched. Major offensive operations would pro- duce only limited results — the next ridgeline. The situation on the ground created the conditions for armistice talks. On June 24, 1951, in a radio speech, Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet Union's UN repre- sentative, advocated a cease-fire, to which Ridgway responded on June 30. On July 10 negotiations of the Korean Armistice Conference opened at Kaesong, later moved to Panmunjom. The negotia- tions broke down repeatedly. The withdrawal of foreign troops, the cease-fire line, the repatriation of prisoners, and other issues extended the talks. And, while the talks went on soldiers continued to fight and die. Admiral Charles Turner Joy, the chief of the UN's command delegation to the Korean armistice conference wrote: The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 143 When the Red Chinese plunged into the fray, the controlling political objective of the United States became a desire to avoid all-out war with China. When the Soviets suggested an armi- stice, the political objectives in Korea became an honorable cease-fire. During the armistice negotiations, we took on a political objective of gaining a propaganda victory over Commu- nism in respect to prisoners of war. Thus the political objectives of the United States in Korea weather- vaned with the winds of combat, accommodating themselves to current military events rather than constituting the goal to be reached through military operations. Consequently, the delegation, and indeed General Ridgway, never knew when a new directive would emanate from Washington to alter our basic objective of obtaining an honorable and stable armistice agreement. In such circumstances it is most difficult to develop sound plans, to present one's case convincingly, to give an appearance of unmistakable firmness and finality. It seemed to us that the United States Government did not know exactly what its political objectives in Korea were or should be. As a result the United Nations Command delegation was constantly looking over its shoulder, fearing a new directive from afar which would require action inconsistent with that currently being taken. 98 Admiral Joy concluded that the negotiating strategy he was directed to employ prolonged the war and thereby caused unnecessary losses in lives. More than 40 percent of American casualties were sustained during the final defensive phase of the war. Airpower was employed to facilitate negotiations. General Clark approved a bombing campaign to destroy dams that provided irrigation to rice fields in northwest Korea. The campaign flooded vast areas. The dam busting campaign, the destruction of North Korean cities, and the continuing interdiction campaign caused considerable hardship and suffering. FEAF Formal Target Committee, meeting in April 1953, concluded that the punishing air campaign had been decisive in bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion: "the damage inflicted upon the enemy as a result of this application [of airpower] has been the only military pressure placed on the enemy during the past months and ... is probably the force which has caused the Communists to . . . put forth new peace overtures." 99 General Weyland supported this conclusion: "Our around-the-clock air operations brought to all North Korea the full impact of war. The material destruction wrought, the panic and civil disorder created, and the mounting casualties in civilian and military populations alike became the most compelling factors in enemy accession to an armistice." 100 Other factors, however, had greater influence on the Communists' decision-making process. The armistice negotiations outlasted the Truman's presidency. In November 1952 Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President of the United States. A month later he flew to Korea to survey the situation, and discuss the war with his commanders in the field. Shortly after his inauguration in Janu- ary Eisenhower made it known that he was considering a new strategy. He was considering removing some of the limitations of the Truman administration, and expanding the war effort to include the use of the atomic bomb. On March 5, 1953, Joseph Stalin died. The Soviet Union had not recovered from the severe destruction and carnage suffered in World War II, and it had no constitutional norms for the accession to power; hence, the death of Stalin created political uncertainty. The Chinese recog- nized that the situation had changed dramatically, and that for the most part they had achieved their primary objectives. The armistice document was signed on July 27, 1953 at Panmunjom. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, concluded that the threat of the atomic bomb had caused the Chinese to reach a final settlement. Others argued that the death of Stalin created conditions of uncertainty in the Soviet Union and China, causing domestic, political matters to take first priority. The shift in priorities caused the Communists to hurriedly seek an end to hostilities in Korea. And still others argue that the conventional air campaign produced the final decision. 144 • The American Culture of War The inability of the Communists and the Americans to reach a decision on the ground with the force deployed created the conditions for the armistice. Conventional airpower alone could not force a decision. It was incapable of stopping the advance of the NKPA or the CPV. The death of Stalin would not have caused the shift in priorities if the situation on the ground had not been stabilized. Had China continued to feel threatened by the advance of the Eighth Army the war would have continued. Eisenhower's threat and great credibility, coupled with the death of Stalin, probably influenced the immediacy, the timing, of the Communist decision; however, the Communists had achieved their major political objectives— the removal of American forces from the Chinese border and the survival of Communist North Korea. They had also gained enormous prestige and confidence by fighting the most powerful nation on the planet to a standstill, and they had an impressive air force. At the same time the American position in world affairs had been diminished. The threat of the atomic bomb would not have produced an armistice agreement had the Eighth Army been on the Yalu River. Multiple factors influenced the Chinese decision-making process; foremost among them was the fact that they had achieved their primary objectives. U.S. forces remain in Korea. And given the unstable nature and hostile disposition of the North Korean dictatorship, and its acquisition of nuclear weapons and intermediate range missile technol- ogy, U.S. forces will remain in South Korea into the foreseeable future. Legally a state of war still ex- ists. No permanent peace agreement was ever signed, and the 38th parallel is one of the most heavily armed borders on Earth. The armistice agreement established a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two nations, a Military Armistice Commission, and the Joint Observation Teams that patrol the DMZ. Most importantly, however, it required the exchange of prisoners of war, the major obstacle to an early agreement. The United States mobilized 5,720,000 officers and men to fight the Korean War, secure Europe, and provide a strategic reserve. These forces were allocated to the services as follows: Army, 2,834,000; Navy, 1,177,000; Air Force, 1,285,000; and the Marine Corps, 424,000. The Army fielded twenty divi- sions, eight of which fought in Korea. Of the 33,741 Americans killed in the Korean War, 82 percent were in the Army, roughly the same percentage as in World War II. The Army suffered 27,731 battle deaths and 77,596 wounded; the Air Force 1,238 battle deaths, and 368 wounded. The Marine Corps suffered 4,262 battle deaths, and 23,744 wounded; the Navy 505 battle deaths, and 1,576 wounded. Better than 94 percent of the battle deaths in Korea were in the ground combat forces. It is estimated that the United States sustained a total of 103,284 wounded in action. 101 South Korea suffered 415,000 military KIA or MIA, an estimated 429,000 WIA, and 500,000 to 1 million civilians dead. The Chinese suffered an estimated 142,000 KIA or MIA, and 238,000 WIA. North Korea sustained 1.5 million military and civilian KIA or MIA. Thirteen allied nations contributed ground combat units, ranging from a division to a platoon. The allies suffered 3,063 dead, and 11,817 wounded. The Korean War was the first war fought by the United States in the nuclear age. Hence, it was a limited war, albeit, with the potential to become World War III and the world's first nuclear war. Technology, the radically changed environment of the 1950s, and the new role of the United States in maintaining the world order, initiated the process of transformation in American thinking about war; however, American culture influenced the unfolding of American military policies, strategies, and doctrines in the years and decades that followed. The preferred American way of war had come to an end. General Douglas MacArthur, who believed in a more total war strategic doctrine, where fighting continued until victory was attained, was incapable of making the transition to a new form of limited war. Mac Arthur's thinking on the conduct of war was more in concert with the thinking of the American people. As General Collins noted: "The American public in November of 1951 was not yet fully resigned to a peace without military victory" 102 When the war was over the American people still were not resigned to limited war and negotiated settlements. And this clearly was not the type The Korean War: The Final Phases, 1951-53 . 145 of war they expected in the age of airpower and nuclear weapons. This was not the type of war they had been led to expect. The Korean War was a dirty infantry war that failed to produce the outcome the American people expected. Thus, the war further eroded American faith in conventional forces. The fact that the war ended in a stalemate seemed to indicate the ineffectiveness of ground forces, influencing American perception about the Army and its place in national defense. The Army, how- ever, believed that: "The communist aggression in Korea . . . marked the beginning of a new military policy for the United States . . . ." And, that: "The final recognition of this fact by the American people made it possible to start the rebuilding of the armed forces to the minimum strength required. . . ." 103 The Army was wrong. 7 Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation The fighting there [in Korea] was finally stopped last July on terms which had been proposed many months before. That result was achieved, at least in part, because the aggressor . . . was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods which he had selected, to areas and methods that we would select [the atomic bomb]. In other words, the principle of using methods of our choice was ready to be invoked, and it helped to stop the war which the enemy had begun and had pursued on the theory that it would be a limited war, at places and means of its choosing. — John Foster Dulles' Thus, to many Americans SAC of the Air Force seemed a panacea. Here was a massive and potentially decisive military instrument, well calculated to achieve absolute success and to spare us the long drawn out agony of mass ground warfare. We saw and understood the vital importance of maintaining it at top efficiency ... but more than that its compatibility with our military concepts led us to overlook some of the limitations both of the instrument itself and the philosophy of warfare that it represented. Therefore, the Korean conflict caught us emotionally unprepared. We fought with an uneasiness and a sense of frustration new to us. . . .The urgent requirements in Korea were first to hold and then to retake ground, and we found ourselves called on to fight just the type of a tough ground force action that much of the Nation had come to feel was somehow obsolete. —James E. Cross, Military Review, June 1956 In 1953, Eisenhower was president and in a position to enact his vision of the future of warfare; however, before he could implement his vision he had to end the war in Korea. On July 27, 1953 an armistice agreement was signed ending three years of bloody war. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, believed that the threatened use of atomic weapons brought the Chinese to the peace table and their acceptance of terms very similar to those previously offered. In a Department of State Bulletin, dated January 12, 1954, in a policy statement entitled, "Policy for Security and Peace," Dulles's words "areas and methods that we would select" was unambiguous code for the employment of nuclear weapons. Through ongoing armistice talks, foreign embassies, the media, and the redeploy- ment of strategic forces, the Eisenhower Administration communicated to the Chinese that the war would be expanded in ways and means beyond the abilities of the PRC to control if an agreement were not concluded. 2 To emphasize this point Eisenhower redeployed B-29s, with undercarriages specially designed to drop atomic bombs, to the Philippines, in striking range of North Korea and China. The » The American Culture of War Figure 7.1 President Dwight Eisenhower. deployment was made public. Eisenhower and Dulles concluded that their initiatives had worked, had brought peace. However, the death of Stalin, conflicting views on strategy between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union, internal divisions in the Communist Party of the PRC, the fact that North Korea had been saved, and other factors also influenced the armistice decision. Eisenhower's Vision of War Dulles promulgated Eisenhower's strategic doctrine of Massive Retaliation, and military policy, "The New Look," tasks that more appropriately belonged to the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson. With the birth of the PRC the theory of the "Communist Monolith" was born. Dulles wrote: "The Soviet menace does not reflect the ambitions of a single ruler and cannot be measured by his life expectancy. . . . The Soviet Communists have always professed that they are planning for what they call 'an entire historical era.' The assets behind this threat are vast. The Soviet bloc of Communist-controlled countries . . . represents a vast central land mass with a population of 800 million." 3 Eisenhower and Dulles did not believe the United States and it allies could match the human and material resources of the enemy; hence, the reliance on armies was considered unreasonable. It was also believed that the effort to match the Communists with conventional forces would bankrupt the country. Eisenhower was concerned with the cost of defense. He believed that the way to defeat the Soviet Union was to demonstrate that the American way of life created the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Economic success, not military success, was the way to defeat the Soviet Union, and maintaining a large, standing Army was expensive. Thus, the major question facing the United States, according to Dulles, was: "How should collective defense be organized by the free world for maximum protection at minimum cost? The heart of the problem is how to deter attack" The answer was nuclear weapons and airpower. The United States adopted a "first use" doctrine that emphasized complete destruction. Dulles wrote: Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 149 This, we believe, requires that a potential aggressor be left in no doubt that he would be certain to suffer damage outweighing any possible gain from aggression. This result would not be assured, even by collective measures, if the free world sought to match the potential Communist forces, man for man and tank for tank, at every point where they might attack. The Soviet-Chinese bloc does not lack manpower and spends it as something that is cheap. If an aggressor knew he could always prescribe the battle conditions that suited him and engaged us in struggles mainly involving manpower, aggression might be encouraged. He would be tempted to attack in places and by means where his manpower superiority was decisive and where at little cost he could impose upon us great burdens. If the free world adopted that strategy, it could bankrupt itself and not achieve security over a sustained period. The free world must devise a better strategy for its defense, based on its own special assets. Its assets include, especially, air and naval power and atomic weapons which are now available in a wide range. . . . The free world must make imaginative use of the deterrent capabilities of these new weapons and mobilities and exploit the full potential of collective security. Properly used, they can produce defensive power able to retaliate at once and effectively against any aggression. 4 Eisenhower's defense and military policies were delineated in National Security Council position paper, NSC- 162/2, on October 30, 1953: Defense Against Soviet Power and Action. In the face of these threats, the United States must develop and maintain, at the lowest feasible cost, requisite military. . . strength to deter and, if necessary, to counter Soviet military aggression against the United States or other areas vital to its security. The risk of Soviet aggression will be minimized by maintaining a strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory strength and defensive strength. This must be based on massive atomic capability, including necessary bases; an integrated and effec- tive continental defense system; ready forces of the United States and its allies suitably deployed and adequate to deter or initially to counter aggression, and to discharge required initial tasks in the event of general war; and an adequate mobilization base; all supported by the determined spirit of the U.S. people. 5 While Eisenhower supported the use of American forces in Korea, he would not have fought the Vietnam War. 6 Eisenhower had a different answer to Kennan's "counter-force at every point" axiom. In 1954 before the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower considered military assistance to the French that would have brought the United States into the war. After careful analysis he, and his advisors, concluded that Vietnam, while important to the national interest of stopping the spread of Communism, was not of sufficient strategic importance to warrant the commitment it would take to sustain a noncommunist country. In his view, limited wars in nations with contiguous borders to the PRC were strategically unwise. In his view, only industrial powers were real threats to the security of the United States — nation-states that had legitimate nuclear targets. Eisenhower wrote: "My feeling was then, and still remains, that it would be impossible for the United States to maintain the military commitments which it now sustains [during the Korean War] around the world (without turning into a garrison state) did we not possess atomic weapons and the will to use them when necessary." 7 In Stephen Ambrose's intimate portrait, Eisenhower: The President, the relative importance that Eisen- hower placed on ground combat forces and nuclear weapons was elucidated: At a mid-December meeting with the Republican congressional leaders, Eisenhower explained his strategy. "The things we really need are the things that the other fellow looks at and respects," 150 • The American Culture of War he declared. The Russians did not respect the handful of American divisions in Europe, but they did respect the bomb. Eisenhower said the United States "must take risks in certain areas," and "must make a long-term effort," so that "we do not get to the point where we must attack or demobilize." Asia-firsters among the Old Guard congressmen protested against the planned reductions in ground strength in Korea. Eisenhower told them that he did not believe "Korea will be stabilized greatly by the continued presence of ground troops. We must put more de- pendence on air." He said that if the Communists broke the armistice, "we go all out" in nuclear retaliation. 8 In a televised news conference, when asked about his "New Look" military policy, Eisenhower stated: "You cannot possibly say that the kind of a unit and organization that I took to war or took over across the Channel in 1944 would have any usefulness today whatsoever. For example, you will recall we landed on June 6; we got out of that narrow little beachhead on about July 25. All right; behind that we built up two artificial harbors and we were landing over the beaches. What would two atomic bombs have done to the whole thing?" Eisenhower went on to delineate his thoughts on the Army and war: "Let me point this out: I hear people say "bigger army." Now, our most valued, our most costly asset is our young men. Let's don't use them any more than we have to. For 40 years I was in the Army, and I did one thing: study how can you get an infantry platoon out of battle. The most terrible job in warfare is to be a second lieutenant leading a platoon when you are on the battlefield. If we can do anything to lessen that number— remember this: we are planning right now the greatest peacetime army we have ever held, one million men in time of peace." 9 Eisenhower was well imbued with basic American cultural tenets. He identified the nation's "most valued asset," and substituted technology for manpower. He also reduced the Army below a million men. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, adopted Eisenhower's visions. Before a Senate Subcommit- tee for Appropriations on March 15, 1954 he stated: "the integration of new weapons systems into military planning creates new relationships between men and material which emphasize airpower and permit overall economies in the use of manpower. . . . The Fiscal year 1955 budget incorporates the new air force's objectives and continues a rapid buildup of air strength. ... As we increase the striking power of our combat forces by the application of technological advances and new weapons and by the continuing growth of airpower, the total number of military personnel can be reduced." 10 This was a fundamental belief prevalent from World War II to the dawn of a new century. Eisenhower was also concerned about the cost of defense and militarism. In a discussion with Emmett John Hughes, one of his speechwriters, Eisenhower stated: The jet plane that roars over your head costs three-quarters of a million dollars. That is more money than a man earning ten thousand dollars every year is going to make in his lifetime. What world can afford this sort of thing for long? We are in an armaments race. Where will it lead us? At worst, to atomic warfare. At best, to robbing every nation and people on earth of the fruits of their own toil. Now there could be another road before us— the road of disarmament. What does this mean? It means for every body in the world bread, butter, clothes, homes, hospitals, schools, all the good and necessary things for decent living. So let this be the choice we offer. Let us talk straight; no double talk, no sophisticated political formulas, no slick propaganda devices. Let us spell it out, whatever we truly offer. 11 Eisenhower had a vision and the confidence of having led the largest invasion in history, of hav- ing defeated in combat the most powerful armies ever arrayed in battle. He understood war, and he hated it. Eisenhower believed it would be impossible to avoid using nuclear weapons in war with the Soviet bloc. He was convinced that war had changed, that the advent of air and nuclear power Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 151 caused a revolution in warfare. He believed that technology could replace the man on the battlefield, that mankind had entered a new age. He would only commit to war if America's vital interests were directly threatened, and he understood the power of geography. Any state that deployed forces on the "Chinese continent" had to be willing to go to war with China, and possibly fight World War III. Eisenhower knew the Army was spread across the planet from Korea, to Japan, to Panama, to parts of Europe. He, however, did not plan to use it. Eisenhower believed the nation had to take risks. It, and particularly the Army, could not be all things, at all times, to all the peoples of the world. Thus, his strategy was not to man the Army to counter the capabilities of Soviet ground forces, and he would not man the Army based on its missions and roles around the globe, but also he would not reduce those missions and roles. Eisenhower wrote: National security does not mean militarism or any approach to it. Security cannot be measured by the size of munitions stockpiles or the number of men under arms or the monopoly of an invincible weapon. That was the German and Japanese idea of power which, in the test of war, was proved false. Even in peace, the index of material strength is unreliable, for arms become obsolete and worthless; vast armies decay imperceptibly while sapping the strength of the na- tions supporting them. Monopoly of a weapon is soon broken. But adequate spiritual reserves, coupled with understanding of each day's requirements, will meet every issue of our time. 12 The presence of the U.S. Army in a state, represented the commitment of the United States, in other words, the Army was simply an ostentatious line telling the enemy not to cross. Eisenhower understood that only certain well-identified nation-states possessed the wherewithal to fundamen- tally challenge American security, and the threat of the atomic bomb would keep them in check. Eisenhower, in keeping with his strategic outlook, placed emphasis on airpower, reducing the Army's budget, and to a lesser extent the Navy's budget. He knew that the United States and its allies, whose power to influence world affairs was still declining, could not match the Communist bloc man for man, and that it was foolish and too expensive to try. He feared such a strategy would bankrupt the country. Eisenhower counseled the American people not to listen to their fear, "I think there is too much hysteria." He believed that the situation was not out of control, and that the Soviet threat was manageable. His confidence, steadiness, experience, and credibility were in themselves a consider- able military asset and deterrent to war. No other president in the twentieth century commanded the respect and credibility due Eisenhower, who, as a person, enhanced Americas security. In the 1950s Americans were taught to live with risk, to live with something less than perfect security. Eisenhower worked to keep Americans out of war, not only by strategy but also by doctrine. Eisenhower promulgated his officially accepted strategic doctrine Massive Retaliation, to the entire world. He insured that the Soviets understood his doctrine. He wanted no ambiguity. The world will never know if he was bluffing, but for a man who professed to hate war, who took pains to keep men out of it, it is at least questionable whether he would have actually initiated Armageddon. As Senator John F. Kennedy noted: "No civilized, peace-loving nation is enthusiastic about initiating a nuclear holocaust — an Armageddon, which would unleash on both sides enough destructive power to devas- tate the world many times over." 13 Perhaps Eisenhower believed that the bluff alone— the magnitude of the threat— would keep the peace. If so, he gambled and won. However, to make the threat real, Eisenhower had to make the capability real. He had to know that the vision of airpower espoused by airmen such as Arnold, Spaatz, and LeMay could achieve all that was predicted, before he could sell the vision to the Soviets, hence, the emphasis on airpower. And to demonstrate his conviction, his confidence in Massive Retaliation, perhaps, he reduced the size of the Army, placed it low in priority as evidence for the Soviet Union. Eisenhower's biggest gamble was in the peripheral areas of the world, areas not firmly in the 152 • The American Culture of War Soviet or U.S. bloc. In these regions Eisenhower's strategy was ambiguous. He depended on the threat of massive retaliation; however, the threat was not viable, as the war in Vietnam demonstrated. Eisenhower had the knowledge that nonaligned nations lacked the wherewithal to directly influence American security. Such areas of the world added to the power and prestige of a given bloc, but did not fundamentally change the balance of power. Eisenhower used the atomic threat, mutual defense treaties, indigenous local forces as substitutes for U.S. ground forces, American economic and military assistance, American political and diplomatic clout, the show of force, the forward deployment of conventional forces, and his great credibility and prestige to keep peace and achieve American objec- tives in peripheral areas important to the United States. Eisenhower's Massive Retaliation threat, in regard to peripheral areas was not viable. It is peculiar and worth noting that Eisenhower adopted a vision very different from that of the other senior ground (infantry) combat commanders who served under him in World War II. It is peculiar because of their shared background, the immersion in Army culture, and the similarity in learning experiences of these senior leaders— West Point, Infantry Basic Course, Command and General Staff College, War College, World War II, extensive professional and social communications, and so on. It is also peculiar because Eisenhower exhibited little loyalty to the service in which he matured as a leader and through which he became president. Eisenhower deduced lessons from World War II and the Korean War, and adopted a vision of war that was diametrically opposed to those of Ridgway, Clark, Taylor, Bradley, Collins, and the vast majority of Army leaders. Why? Eisenhower's actions may have also been designed to show that he was in fact a joint Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, that he favored no one service. Still, Eisenhower did a disservice to the Army, not by his frugal policies, but by his failure to insure that the Army retained its center and fighting spirit, that it remained fundamentally a ground combat force designed to close with the enemy and kill them. It is one of the great ironies of twentieth-century American history that the man whose very being was so deeply associated with the U.S. Army, whose character was shaped by the institution, was president of the United States with the power to move the Army in any direction he desired, when the Army lost its compass. Still, Eisenhower can only be charged with neglect. The Army itself was responsible for safeguarding its most basic tenets. During the Eisenhower administration the American ideology for the use of military force con- tinued its process of transformation. The belief that wars could be fought exclusively from the air; that mankind in technologically advanced societies had finally moved beyond the dirty business of ground warfare, was firmly established. Armies of the future would simply mop up the battlefield, occupy the defeated country, or attempt to restore order in cities destroyed by nuclear weapons. Not all agreed with this vision of war. The Army's Fight against the Doctrine of Massive Retaliation General Mark Clark, who commanded Allied Forces in Italy during World War II and the United Nations Command in the Far East during the last year of the Korean War, writing in 1954, challenged the current thinking of the Eisenhower administration: There is much talk these days about push-button warfare and the fact that the technical experts have developed such weapons of mass destruction that the role of the infantryman is now secondary. There has been great technical development in weapons and I hope our experts in research and development will continue to make improvements. However, in my opinion, and without in any way disparaging the vital roles of the Air Force and the Navy, the infantryman remains an indispensable element in any future war. Certainly he must be supported by the Air and the Navy and every kind of technical weapons, but he never will be relegated to an Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 153 unimportant role. He is the fellow with the stout heart and a bellyful of guts, who, with his rifle and bayonet, is willing to advance another foot, fire another shot and die if need be in defense of his country. 14 The Army maintained its most fundamental belief that man was the dominant instrument on the battlefield. During the mid- to late 1950s Generals Ridgway and Taylor were the most vocal, tenacious advocates of limited war, and they had the experience of the Korean War to support their arguments. Ridgway believed that the lessons of the Korean War were that air and naval power alone could not stop a determined enemy. The air and naval components had not stopped the Communist advance down the Korean peninsula. In addition there were no nuclear targets in Korea, or later in Vietnam. The regions of the world where conflicts were most likely, possessed no vast industrial areas to destroy; hence, the employment of the atomic bomb in these regions was a form of extermination warfare. The use of such weapons of mass destruction in poor and undeveloped regions of the world would have been a crime against humanity. It had taken ground forces to stop and then take back South Korea from the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) and the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). Korea was thus viewed as the future of warfare— limited war. Ridgway and Taylor envisioned a range of wars from limited to total. Ridgway wrote: "The basic point at issue, I think, lay in differing concepts of how, in the event of war, the doctrine of massive retaliation should be applied. My belief was simply this: that we must possess the power of swift and devastating retaliation. At the same time we must possess the capability for 'selective retaliation, the capacity to use one arm, or two, or all three— land, sea, and air combined— to apply whatever degree of force a particular situation demanded." 15 Another lesson of Korea was that the U.S. Army had been unprepared and as a consequence had needlessly expended the lives of American servicemen. Ridgway in his memoirs in reference to the Korean War wrote: "It was the bitter lesson, learned through our experience in Korea at such a cost in blood and national prestige, that steeled me in my resolution later, when as Chief of Staff, I protested with greatest vehemence against 'economies' which would have placed us in the same relative state of ineffectiveness." 16 Ridgway 's experiences in Korea reinforced convictions formed in World War II— another war the United States entered unprepared— and influenced his words and actions as Army Chief of Staff. In Ridgway 's view the Army should maintain a large, well-trained, well- equipped, strategically deployable force to meet contingencies around the world. And they should not be a "trip wire force" for the initiation of nuclear war: It was a time to give a soldier deep concern, for in that period following the end of World War II, there was a growing feeling that in the armies of the future the foot soldier would play only a very minor role. Two factors stimulated this thinking— the earnest desire of the nation to cut down on its military expenditures, and the erroneous belief that in the atomic missile, delivered by air, we had found the ultimate weapon My arguments regarding air power . . . were in no sense a protest against emphasis on the air arm. They were in protest against what I sincerely believed to be an overemphasis on one form of air power, the long-range bomber, to the neglect of other means by which the magnificent weapon, the combat airplane, can be employed. My strongest arguments, in fact, were for a greater and more varied development of air power. It was clear to me, as to every other even moderately intelligent infantry officer, that the army of the future must be very greatly dependent upon aircraft of one form or another. As I have pointed out ... it must be an air-transportable army, possessed of long- and short-range mobility far beyond anything ever known in war before. To fight the war of the future we must possess the capability not only to transport the nuclear bomb for great distances, and drop it with fine accuracy on a target. We must also possess the capability to lift whole armies, armed 154 • The American Culture of War Figure 7.2 General and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway bid farewell to General George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense, as he leaves H: Airbase, Tokyo, Japan, for the United States. U.S. Army photograph, June 11, 1951. with nuclear weapons, and put them down upon any spot on the earth's surface where their tremendous, and selective, firepower will be needed. 17 Ridgway too accepted the thesis that in future wars airpower would be the dominant factor. How- ever, he envisioned a very different form and use of air power. Ridgway believed that it was possible to develop an Army that was totally deployable by air. He argued that: "the Army plans to place increas- ing emphasis upon airborne, air-transportability and air-ground support techniques. For it is only by air that we can combine maximum mobility and maximum firepower. This of course will entail very close cooperation between Army troops and the Air Force and air elements of the Navy." 18 Ridgway stressed the need for joint operations and joint doctrine, recognizing that the Army lacked strategic mobility, lacked the ability to get to the battlefield. The Army was the only service that had to depend on the other services to get to the battlefield. And, the Army was virtually alone in this vision. Half a century later the Army was still making the same arguments, and the nation was still incapable of rapidly projecting major ground combat units into troubled regions of the world by air. 19 In 1954 the eight National Guard Divisions mobilized for the Korean War — the 28th, 31st, 37th, 40th, 43rd, 44th, 45th, and 47th Infantry Divisions— returned to state control. In the years that fol- lowed, the 5th ID, 7th Armored Division, and 10 1st Airborne Divisions were deactivated. Cutting the Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 155 Army's strength was an attractive way to reduce the defense budget, or to reallocate funds to high-tech weapon systems. The Army had the lowest technology budget, but the highest manpower budget. The deactivation of an Army division could fund the research and development of new aircraft. The majority of the American people tended to support this policy, not fully recognizing the need for the Army in a world where airpower and nuclear weapons were considered the decisive technologies for the conduct of war. Americans also retained the erroneous belief, a tenet of American culture, that all American men could serve equal well as combat soldier; hence, It was only necessary to put them uniform an ship them to front. In addition, defense contractors lobbied Congress and the American people to gain their support for the latest aircraft or related technologies. By reducing the size of the Army and thereby the intrusion into the lives of Americans, protests against the citizen-soldier Army were limited. The Army was still defending hundreds of millions of foreigners in various parts of the world, but there was no war and the Army was in reality too small to actually defend the areas it occupied. Indigenous forces carried the heaviest burden for their defense, with help from military assistance programs. While most congressmen tended to support a national strategy based on advanced technologies the Army received some Congressional support. Senator John F. Kennedy was a supporter of the doctrine of limited war, and tried, along with other senators, to prevent cuts in Army strength: Back in 1954, when these manpower cuts began, I offered an amendment to prevent a cut in Army divisions from nineteen to seventeen. Senators Gore, Mansfield, Symington, Humphrey, Monroney, and Lehman joined in sponsoring the amendment, and a majority of Democratic Senators supported it. But the amendment lost— and so did the cause of our ability to fulfill far-flung commitments in Berlin, the Middle East, the Far East, and throughout the world. And we lost, General Gavin told us once he left the Army, because "Congress was assured that our combat strength was not being reduced. We were simply cutting the fat . . . [But] the contrary was the case." 20 While recognizing the need to fight limited war, Ridgway and Taylor also believed that the Army had to develop a new doctrine to fight on the atomic battlefield. In the late 1940s and 1950s, infantry officers, specifically airborne infantry officers, dominated the top levels of the Army. They envisioned an army that was strategically deployable by air, an army that could put significant combat power on the ground anywhere in the world. Given this vision of war, the placement of strategic air transports under the Air Force in 1947 was a major mistake. The focus of the Air Force, its priorities, greatly impeded the development of such a capability. Ridgway s tenure as Army Chief of Staff came to an end in 1955. He passed the responsibility for transforming the Army, and nation's thinking about the conduct of war to Taylor. In reference to his tenure as the Army's top leader in the Pentagon, Ridgway wrote: "Throughout my service as Chief of Staff three great tasks confronted me: First, to preserve the spirit and pride of an Army which top-level efforts steadily sought to reduce to a subordinate place among the three great services that make up our country's shield; second, to deploy this waning strength in such a way that ground combat units would be as effective as possible in the event of war; and third, to lay the foundations for a totally different Army . . . an Army trained, equipped, and organized to fight and win in an atomic war." 21 Ridgway was in a constant battle with his political bosses, who pressured him to reduce the strength of Army divisions, deactivate units, and reduce the Army's budget. Ridgway concluded: '7 did not feel during my tour in the Pentagon there was any real understanding of the Army's needs, or any real recognition of what would be required in men, money, arms and equipment to carry out the missions the Army was asked to be ready to perform'.' 11 Ridgway s opposition to the secretary of defense and president ultimately cost him his job. With the loss of Ridgway the Army lost not just the battle, but also the war with advocates of airpower. 156 • The American Culture of War The spirit of the Army was severely damaged in the 1950s. The Army's position as the nation's pri- mary war- winning service was usurped by the Air Force. And, many came to believe that the Army's campaign-winning infantry doctrine was obsolete. In an article published in Military Review in April 1956, entitled, "In Defense of the Army," Lieutenant Colonel Wallace C. Magathan, a member of the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, responded to an argument that advo- cated that the Army become an auxiliary of the Air Force, a view delineated in Army Combat Forces Journal in August 1955: "It had become clear that the Army is now an auxiliary service. . . . Of course everyone admits that ground forces are still needed. . . . Why not make the Army a branch of the Air Force? ... it is hoped that many officers will begin to be attracted by the . . . honor that the Nation will accord us for closing up an unmodern and expensive service." 23 Magathan noted that the fact that these words were written indicated the extent of the "uneasiness in the Army officer corps on the true role of the Army in the thermonuclear missile era." In an article entitled, "What is the Army's Job?" published in Military Review in 1956, the support- ing role of the Army, and the transformation of American thinking about war, were identified: Today, the United States is maintaining more powerful ground forces than ever before in her peacetime history. Paradoxically, the country is less certain than ever before of why it is main- taining these forces. They are no longer our primary deterrent against large-scale enemy attack, and they no longer constitute our primary weapon for waging large scale war. The massive long-range striking force of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) has come to fill these roles, while the ground forces and, to a large extent, the naval forces are now cast in supporting roles. To the average citizen these supporting roles, particularly that of the Army, are vague and poorly defined. He is confused as to the types of wars his country is prepared to fight. Worse, he senses that his leaders share his confusion. 2 ; And, as late as 1959, Major General H. P. Storke felt compelled to write: "too many false impres- sions—impressions which some day could endanger the security of our Nation— have been permitted to spread unchallenged." He continued: Those who proudly wear the Army Green find it extremely difficult to understand the appar- ent belief that the Army would be of little use in modern warfare. Nevertheless, many — too many — Americans do believe this to be true. These patriotic Americans, whose very existence some day may depend on the Army's fighting men and who today are paying heavy taxes to guarantee the defense of that existence, have been poorly informed of the missions and capa- bilities of our modern Army. ... By them, the Army too often is regarded as a lethargic, land- bound, mud-slogging body of miserable men with rifles— an anachronism with no place in a push-button war fought with supersonic airplanes, missiles, and atoms. This is a false image of our modern Army . . . . 25 The Army lost the battle for the public imagination. Americans came to view wars of the future as primarily air wars. The Navy too emphasized airpower. The aircraft carrier became a symbol of American naval power, almost exclusively. Airpower greatly influenced American thinking on war. Airpower, not the Army's ground forces, was supposed to be the decisive instrument for the conduct of the Vietnam War. The Army was to defend and wait, to fight a strategically defensive war of attrition while airpower secured victory through strategically offensive operations. Vietnam was the first war in the nation's history in which Army ground forces were not the primary instrument for defeating the enemy. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., observed: "attitudinal surveys conducted during the Cold War period showed Americans consistently giving highest prestige to the Air Force followed, in order by the Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 157 Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. These surveys also found specific stereotypes associated with each of the services: Air Force, technical training and glamour; Navy, travel and excitement; Marine Corps, physical toughness and danger; Army, ponderous and routine." 26 The Army's own internal surveys revealed that Army personnel also believed the Air Force was "the most modern and glamorous" service, and that the Army was "tradition-bound and routinized." Ridgway concluded: "All the reductions in the Army's strength, all the failure to provide for the Army the mobility and the aerial fire support it needs, is merely a reflection of. . . the erroneous at- titude that air is all powerful and the foot soldier is obsolete. There are many people, and they have great influence, who continue to shout that a new war would be over very quickly — that air power alone could fight it, in a matter of weeks, and control the peace thereafter." 27 The psychological ef- fects of the airpower ethos were cumulative. The mental disposition it created could not be reversed in 1964 when decisions were made to fight a ground war. The Vietnam War was lost between 1945 and 1960. Airpower created a false vision of war. Americans were much more willing to fight a war with airpower, than with ground forces. Airpower made it seem that wars could be fought and won cheaply in terms of American lives. Taylor was selected to replace Ridgway with the specific understanding that he would not openly oppose the president's defense programs, that he would support the position of the president. Dur- ing Taylor's tenure as Chief of Staff (1955-59) the Army's position continued to deteriorate. Taylor noted that, "As I had feared, the only way to relieve the pressure acceptable to the New Look was to cut military power, particularly that of the Army." In 1957 the Army consisted of twenty active duty divisions, fourteen Infantry, four Armor, and two airborne. Forty percent of the Army was deployed overseas, with four Infantry Divisions and one Armor Division forming the Seventh U.S. Army in Europe, and two Infantry Divisions in Korea forming part of the Eighth Army. Eight divisions formed the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF). 28 These were combat-ready forces with missions to reinforce the forward deployed units. Between 1954 and 1959 the Army's strength declined every year: from over a million to 870,000 men and sixteen divisions. These reductions in forces were not followed by reductions in missions. In 1959 the defense budget was $41 billion of which almost half went to the Air Force. Roughly 46 percent of the defense budget throughout this period went to the Air Force. Twenty-eight percent went to the Navy, and 23 percent to the Army 29 Taylor also opposed the strategic doctrine of Massive Retaliation, which he argued: "could offer our leaders only two choices, the initiation of general nuclear war or compromise and retreat. From its earliest days, many world events have occurred which cast doubt on its validity and expose its fallacious character. Korea, a limited conventional war, fought by the United States when we had an atomic monopoly, was clear disproof of its universal efficacy." Taylor believed the proof of the great fallacy was ample: "The many other limited wars which have occurred since 1945— the Chinese civil war, the guerrilla warfare in Greece and Malaya, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hungary, the Middle East, Laos, to mention only a few — are clear evidence that ... it [the atomic bomb and airpower] has not maintained the Little Peace. . . ." 30 In the latter half of the 1950s, Taylor and the Army became the leading advocates of the doctrine of limited wars. 31 During the Eisenhower administration, like his predecessor, Taylor was fighting a losing war. Taylor noted: "In the climate of the Eisenhower Administration, it was hard to make the case for limited war to the satisfaction of the decision-makers. Limited war suggested Korea, a thought which was repulsive to officials and the public alike. . . . The resources needed for limited war were largely ground forces using unglamorous weapons and equipment— rifles, machineguns, trucks and unsophisticated aircraft— items with little appeal to the Congress or the public." 32 The Army's budget 158 • The American Culture of War reflected the attitude and priorities of the time. Instead of investing in the basic requirements for land warfare, the Army was pushed to go into the high-tech business. Taylor recalled that: "Secretary Wilson once sent back an Army budget to get us to substitute requests for newfangled items with public appeal During Taylor's tenure the Army went through one of the most radical transitions in operational and tactical doctrine in its long history. It transitioned from its World War II and Korean War infantry and armor campaign-winning doctrines to the Pentomic doctrine. Army divisions were reorganized to fight on the atomic battle. The Army developed tactical nuclear weapons — artillery, rockets, and a mortar — and sent them down to division level. The Army sought new innovative technology to increase operational and tactical mobility. It sought to develop air deployable divisions that produced greater combat power than its traditional divisions. While the Pentomic doctrine and organization were discarded in the early 1960s, the Army produced weapon systems that would be used for the next two decades, and some of them far beyond. The first generation of tactical nuclear weapons that were later deployed to Western Europe was produced. The helicopter, M-60 tank, M-113 armored personnel carrier, M-60 machinegun, 90-mm recoilless rifle, 81 -mm mortar, and other systems were developed. 33 Throughout the 1950s the Army wrestled with the problem of fighting war on the nuclear battle- field, and keeping up with the Russians. Testifying before the Senate, Taylor noted that the Soviet Communists had equipped their army "with a complete family of modern weapons and equipment and continue to maintain it in an excellent state of combat readiness." Taylor concluded that the U.S. Army was behind, that it was possible to fight on the nuclear battlefield, but that it would take con- siderably greater mobility, radio communications, individual initiative, force protection, and atomic firepower. Taylor wrote: "In the first place, it [Army divisions] should be adaptable either to a non- nuclear limited war on the Korean model or to war in a European theater of operations where the use of nuclear weapons might be expected. To have this dual capability, it must be able to disperse into small units capable of independent action and to reassemble swiftly when it was safe to concentrate without danger of attack by nuclear weapons." 34 By dispersing and hiding Taylor believed the likeli- hood of Army formations being targeted with nuclear weapons was greatly reduced. Yet to fight and exploit opportunities created by nuclear firepower they had to be capable of rapidly concentrating: "The ability to disperse and hide, coupled with the ability to converge and fight, required mobility of a kind we have only begun to appreciate." The technology that Taylor required to perform these operations simply did not exist in the 1950s. And important parts of the capabilities Taylor sought did not exist at the end of the century. The logistical requirements of a division were enormous. It was not possible to make these supply trains airmobile, nor was it possible for the division to operate without them. Colonel Mataxis noted: "this [a single-type Pentomic division structure] will not be practicable until new developments permit the capability for sustained combat, air transportability, and battlefield mobility to be incorporated in a single division without prohibitive costs. Viewed realistically, this is a 'long-long range' goal." 35 The Army undertook a major effort to develop the new technologies required to dramatically increase tactical and operational mobility. Writing in 1958 Major General Paul F. Yount, Chief of Transportation, outlined some of the programs under development: Within the combat zone the Army is rapidly increasing its organic capability for air transport of troops, equipment, and supplies. The Army is developing a family of STOL (Short Take-off and Landing), VTOL (Vertical Take-off and Landing), and helicopter aircraft capable of performing a myriad of transportation tasks varying from moving combat troops across obstacles to the more routine movement of supplies from the Army maintenance area forward to the combat units. Some of the items of inventive genius, now under development, which may be expected to enable the Army of the future to meet the challenge include: Hiller Flying Platform, Delackner Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 159 Aerocycle; Sky Hook, a radio-controlled flying pallet; Flying Crane, a heavy lift helicopter de- signed to lift 8 to 16 tons for short distances at low speeds; an aerial vehicle capable of perform- ing all tasks commonly associated with the land jeep: the Bell XV-3 utilizing the tilting rotor principle; the XV- 1 Convertiplane; and a nuclear-powered, remote-controlled cargo -carrying device with VTOL capabilities. 36 With the exception of the heavy lift helicopter none of these items existed in the Army's inventories at the dawn of the new century. The technology simply did not exist to perform the tasks of mobility the Army sought with its Pentomic doctrine. The Army's efforts to get back into American thinking about the conduct of war led it astray. The Army too was inculcated with the American faith in science and technology to solve all of humanity's problems. In 1957 Taylor outlined the requirements for the new Pentomic doctrine: "In developing future Army forces adaptable to the atomic battlefield we are impressed with the need to accomplish four things. First, we must increase our ability to locate atomic targets on the battlefield. Second, we must increase our ability to deliver nuclear fires. Third, we must reduce our susceptibility to detection by the enemy. Fourth, we must increase our ability to exploit our own firepower." 37 Taylor envisioned a doctrine that in the 1950s and 1960s was technologically impossible. In the 1990s some parts of Taylor's vision were realized. Satellite technologies made it possible for the United States and Russia to detect "atomic targets," collect intelligence, and much more. Precision-guided munitions technologies "have increased our ability to deliver nuclear [and conventional] fires." Stealth technologies have "reduced susceptibility to detection." Operationally and tactically, with helicopters the Army moved infantry forces considerably faster than in the late 1950s. Armor forces, however, at the end of the century were only marginally faster than the Army of the 1950s, and strategically the logistical requirements of an Army division had increased enormously. Hence, the ability of the Army to strategically deploy, to cross oceans to get to the battlefield, had actually declined. Taylor's Pentomic division eliminated the triangular division structure. The Pentomic division consisted of five battle groups. The level of command, the regimental headquarters, was eliminated. The battle groups consisted of five companies. Each battle group was capable of independent actions. The strength of an Infantry Division was reduced from approximately 17,000 to 14,000. The division had nuclear capable 8 inch howitzers, rockets, guided missiles, and even a small rocket, that looked like a mortar, with a miniature nuclear warhead called the Davy Crockett. Nuclear firepower was one of the few parts of Taylor's vision that was attainable. And, the question always present was: would the employment of tactical nuclear weapons lead to the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons, would the war escalate? 38 Amazingly, Taylor reorganized Infantry, Airborne, and Armor divisions, before the doctrine was adequately tested and proven. General Westmoreland, who commanded the 101st Airborne Division when it was converted to the new Pentomic organization, observed that: "Because the Pentomic Division was a creature of the Chief of Staff, few in the Army were about to criticize it. During its test period with the 101st, the slogan was: 'Our job is not to determine whether it will work— it is to make it workX Because test officers were reluctant to tell their bosses that the organization was unsound, the concept was adopted and remained standard for several years, a prime example of the difficulty that 'yes-men' can cause . . . ." 39 Westmoreland, after gaining some experience with the new organization and doctrine, recommended abolishing the Pentomic Division, noting that, "in view of the way the Army had to operate in Vietnam ... we would have been in real trouble with the Pentomic Division." To defend itself the Army tried to become something it wasn't. It bought into pop culture, science fiction, and a different set of values. It tried to compete with the Air Force by becoming more like the Air Force. The Army went into the high technology business; the nuclear business; the missile business; and research and development business for cutting edge, high speed, exotic technologies. 160 • The American Culture of War The Army believed that it needed high tech weapons, particularly nuclear weapons and missiles, to survive. The Army tried to create a Hollywood image that it could sell to Congress and the American people. Taylor wrote: In early October 1957, when Sputnik I was placed into orbit by the USSR, the Army was ready to compete in the space race with the Jupiter C missile. In early November of that year, the Army was directed to place a satellite in orbit without delay. Eighty- four days later, on 31 January 1958, the Army successfully placed Explorer I in space. . . . Currently the Army is developing a \Vi million pound thrust space vehicle booster for the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense; it will provide a number of scientific satellite launch- ing vehicles to the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA); and it will test 10 NASA space capsules. . . . The Army has pressed forward with an urgent requirement for the very small, close range atomic weapons with yields in the order of tons, rather than kilotons. These are essential for use in close proximity to friendly forces with little or no danger. . . . The Army has broadened its program to provide a family of nuclear power plants for supplying heat and electricity . . . Programs have been undertaken for developing nuclear propelled special land vehicles. An example is the Army Overland Train . . . . 40 In a losing endeavor to compete with the Air Force, Army leaders undertook efforts to remake the Army into something that deviated from its fundamental purpose. And while trying to adjust to the new reality of nuclear war the Army lost its focus. James E. Hewes, Jr., in his study of the Army noted: The Army's own modernization program emphasized the development of missiles and Army aviation at the expense of conventional weapons and equipment, Mr. Hitch charged. In an era of financial austerity the Army's major overhead operating costs, the operations and maintenance program, suffered most. More and more equipment was useless for lack of spare parts. Deferred maintenance seriously impaired the Army's combat readiness. Local commanders often had to transfer operations and maintenance funds intended for repairs and utilities for more urgent missions, and illegal transactions made possible by the thin dividing line that existed in practice between procurement activities and overhead operations. 41 The Army's expenditure in missiles and nuclear technology damaged its efforts to modernize its ground forces to fight limited wars. Andrew Bacevich concluded that: "taken as a whole the Army's missile program reflects a preoccupation with an excessively narrow concept of war— despite the Service's theoretical appreciation for a broader spectrum of conflict. This enormous investment in missile development shows that in practice the Army assumed that atomic weapons would be used in any future war and would determine its outcome." 42 While the Army searched for the technology to fight on the nuclear battlefield, its ability to fight a limited or general conventional war deteriorated. The Army and nation deluded themselves in the late 1950s and early 1960s in regard to what was technologically possible. And the Army, by trying to become something it was not contributed to the demise of the public's understanding of war. The American people did not believe that man was the ultimate weapon on the battlefield. The Army itself seemed to no longer believe this basic tenet. The American people came to believe that war could be fought and won from the air, that in the future the U.S. would fight "push button" wars. In the December 1956 issue of Military Review, Professor Harry H. Ransom of Harvard University in an article titled "Scientific Manpower and National Strategy," outlined the dominant perspective of the time: "United States Armed Forces today are engaged in a technological race with the Soviets. The outcome may affect national survival. . . . this contest may be won or lost in the field of research and Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 161 development, and ultimately in the Nation's classroom." 43 Ransom believed that there were rapidly increasing numbers of scientists, engineers, and technicians in the Soviet Union, and growing short- ages of the same in the United States. On October 4,1957 it seemed all of America accepted Ransom's assessment. The Soviet Union had placed the first man-made object in orbit around the Earth, Sputnik, initiating a series of firsts in the space race. Sputnik and other Soviet firsts caused fear and a "crisis of confidence" in the United States that intensified the space, technology, and military races, and the transformation in American thinking about the use of force. One witness of the event wrote: Watching Sputnik traverse the sky was seeing history happen with my own eyes. To me, it was as if Sputnik was the starter's pistol in an exciting new race. I was electrified, delirious, as I witnessed the beginning of the Space Age. . . . The Russian satellite essentially forced the United States to place a new national priority on research science. . . . Politically, Sputnik created a percep- tion of American weakness, complacency, and a "missile gap," which led to bitter accusations, resignations of key military figures, and contributed to the election of John F. Kennedy, who emphasized the space gap and the role of the Eisenhower- Nixon Administration in creating it. . . . Within weeks America had begun to use Sputnik to reinvent itself. 44 The Soviet success in space was considered a direct challenge to American leadership in science and technology, and created a sense of urgency. George Kennan noted: "It caused Western alarmists ... to demand the immediate subordination of all other national interests to the launching of immensely expensive crash programs to outdo the Russians in this competition. It gave effective arguments to the various enthusiasts for nuclear armament in the American military- industrial complex." It caused Americans to invest billions in the advancement of science. It caused the creation of new institutions such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), in 1958, the enactment of new legislation, such as the National Defense Education Act to provide loans to college students studying science and provide grants to universities. It caused the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- tion (NASA). And, it motivated Kennedy to spend billions of dollars to insure that an American was the first human being to walk on the moon. It also ignited the imaginations of thousands of American youth, creating the dreams of space travel and technological solutions to all human problems. Sputnik, thus, intensified the transformation in American thinking about the use of military force, and exerted greater pressure on the Army to become something new and modern. In June 1959 Taylor passed the responsibilities of the Army Chief of Staff to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. It was now his duty to defend the Army by explaining why the nation needed it, and by advocating limited war doctrine in which the Army still played the primary role: The question [has] existed in the minds of many concerning the usefulness of ground forces in a nuclear war. The military requirements which exist and will continue to exist to meet the military challenge which could confront us, in the form of either general or limited war, and the essential requirement to seize, occupy, and hold ground before victory can be won, eliminate all doubt concerning the indispensable function of the Army as a fundamental element in provid- ing national security. While the Army has been regarded in some circles as at best obsolescent, it is in fact very much in step with the needs of the times. In reviewing the history of limited wars which have occurred in a wide variety of places and circumstances since 1945, it becomes evident that despite many points of difference in these wars, they have possessed a common distinguishing characteristic. This was combat operations on land — in most cases, sustained combat— for the purpose of securing control of land areas and the 162 • The American Culture of War people in them. Thus, it is in this field of limited war capability that I believe we must continue to improve in order that we may confront the entire spectrum of threats posed by the Communist bloc with the optimum degree of appropriate force to meet the varying situations. 45 Lemnitzer adopted the Ridgway and Taylor vision of limited war. The best argument for main- taining a large, combat ready army was not fighting on the nuclear battlefield, a doctrine of war that was ultimately discredited, but recognition of the type of wars the United States was most likely to fight— limited war. General Bruce C. Clarke, Commander of U.S. Army Continental Army Command, writing in 1959, noted: "Despite an initial nuclear monopoly and a continuing superiority in atomic strike power on the part of the United States, Communism managed in the ten year period between 1946 and 1956 to gain control of more than five million square miles of territory inhabited by more than six hundred million people. All of this was accomplished by means short of general war." General Clarke believed the Soviets were expanding their efforts to turn developing states into Communist states. He then outlined the type of Army needed: We need deployed forces in being in critical areas of the world to provide the Soviets with con- vincing evidence of our determination, to bolster the morale of our allies, and fight in place, or be redeployed rapidly if necessary . . . . We need to extend the effect of these deployed forces by providing assistance in material and training to indigenous forces .... We need a mobilization base sufficient to maintain a general war posture even while participat- ing in limited wars. This places particular emphasis on the requirements for reserve component forces in a high state of training and properly equipped. We need a flexible logistic support system with required overseas stockage to permit support offerees deployed anywhere in the world. We need joint and combined plans and doctrine for limited war. This includes the need for joint training exercises on a frequent basis .... Finally, we need a strategic strike force sufficient to enable rapid reaction by use of measured force where and when required. This force must be capable of accomplishing assigned tasks with or without the use of atomic weapons. 46 Remarkably, four decades later the Army was still making the same arguments. In 1959 the United States was in the early stages of its commitment to the war in Vietnam. U.S. Army advisors were in the new Republic providing military assistance against the Communist insurgency. The reality of Vietnam conflicted greatly with the vision of the nuclear battlefield, and since no nuclear weapons had been employed since World War II, the Pentomic doctrine, which was based on technology that did not exist, came into question. In the early 1960s the Army was reorganized. For fifteen years, from 1945 to 1960, Army leaders fought against the vision that airpower had fundamentally changed the nature of war and that henceforth armies were obsolete. With the elec- tion of President Kennedy it seemed that the Army had won its case. The policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations did much to damage the ability of the Army to generate combat power and damaged the Army's spirit, and by extension the spirit of the nation. Americans learned to live with the terror of nuclear holocaust, retained their vision of total, unconditional war, and accepted the Eisenhower thesis that airpower dominated the planet. The ability of the Armed Forces of the United States to conduct joint operations actually declined during the Truman and Eisenhower years. The exigencies of total war that forced cooperation in World War II were gone. The limited budgets; the administration's emphasis on the Air Force; the conclusion drawn by many that the Army, and to a lesser extent the Navy, were obsolete; and the services' efforts Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 163 to maintain their campaign-winning technologies and doctrines, increased the competition between the services. The United States entered the decade of the 1960s with four separate armed forces, each seeking to duplicate the capabilities of the other, each seeking more and broader missions. The Army, however, was the biggest loser. Ultimately, with a strategic doctrine based solely on airpower, the na- tion would be the biggest loser. The Chaotic Array of Nuclear Deterrent Forces In the late 1950s numerous ideas were considered, tested, and developed. Each service was developing missile technology, nuclear weapons, and nuclear powered vehicles. The Navy and Air Force were developing several types of strategic nuclear capabilities. The Navy sought strategic nuclear missions for its primary instrument of war, the aircraft carrier, and for its submarine. The Air Force sought land based continental missile technology, primarily to compete with the Army and keep the missile program in the Air Force; in addition, it continued to develop strategic aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons and a nuclear powered aircraft. The Army too was developed strategic missiles technology. It developed the Redstone and Jupiter missiles for strategic deterrence and to put a satellite in orbit. The Army also advanced the development of tactical nuclear weapons. Congress was asked to fund a myriad of programs; however, the services, to get the mission, would initially fund programs out of their service budget. The driving force was more psychological than real. The cost of making Ameri- cans feel secure, the cost of making the nation's nuclear threat credible to Americans, its allies, and the world, caused the enormous expenditures, not the real capabilities of the Soviet Union, which were partially known. The 1950s might be considered "the wild, wild west of nuclear technology." The array of uses the services envisioned for nuclear energy was astounding. No other people on the planet were as pre- disposed as Americans were to pursue such an enormous array of atomic technologies. The services competed and invested in all sorts of ideas; nuclear airplanes; nuclear trains; nuclear-powered, remote- controlled cargo-carrying devices with vertical takeoff and landing capabilities; atomic mortars and artillery; and numerous other ideas. Yet, in the late 1950s the Soviet Union did not have the resources to initiate a first strike against the United States that would cause sufficient damage to preclude retalia- tory attacks. To clarify these issues and make sense of this chaotic environment some understanding of the nation's strategic nuclear capabilities at the end of the Eisenhower administration is necessary. Kennedy inherited this situation. Throughout the 1950s the strategic bomber was the primary nuclear weapon delivery system and main deterrent to nuclear war. The three major technological considerations for a strategic bomber were range, speed, and payload. Other considerations were cost, reliability, and maintenance requirements. Part of the equation was what Congress was willing to fund. Thus, new weapon systems required the services to lobby Congress. In 1948 the B-36 Peacemaker, long-range bomber, with an unrefuelled range of 6,500 miles or a combat radius of 3,000 miles, entered service. The aircraft was too slow to outrun enemy fighters, and lacked the range to bomb the Soviet Union from the borders of the United States. The B-36 was a compromise. It represented the transition from the internal combustion engine to the jet engine. It was powered by six combustion engines and four jet engines, and was the largest bomber ever to enter service. It was also the Air Force's last propeller driven bomber. In 1949 SAC understood that the next generation of fighter aircraft would make the B-36 obsolete. In October 1951 the medium-range B-47 Stratojet bomber entered service, and the U.S. Air Force entered the jet age. 47 The B-47 was powered by six General Electric jet engines, and had a relatively short radius of 1,700 miles; hence, it had to be forward deployed to the United Kingdom, and depended on air-to-air refu- eling. In 1953 a B-47 flew from the United States to England in record time: 3,120 miles in five hours 164 • The American Culture of War and thirty-eight minutes. By 1955 1,260 of SAC s 2800 aircraft were B-47s organized into twenty-three wings. The aircraft remained in frontline service throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. However, the mainstay of the SAC throughout the cold war and the successor to the B-36 was the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress. The first production B-52A rolled out of a Boeing plant in Renton, Washington in March 1954. The aircraft entered operational service the following year. 48 In 2003 in Operation Enduring Freedom the B-52 was still carrying out combat missions. It had a range of 8,000 miles, and air refueling capabilities. It was originally designed to drop nuclear bombs, but was later modified to drop conventional bombs and cruise missiles. In this capacity it was used extensively in Vietnam. Over its service life the aircraft was refitted and upgraded numerous times, to adjust to the changing environment and advances in technology. In the late 1950s the B-58 entered service. This aircraft met Strategic Air Command's (SAC) re- quirement for a supersonic bomber. At a speed of Mach 2, a range of 5,000 miles, air-to-air refueling capability, and a delta-winged design, the B-58 was the most impressive aircraft in SAC. However, the aircraft saw a mere ten years of service. The Air Force experimented with other supersonic aircraft in the late 1950s and early 1960s; however, the argument for missile-based deterrence, technical prob- lems with supersonic aircraft, and the high cost of manned aircraft caused the cancellation of these experimental aircraft. Missile technology threatened manned bombers. In 1956 the SAC argued that there was a "Bomber Gap," that the Soviet Union had developed and deployed long-range bombers capable of attacking the United States and was producing them in large numbers. Based on this assessment SAC concluded it needed more B-52s and atomic bombs to provide deterrent and adequate retaliatory force. SAC had little proof to back up its claims, however, the prospects were too dangerous to neglect. The lack of intelligence sharing between governmental agencies was unimaginable and precluded the decision makers in Washington from getting a clear picture of the threat. There was a growing concern for the vulnerability of the deterrent force to a first strike nuclear attack, which would leave the U.S. defenseless. To get a better picture of the situation in the Soviet Union, Eisenhower in 1954 approved the devel- opment of a high-flying, long-range aerial reconnaissance aircraft— the Lockheed U-2, secretly built at "Skunk Works" in Burbank, California. The U-2's capabilities so exceeded those of all other aircraft it was considered invulnerable. It was loaded with data collection devices, cameras, which scanned through seven apertures, and monitors, which received radio and radar transmissions. Eisenhower approved overflights of the Soviet Union territory in 1956. The CIA operated the U-2, thus the intel- ligence it collected went through the NSC to the President. The Soviets protested the overflights, but the U-2s provided "ninety percent of our hard intelligence information about the Soviet Union." They revealed that there was no "bomber gap." In fact, the Soviet Union had very limited capability to strike the United States from its borders in the mid- and late 1950s. And, according to Michael Beschloss, a student of the U-2 affair, they: "reassured the President that Soviet boasts about a mammoth bomber and missile buildup were no more than boasts. This helped to persuade Eisenhower to hold down defense spending against almost unbearable public pressure." 49 Overflights did not provide continuous images of Soviet alert status or preparations for surprise attacks. Eisenhower had to personally approve each overflight, and fewer than two hundred flights were conducted. Eisenhower closely managed the program. He sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union and he recognized the overflights were a considerable source of friction. They angered Soviets, who were making rapid strides in missile technology, with emphasis on surface to air, antiaircraft missiles. 50 In the latter half of the 1950s the Tactical Air Command (TAC) acquired tactical nuclear weapons, and aligned itself more closely with the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Given resource constraints- training time and money, and aircraft maintenance — the nuclear mission took precedence over con- ventional tactical missions. The lessons learned from the experience in Korea were lost. Many came to Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 165 believe that Korea was an aberration, and that under the Eisenhower doctrine of Massive Retaliation the most likely war would take place in Europe against the Soviet Union— clearly the most dangerous threat. Conrad Crane concluded that: "Weyland [former commander of FEAF] and his TAC succes- sors struck a Faustian bargain with the atomic Mephistopheles, transforming the organization into a 'junior SAC concentrating on the delivery of small nuclear weapons. The F- 105 Thunderchief, which replaced the F-84 and would bear the brunt of tactical air support in the early years of Vietnam was designed to deliver a nuclear bomb after a high-speed, low altitude approach. It was unsuitable both for air combat and for true close air support." 51 As a result of emphasis on the nuclear mission the TAC entered the Vietnam War much the way it entered the Korean War— psychologically, technologically, and doctrinally unprepared. While the Air Force's strategic bombers were Eisenhower's primary means for deterring war, the Navy too sought part of the nuclear deterrent mission. In the 1950s aircraft carriers and submarines were developed with the capability to deliver nuclear weapons. The submarine would ultimately prove to be the launch platform least vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. The submarine's unique capabilities almost guaranteed the ability of the U.S. to suffer a first strike and still deliver a devastating blow to the Soviet Union. Before World War II came to an end the Navy had identified a role for the aircraft carrier in the strategic bombing mission. Shortly after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Navy sought the ability to employ atomic bombs. On July 24, 1946 acting Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, wrote the President: The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the first Bikini [island] tests have amply demonstrated that the atomic bomb is the most effective single instrument of mass destruction ever developed. The high mobility of the Naval Carrier Task Force combined with its capacity for making successive and continuous strikes in almost any part of the world make this force a most suit- able means of waging atomic bomb warfare. Carrier Forces are particularly effective during the early phases of a war when fixed shore installations may be temporarily immobilized by planned surprise attack in force. Increased range of carrier aircraft . . . will further increase the areas accessible to attack by carrier based aircraft. Also, the Carrier Task Force can provide a fleet of fighters to escort its bombers throughout their tactical range and thus insure maximum probability of successful accomplishment of the bombing mission. Sullivan concluded: "I strongly urge that you authorize the Navy to make preparations for possible delivery of atomic bombs in an emergency in order that the capabilities of the Carrier Task Forces may be utilized to the maximum advantage for national defense." 52 Truman permitted the Navy to initiate the modifications to existing carriers and aircraft to employ the atomic bomb. Because of the size and weight of the plutonium bomb, Fat Man (60 inches diameter, 10,000 pounds), dropped on Nagasaki the Navy had few aircraft capable of being modified. Nevertheless, the Navy was determined to present the president and the secretary of defense with a fait accompli. With the capability already proven and operational the Navy not only secured for itself nuclear weapons and a piece of the strategic mission, but also created the need for new aircraft and carriers to accommodate nuclear weapons. In March 1949 the Navy demonstrated the capability to launch an aircraft from a carrier and de- liver a simulated atomic bomb over three thousand miles from the carrier. This was a one-way trip. The actual radius of an unmodified propeller driven AJ-1 Savage was eleven hundred miles. In April 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson canceled the Navy's supercarrier, the U.S.S. United States, 166 • The American Culture of War causing the "Revolt of the Admirals." However, a student of naval warfare, Norman Friedman, con- cluded that: "From 1953 onward nuclear as well as non-nuclear components [or the atomic bomb] were deployed at sea, the navy having, in effect, won the battle symbolized by the United States!' 53 The acquisition of the mission, and acknowledgment and acceptance of that mission by the Department of Defense, Congress, and the Executive branch created the conditions for the further development of carriers and aircraft capable of delivering atomic bombs. The Navy suffered a setback, with the cancellation of the United States, but it won the war for a strategic nuclear capability, and continued to lobby and argue for a new supercarrier. 54 The war in Korea not only demonstrated to the Congress and the country the utility of naval aviation, it also demonstrated to the Navy that tactical aircraft to support the ground war were still necessary, that the atomic bomb and strategic bomber had not replaced its World War II mission. With the outbreak of the Korean War, Congress was willing to fund a scaled down version (60,000 ton) of the U.S.S. United States (80,000 tons). On October 1, 1955 the first Forrestal class aircraft carrier was delivered to the Navy. It was one of four that joined the fleet between 1955 and 1959. It incorporated all the design features in use at the end of the twentieth century; however, the size and displacement of these vessels increased almost with each new ship. 55 Since the innovations of the 1950s, most of which were British, the aircraft carrier has changed little. 56 The aircraft carrier became a symbol of American power. Its impressive size and technologies inspired awe. It had a psychological effect on Americans, ultimately becoming the central character in movies and television programs. The aircraft carrier was also a source of deterrent. Its mere presence caused potential enemies to rethink their actions. In 1954 the Navy launched its first nuclear-powered submarine (SSN), the Nautilus. It was followed a year later by the Seawolf. In 1960 the first Polaris class submarine entered service. The Polaris was the first submarine capable of employing submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Polaris submarines revolutionized nuclear strategy. The vastness of the ocean, the stealth characteristics of the submarine, the ability to move throughout the oceans of the world to geographic locations in close proximity to the Soviet Union, and the ability to launch while submerged produced a new level of capabilities. The Soviets developed a similar capability. The range of the solid-fuel rockets, the accuracy of the warhead, and the number of warheads (Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles— MIRVs) that could be placed on a single rocket increased in the following decades, as the size of submarines and the numbers of missiles carried also increased. As a result, the nuclear-powered ballistic mis- sile submarine became the most destructive weapon system ever produced, and its captain the most powerful man on the planet. The Trident class guaranteed American second-strike nuclear capability to the end of the cold war. Land based missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), had the potential to replace the strategic bomber as a delivery system. They threatened the piloted aircraft. They were less vulnerable than bombers, required less maintenance, and eliminated much of the human factor on the ground and in the air. However, once launched they could not be recalled, and they could not shift targets. Thus, the aircraft offered greater flexibility but more uncertainty. At the end of World War II, the Army secured a number of German V-l pilotless bombs and V-2 guided missiles. The V-l was essentially a cruise missile, flying within the earth's atmosphere using aerodynamic lift to overcome gravity. The V-2 was the first guided missile, a rocket with a warhead and guidance system. The United States pursued the development of both systems. In addition to securing German technology the Army secured German plans and scientists. In the late 1950s the Army and Air Force competed in the development of rocket technology. The Soviet launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957 created a sense of urgency. In November the Soviets launched Sputnik II, which carried a larger, heavier satellite. If the Soviets could put an eleven-hundred-pound satellite in orbit, it could hit the United States with a nuclear weapon; however, it did not equate to the ability to destroy Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation • 167 America's nuclear capabilities in a first strike. Still, the Soviet achievement had profound implications for reconnaissance, communications, and navigation, and a profound psychological effect. The American missile problem was insufficient range. The initial developments in rocket technol- ogy produced systems incapable of being launched from the United States and hitting targets in the Soviet Union. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) were developed and forward deployed to the United Kingdom and Alaska. In 1960 the first "true" ICBM entered service. The Air Force's Atlas missile had a range of 8,700 miles. The Atlas was launched in the open from fixed launch pads. It took considerable time to mount and prepare the rocket for launch. Time was a key factor in the event of nuclear war. The Air Force activated several squadrons of Atlas ICBMs, thus providing the nation with a new deterrent force. Writing in 1959 Bernard Brodie concluded: "The criterion of costs being within reason' invokes a subjective judgment, but the requirement to reduce the vulnerability of the retaliatory force deserves such priority that if necessary certain other kinds of military expenditures should be sacrificed to it; secondly, there is no question that this country can afford, if it must, a much larger military budget than it has become accustomed to at this writing." 57 Sputnik made Americans feel vulnerable, and demonstrated that the Soviets had surpassed the United States in rocket technology. The Kennedy administration inherited the problem of making the nation's strategic, nuclear retaliatory force in- vulnerable to Soviet attack. It inherited a chaotic array of new complex technologies and capabilities. How to organize these strategic forces; what forces required further development and funding; which forces were unnecessary duplications of capabilities; which systems were technologically out of reach; how best to divide defense spending to insure strategic nuclear capabilities and develop a more viable limited war capability; how best to make Americans feel secure; and how best to influence the behavior of the Soviet Union in the strategic nuclear environment and in developing nations? These were some of the issues that confronted the new president at the beginning of the 1960s. 8 Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure In the creation of a sound military force for the armed defense of the nation, there is no place for free competitive enterprise among the separate services in the business of fighting a war. Security is a cooperative venture; it is not a competitive race. To forewarn aggressors and to construct effective military might, we are in need of partnership, not partisanship; concern for the safety of this nation, not the survival of our arms. — General Omar N. Bradley 1 However desirable the American system of civilian control of the military, it was a mistake to permit appointive civilian officials lacking military experience and knowledge of military history and oblivious to the lessons of Communist diplomatic machinations to wield undue influence in the decision-making process. Over-all control of the military is one thing; shackling professional military men with restrictions in professional matters imposed by civilians who lack military understanding is another. — General William C. Westmoreland 2 The National Security Act of 1947 set up the most dysfunctional, worst organizational approach to military affairs one can possibly imagine. In a near-perfect example of the Law of Unintended Consequences, it created a situation in which the biggest rival of any U.S. armed service is not a foreign adversary but one of its sister services. —General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC 3 For half a century, observant, senior military and civilian leaders have argued that the national command structure for the maintenance and employment of the Armed Forces of the United States instituted in the early days of the cold war, damaged the ability of the United States to fight war; and as a consequence, impeded or precluded it from achieving political objectives. It has also been argued that the national command structure has wasted billions of dollars, and more importantly the lives of servicemen. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Amendments of 1949, which created the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the system of competing services with overlapping responsibilities and capabilities; decisively destroyed consensus in the national command structure, and as General Zinni noted, created a situation in which the biggest rivals of any U.S. armed service are its sister services. The inability of the Armed 170 • The American Culture of War Forces to develop joint doctrine, unified chains of command, and coherent strategy facilitated defeat in Vietnam, and ultimately the destruction of the citizen- soldier Army 4 The inability of the American people to accept a limited war doctrine was, in large part, a function of the inability of the Armed Forces to effectively fight limited war. Organizing For Defense The organization for the command and control of armed forces instituted by a nation-state is in part a function of its historical experiences; culture; military traditions; geographic circumstances; political system; myths and legends; and values, ethics, and beliefs of its people, who, in the age of the modern nation-state, supported and maintained the armed forces. It is a certainty that no system of command, control, and planning for the employment of armed forces is perfect— maximizing the combat effectiveness of all components. As in all aspects of life, tradeoffs and compromises have to be made. It is also a fact that some nation-states have, by design, not sought to maximize the combat effectiveness of their forces. The system of command and control does not function exclusive of the political system and the values of the people. Hence, maximizing combat effectiveness was not a pri- mary objective for some nation-states, and was a secondary or tertiary consideration for others that were primarily concerned with priorities, such as, civilian control of the Armed Forces and nonin- terference of the military in the lives of the people. Of course, military ineffectiveness caused by the system of command and control is a luxury of nation-states that are not directly threatened by other significant powers. Prior to World War II, the United States enjoyed this luxury. Protected by two great oceans and a world order maintained by the British and French empires, the United States possessed a level of security the German and Russian speaking people, for example, never enjoyed. And that luxury made possible systems of command and control that could survive with extraordinary waste, diffused power, neglect, and military incompetence. The survival of the United States for most of its history was not tied to the survival and capabilities of its Armed Forces. Thus, the American cultural norm was to institute systems for command, control, and administration that intentionally failed to maximize military effectiveness. While cultural change can take place rapidly under the conditions of war or some other traumatic event in the life of a nation, as a rule, cultural change takes place slowly. Changes in the American system for administrating the Armed Forces have taken place at various periods throughout the nations history; however, more fundamental changes in the system have taken considerable time. Such, was the case in the postwar period. There were many systems of command and control a state could institute: they ranged from the British committee system, under which power was diffused, to the German General Staff system, under which power was centralized and concentrated. The development of the German General Staff— possibly the most proficient, professional organization for the conduct of war ever devel- oped — was an outgrowth of Prussia's/Germany's geographic circumstances, no natural defensible borders; the prevalence of significant, strong states with contiguous borders; the relative impoverished state of Prussia; the greed and competitiveness of the European monarchy system; the growth of the standing army; the experience of the suffering and devastation caused by the Thirty Years' War; and the perennial nature of war in Europe. 5 The continuous existence of the Prussian state was a function of the continuous efficiency and professionalism of the Prussian Army. The state existed because the Army existed. The German organization, however, was incompatible with America's culture, political system, and geographic circumstances. 6 The British and American democracies had much in common. American values and ethics were to some degree derived from those of the British people. Nevertheless, Britain's island domain and twenty- mile geographic separation from continental Europe, worldwide empire, social strata, colonial experiences, and monarchy created significant differences. During World War II the United States Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 171 modeled its Joint Chiefs of Staff on the British Imperial General Staff. Yet, throughout the war it was evident that American and British military leaders at all levels had very different conceptions of the command and control offerees, and that American experiences in the Civil War exerted a persistent influence. 7 Nation-states cannot simply adopt the system of organization of other political entities. Thus, the American system for the command and control of armed forces had to be exactly that, a culturally unique American system. Communication technologies greatly influenced systems of command and control. Systems evolved with the technology. As the speed and reliability of communications increased, the autonomy of field commanders tended to decrease. The range of freedoms that commanders enjoyed in the nineteenth century had diminished considerably by the mid-twentieth century. And, by the end of the twentieth century a battle could literally be controlled in real time from the other side of the planet. Greater centralization of decision making resulted from these new technologies. This, however, did not mean that better decisions were made. It did mean that political concern in a nation's capital could almost immediately influence actions on the battlefield, and that the power of the media to influence decisions in the field, by influencing decisions in the capital, had multiplied many times. This consideration also caused states to move toward greater centralization of their systems of command and control, toward a joint system of command. The tests of any system of command are threefold: first, does it achieve its political objectives? Second, does it maximize the capabilities of the forces employed? And third, does it preserve the fighting forces — physically, emotionally, and psychologically? By these standards the National Security Act of 1947 was an abysmal failure. This fact was evident before and during the Korean War; how- ever, the system as executed during the Vietnam War was a national disgrace, eroding the potential combat power of all the services. The 1947 Act survived because the services, the administrations, the Congress, the American people, and the defense industry wanted it. In a limited war, where the homeland was not threatened, a nation-state as powerful as the United States did not have to rational- ize its resources. The war could be carried out with gross inefficiencies because of the country's great wealth and power. In fact, in limited wars in the post- World War II period, victory was a secondary or tertiary consideration. The National Security Act of 1947 institutionalized selfishness, not only in the Armed Forces, but also in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, in industries, and in communities all across the United States. It diffused power, a cultural tenet for the Armed Forces, and permitted the services to pursue their own objectives, almost exclusive of the other service. Other agents embraced this system, in large part because of the economic incentives it produced. The cold war made defense big busi- ness, and the United States became the biggest producer of arms on the planet. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars annually on defense, some of which went to each agent, caused the formation of what has been called the "Iron-Triangle" between the government, the military, and the industries manufacturing military equipment. Each point of the triangle had vested interests in the system that placed fighting war well below other priorities. Lobby groups fought tenaciously to maintain bases, weapon systems, research and development programs, and other programs that had little to do with the ability of the Armed Forces to fight war. In fact, some of these programs forced technologies, including weapons, on the services that they did not want, caused the maintenance of facilities that hindered the ability of a service to deploy and train, and caused the services to maintain facilities and equipment they did not need. Many Americans supported the system because they benefited financially from it. Military bases and technologically sophisticated production facilities created good jobs and pumped money into local economies. The American defense industry influenced local, state, regional, and the national economy. On the other hand, watching the poor performance of the military and the government in Korea and Vietnam and in other operations damaged the credibility of the services, eroding American faith in the 172 • The American Culture of War Armed Forces and government. The national command structure, which institutionalized competition and selfishness, contributed to the destruction of the citizen- soldier Army. Congress institutionalized a system that effectively precluded the Armed Forces from cooperating on the battlefield, a system that wasted lives, enormous national resources, and arguably caused the nation's first defeat in war. However, again, the best explanation for the organization of the national command structure comes from an understanding of American culture and the cultures of the services. Maximizing military effectiveness for almost two hundred years was not an objective of the United States; in fact, it was un-American to do so. Civil-Military Relations: Conflicting Loyalties During World War II new technologies emerged that produced new doctrines that produced a new service, and significantly changed the way the other services fought war, particularly the Navy. These developments were rapidly followed by the advent of the cold war and the assumption by the United States of the new status of superpower. This new role of the United States in world affairs created the greatest demand for sustained military preparedness in the nation's history, in effect, causing the expenditure of tens, and later hundreds, of billions of dollars annually. The services perfected their individual doctrines. They were unable to develop a joint doctrine. Each service believed its primary weapons systems and operational doctrines were essential to the security of the United States and its ability to fight war. As a consequence, the services were in conflict. Interservice rivalry produced a command structure that institutionalized conflict. Limited war intensified the rivalry. In the cold war and limited wars, the exigency of war never supplanted the rivalries between the services. The services fought over dollars, missions, strategy, doctrine, technologies, and other resources, making it impossible for the service chiefs to present the Secretary of Defense and the President with a coherent, comprehensive vision of war. Limited conventional war meant the allocation of limited resources. The services continually participated in a zero-sum game, where a gain for one service was a loss for another. Truman recognized this problem and advanced a solution. Truman became President in April 1945. There was still plenty of war to fight, and he worked closely with Marshall and King. He had the opportunity to see firsthand, how things worked and did not work. A few months after the Japanese surrendered Truman sent Congress a long letter outlining the problems of the World War II national command structure. He delineated the objectives he hoped the Congress would achieve through the legislative process. Truman wrote: Today, again in the interest of national security and world peace, I make this further recom- mendation to you. I recommend that the Congress adopt legislation combining the War and Navy Departments into one single Department of National Defense. Such unification is another essential step — along with universal training — in the development of a comprehensive and continuous program for our future safety and for the peace and security of the world. One of the lessons which have most clearly come from the costly and dangerous experience of this war is that there must be unified direction of land, sea, and air forces at home as well as in all other parts of the world where our Armed Forces are serving. We did not have that kind of direction when we were attacked four years ago — and we certainly paid a high price for not having it. In 1941, we had two completely independent organizations with no well-established habits of collaboration and cooperation between them. If disputes arose, if there was failure to agree on a question of planning or a question of action, only the President of the United States could make a decision effective on both. Besides, in 1941, the air power of the United States was not organized on a par with the ground and sea forces .... Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 173 It is true, we were able to win in spite of these handicaps. But it is now time to take stock, to discard obsolete organizational forms and to provide for the future the soundest, the most effective and the most economical kind of structure for our armed forces of which this most powerful Nation is capable. I urge this as the best means of keeping the peace .... Now that our enemies have surrendered it has again become all too apparent that a portion of the American people are anxious to forget all about the war, and particularly to forget all the unpleasant factors which are required to prevent future wars. We would be taking a grave risk with the national security if we did not move now to overcome permanently the present imperfections in our defense organization. However great was the need for coordination and unified command in World War II, it is sure to be greater if there is any future aggression against world peace. Technological devel- opments have made the Armed Services much more dependent upon each other than ever before. The boundaries that once separated the Army's battlefield from the Navy's battlefield have been virtually erased. If there is ever going to be another global conflict, it is sure to take place simultaneously on land and sea and in the air, with weapons of ever greater speed and range. Our combat force must work together in one team as they have never been required to work together in the past. We must assume . . . that another war would strike much more suddenly. . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not a unified command. It is a committee which must depend for its success upon the voluntary cooperation of its member agencies. During the war period of extreme national danger, there was, of course, a high degree of cooperation. In peacetime the situation will be different. It must not be taken for granted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff as now constituted will be as effective in the apportionment of peacetime resources as they have been in the determina- tion of war plans and in their execution. As national defense appropriations grow tighter, and as conflicting interests make themselves felt in major issues of policy and strategy, unanimous agreement will become more difficult to reach. 8 Truman concluded that: "Had we not early in the war adopted this principle of a unified command for operation, our efforts, no matter how heroic, might have failed. But we never had comparable uni- fied direction or command in Washington. And even in the field, our unity of operations was greatly impaired by the differences in training, in doctrine, in communication systems, and in supply and distribution systems, that stemmed from the division of leadership in Washington." Extrapolating from Truman's words, one could forecast defeat in some future war if the defects in the command structure were not fixed. The failure to establish unity at the very top precluded any real unity at the operational level. From the tactical level up, each service, each commander had the ability to appeal to its service chiefs in Washington if a theater commander gave orders that a particular service disagreed with. In Korea and Vietnam each service fought its own war, almost exclusive of the other services. Truman's letter was prescient. It was remarkable for its clarity. It not only elucidated the problems of command, control, planning, and resource allocation that plagued the Armed Forces during World War II, but it also delineated the current problems of the services in their efforts to demobilize while protecting "the free world" at the dawn of the cold war. And finally, he predicted what would happen if the Joint Chiefs were not unified. Yet, Truman was also part of the problem. As the cold war emerged, generals and admirals sought additional funds to meet the very real and growing Communist threat. The President outlined a Policy of Containment that required a defensive strategy in noncommunist parts of the world. The Armed Forces did not question the President's policy; however, to carry it out required more resources, larger forces, and modern technology. The rapid, irresponsible demobilization; the knowledge of Soviet military potential; the fear of Communist expansion; the emotional memories of the turmoil, uncertainty, and unpreparedness that accompanied 174 • The American Culture of War the outbreak of World War II; and loyalty to men and women of the Armed Forces, caused the generals and admirals to seek a level of peacetime military expenditures unimaginable to most Americans and their political leaders. On October 2, 1950, Time Magazine, in an article entitled, "Why Was the U.S. Unarmed?" endeavored to explain to the American people the reason for the poor state of its armed forces in the opening weeks of the Korean War: When war began in Korea, Americans had good reason to believe that the sinews of their war machine were tough and thick; never in peacetime had U.S. coin been spent so lavishly on the armed forces of the nation. In the five years after World War II, the U.S. had poured out a stag- gering $90 billion for the Army, Navy and Air Force. ... In 1949, the defense bill came to $100 for every man, woman and child in the U.S., v. only $8 apiece in 1938. . . . Yet the first agonizing weeks in Korea proved well enough that all this coin had failed to develop the sinews of war. Said one military man: "The fist is still there, but the muscles of the arm have been wasted away." For its $90 billion the U.S. got — not a powerful fighting force— but only ten combat divisions. And even those were sadly understaffed, full of green troops, and underequipped. U.S. tanks, almost all left over from World War II, were obsolescent; antitank weapons were out of date. Most of World War Us mighty Navy lay cocooned, prepared to fight off rust rather than an enemy. Even the Air Force, the strategic bombing darling of military planners, had to scramble to find planes to give ground troops limited tactical support. Faced by the shocking weakness of its armed forces many an American bleakly asked: Where did the $90 billion go ... ? How much will it cost to guarantee reasonable security in the future? Objectively the answer to this last question was unknowable. But, what was obvious in the first battles for Korea, was that the Truman administration was far off the mark. Truman's defense policies and budgets put the services on the defensive. The administration's foreign and fiscal policies conflicted with its military policies, creating a serious conflict of interests and conflict of loyalties for the gener- als and admirals. The policies of the administration exacerbated interservice rivalry. Truman placed little value on the advice of the Joint Chiefs, believing that they were incapable of working together to fashion a reasonable budget, that they always sought more and larger forces, and that they did not understand the economic situation of the country that he had to manage. 10 Truman's impressions and attitude were created, in part, by his observation of the behavior of the generals and admirals. Issues of loyalty were, and are, extremely complex. While service culture clearly limited the vision of war of senior military leaders, it would be wrong to conclude that they were not men of integrity, or that they acted purely out of arrogance, ignorance, or selfishness. The twentieth edition of the Officer's Guide informed new Army officers that: "Loyalty is demanded in all ways from military officers. He must be loyal to his men, to his brother officers, his organization, his commander, the Army, and to the Nation he has sworn to protect." 11 However, the actual working of the system of loyalties was not simply hierarchical, and there was little agreement on which loyalty required the highest devotion. 12 A brief study of the concept of "loyalty" reveals that there was no consensus in the Army In 1950 S. L. A. Marshall wrote, "His [the Army officer's] ultimate commanding loyalty at all times is to his country and not to his service or his superior." In 1967 Matthew B. Ridgway wrote: "While the loyalty he (the officer) owes his superiors is reciprocated with equal force in the loyalty owed him from above, the authority of his superiors is not open to question." And, in 1970, General W. R. Peers wrote: "An officer's highest loyalty is to the Army and the nation." The Army, the nation, and superiors all laid claim to the highest loyalty. Thus, loyalties conflicted. Loyalty to one's service could, at times conflict with loyalty to the President, country, subordinates, or career. During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur, who was relieved by Truman, made the argument that he was acting on a higher loyalty Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 175 than that owed the President. He was acting on loyalties to the country, and to the men under his command. Consider the problem: In 1950 Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson cut the defense budget three times until it was less than half the $30 billion the Joint Chiefs requested and believed necessary. At the same time, Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze were arguing for a major increase in the defense budget, Army Chief of Staff, J. Lawton Collins, with full knowledge that the Truman budget did not meet the needs of the Army, or the other services, loyally went before Congress to defend Truman's Fiscal Year 1951 budget of $4 billion, which reduced the size of the Army by about 37,000 soldiers. Collins, standing before Congress, painted an optimistic picture of the current state of readiness of the Army: We have units that are ready to move right now in case of aggression; we have the best men in the Army today that we have ever had in peacetime, and although we have a number of critical equipment problems yet to solve, I can assure you that our troops, with the equipment that they have, would give a good account of themselves, if we were attacked. The recent reductions in our occupation commitments have enabled us to concentrate more of our efforts upon strengthening the combat units which form the hard core of our fighting force. We are giving our divisions and other combat units more officers and men, some items of better weapons and equipment, and improved training under field conditions. 13 Collins's words were not an accurate assessment of the current state of readiness of the Army, and he knew it. Collins, in response to questions regarding the adequacy of the size of the Army, in es- sence lied to Congress. He justified his position by placing the burden of war on National Guard and Reserves, the other services, and American industry: We realize that if there is anything that gives any nation pause today with respect to starting a possible war, it is less the actual military strength of the United States than the tremendous industrial potential of this country. . . . We can safely reduce to approximately this number only if we maintain a high state of readiness in our National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps. However, we are supporting this budget that will provide only 10 divisions because we real- ize the necessity to integrate Army requirements with those of the other Services within our national budget. 14 Collins had not told Congress what he honestly believed. His primary duty, as he understood it, was to support the President's defense program, and he loyally carried out this responsibility. The cost of this loyalty was high. Collins later lamented: "From this record it is clear that members of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], including General Bradley and myself, shared with the President, the Administration, and the Congress the responsibility for the reductions in JCS estimates of military requirements, which so hampered our conduct of the Korean war." He further noted that: It has sometimes been argued . . . that the JCS should submit its estimates of military require- ments without any consideration of their impact on the national economy. There maybe some theoretical merit to this idea, but it is contrary to our American system and, in fact, contrary to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. This act requires that officers and employees of the executive branch of the government support the President's budget recommendations and of- fer "no request for an increase in an item . . . unless at the request of either House of Congress." The prescribed procedure in the Department of the Army in my day was that an Army witness was bound to present and support all budget items unless specifically asked by a Committee member for the witness' personal views. 15 176 • The American Culture of War In other words, lying was institutionalized. Generals and admirals were to support the President's policies and budget directives whether they agreed with them or not. This practice continued into the twenty-first century. Collins concluded that: "Looking back, perhaps the JCS should have taken a firmer stand in defending its $30 billion estimate for the fiscal year 1950, even in the face of broad public concern for the mounting national debt, the lessening purchasing power of the dollar, and the insistent demands for economy in government. . . ." 16 Americans died who should not have died. Strategy was implemented that should not have been. Operations were at risk that should not have been. And political objectives were changed that should not have been. Collins recognized that the cost of the President's fiscal policy had been high. Some generals and admirals earnestly concluded too high. Words similar to those of Collins were spoken years later by senior Army leaders, who after the tragic results of the Vietnam War wished they had done more to change policies and strategies they knew were deeply flawed and had little chance for success. 17 Collins's loyalty to the service and the President's Policy of Containment conflicted with his loyalty to the President and the President's fiscal policy. The loss of life, credibility, prestige, that accompanied the succession of defeats in the opening phase of the Korean war; the loss of half of Korea, and the cost of all the subsequent difficulties that the Communist half of Korea created for the remainder of the century, while primarily the fault of President Truman, weighed heavy on men such as Bradley, Collins, and Ridgway, who had recognized the dangers but were powerless to change the situation. The service chiefs also share the blame with Truman because they had damaged their credibility with the President by their inability to develop a unified command and force structure, produce comprehen- sive strategies and plans, and fight on the same battlefield as teams. War is the most serious business of mankind. The survival of South Korea, and the lives of people of North Korea were determined by the strength— or lack thereof— of the Armed Forces of the United States, particularly the Army 18 On the other hand, perceived disloyalty to a President could end a career, as General Ridgway, who earned the ire of Eisenhower, learned. By pressing too strongly for additional resources, changes in strategy or doctrine, or for particular programs and weapon systems a general or admiral could end his career. Loyalty to the administration became one of the prerequisites for service at the highest levels of the Armed Forces. However, loyalty to one's service was a prerequisite for achieving high rank. And loyalty to the administration was not necessarily the same as loyalty to the service. Just as loyalty to ones career was not necessarily the same as loyalty to one's service. Institutional learning took place rapidly in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The services learned how to circumvent and manipulate the system. They had to learn to cope with a system that put them constantly in a situation where loyalties conflicted. There was another dynamic that influenced the behavior of civilian and military leaders, the desires of administrations to show unanimity in public discourse, to demonstrate that they had the support of the nation's senior most military leaders. Consider the words of Ridgway: I then reiterated my previous stand— that I would not order reductions in Army units in potential combat areas unless I had direct orders to do so. That Mr. Wilson [Secretary of Defense] had the authority to issue such orders I did not question. But the responsibility for the consequences, I felt must also rest on his shoulders. Throughout my tour there was never any lack of willingness on the part of the Defense Department to exercise full authority. Frequently though, this was not accompanied by an equal willingness to assume responsibility for actions taken. On the other hand there seemed to me to be a deliberate effort to soothe and lull the public by placing responsibility where it did not rest, by conveying the false impression that there was unanimous agreement between civilian authorities and their military advisers on the form and shape the military establishment should take. Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 177 As a combat soldier I have been shot at from ambush, and bombed by planes which I thought to be friendly, both of which are experiences that are momentarily unsettling. I do not recall, however, that I ever felt a greater sense of surprise and shock than when I read in President Eisenhower's State of the Union message in 1954 that: "The defense program recommended for 1955 ... is based on a new military program unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." As one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who most emphatically had not concurred, I was nonplused by his statement. 19 The Army opposed Eisenhower's New Look and strategic doctrine of Massive Retaliation. This subterfuge influenced the ability of the nation to conduct war by inhibiting or in some cases preclud- ing the nation's senior most military leaders from speaking their mind and responding honestly. This requirement under certain conditions caused a credibility gap between the administration and Congress, the administration and the American people, and between the military and the American people. This credibility gap, during war, eroded American support for the war— the greater the gap, the greater the erosion of the good will and faith of the American people. General Maxwell Taylor, Army Chief of Staff from 1956 to 1960, characterized the situation: The new Chiefs [under the new Eisenhower Administration] were regarded as members of the Administration "team," working for the objectives of that team under the guidance of their civilian superiors. In formulating their military advice, it was hoped that they would take into account the views and feelings of these superiors and avoid submitting contentious or embar- rassing recommendations. They were expected to accept public responsibility for the actions of the Administration in the field of military policy, regardless of their own views and recom- mendations. They were to avoid any impression of disunity in public or before Congress. That dissent might invoke sanctions was clearly implied by appointing the new Joint Chiefs of Staff for no specified term, with the stated intention to review all appointments after two years. 20 Since the enactment of the National Security Act in 1947 every Administration has expected and demanded the loyalty of the Joint Chiefs. Thus, when the Joint Chiefs speak in public the American people and Congress cannot trust, cannot believe that they are hearing an honest assessment based on the Chiefs' years of experience and service. In fact, their spoken words were sometimes not their own, but prepared statements, "talking points," for programs and policies the administration was en- deavoring to sell to Congress and the American people. And, because under the Constitution of the United States Congress is responsible for organizing, equipping, and funding the Armed Forces, the match between means and objectives was easily lost or distorted. The requirement for "team players" was in part a requirement for "yes-men," primarily in the areas of national military strategy, strategic doctrine, and strategy for a given war. A few senior officers have publicly broken with administra- tions on various issues of national strategy. And as a rule, they have hurt or ended their careers in the process. 21 The system corrupted. General Westmoreland explained how this system hurt the nation during the Vietnam War: Secretary Rusk admitted on television that "we don't expect these men to sit there like hypnotized rabbits waiting for the Viet Cong to strike," but he went on to intimate that they were outside their bases only to keep the enemy off balance and prevent major attacks against installations. The President's press secretary said flatly, "There has been no change in the mission of the United States ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to General Westmoreland recently or at any other time." On the other hand, he explained, "General Westmoreland also had authority within the assigned 178 • The American Culture of War mission to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when in his judgment the general situation urgently requires it." It was not falsehood, but it was a masterpiece of obliquity, and I was unhappy about it. To my mind the American people had a right to know forthrightly, within the actual limits of military security, what we were calling on their sons to do, and to presume that it could be concealed despite the open eyes of press and television was folly. This was either the start of or a contribu- tion to a troublesome, divisive credibility gap that was long to plague the Administration and eventually to affect the credibility of some of my own pronouncements. 22 The system caused duplicity. The dishonesty of an administration automatically became the dis- honesty of the loyal Chiefs of Staff.Westmoreland, like Collins, felt the pull of conflicting loyalties: "Yet it was difficult to differentiate between pursuit of a military task and such related matters and the morale of the fighting man, who must be convinced that he is risking death for a worthy cause. I myself as the man perhaps most on the spot may have veered too far in the direction of supporting in public the government's policy; an instinct born of devotion to an assigned task even more than to a cause and of a loyalty to the President as Commander in Chief." 23 Collins, Ridgway, Taylor, and Westmoreland all voiced their concerns that the system promoted conflicting loyalties, and destroyed honest discussion and openness. How can a nation that cannot honestly address problems successfully fight a war? How can a nation in which loyalty to the President conflicts with loyalty to the mission and the fighting men, successfully conduct a war? Clearly some level of conflict is natural, and even healthy; however, at some point it becomes destructive, and when conflicts are not honestly faced their negative effects are multiplied. The problem of command, control, and planning was still more complicated. Under certain condi- tions senior military leaders have openly challenged the authority of the administration. In 1993, the military historian Russell Weigley wrote: The era of the Cold War brought an unprecedented frequency of decisions to be made at that political-diplomatic-strategic intersection. Of necessity, this Cold War circumstance also produced an unprecedented mingling of civilian and military leaders in the course of the policy-making process. The consequent familiarity of leaders on both sides of the civil-military boundary with each other almost certainly reduced the distanced respect of the military for the civil authorities that rendered the military almost excessively self-deprecating as late as the preparations for war with Japan in 1940-41, and that declined but still managed to prevail throughout the four subsequent years of war. As usual, familiarity bred if not necessarily con- tempt, then at least a sure reduction of awe and even respect. 24 Weigley advanced the thesis of Samuel Huntington, published in his classic study, The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Weigley believed that a system of "subjective civilian control" was operative at the highest levels of government, as opposed to the ideal "objective ci- vilian control." 25 Huntington noted that subjective control presupposed the involvement of the military in institutional, class, and constitutional politics. Power was subjective based on the personalities and influence of given leaders, and the boundaries between military and civilian authority were blurred. There is evidence that by the late 1940s the "awe" and "excessively self-deprecating" nature of the officer corps had already started to disintegrate. In the early days of the cold war some very senior officers concluded that they would overtly, directly challenge the authority of the President. The most outstanding example of this came in 1 95 1 when General Douglas MacArthur undertook to rewrite the foreign and military policies of the United States to fit his strategic vision and was relieved of duty and retired. However, MacArthur was not alone in challenging Presidential authority. In 1949, Secretary of Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 179 Defense Louis A. Johnson, with the approval of President Truman, canceled the Navy's supercarrier, the U.S.S. United States, a $200 million vessel, which led to the Revolt of the Admirals. And, in 1956 General Maxwell Taylor opposed President Eisenhower's New Look policy, and took steps, similar to those of the admirals, to undermine it. One student of the Revolt of the Admirals wrote: In the aftermath of the cancellation, naval frustrations were at an extremely high level as many top officials, most notably aviators, concluded that the existence of their branch was at stake. In this charged atmosphere they began preparing for a battle they perceived as essential to save their service from a severe crippling at best and extinction at worst. By this time the Navy had pinpointed its three major adversaries: President Truman, whose insistence on a total military budget of under $15 billion for fiscal years 1949 and 1950 was making all the squeezing neces- sary; Secretary of Defense Johnson, who seemed determined to build up the Air Force at the expense of the Navy. . . and the Air Force, which was misrepresenting what airpower could do and what the Navy could not do in providing for the nation's defense. 26 Bradley, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was also targeted because he sided with the Air Force. The Navy executed a deliberate, coordinated plan to subvert the will of elected political lead- ers, whom they believed were attacking their service. Because the nation was not at war, this plot was not as potentially destructive as MacArthur's insubordination; however, in regard to civil-military relations it was a greater threat because it involved numerous senior officers engaged in an organized plot. Naval officers lied, spread inaccurate rumors, and engaged in personal attacks, demonstrating that their service loyalty, on specific issues, took precedence over loyalty to the President. The Navy's charges against the Air Force led to Congressional hearings, during which Bradley argued: I stressed these points: That inasmuch as the surface navy of the Soviet Union was "negligible," it was grossly wasteful to fund a U.S. Navy beyond what was needed to cope with the grow- ing Soviet submarine threat. That inasmuch as the Air Force had been assigned the primary responsibility for strategic bombing, it was militarily unsound to build supercarriers when the money was required for "other vital needs." That aircraft carriers could not be justified to sup- port future amphibious operations. I predicted that "large-scale amphibious operations" such as those in Sicily and Normandy "will never occur again." I added: "Frankly, the atomic bomb properly delivered almost precluded such a possibility. That no one could abolish the Marine Corps without congressional approval. I did not recommend that it be abolished but directly and indirectly I challenged the need for a large Marine Corps. I pointed out to those who believed that a "tremendous Marine Corps" was essential for amphibious operations, that at Sicily and Normandy, "two of the largest amphibious assaults ever made," no Marines were present. . . , 27 Bradley, like other senior military leaders of the time, was fixated on total nuclear war. He dem- onstrated little understanding of the future roles of the Navy in limited war. Bradley has been much maligned by historians and Navy and Marine officers for his comments about amphibious operations; however, he was right. The Inchon Landing was in no way comparable to the landings at Sicily and Normandy where eight divisions were put ashore in a period of twenty-four to forty-eight hours. There has been nothing comparable in size, scale, and significance to the invasions in the Mediterranean and European Theater since. And in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Marine Corps also accepted the Bradley thesis on amphibious operations. 28 General Eisenhower, witnessing the Revolt wrote: "I believe the President has to show the iron beneath the pretty glove. Some of our seniors [military leaders] are forgetting that they have a Commander in Chief. They must be reminded of this, in terms of di- rect, unequivocal language. If this is not done soon, some day we're going to have a blowup [The 180 • The American Culture of War President and Secretary of Defense] are going to have to get tough— and I mean tough." 29 Eisenhower as President would face the revolt of his own service. In February 1950, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, took it upon himself to remind officers of their duty and responsibilities: It is a praiseworthy trait and a splendid tradition that every military man should be loyal to his service and have faith in his weapons, but all them should bear in mind that they are working together with their companion services for a common objective— the security of the United States. We have always tried to instill a sense of loyalty to his own service in every soldier, sailor, marine and airman, but we all owe an even higher allegiance to our country. The common cause of national security transcends the interest of any service, and each service must make concessions for the benefit of all. ... I have made it clear . . . that harmful competition among the military services for headlines and publicity will not be tolerated. 30 Johnson equated loyalty to the Administration with loyalty to the country, which, in most cases, is the correct formulation. Elected political leaders, in theory, promulgated the general will of the people. The Navy's Revolutionaries and MacArthur wrongly separated these loyalties. This behavior was very different from that of Collins, Ridgway, and Westmoreland who disagreed with the policies of an administration, argued against them, implemented means and manipulated resources to mitigate their influence, but took no steps to deliberately undermine Presidential poli- cies. They recognized that the administration was using them, by attributing assessments and poli- cies to them that they did not support, but they served at the pleasure of the President. They could always quit, resign their commission, and then protest Presidential policies. Ridgway followed this path, publishing excerpts from his book Soldier that were highly critical of the President's New Look. However, openly opposing presidential policies, was opposing presidential authority, and thus, the Constitution of the United States, and, in theory, the will of the people. The Navy and Marine Corps believed that Johnson was out to gut them, and possibly eliminate them. Admiral Conolly recorded a conversation with Secretary Johnson: "Admiral, the Navy is on its way out. Now, take amphibious operations. There's no reason for having a Navy and a Marine Corps. General Bradley . . . tells me that amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We'll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything that the Navy can do nowadays, so that does away with the Navy." 31 There is no reason to doubt Conolly s recollection. The secretaries of defense do not have the power to eliminate a service; however, they possessed the power to do considerable harm, and it would be wrong to assume that the men who have held this position were free of preferences, prejudices, and loyalties to a specific service. And, it is a fact that secretaries of defense, at various times, have damaged individual services. While the insubordination of the Navy cannot be justified, the Navy's assessment of Johnson was reasonably accurate. To be sure, the Navy was not alone in these practices to undermine the will of the President and Secretary of Defense, frequently in collusion with supportive U.S. Senators and Representatives. As noted, Taylor undertook a similar course of action in 1956. Taylor's attempted revolt did not go as far as that of the Navy, but he was required by Secretary of Defense Wilson to publicly show his support for the 1957 New Look budget: "I have taken the position of going along with and support- ing the present budget for 1957 and there is no revolt in the Army." 32 All the services have engaged in this practice to various degrees, with varying degrees of political skill and success. In 1955 the Navy got its carrier. It commissioned a slightly scaled down version of the supercarrier, the Forrestal class. The Navy's acquisition of part of the strategic bombing mission and the Korean War demonstrated a continuing need for naval aviation. 33 This would have taken place without the revolt. The institutional learning that took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s became accepted prac- Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 181 tices for the services. Nick Kotz, in his book, Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics, and the B-l Bomber, traces the history of the development of the B-l Bomber. He wrote: On October 1, 1986, the U.S. Air Force proudly hailed a victory for which its generals had val- iantly fought for thirty years. A new strategic bomber called the B-l was taking its place in the American nuclear arsenal. ... At a cost of more than $28 Billion for the hundred-plane force, the B-l was the most expensive airplane in aviation history. . . [until the B-2 Stealth Bomber]. Prodded by congressional investigators, the Air Force admitted that, despite the fanfare, not a single bomber had been battle-ready that October day. The B-l was instead snarled in technical problems— problems the Air Force had known about for more than a year. The most serious malfunction would take at least four years to correct— handicapping the B-l precisely during the critical period for which the Air Force had contended the plane was most needed. . . . The American public had been misled; so had the Congress and Secretary of Defense Casper Wein- berger. Even the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, responsible for the nation's secret war plan, was unaware that the B- Is were not ready for battle. 34 A congressional investigation revealed that: "the B- 1 bomber's chances of completing a wartime mission were only half as good as intended. 'Frankly, the Air Force screwed it up,' said committee chairman Les Aspin. . . . "They screwed it up and didn't tell us about it.' Aspin predicted it would take more than $3 billion and four years to deal with the problems, 'some of which are correctable at a price and more are question marks, where a solution isn't in sight at any price."' Loyalty to the Air Force took precedence over loyalty to the administration, and arguably to the American people who had to pay for it. The services learned that it was better to have a faulty weapon system than no weapon system at all. After having spent billions of dollars on an aircraft or ship, it was almost impossible to close the program. For better or for worse, the technology had to be fixed. This was the case with the B-l bomber. It had to be fixed, and the Air Force knew it. Hence, from the Air Force's perspective, the duplicity was worth the goal. The Air Force got its bomber. Both the Air Force and Navy secured the weapon systems that maintained their service in its cur- rent organization and operational doctrine, which changed little from World War II to Vietnam. The services, particularly the Navy and Air Force, were based on primary weapons systems that virtually dictated their operational doctrine. Without these primary weapons systems the services lost their identity. The Navy's identity was based on the aircraft carrier. The Air Force's identity was based on the strategic bomber. Strategic bombing was a primary Air Force operational doctrine and strategy for war. The missions associated with strategic bombing formed the service's reason for being. They formed the service's history, self-image, and culture. The aircraft carrier was the Navy's strategic bomber. These primary weapon systems dominated service thinking. In war these systems had to be employed, their basic missions had to be performed. The weapon system, the technology, thus, dictated operational doctrine, influenced strategy, and made it difficult to develop joint doctrine. The absence of joint doctrine precluded the services from producing synergy in war, damaging their credibility with the American people. Administrations came and went, but the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines were forever. What one administration was unwilling to do, the next might be convinced to do through political persua- sion, economic incentives, coalition building, threats and coercion. The services in the latter half of the twentieth century regularly mounted campaigns to subvert the will of the President. The Marine Corps' V-22 Osprey, an aircraft with the vertical lift capabilities of a helicopter and the in-flight capabilities of an airplane, was canceled by Secretary of Defense Cheney during the Bush I administration. The Bush II administration decided to build it. 35 In 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cancelled 182 • The American Culture of War the Army's Crusader Artillery system causing the Army to appeal to Congress and mount a cam- paign to save the system. The Army lost the battle. Still, the system that the Army had spent billions of dollars on was not completely dead. The practice of undermining the decisions of presidents and secretaries of defense by lobbying and marketing to the Congress and the American people became an accepted practice. However, these practices were primarily in matters directly influencing the internal workings of the services. There was no revolt of the admirals, or the generals, over the strategy and strategic doctrine for the war in Vietnam. Threats to the primary weapons systems and operational doctrines of the services generated far greater response than failed strategy and fatally flawed strategic doctrine. The history of the post- World War II era reveals that in matters involving the primary weapons systems and operational doctrines of the services; and the autonomy, internal workings, and culture of the services, they were less willing to compromise and accept the decisions of the administration. The services produced officers willing to fight tenaciously for their service, to the point of undermining the will, policies, and authority of the administration. However, in matters of strategic doctrine, national strategy, and strategy for the conduct of war, they were flexible, concerned primarily with the employment of the primary weapons systems and perfecting their operational doctrines. As a consequence of this outlook, the services were incapable of providing administrations with the quality of strategic advice they needed and expected. The tests of the 1947 Act were war, military effectiveness, and the maintenance of forces. After the Vietnam War it was evident that the system had failed in all areas. In a book titled, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, H. R. McMaster argued that the inability of the joint chiefs of staff to provide the President with quality, effective advice was the major cause for the nations defeat in Vietnam. He wrote: The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or on the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C., even before Americans as- sumed sole responsibility for the fighting in 1965 and before they realized the country was at war; indeed, even before the first American units were deployed. The disaster in Vietnam was not the result of impersonal forces but a uniquely human failure, the responsibility for which was shared by President Johnson and his principal military and civilian advisers. The failings were many and reinforcing: arrogance, weakness, lying in the pursuit of self-interest, and above all, the abdication of responsibility to the American people. 36 The Vietnam War was arguably lost in 1947 with the passage of the National Security Act, which amplified interservice rivalries, and thus exaggerated human weaknesses, such as selfishness, pride, and arrogance. McMaster concluded that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been derelict in their duty as advisers to the President in military affairs, strategic planning, and the conduct of war; and as loyal servants of the people of the United States. President Kennedy too came to this conclusion follow- ing the "Bay of Pigs" debacle. In a meeting at the Pentagon on May 27, 1961 Kennedy told the Joint Chiefs that: I must say frankly that I do not think that the JCS gave me the support to which the President is entitled. . . .While the CIA was in charge of it [the Cuban invasion operation], I would say that you should have been continuously scrutinizing the military soundness of their plan and advising them and me as to your views. The record as I know it does not show this kind of watchfulness. . . . The advice you owe me as Commander-in-Chief. . . should come to me directly. I imagine that there will be times when the Secretary of Defense will not agree with your advice to me, in which case I would naturally expect him to tell me so and why 37 Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 183 Kennedy's opinion of the Joint Chiefs further deteriorated following the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was not that the men who formed the Joint Chiefs lacked knowledge or comprehension of military affairs, or were personally selfish. In fact, the men who occupied the offices of the Joint Chiefs were proven leaders of courage within their services. However, the uniforms each wore pulled him inexo- rably toward his service, and the organizational structure established in 1947 did nothing to mitigate the effects of service loyalty, but in fact amplified the problem. In 1983, Senator Barry Goldwater, who was a general officer in the Air Force Reserve, stated on the floor of the U.S. Senate: "I regret to conclude after years of observing this process that the system is such that the members of the Joint Chiefs rarely override their individual Service allegiances. When the rope from the individual Services pulls in one direction and the rope from the Joint Chiefs pulls in the other direction, the individual Services invariably win the tug-of-war. The Services win the tug-of-war, but the country loses. . . . Reports commissioned by the Executive branch in 1949, 1960, 1970, and 1982, reached the same conclusion: the Joint Chiefs do not provide useful and timely military advice." 38 In the post- World War II period, the Armed Forces of the United States did not fight war, they fought weapon systems. War was not viewed as a comprehensive whole, but the perfection of the deployment of a particular weapon system. In this sense, they were like a professional team of super- stars, each individually displaying unparalleled skill and capable of generating greater power than any single opponent in that field, but incapable of producing synergy, incapable of functioning as a team, incapable of supplanting service ego for the good of the whole; and, as a consequence, incapable of maximizing their potential power and usefulness to the nation. The defects of the system were well known and studied; however, the system itself took precedence over the missions and objectives of the Armed Forces, the political objectives of the United States, and the men and women under their command who selflessly committed their lives for the good of the nation. The result was the destruc- tion of the good will and faith of the American people, and defeat in Vietnam. The services were guided by their individual cultures. The requirements placed on the Armed Forces of the United States were unprecedented; yet, the exigencies of total war were absent. In this environment service culture exerted the dominant forces. The Iron Triangle How did the Armed Forces, political leaders, and the nation decide on the procurement of weapons, the adoption of strategic and operational doctrine, the allocation of resources among the services, and the delineation of the responsibilities and functions of the services? American cultural tenets influenced the relationship between the services, and the services and the American people. The competitive, capitalist nature of American society, the American faith in science and technology, and the American predilection for bigness, influenced the American military force structure. The ability of a service to create a vision of war acceptable to the American people was a major factor in force design and resource allocation. For that vision to be acceptable it had to hold cultural contents. Real, proven effectiveness was less important than cultural acceptability. Michael S. Sherry in his book, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon, argued that: The danger of nuclear armageddon, as well as perceptions of that danger, was created less by the invention of nuclear weapons than by the attitudes and practices established before 1945. . . . I . . . concentrate on what Americans have expected of and learned from strategic bomb- ing. Their perspectives on the bomber are crucial, for the warplane was created in imagination before it was invented as a practical weapon. The bomber was the product of extravagant dreams and dark foreboding about the role it might play in war and peace. . . . The bomber in imagination 184 • The American Culture of War is the most compelling and revealing story. ... I emphasize that practical developments were usually secondary to imagination in shaping strategic air war. ... I suggest that among policy makers, if not the public at large, a technological fanaticism often governed actions, an approach to making war in which satisfaction of organizational and professional drives loomed larger than the overt passion of war. 39 In World War II the United States adopted an unproven doctrine of war. It expended enormous resources in time, intellect, men, and material to test and prove an idea— strategic bombing doctrine. The nation accepted the claims of air enthusiasts that airpower would be the decisive instrument in the conduct of the war, and thus, committed vast resources in search of a dream. Thus, the American approach to war was not based solely nor primarily on rational calculation of the capabilities of men and machines. Other, sometimes profoundly irrational, factors influenced the allocation of resources, the organization of the Armed Forces, and strategic and operational doctrines. Science fiction, the preference for technological solutions, the hopes for the elimination of dehumanizing aspects of war, the desire to avoid military service, and dreams of some future world, also influenced decisions on the organization of the national defense establishments. The services had to sell their "visions" of war to Congress and the American people. This was easier to do with an impressive piece of technology. In 1954, Army Chief of Staff Ridgway concluded that the Army had to do a better job of selling itself to the American people, that it had to reverse long-held philosophies: Our long-range objective must be to inform the American public of genuine military activities and accomplishments ... in order to instill confidence in Army personnel, policies and manage- ment, and to widen public understanding that the Army is performing loyally and intelligently in support of national aims and the public interest. To accomplish this objective, we must modify the philosophy which has for years guided the Army's action in the field of public relations. This philosophy has influenced officers to remain aloof from the public and reticent on their few appearances. We must become more articulate and develop a positive public relations attitude throughout the Army. Too many officers look upon public relations as a defensive operation rather than a living, dynamic one. 40 Senior Army leaders throughout the 1950s advanced Ridgway s argument that the Army had to change its approach to the media and the public. One colonel wrote: "The Army in general has not yet accepted the fact that, whether it wills it or not, it is engaged in the battle for men's minds as truly as any other enterprise ..." He further noted that the Army was at a disadvantage: "Today, because of the world tensions, we must maintain an Army of greater size than can be accomplished by voluntary service. This involves two concepts that are traditionally unpopular with the American people— a large standing Army and peacetime conscription''* 1 He might have added that the Army was at a further disadvantage because of the American penchant for high technology and big, glamorous weapon systems. He concluded: "Officers must learn to seek, rather than to shun, contact with the public." The Army got better at selling itself, but, with its innate disadvantages, was never as good at selling itself as were the other services. Of course, all the other services made the same argument; however, each developed unique lists of disadvantages. The Air Force as the newest service did not have the long lineage and constituents as did the Army and Navy. The Air Force also argued that the general public did not understand the theory of strategic airpower. The Navy made similar arguments. Nevertheless, the people and Congress were the targets of the services' marketing effort. They had to sell themselves and their primary weapon systems to the American people. In 1955 General Maxwell D. Taylor replaced Ridgway as Army Chief of Staff. Taylor recognized that telling the story was not enough. The story had to be packaged in a manner that would make people Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 185 want to buy. The glamour factor was important, and the Army was the least glamorous service. Taylor explained how the Army's budget was determined during his tenure as Chief of Staff: In the climate of the Eisenhower Administration, it was hard to make the case for limited war to the satisfaction of the decision-makers. . . . The resources needed for limited war were largely ground forces using unglamorous weapons and equipment — rifles, machineguns, trucks and unsophisticated aircraft — items with little appeal to the Congress or the public. Secretary Wil- son once sent back an Army budget to get us to substitute requests for newfangled items with public appeal. ... It was partly a misguided response to this urging which drew the Army into a costly and losing competition with the Air Force in producing an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) at a time when the ammunition reserves for basic Army weapons were far too low for comfort. It also led me to conjure up the Madison Avenue adjective, "pentomic," to describe the new Army division which was designed on a pentagonal rather than triangular pattern with atomic-capable weapons in its standard equipment . . . nuclear weapons were the going thing and, by including some in the division armament, the Army staked out its claim to a share in the nuclear arsenal. 42 The requirement to sell the Army and Army programs to the American people, and the American people's preference for large, glamorous weapon systems, thus influenced the organization, equip- ment, and doctrine of the Army. Wernher von Braun, the intellectual power behind the Army's missile program noted: "The Jupiter involves several hundred million dollars of taxpayers' money. One hundred percent security would mean no information for the public, no money for the Army, no Jupiter. . . . The Army has got to play the same game as the Air Force and the Navy." 43 How well a service "played the game" and American preferences had little to do with the combat effectiveness of American forces in the next war. A professor at the Naval War College, George W Baer, in his book, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990, a work used to educate and indoctrinate midlevel naval officers who aspired to be admirals, explained the responsibilities of officers to the service. He wrote: "Ma- han would have seen the problem in a moment. As in the mid- 1940s, the Navy thought its interests would be taken for granted. In fact they had to be established, both within and outside the service. That indeed is the central thesis of this book, that the Navy, as any other agent of government, is the instrument of national policy, its junior partner in every regard, and to disassociate itself from the broad national position is to disassociate itself from the source of its purpose and strength." 44 Mahan was as much a salesman as a military theorist. He marketed the doctrine of "sea power." The Navy had to insure that it was always relevant in national security policy. By doing so the Navy guaranteed its continued existence and prosperity. Relevance was best demonstrated by employment and success in war. The primary weapons systems of a service, which did not fundamentally change, had to be adapted continuously to new threats. This meant developing new uses, new doctrines, that employed the same primary weapon systems to defeat the new threats, and selling these new uses and doctrines to the American people. By the end of the decade of the 1950s the services were committed to marketing themselves: The better the public image, the larger the service budget. The services ultimately became as good at marketing themselves as General Motors and Ford. The services have learned that whether they get a particular weapon system is greatly influenced by public perceptions. In the 1950s the Air Force was the biggest winner. It scored the highest in public opinion polls and received the lion's share of the defense budget. Senator Goldwater noted: "The aircraft industry has probably done more to promote the Air Force than the Air Force has done itself." The Navy came in second. The image of a supercar- rier launching aircraft produces feelings of pride and patriotism in many Americans. Systems such 186 • The American Culture of War as aircraft carriers and bombers appeal to the American imagination, but also to the American myth and self-image. Great nations possess great weapon systems— the greater the nation, the bigger and more technologically sophisticated its military hardware. The weapon systems that won the hearts and minds of the American people tended to win Ameri- can dollars. The weapon systems that won the American dollars were the biggest, most glamorous, and technologically advanced weapons mankind was capable of producing. However, the service and weapons systems that won in the American marketplace were not necessarily those best suited to win in the jungles of Southeast Asia, the mountains of Afghanistan, the cities of Iraq, or in other foreign lands. Americans designed and purchased weapons systems to fight the war they wanted to fight, not the war they were most likely to fight. During the 1950s the weapon systems that dictated the operational doctrines of the services did not facilitate the nation's ability to fight limited wars and achieve political objectives in developing nations. General Weyland, commander of the Tactical Air Command in 1959, "warned that the Pentagon's preoccupation with strategic bombing and long-range missiles may soon leave us unprepared to fight a limited war." 45 The United States entered the Vietnam War, not with a joint air and ground forces and not with the joint strategic and operational doctrines required to fight a limited war in the jungles and rice fields of Southeast Asia. The United States entered the war with substantial overkill in the technologies and doctrines needed to deter war and fight one type of war — total war against the Soviet Union. This approach to force structure and doctrine was a well- imbued American cultural norm that did not change following defeat in Vietnam. Decades later in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the U.S. force structure was too poorly designed to fully, expeditiously achieve the political objectives. In Afghanistan in 2002, the United States was incapable of deploying and sustaining one heavy mechanized brigade to hunt down and kill the man most responsible for bringing down the World Trade Center in New York. From World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom there has been an overall failure to match means to objectives, because the force structure of the United States has not been based on rational calculations of the threats and forces needed to fight conventional wars or counterinsurgency wars, the most likely wars, but on systems that won in the marketplace. This is a uniquely American form of militarism. In America a vision of counterinsurgency or light infantry warfare could never compete with a vision of air war fought with very advanced, very expensive aircraft. It did not matter that multimillion dollar aircraft were being used to attack an old truck moving down the Ho Chi Minh trail, a task that could have been better performed by a slow moving World War II P-51 Mustang. The American force structure was not based on the exigencies of war, the realties of geography, or political dynamics of the region, but the exigencies of the marketplace, the dictates of the Iron Triangle, and the preferred American cultural vision of war. A decade of successful marketing could only end with a strategic doctrine of limited war based on the systems that won in the marketplace. The doctrine that lost the Vietnam War, Graduated Response, was based on airpower technologies. The United States endeavored to fight an insurgency war from 20,000 feet with the most sophisticated aircraft ever produced by man. The strategic doctrine for the Vietnam War was so flawed that not even U.S. abundance could compensate for its deficiencies. To sell themselves, the services maintain congressional liaisons, public affairs offices, and lobby groups made up of retired senior officers. They publish position papers, target specific legislation in mailing campaigns, sponsor conferences, court members of Congress, and petition the media for coverage of specific concerns or weapon demonstrations. Over the years the services have become adept at sponsoring key weapons systems and policies, using all forms of communication, television, newspapers, magazines, e-mail, and even public appearances to get across their positions. Congress controls the purse. It controls military expenditures and weapons procurement. In the 1950s an "iron triangle" emerged of Congressmen and their constituents— the American people— the military and civilian leaders in the Department of Defense, and defense contractors. The si Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 187 bied Congressmen to protect their interests and to secure particular technologies. The Marine Corps historian Allan Millett wrote: "As the Eisenhower administration pressed for further economies and reductions in defense spending in 1954 and 1955, the Corps sensed that the FMF [Fleet Marine Force] would fall victim to the budget officers. . . . Headquarters turned to Congress and was again successful in minimizing the impact of the Eisenhower austerities." 46 Congressmen were interested in weapon systems and military installations primarily because they produced jobs for constituents and money. Fighting war was, for too many Congressmen, a secondary consideration. Weapon systems and other military equipment frequently took on a life of their own, separate from that intended by the service. Congressmen have supported production facilities, technologies, and military installations that benefited their state or district. As a consequence services have acquired more of a particular piece of equipment than they needed, bases have been constructed in areas that did not facilitate the deployment of those tenant forces, and facilities have been constructed or maintained with little utility. Congressmen regularly join the services and participate in campaigns to advance particular programs, installations, and weapon systems, the success or failure of which can directly influence their political careers. Collusion between Congressmen and the services has become commonplace. The higher the technology, the more sophisticated the weapon, the greater the cost, and the greater the profits for defense contractors and the communities that produced them, the more successful are the members of Congress. However, this relationship erodes civilian control of the military. Congressmen who conspire with the services over bases and equipment not only diminish the respect due high elected officials, but establish a relationship that destroys their objectivity. On matters of national defense they are biased before the issues are known. And, the services know to whom they can go for support on this or that issue. National defense as a consequence, is somewhat of a game, played by the services and Congress. Unfortunately, the outcome of the game frequently has little to do with the next war. The inability of the Armed Forces of the United States to work together became obvious to the American people during the 1950s and 1960s. And, while interservice rivalry and the Iron Triangle eroded their faith and confidence in the services, it did not motivate a national call for change. The American people were, in fact, a part of the Iron Triangle. The jobs produced by bases and expen- sive weapon systems, the billions of dollars servicemen pump into communities, and political and economic clout that accompanies major military projects, cause people to act in their own financial self-interest. Thus, the American people have been in a rather odd situation. They have recognized that the system fails to produce the best military organizations possible, but they have had economic and other incentives to leave the system alone. The lack of confidence in the system damages the abil- ity of the nation to produce and retain the goodwill and faith of the American people, and the ability of the Armed Forces to recruit their young sons and daughters, but the system encourages parents to vote for administrations that support strong defense and particular weapon systems that directly influence their communities, county, and state. The American response was thus: "yes" on technol- ogy, but "no" on our sons and daughters. The American people have a vested interest in maintaining the Iron Triangle, though to be sure, some communities, states, and regions are far better players at this game than are others. The marriages that produced the Iron Triangle concerned and worried Eisenhower, prompting him to issue a warning to the American people in January 1961, as he departed office: "The conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. . . . The total influence— economic, political, even spiritual— is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. ... In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military- industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." 47 Eisenhower meant "the military-industrial-congressional complex." He concluded that this 188 • The American Culture of War complex must never be allowed to "endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted." Eisenhower identified and witnessed the emergence of a new American form of militarism. Alfred Vagts defined militarism: "Militarism . . . covers every system of thinking and valuing and every complex of feelings which rank military institutions and ways above the ways of civilians. . . . Militarism . . . presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thoughts associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purpose. Indeed, militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and defeat the purpose of the military. ... An army [navy and air force] so built that it serves military men [Congressmen and their constituents], not war, is militaristic; so is everything in an army which is not preparation for fighting, merely exists for diversion or to satisfy peacetime whims . . . ," 48 The American political, economic, military system in the latter half of the twentieth century tran- scended true military purpose. It served many needs beyond the necessities for war. Americans have developed and accepted a unique form of militarism one that does not seek war or place military values and ethics above those of civilian society, but one that highly values the instruments of war, the images of power they produce, and the wealth they generate. The United States has practiced an economic and political form of militarism, which at the end of the twentieth century was firmly entrenched in the American way of life. And, this militarism greatly diminished the ability of the United States to fight wars. The Armed Forces did not (and do not) produce synergy in war. And the American people have supported an economic, political militarism that while sustaining industries, communities, and political positions, actually damaged the martial spirit of the nation. Americans would much prefer to send technicians to war, and that is the way the United States is moving. The National Military Command Structure In 1947, 1949, 1953, 1958, and 1986 the U.S. Congress passed legislation to reorganize the national defense organization, and in 2003 further change was recommended. The body of written material on this topic is extensive and no effort is made here to reproduce it; however, the major arguments and objectives of these Acts are delineated. The impetus for the unification of the services grew out of the experiences of World War II. The inability of the United States to present a united front to its British ally in strategic planning; the in- terservice disputes over operations, doctrine, resources, and command; and the desire of the President to have the Armed Forces speak with one voice when recommending strategic options, created the driving forces for the unification of the services at the highest level. In the years that followed, the high cost of new technologies and the cost of maintaining four separate services became additional incentives for unification. And, in the years following the war in Vietnam, defeat became an additional motivator. These motivating factors, however, never overcame vested interests. Truman recognized that unification was a long-term process, and that the process required much more than changes in organizational structures: "It will require new viewpoints, new doctrine, and new habits of thinking throughout the departmental structure." Significant change in the cultures of the services was required to produce "new habits of thinking," and long after Truman's death this objective was still unrealized. Truman understood too that there was considerable opposition from some senior officers, particularly the admirals, and that the undertaking would present the "greatest difficulty." Still, he concluded that when the task was completed, "we shall have a military establish- ment far better adapted to carrying out its share of our national program for achieving peace and security." Truman advanced nine recommendations: 1. We should have integrated strategic plans and a unified military program and budget. 2. We should realize the economies that can be achieved through unified control of supply and service functions. Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 189 3. We should adopt the organizational structure best suited to fostering coordination between the military and the remainder of the Government. 4. We should provide the strongest means for civilian control of the military. 5. We should organize to provide parity for air power. 6. We should establish the most advantageous framework for a unified system of training for combined operations of land, sea, and air. 7. We should allocate systematically our limited resources for scientific research. 8. We should have unity of command in outlying bases. 9. We should have consistent and equitable personnel policies. 49 The National Security Act of 1947 accomplished, affirmatively, only two of these recommendations, the separation of the Air Force from the Army and the establishment of unified commands. Other recommendations were partially implemented. In subsequent legislation the civilian control of the military was strengthened by increasing the power of the Secretary of Defense. With the 1958 legisla- tion almost all deployed forces were placed under unified commands, and operational control was removed from the service chiefs. The Secretary of Defense issued orders to the unified and specified commands through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was not officially in the chain of command. Other recommendations were accomplished a decade later under McNamara, specifically item numbers 1, 2, and 7— the consolidation of the budgeting process, the creation of a semiunified supply system, and the consolidation of research and development programs. Since World War II the defense agencies have been moving incrementally toward greater centralization. The objective was centralized planning and decision making, while maintaining the initiative for field commanders in the operational and tactical environments, decentralized execution. However, centralization was not unification. The services never developed the kind of joint thinking and joint culture of which Truman spoke. At the end of the twentieth century, the two biggest defects remained: the Armed Forces of the United States rarely trained together; and second, there was no joint culture or mutual comprehension and acceptance of the cultures of the separate services. The services could fight on the same battlefield, but not as cohesive combat teams with joint doctrine. And, as late as 1983, the invasion of Grenada, dumb things, such as incompatible radio systems, hindered the ability of the Army and Navy to communicate. Since, Vietnam the United States has not fought a people's war. And, it has fought enemies vastly inferior in every way that mattered. Hence, the system has not been fully tested against an enemy where the potential existed to lose. On April 9, 1946, the Senate Military Affairs Committee, introduced S.2044, which followed closely the President's recommendations. A month later, May 9, the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committee promulgated a letter that outlined the Navy's objections to the bill: In a sincere desire to be helpful to you and the Secretary of War, we are submitting some views we entertain in regard to bill S. 2044, to promote the common defense by unifying the depart- ments and agencies of the Government relating to the common defense. ... A preliminary analysis of the testimony which has been given on the bill S. 2044 indicates that it contains the following defects: (A) It fails to differentiate between democratic and authoritative methods of procedures. By creating one Secretary of Common Defense and one Chief of Staff of Common Defense the bill would concentrate too much power in the hands of too few men. It would establish authoritative controls similar to those associated with dictatorships and other totalitarian forms of government. . . . The essence of American strength lies in our democratic procedures. The greatest war in history has just been won by employing democratic processes .... 190 • The American Culture of War (B) It fails to differentiate between the functions of planning and the execution of a plan . . . The bill, if enacted, would relegate the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the position of an advisory body only. It would substitute for the joint decisions of this body the decisions of one man who would have the authority not only to dictate a plan but also the authority to direct how the plan should be carried out. (C) It reduces civilian control and congressional control over the military establishments. If the bill S. 2044 should be enacted, the Congress would receive reports, testimony, and advice from one Secretary only . . . . (D) It permits the executive branch of the Government, without prior reference to or ap- proval by the Congress, either to abolish the Marine Corps outright or to divest it of most of its vital functions. In divesting the marines of amphibious functions we would be making the same basic error which was made by the British when they reduced the Royal Marines to impotency so that the marines were unable to make landings in Norway and other places in support of fleet action. (E) It permits, without prior reference to Congress, the executive branch of the Government to transfer vital aviation functions to the Army Air Corps. In transferring these vital naval aviation functions to the Army Air Corps, we would be guilty of the same mistake made by the British when all air functions were consolidated in the Royal Air Force. (F) It permits the National Defense organization to become unbalanced. Centralized prepara- tion and control of the military budget would make it possible to deny the equitable distribution of funds among the different branches of the armed services. (G) It violates sound administrative procedures. ... It deprives the Army and Navy of repre- sentation in the Cabinet .... (H) There are some defective and dangerous legal aspects in the bill. In contains unwise delegations of legislative power and congressional functions to the President. In our judgment, the Congress is not likely to approve a bill containing the major defects listed above after the Members of the Congress become fully aware of these defects. 50 The authors of this document appealed to traditional American fears of the Army taking over the country; of violating the Constitutional divisions of powers; of enacting undemocratic practices; and of creating an all powerful, German type Chief of Staff. The major concerns, however, were more ba- sic, and represent the same thinking that precluded the armed forces from operating with maximum combat effectiveness in Vietnam and other wars. The larger concerns were items (A) "the bill would concentrate too much power in the hands of too few"; (F) "the equitable distribution" of the military budget; and (G) "representation in the Cabinet." The Navy was primarily concerned about its autonomy, believing that the newly independent Air Force would dominate a unified command structure, and that it and the Marine Corps would suffer as a result. The Navy was also concerned about access to the President and Congress, and expanding the missions and roles of Navy aviation and the Marine Corps. During the time this letter was prepared "the equitable distribution of funds" was becoming a major concern. The Air Force and Navy were engaging in a bitter feud that led to the Revolt of the Admirals. The Navy concluded that Air Force doctrine and technology were consuming the defense budget. The Air Force's share of the budget was damaging the Navy's efforts to construct a supercarrier. The Soviet Union, which would be the nation's principal enemy for the next forty years, had no major navy for the U.S. Navy to fight. The Air Force, thus, argued the big expensive aircraft carriers were unnecessary, and argued for increases in the number of air groups. The Navy too recognized that control of the sea was no longer a mission that justified the expenditure of vast resources to build aircraft carriers. The Navy needed a new mission. It needed part of the strategic bombing mission. It needed atomic Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 191 weapons — the technology in vogue. To deliver these atomic weapons it needed heavier jet aircraft. World War II carriers had limited capabilities to accommodate such aircraft. Hence, the Navy needed a supercarrier, and new aircraft. The Navy viewed this as a fight for the life of naval aviation. The Marine Corps too concluded that Truman, with the help of the Army, was planning to eliminate the Marine Corps along with the Navy. Allan Millett wrote: Determined to save the FMF as a team of divisions and aircraft wings, Vandergrift quickly developed the Corps position of unification. . . . The air-ground FMF must be preserved as the amphibious element of the Navy's "naval campaign" fleet organization; the Marine Corps must be recognized as an independent service; and defense decision-making must not be centralized under either a single, powerful civilian secretary or a single chief of all the armed forces. Instead the 1945 pattern should continue, for the "greatest advantage of the current organization from a national point of view is that it is responsive to the control of Congress and the people. . . ." Vandergrift urged the Congress not to eliminate the positive benefits of interservice rivalry in designing military techniques. 51 Vandergrift gave a speech before Congress that went against the President's proposal— something that happened primarily when a service felt threatened. He concluded: The Marine Corps, then, believes that it has earned this right— to have its future decided by the legislative body which created it— nothing more. Sentiment is not valid consideration in determining questions of national security. We have pride in ourselves and in our past but we do not rest our case on any presumed gratitude owing us from the nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go. But I think you will agree with me he has earned the right to depart with dignity and honor, not by subjugation to the status of uselessness and servility planned for him by the War Department [the Army]. 52 There was emotion, indignation, and anger in Vandergrift's words. The Secretary of the Navy, and the first Secretary of Defense (September 1947 to April 1949), James Vincent Forrestal, with the politi- cal support and lobbying of the Navy and Marine Corps, also opposed the unification plan advanced by the President and the Army, believing that it concentrated too much power into too few hands. Forrestal accepted the Navy's horizontal system of command, which depended, in part, on voluntary coordination and cooperation. 53 On April 16, a day after listening to General Eisenhower's testimony in support of the legislation before Congress, Forrestal outlined his thinking in his diary: I was somewhat shaken by the recurring evidence of the Army's intransigence in regard to the chain-of-command concept (when, as a matter of fact, during the war they had not been able to issue a single order to MacArthur— and they couldn't now). I said my whole attitude in the bill was that unless the civilians who were named to the various jobs outlined would work together in complete harmony, the operation of the bill would be a mess. And by the same token, I said that unless the Services were led by officers who were determined to make the thing go, there would be the same chance of a mess. I said the difficulty I had all along was the Army's genial assumption that by writing a chart and drafting a law you could get discipline, when as a matter of fact I had seen very little of it in the Army itself. Cooperation and harmony take constant effort and work as well as imagination to foresee the things that will create friction. 54 Because officers were formed and permanently shaped by the cultures of their service it was impos- sible to produce the type of officers Forrestal believed was necessary. And, because civilian leaders 192 • The American Culture of War rapidly adopt the culture, perspective, norms, and exigencies of the service they represent they too were incapable of the kind of job performance that produced effectiveness and harmony. Forrestal himself was an example of civilian leadership adopting the culture of the service they represented. During World War II Forrestal frequently appeared in the field wearing navy khaki uniforms. 55 The Navy had no better advocate than Forrestal. 56 In all matters, particularly budgetary, Forrestal was a "Navy man." 57 This outlook made him incapable of representing the other services as Secretary of Defense. Forrestal's willingness to advance the Navy's position ultimately caused the President to conclude he was disloyal and to remove him. Nevertheless, Forrestal, the Navy, Marine Corps, and other legislators were able to shape the bill to insure that the United States retained a system of competing services. All the services wanted to survive to preserve their technologies, doctrines, missions, and tradi- tions. All the services were proud organizations with distinguished histories. And all the services placed their institutional needs above the needs of the country as defined by the President. World War II and the cold war moved them into the forefront of American institutions. They had greater responsibilities than ever before, but the resources were still limited. All the services demanded more resources. All the services sought and fought for larger role in national defense, which meant more resources. In the process they managed to alienate and create enemies of one another. In the process they managed to produce sufficient distrust and animosity between themselves to last generations of servicemen. Some of the services even taught distrust of other services in their profession military education courses. The result of this interservice fighting was the National Security Act of 1947. The Act institutionalized selfishness. All the services could rationalize their views. All could argue that their technologies and doctrines were in the best interest of the country and the most efficacious for achieving political objectives. And not even war could overcome the pull of service loyalty. Not even defeat in war could change the services. In matters where service interests conflicted with national interests the services always won. Ultimately the nation was the biggest loser. The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Military Establishment (NME) under the Secretary of Defense. The NME consisted of the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force, com- pleting the divorce between the Army and the Army Air Force. The Marine Corps became a separate service within the Navy Department, and retained all its World War II duties. Millett noted: "When the National Security Act of 1947 finally passed both houses and went to Truman for signature, the Marine Corps believed it had won the ultimate legislative sanction for its role as both amphibious assault specialist and force in readiness." 58 The NME was not an executive department. The services retained command authority over their forces and budget authority. The Secretary of Defense was "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security." He was to supervise the budget process and provided direction; however, he had little control over the services. The service secretaries still exercised considerable authority as cabinet members. The Secretary of Defense created another layer of civilian authority between the President and his senior military advisors, and with the addition of the Air Force Chief of Staff, and later the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the advice the President and Secretary of Defense received was further diluted, creating greater opportunities for friction. The new status of the Marine Corps increased the clout of the Navy. No President since the passage of the Act has had the quality of advice, relationship, and trust enjoyed by Roosevelt, Marshall, and King in World War II. And no service chief since has had the access to the President enjoyed by King and Marshall. The Joint Chiefs, provisionally established during World War II, were made a permanent part of the NME. It consisted of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and the Chief of Naval Opera- tions. Its duties were to prepare strategic plans, to provide strategic direction to the military forces, to establish unified commands in strategic areas, to formulate policies for joint training, to act as principal military advisors to the President and Secretary of Defense, and to carry out the duties directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The National Security Act also provided for Joint Staff, Civil-Military Relations and the National Military Command Structure • 193 RELATIONSHIP OF ELEMENTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY CONGRESS | money POLICY RESOURCES Figure 8.1 This 1947 chart shows the relationship of major elements of the National Security- strategy, and military effort. It charts functional, rather than organizational relationships. ^ 0*7 V \ V _ Figure 14.8 Persian Gulf War, VII Corps Final Assault, February 28, 1991. The Persian GulfWar: Operation Desert Storm . 367 Ground forces carried out the vast majority of the physical destruction of the Iraqi Army. During the ground war, of the 2,159 tanks destroyed, the ground forces destroyed 1,708 tanks, and the air forces 451; of the 521 APCs destroyed, the ground action accounted for 297, and air action 224; and of the 1,465 artillery pieces destroyed, the ground force eliminated 1,112, and air forces 353. 41 Given this data it is difficult to argue that airpower won the war, even if one accepts Honer's argument of the destruction of Iraqi morale. To be sure airpower destroyed the will and fighting spirit of some Iraqi units, but subsequent battles show conclusively that other Iraqi units fought with determination. 42 Like most armies some units are better trained, led, equipped, and motivated than others. The Re- publican Guard units, and some Iraqi armor and mechanized divisions were among the better units. Static infantry divisions, poorly trained formations, and those units that had little or no attachments to the regime had little reason to fight, and hence, collapsed with a little inducement and the promise of fair treatment. The Army also rejected the argument that it won only because of its superior technology 43 It is interesting to note that the Russians also rejected this argument, concluding that had Russian soldiers manned those T-72 tanks, which were considered the equal of the Ml, the outcome would have been very different. The Army argued that it was better trained and led, and that the training revolution of the 1980s, which produced the NTCs made the difference. While accepting this assessment and acknowledging that the Army deployed to the Gulf was the best educated, best trained army in its his- tory, superior technology was no small factor in the outcome of the war. The M1A1 with its 120 mm main gun, laser range finder, upgraded computer system, thermal imaging sights, and cross-country speed gave the U.S. forces considerable advantages. Other technologies such as the Apache and A- 10 also contributed to the success. Arab culture was also a larger factor. The Iraqi Army suffered from the same cultural disadvantages that the Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians, and Jordanians suffered from in all the Arab-Israeli Wars. Culturally it was incapable of meeting Western standards of combat effective- ness and professionalism. Nevertheless, Americans could again feel proud of all the Armed Forces, and again believed the world had entered a new age. Most observers were convinced that American air power technology had finally lived up to the claims of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Military Victory and Political Failure As soon as the Iraq War ended, the controversy began: had the war been stopped too soon? Did the United States and UN achieve their political objectives? While the decision to halt the killing rested with President Bush, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, was the first to push for an end to hostilities. He explained why: I had already spoken to Norm Schwarzkopf earlier in the morning and told him I sensed we are nearing endgame. The prisoner catch was approaching seventy thousand. Saddam had ordered his forces to withdraw from Kuwait. The last major escape route, a four-lane highway leading out of Kuwait toward the Iraqi city of Basrah, had turned into a shooting gallery for our fliers. The road was choked with fleeing soldiers and littered with the charred hulks of nearly fifteen hundred military and civilian vehicles. Reporters began referring to this road as the "Highway of Death...." Our forces had a specific objective, authorized by the UN, to liberate Kuwait, and we had achieved it. The President had never expressed any desire to exceed that mandate, in spite of his verbal lambasting of Saddam. We presently held the moral high ground. We could lose it by fighting past the "rational calculation . . . ." And as a professional soldier, I honored the warrior's code. "We don't want to be seen as killing for the sake of killing, Mr. President," I said. "We're within the window of success. I've talked to General Schwarzkopf. I expect by sometime 368 • The American Culture of War tomorrow the job will be done, and I'll probably be bringing you a recommendation to stop the fighting." 44 While the objective of the UN was the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty, an objective that had been achieved, the United States had also established the objective of the destruction of the Iraqi Army, and this job had not been completed. Still, Schwartzkopf supported the cease-fire decision even though he had earlier asked for an additional twenty-four hours. He wrote: He [Powell] waited as I took a minute to think. My gut reaction was that a quick cease-fire would save lives. If we continued to attack through Thursday, more of our troops would get killed, probably not many, but some. What was more, wed accomplished our mission: Id just finished telling the American people that there wasn't enough left of Iraq's army for it to be a regional military threat. Of course, Yeosock had asked for another day, and I'd have been happy to keep on destroying the Iraqi military for the next six months. Yet we'd kicked this guy's butt, leaving no doubt in anybody's mind that we'd won decisively, and we'd done it with very few casualties. Why not end it? Why get somebody else killed tomorrow? That made up my mind. "I don't have any problem with it." 45 Schwarzkopf rationalized ending the war: "We hated the idea of sparing any Iraqi equipment, particularly Republican Guard T-72s: sooner or later those tanks would be put to malicious use. But from a purely military standpoint, and from the standpoint of our Arab allies, we weren't concerned. To reconstitute even a single effective division from what was left would take Iraq a long time." Schwar- zkopf was wrong. Saddam Hussein used these forces and weapons to maintain political control. Many Americans have since concluded that Powell was wrong for prematurely advancing a cease- fire, that Schwarzkopf was wrong for not arguing against it, and that Bush was wrong for accepting Powell's recommendation to cease hostilities, and for deciding not to force the Iraqi soldiers to walk home without their weapons and vehicles. Thomas G. Mahnken, in an essay entitled, "A Squandered Opportunity? The Decision to End the Gulf War," wrote: "Powell's fear of exceeding the culminating point of victory is . . . ironic, since, if anything, coalition forces stopped short of achieving a decisive victory, based at least in part upon his advice." 46 Bush, some argued, missed the opportunity to re- move the dictator, and by so doing laid the foundation for a second war in Iraq in 2003. Mahnken continued: "By contrast, halting too soon can yield an incomplete victory and leave in place a foe that is weakened but unchastened. Even though the Bush administration did an outstanding job of planning and conducting the Gulf War, it encountered considerable difficulty determining when to end it." 47 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor in their book, The General's War, also advanced this argument, adding that: "The United States also erred in renouncing any intention of going to Baghdad, a reassurance aimed at our Arab allies. This self-denial simplified things for Saddam Hussein when the ground war got under way. A 'survivor,' he then knew that he did not have to worry about the allies toppling him," a repeat of the Johnson mistake. 48 Bush faced a situation similar to that faced by Truman following the Inchon Landing and the destruction of the North Korean People's Army. Whereas Truman decided to gamble and advance across the 38th Parallel, Bush decided not to take Baghdad and occupy Iraq. Bush later wrote: "In my view, I told the country what we were going to do. The United Nations resolution authorized us to end the aggression. We tried to do it peacefully; and when that didn't work, we used force and we did, indeed, end the aggression. Our mission was not to kill Saddam and it darn sure was not to be an occupying power in that Arab country. It was simply to end the aggression, keeping our word along the way to our allies and the Coalition." Bush and Scowcroft further noted: "Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline The Persian GulfWar: Operation Desert Storm . 369 about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in mission creep,' and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, there was no viable 'exit strategy we could see. . . ." Bush concluded, "the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitter hostile land." 49 Bush, unlike Truman, did not have to worry about major powers such as the Soviet Union or China entering the war; hence, it can be argued that he had greater freedom to advance to Baghdad. However, Bush had formed a coalition that included Saudi Arabia, the nation that paid for most of the war, Egypt, and other Arab countries. For the first time in history Arab Egyptian and Saudi divi- sions were fighting alongside American divisions. Bush had legitimate concerns about alienating these new allies which had stepped up to assist the United States. The Soviet Union and France also would not have supported a march on Baghdad. Bush also recognized the risks and difficulties in occupy- ing an Arab nation. Americans would be seen as an imperialist power and occupiers. What started out as a limited war against a dictator had the potential to turn into a people's war against Iraqis and possibly other Arab states, or volunteer fighters from other Arab states. In this sense, Bush's decision carried risks similar to those faced by Truman. Then Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, defended Bush's decision: If you're going to go in and try to topple Saddam Hussein, you have to go to Baghdad. Once you've got Baghdad, it's not clear what you do with it. It's not clear what kind of government you would put in place of the one that's currently there now. Is it going to be a Shia regime, a Sunni regime or a Kurdish regime? Or one that tilts toward the Ba'athists or one that tilts toward the Islamic fundamentalists? How much credibility is that government going to have if it's set up by the United States military when it's there? How long does the United States military have to stay to protect the people that sign on for that government, and what happens to it once we leave? [And, at what cost in lives and treasure?] 50 These were good questions, to which the Bush Administration had no good answers. Bush was able to go against the American preference for total solution, absolute victory, in part, because the American people were not involved in the war effort. The "nation" was not at war. The military cluster fought the war. Nevertheless, an additional twenty- four hours, or the decision to make the Iraqis walk home without their weapons and vehicles, may have ended the reign of Saddam Hussein. 51 This was the real mistake.. Why the Bush Administration did not disarm Saddam Hussein's Iraq is incomprehensible. While the Bush Administration proved adroit at gaining support for, planning, and fighting the war, it proved inept in planning the peace. And Bush should have consulted with his allies, particularly the British, who had very definite ideas about what the postwar peace ought to look like. It also would not have hurt to consult with the UN. The end of the coalition war signaled the start of another war in Iraq. The Kurds and Shia, with the encouragement of the White House, rose up to oppose Saddam Hussein. And, had coalition forces achieved a more complete victory, disarming Saddam Hussein, the rebellions might have succeeded. However, Saddam Hussein escaped with significant combat power, and coalition forces stood aside and watched as he used them to retain power. Saddam Hussein used tanks and attack helicopters against unarmed people. Entire towns emptied as the inhabitants fled into the mountains. This was the shabbiest performance of the war. What principles, what moral laws, and what warrior's codes were at work that permitted this human catastrophe to take place? When George Bush left office Sad- dam Hussein was still the dictator in Iraq, and Bush had reinstalled a monarchy, not a democracy, in Kuwait. Another opportunity squandered. 370 • The American Culture of War A few months after the end of hostilities, in May 1991, the UN Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM) arrived in Iraq to start the process of finding and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and identifying programs and facilities designed to construct them. 52 The In- ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which had been in Iraq for a decade prior to the war, took part in the search for nuclear technologies and facilities. The IAEA was the UN body charged with enforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Signatories to the treaty were to permit inspections to insure that they were not developing or producing nuclear weapons. When the world entered the nuclear age it was acknowledged that only a few nations possessed the wherewithal to produce nuclear weapons. Hence, it was a very exclusive club. However, the knowledge to produce these weapons was not difficult to obtain. The acquisition of the production facilities, spe- cific types of nuclear reactors, required to produce plutonium and uranium 235, became the biggest obstacle. The oil rich nations of the Middle East, while internally lacking the wherewithal to develop nuclear facilities, had the wealth to purchase them from any nation willing to sell the technology. Iraq had the desire and the wealth to acquire a nuclear weapons program, and the French and Russian governments were willing to assist. Israel, with the assistance of the United States, had it own nuclear program. In 1981, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor before it went online. This action did not stop the Iraqi search for nuclear weapons, and motivated other Middle East nations to initiate the search for nuclear technology to restore the regional balance of power that was lost with the Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the wake of World War I, a war in which chemical weapons killed hundreds of thousands of combatants, the 1925 Geneva Protocol went into effect. It prohibited the use of gas and "bacteriological methods of warfare." In World War II these terrible weapons were not used. However, the technology to produce these weapons spread beyond the borders of the Western developed nations. And some Middle East nations, with the assistance of the West, developed the means to produce and employ these weapons. In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, during which Iraq employed these weapons with devastating effects against Iranian forces, the UN. 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention prohibited the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and established inspection procedures. Other UN sponsored laws, resolutions, and conventions were also designed to stop the spread of WMDs; however, the system went against the internationally accepted ideal of sovereignty — an ideal to which the United States held firmly. Iraq, in defeat, agreed to comply with UN measures governing WMDs and to submit to inspec- tions. Resolution 687 went into effect immediately after the war. It required the "destruction, removal, rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related sub- systems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto; and all ballistic missiles with range greater than 150 kilometers [approximately 93 miles], and related major parts and repair production facilities." Saddam Hussein ignored Resolution 687. Instead of complying he engaged in games of subterfuge, misdirection, and "hide and seek." However, Dr. David Kay, the chief inspector for UNSCOM was tenacious. His inspections were so aggressive and invasive that Saddam Hussein was forced to destroy large quantities of his stocks of chemical and biological weapons and the technology to produce them to preclude discovery. Saddam Hussein had significant enemies, both internal and external. If they perceived a weakness, or that Saddam Hussein lacked the wherewithal to retaliate with substantial force, they might be motivated to attack or attempt to overthrow him. Hence, uncertainty about what weapons Iraq possessed was a form of security for Saddam Hussein. While UNSCOM was in fact achieving its objectives, it was incapable of determining how much of this illegal material Saddam Hussein possessed; hence, it was incapable The Persian GulfWar: Operation Desert Storm . 371 of knowing what percentage they had found and destroyed. This intelligence gap was never breached creating the conditions that, in part, led to the second GulfWar in 2003. The Media and Public Opinion General Michael J. Dugan, U.S. Air Force, noted: "There is a good deal of ill feeling among members of the media over how they were treated by the military during the Persian GulfWar. The feeling seems to be mutual. In an interview with David Frost, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf charged that during the war CNN was 'aiding and abetting an enemy. . . .'" In post- Vietnam War operations the Army and the other services, remembering the media's coverage of that war, tightly controlled the movement of the media, limiting its access. 53 The Bush Administration supported this policy. Bush believed that: "Vietnam and Watergate had created an adversarial sense of cynicism among many in the press, who seemed convinced that all public servants could be bought or were incapable of telling the truth, that all were unethical in one way or another. The result was that every rumor is pursued no matter what the truth, no matter how hurtful to innocent parties." 54 Given this lack of trust in the press, the Armed Forces, with the support of the President, took positive measures to control the movement of report- ers. Instead of censorship the services granted limited access, which achieved the same purpose. Still the Center for Army Lessons Learned, After Action Report, Desert Storm concluded: "Civilian news coverage contributed greatly to maintaining soldier morale during Desert Storm. The coverage was generally positive; the American people were behind the operation and soldiers felt this impact." 55 This assessment represented a shift in attitudes that influenced the behavior of the Pentagon and the services in future wars. Wars in the late twentieth century tended to be one major operation with numerous smaller op- erations carried out by the various branches of the service. The World War II equivalent would be the Normandy Invasion; the invasion, however, would be the entire war. Operations were fast and covered a considerable distance. Hence, to cover an operation, reporters had to be transported and sustained by the major commands that were moving with the flow of the battle. This gave the service considerable control over what reporters saw. And, the combat operations of the Air Force and Navy could only be viewed through the cameras of those services. In recognition of this new operational environment, in 1977 the Army disbanded the Army Field Press Censorship reserve units. In Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, 1983, the press was not permitted access to American forces, and for the first two days of the conflict they were not permitted on the island. The American people, who were growing more conservative, and less tolerant of the "left-wing, liberal press," tended to support the Pentagon's press policy. Nevertheless, after Grenada the press complained loudly, caus- ing General John W Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to form a panel to study how the needs of the press, to keep the American people informed, and the needs of the armed forces, to maintain operational security, could both be met. Major General Winant Sidle, chaired the panel that came up with a number of recommendations, one of which was to select, provide security clearance, and train and equip a group of reporters that would be activated for a given military operation. Sidle explained how the system they developed was supposed to work: The press pool was envisioned as a small group of reporters, the size to depend on the situ- ation. The group would be composed of representatives of the wire service, television, news magazines and daily newspapers, if possible. . . . The criterion used to select the news organiza- tions gave precedence to those that cover the widest American audience. . . . Material generated by the pool would be made available to all interested agencies not included in the pool. . . . The pool would be alerted shortly before an operation began, then transported to the scene at, or 372 • The American Culture of War soon after, H-hour. Members would be briefed and provided with escort(s) and transportation to assist them in covering the story. They would also be provided with meals, billeting and a means to file their material back to their home offices. The panels also recommended that the largest possible pool should be used initially, and the pool would be replaced by "full coverage" as soon as feasible. 56 In 1984 the Department of Defense (DOD) accepted the recommendations of the Sidle Panel, and in 1985 instituted the National Media Pool (NMP). DOD selected the networks and agencies, and they selected their "news media representatives " (reporters). The reporters received background checks, training, and accreditation, and became members of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. Members of the pool were on call in Washington, available for worldwide deployment. After the NMP was formed, DOD conducted a number of rehearsals to identify and fix potential problems. The NMP was first employed in Operation Just Cause in Panama, December 1989. The system did not work as planned. Other reporters were on the scene before the NMP, and members complained that they were not granted the access required to make the effort worthwhile. Panama was a free and open country with a significant American presence. The major media networks had branches or affiliate stations in Panama. They were there before the operation started, and could travel throughout the country. Under these circumstances the only real privilege the NMP received was to witness parts of the deployment, and even there they were severely limited. The media could not cover many of the most impressive actions, those carried out by Rangers, Special Forces, and Navy SEALs. In 1990 for Operation Desert Shield the NMP was again activated. The Secretary Defense, Dick Cheney, requested visas and access from the Saudi government for American reporters. 57 Access was granted provided the U.S. military transport reporters. In the initial deployments a seventeen-person NMP accompanied U.S. forces. CENTCOM, however, did not control the government of Saudi Arabia, and as the buildup of troops progressed, so did the buildup of reporters from all parts of the planet. In December there were 800 correspondents in Saudi Arabia, and when the war ended 1,600 reporters. Still, reporters could not accompany U.S. forces during Operation Desert Storm without the approval of CENTCOM. And too many reporters hindered operations. Sidle explained: The press prefers to be on its own during battle but, as any military person who has seen combat knows, too many reporters on hand trying to cover an action can impair operational security and troop safety. Too many reporters on their own can impede the conduct of a battle. This is particularly true when the large majority of the correspondents are not experienced in covering combat, which was the case in Saudi Arabia. Some try to question troop leaders in the heat of a fight. Others draw unwarranted conclusions because they do not know or understand what is going on. Many are unfamiliar with the military tactics and, by their actions on the ground, can inadvertently create problems by exposing troops positions or movements, or by filing stories that will be helpful to the enemy 58 This is an old story; however, in World War II and Korea the relationship was less adversarial. Footage from the Vietnam War reveals reporters interviewing soldiers and marines in the middle of the battles for Hue and Saigon during the 1968 Tet Offensive, absurd scenes of reporters sticking microphones to the mouths of soldiers in the middle of a firelight. Sidle recalled seeing a cable sent by a major television network to its Saigon bureau chief, which said: "When the Army does something well, it is not news. It is expected. So, concentrate on when the Army does something wrong. That's news." In 1991 Sidle concluded that, "Based on this networks current nightly news programs, the network is still sometimes operating by this principle." In addition, pseudo-news had become enter- The Persian GulfWar: Operation Desert Storm . 373 tainment. The twenty-four-hour news networks, talk radio, and news programs such as Sixty Minutes and 48-Hours, and others had transformed news into entertainment, which changed significantly the journalistic ethics of reporters, producers, and anchors. To accommodate the press CENTCOM formed twenty small press pools of roughly seventeen reporters. Each was assigned to major commands for Operation Desert Storm. About half went to the Army and the other half to the Marines, Air Force, and Navy. DOD issued ground rules for report- ers, and when operation Desert Storm started nearly 200 reporters were in place with combat units. Given that the services had to provide transportation, and other forms of support for these reporters, this was no small task. Sidle noted that the ratio of reporters in the field compared favorably to other wars. 59 Still, reporters did not like being grouped together in this manner. Public affairs officers reviewed stories to insure they were in compliance with the established ground rules. Operational security and force protection were the objectives of the "Media Ground Rules." They included for example: "The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize and endanger lives. . . . Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations or strikes. . . . Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units. . . ." 60 In cases where the reporter and public affairs officer disagreed, the problem was passed up the chain of command, and could go all the way back to the Pentagon. This review process could cause considerable delay, but neither the services nor the Pentagon had the power of censorship. Still, the press was never granted the type of access it had enjoyed in Vietnam. Reporters complained that they were being denied access, kept in groups, and were unable to inves- tigate for themselves. In essence, they got the story the services wanted them to get. U.S. News and World Report concluded, "Because of the Pentagons policy of refusing to permit reporters to freely accompany troops into battle, the four-day ground war was both sanitized and largely invisible." 61 The news magazine believed that the Americans never received an accurate picture of the war. To correct the historical record it published a book entitled, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War. Americans came away from the war with a story told primarily the way the Pentagon and White House wanted it told. In the type of war fought in the KTO it was not possible to have reporters run around the battlefield independently, nor was it possible for the military to provide transportation, security, and PA officers for every reporter. In Desert Storm Americans could rightly conclude that the Armed Forces performed in an outstand- ing manner. However, if the press had been given free reign the picture might have been somewhat different. Bad things happen in every war. In any large human endeavor where emotions and feelings run high, things are going to happen that people regret. The danger is when the minor stories of hu- man failings come to dwarf the larger story of the human sacrifices that are being made to achieve some greater good. Still, the services and the Pentagon came away from the war with a more positive assessment of the press. In subsequent wars they would institute a policy of "openness." However, the antagonism between the two institutions would not go away. Television and the U.S. Air Force provided Americans with the most spectacular view of war from the air ever shown. And the new twenty-four-hour news cycle and the cable news stations insured that Americans saw these incredible images repeatedly. These images created a false impression of the war, of the accuracy of precision guided munitions, the number of precision weapons employed, and their effects on targets. How many Iraqis died during the war, how much equipment was destroyed, and how many vehicles and tanks the Army destroyed, and how many the Air Force destroyed have been debated since the war. Nevertheless, the airpower demonstrated by the Air Force reinforced American cultural norms, and set the stage for future wars. During the war the media failed to question the validity of the stories "coming out of Kuwait," and 374 • The American Culture of War the veracity of Kuwaiti officials. In fact, the media let itself be used as a propaganda instrument of the Kuwaiti government. It helped sell the war. To win the support of the American people, who had no affinity for Kuwaitis, stories were fabricated, taken out of context, and exaggerated. Stories about stolen incubators and babies being left on the floor to die, stories of mass rape and mass executions, and others, were clearly exaggerated to gain the moral support of the American people. The media clearly failed to expose these inaccuracies. Instead it became a propaganda instrument. This problem was never corrected. The Verdict The very success of the Armed Forces in Iraq paved the way to reductions in forces. 62 It was evident that the victory in Iraq could have been achieved with a considerably smaller Army. Immediately fol- lowing Operation Desert Storm the Administration sought a "peace dividend." President Clinton was frequently blamed for "dismantling" the military; in fact he simply carried out the Bush cuts. The cold war was over. It was time to get rid of the cold war Armed Forces. More than a third of the Army was deactivated. The Bush Administration, even before the first missile was launched in Iraq, had started the deactivation of Army divisions. When the war started in Iraq the Army was literally in the process of shutting down divisions. Deactivation was delayed to fight the war, but resumed immediately after it. Generous early retirement programs were implemented, a function of the new, high regard with which the American people held the armed forces in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. At the end of the Vietnam War no such programs were offered. And as before, there seemed to be no logic to the reduction in force. The light infantry forces, those units that would have been most useful in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, were eliminated. The 9th, 7th, and 6th Infantry Divisions furled their colors and went away. Hundreds of thousands of highly trained soldiers left the Army. Unlike other reductions in force, the Army did not select the officers who departed. The Army offered generous retirement programs and other incentives, and those individuals who had the most options left. The Army lost many of its best soldiers and leaders, and shut down some of its most highly trained, motivated, and effective units. Light-infantrymen are a unique breed, a unique national resource that has been continuously undervalued in American culture, in part, by the erroneous belief that anybody can serve as a combat soldier. The American fetish for advanced technologies further devalued the role of soldiers. No other profession lives with the discomfort and the physical hardship experienced, accepted, and, in some cases, enjoyed, by infantrymen. It was this breed of soldier the Army and the nation got rid of; the same breed that was required in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other undeveloped regions of the world, where the physical comforts most Americans expect do not exist. This was the breed of soldier most needed to fight insurgent forces, conduct operations in urban and mountainous terrain, patrol borders, provide humanitarian relief, hunt down Osama bin Laden, kill Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, contain regional warlords, carry out nation building operations, and so on. No other fighting force is as flexible and can be moved as quickly to troubled regions. This was no small loss,but it went almost unnoticed, until they were needed again. And to be sure, they were needed again, and will be needed in the future. Colonel Daniel P. Bolger, writing in 1999, echoed concerns voiced by Bradley, Collins, and Ridgway in the late 1940s and 1950s: "American military leaders [and political leaders] intentionally and sys- tematically substituted firepower for manpower. . . . With 91 active-duty infantry battalions (67 Army, 24 Marine) and the Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force combat control teams who also fight up close and personal, there are about 100,000 infantry types in the entire armed forces. . . .The armed forces field 1.4 million men and women. Doing the math tells its own tale. For every rifleman or machine gunner, there are thirteen guys doing something else." 63 But this was culturally regular. The Persian GulfWar: Operation Desert Storm . 375 The all-volunteer, professional force performed extraordinarily well in its first major war against a large force armed with much of the latest Soviet weaponry. And it did so without the American people, validating the new American way of war. In the wake of the war, after nearly fifty years of worry, Army leaders stopped voicing their concerns about the willingness of the American people to defend freedom in distant areas of the world. It was more effective to fight war without disturbing the American people. The victory also gave subsequent White House and Pentagon civilian leaders supreme confidence in the capabilities of the Armed Forces, and thus, the willingness to use them. The operational tempo of all the services increased considerably during the Clinton and second Bush Administrations. However, Operation Desert Storm was in many ways an aberration, coming when it did at the end of the cold war. And, it is important to remember that contrary to the initial belief, the United States did not fight a cohesive, culturally unified nation that was capable of fighting a more total, people's war. And President Bush, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Powell, took extraordinary measures to insure that the United States did not get bogged down in a war with the Iraqi people. TheBush Administration handed power over to the "baby-boom" generation, which had not experienced the Great Depression or World War II, which had benefited most from the great prosperity of the 1950s and rapid advances in technology, and had experienced and (one way or another) had participated in the nation's first defeat in war. These were very different Americans. The sacrifices, hardships, uncertainties, and fears that shaped the World War II genera- tion were unknown to them. In the aftermath of the Persian GulfWar, American power, prestige, and influence were the highest they had been since World War II. The Berlin Wall had fallen, the cold war was over, the Soviet Union was collapsing, and the United States stood alone, as the world's only superpower, the most power- ful nation on Earth ever, and it had just demonstrated that power to the world creating considerable awe. Economically and technologically the United States had no equals. At this juncture President Bush had a rare opportunity, one that comes along maybe once in a century, to articulate a new vi- sion for the world to replace the cold war world order. He had the political, military, and economic powers to put in place a new world order. Bush, however, was not a man of vision, nor was he able to adopt the ideas of others. The opportunity passed. The awe was fleeting. Under the Bush leadership, or more accurately, absence of leadership, the United States squandered an opportunity to reshape the world. In this vacuum created by the end of the cold war, radical, anti- American elements grew. Their ideas and vision moved from behind the curtain, and took hold in the Middle East, and other parts of the world. This lapse was one of the biggest political failures of the twentieth century. It was equivalent to the British Policy of Appeasement that was, at least in part, responsible for the rise of Nazi Germany. 15 The New American Way of War Cultural dissonance has developed, to some degree, in communities all around the country. On the eve of the twenty- first century, America has become a splintered society, with multi-ethnic towns . . . reflecting a nation more diverse than ever. [T]he term cluster . . . refers to population segments where, thanks to technological advancements, no physical contact is required for cluster membership. . . . [T]he clusters simply underscore realities already apparent, such as the widening gap between the richest and poorest Americans. . . . Sociologists say global competition and the cyber- revolution have widened the gap that divides the haves from the have-nots. . . . "No longer are Americans rising and falling together, as if in one large national boat," former labor secretary Robert Reich observed. "We are, increasingly, in different, smaller boats." And not all are assured of life rafts. —Michael J. Weiss 1 After the horrendous attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration made no demands on the American people. It instituted tax cuts and told the American people to "go shopping." Out of the more than 280 million Americans the burden of war fell on less than 1 percent of the American people. The war was not a national effort. In the years that followed the Vietnam War, with the end of the draft, the Armed Forces of the United States formed a "military cluster" (0.5% of U.S. households) a professional fighting force with its own unique system and set of values, ethics, and beliefs. They would fight the future wars of the United States. The most significant transformation in the American conduct of war since World War II and the invention of the atomic bomb, was not technological, but cultural, social, and political — the removal of the American people from the conduct of war. With the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union the U.S. Army and Air Force were partially out of work. The war the two services had prepared to fight for half a century would not take place in the foreseeable future. In the 1980s, the decade just prior to the Soviet demise, the Army had more than a third of its forces in Europe, roughly 300,000 soldiers, two corps, the equivalent of more than five divisions. The Army's heavy divisions, its armored forces, now appeared to many observers to be obsolete; and there was serious talk that the days of the tank had passed. The Air Force's strategic bomb- ing and air superiority missions against the Soviet Union had shaped its doctrine and technology. The Bl and B2 bombers were designed to penetrate Soviet air space and deliver nuclear weapons. The Air Force's new F-22 Raptor was designed to defeat the best Soviet air superiority fighter. These missions no longer provided a reason for being. The Army and Air Force needed new missions to justify their force structure. The collapse of the Soviet Union had little influence on the Navy's surface fleet, and 378 • The American Culture of War the Marine Corps. The mission of the Navy's aircraft carrier fleet was little changed, and the Marine Corps had no significant forces in NATO. (The strategic mission of the Navy's fleet of missile-launch submarines was diminished.) The Army and Air Force did not have to look far for new missions. Continuous crises in the Middle East, the attacks of 9/11, and two of George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil" states, Iran and Iraq, provided purpose and direction. Access to the region and the very different nature of the threat required the two services to reexamine their force structure, means for deployment, and operational doctrine. The transformation of the two services was, at least in part, a function of their changing roles and missions. The new orientation of the Army and Air Force caused them to collide with the Navy and Marine Corps. The air forces and ground forces of the Navy and Marine Corps were based at sea. Thus, they did not have the problem of access that confronted the Army and Air Force. The Army needed bases in the Middle East. It needed lighter, faster, more strategically airmobile forces. And it needed greater operational intratheater mobility— air and sea. The Air Force also needed new bases and an expanded air refueling capacity. Air Force bombers had global reach; however, its fighters required numerous refuelings to stretch airpower from the U.S. to the Middle East. Hence, the Air Force too needed advanced bases. Private military firms (PMF) provided the Army with strategic mobility, transporting heavy armor forces from the United States to the Middle East; and the maintenance of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other equipment on ships prepositioned in the region. PMF also pointed the way for intratheater mobility. The Gulf War showed the effectiveness of stealth and precision technologies, and showed that the Army, which suffered few casualties in the ground war, could have destroyed the fourth-largest army on Earth with half the forces deployed. What this told Administrations and Americans was that the all-volunteer force was working and effective, and that its ground forces were too large. It appeared to many that the United States could get rid of substantial parts of the Army more than a third, and experience little or no deterioration in capabilities. The United States could also increase its effectiveness by investing in airpower technologies. No matter what the outcome of a war, America always learned the same lessons through the prisms of American culture, which produced a strong preference for technological solutions and a strong disinclination to employ American manpower in limited wars. In wake of the Persian Gulf War it was believed that information technology was "revolutionizing" the conduct of war. It was believed that a revolution in military affairs was underway. However, it was uncertain as to what the services would look like when transformed, and it was uncertain exactly how information destroyed the enemy's will to resist, or its fighting forces, or its government. The Clustering of America: Cultural Transformation As a consequence of the increased cultural diversity of the American population, economic competi- tion from abroad, conflicting interests, and the fight for limited resources, "tribal-nations" formed across the United States. According to the 1990 census, Americans belong to seventy- five ethnic tribes, six hundred Native American tribes, seventy Hispanic tribes, and many other racial tribes. Between 1970 and 1990, 26.3 million immigrants became occupants of the United States creating new school districts in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Over one hundred different languages are spoken in the American school system. Given the diversity of the American population and the ways in which Americans form enclaves, it is more accurate to think of the United States as a composite state, made up of many diverse tribes, than a culturally cohesive nation. There are tribal-nations in the United States that because of ethnic, racial, or religious attachments consistently place the welfare of other nation-states before that of the United States. Without cultural cohesion it is impossible to fight more total war, or significant limited wars. Consider these words: The New American Way ofWar • 379 Cultural uniformity in some degree must characterize the members of a society. The members need not be identical. Variety among its members is a characteristic of societies distinguish- ing them from organisms in which cells may approach identity. The members must, however, be in some respect similar. They must have some sentiments in common, or there can be no spiritual union. They must have some standardized responses to language and other means of communication, or there can be no obedience or leadership. They must have some common aims, or there can be no co-operation. 2 With the end of the draft one of the primary mechanisms for bridging the gap between cultural, racial, ethnic, religious, and other groups was eliminated. The Armed Forces realized that the all- volunteer force enhanced professionalism, reduced turnover, and promoted homogeneity. The people who joined wanted to be there, and they stayed longer. Once indoctrinated with military values, ethics, and beliefs; and,, love of service, these individuals became lifelong soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. They became part of a military interest group. Upon retiring or leaving the service, and with a twenty-year retirement program many officers and NCOs departed the military every year, they retained the attachments to their service. They joined and supported the many military organizations that lobby Congress, and advanced issues important to the services. Many worked in military towns or industries that produced equipment and weapons for the military. Their numerous attachments to their service influenced how members of the military cluster viewed the world, how they thought, and how they voted. The demographic of the military cluster was not and is not representative of the nation. By the end of September 2000, 42 percent of all recruits were from the South. Recruits from the West made up the second largest segment. Participation in the armed forces from the Northeast and Midwest contin- ued to decline. Blacks made up 22 percent of enlisted personnel, but only 12.5 percent of the civilian population. Hispanics were underrepresented in the Armed Forces; however, their numbers were growing rapidly. In Operation Iraqi Freedom some 37,000 "noncitizens," mostly Hispanic, served in the Armed Forces. Service men and women were better educated than the general population. In 1 995, for example 96 percent of recruits had earned high school diplomas, as compared with 79 percent of the civilians in the same age group. Service men and women also stay in the service longer than at any other time in the twentieth century. The average enlistee stays about seven years, as compared with two years in 1973. In 2000 half of all enlisted women in the Army were black, and they made up 35 percent of all the women in the services. In 2000 the vast majority of military personnel and former military personnel (excluding blacks) were Republicans. "Among those in both the elite military and active reserve groups, Republicans outnumbered Democrats by margins of approximately 8 to 1 and 6 to 1, respectively. In contrast, the civilian leaders were more evenly divided, with a strong plurality of the veterans preferring the Republicans . . . ." 3 It can be argued that in the hotly contested 2000 elec- tion between George W Bush and Al Gore, the military pushed Florida into the Republican camp, securing a victory for Bush. One student of civil-military relations, Thomas E. Ricks, wrote: "U.S. military personnel of all ranks are feeling increasingly alienated from their own country, and are becoming both more conservative and more politically active than ever before." 4 Ricks recorded the feelings of several military leaders: "'Today,' says retired Admiral Stanley Arthur, who commanded U.S. naval forces during the Gulf War, 'the armed forces are no longer representative of the people they serve. More and more, enlisted [men and women] as well as officers are beginning to feel that they are special, better than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an armed force serving a democracy.'" Retired Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, USMC, explained the difference: "When I got out of boot camp, in 1946, society was different. It was more disciplined, and most Americans trusted the government. Most males had some military 380 • The American Culture of War experience. It was an entirely different society — one that thought more about its responsibilities than its rights." Trainor's comments reveal not only his assessment of American society but also a percep- tion of how the American concept of citizenship has changed. While Ricks's study is not scientific, and is based on analysis of a small group of marines, other studies have supported his conclusions. In the 2003 Military Times Poll it was found that: "Two-thirds [of surveyed military personnel] said they think military members have higher moral standards than the nation they serve. . . . Once in the military many said, members are wrapped in a culture that values honor and morality. 'Even if you don't have it when you enlist, they breed it into you to be a better person,' said Army Sgt. Kevin Blanchard. 'When you go home you see how you're different than the people you grew up with.'" It was also found that: "Respondents were evenly split on the question of whether civilian leaders have their best interests at heart." 5 Consider the words of a young marine corporal who served in Iraq in 2003: We all came together Both young and old To fight for our freedom To stand and be bold. I'm harder than nails, Stronger than any machine I'm the immortal soldier, I'm a U.S. MARINE! In the midst of all evil We stand our ground, And we protect our country From all terror around. Peace and not war, Is what some people say. But I'll give my life So you can live the American way. I give you the right To talk of your peace To stand in your groups and protest in our streets. But still I fight on, I don't bitch, I don't whine. I'm just one of the people Who is doing your time. So stand in my shoes, And leave from your home. Fight for the people who hate you, With the protests they've shown. Fight for the stranger, Fight for the young. So they all may have, The greatest freedom you've won Fight for the sick, Fight for the poor, Fight for the cripple Who live next door. But when your time comes, Do what I've done. For if you stand up for freedom, You'll stand when the fight's done. 6 In fact, there was very little protest against the war. Most Americans were detached from it. Still, the contempt of this young marine is evident, and a conversation at any airport in American with veterans on leave from Iraq reveals similar attitudes. The men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States have not reflected mainstream American values, ethics, and beliefs since the advent of the professional, long-service force. And, there is evidence that service men and women are developing a distrust of the nation's civilian leadership. During the 1990s the majority of service member considered the Clinton Administration antimilitary, and during the Bush Administration, which was considered promilitary the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, were over extended fighting insurgency, guerrilla wars in Afghanistan and Iraq without a substantial increase in the size of force or significant reduction of other worldwide missions. This left the Army without an adequate rotation base, damaging morale, and, at least to some degree, created The New American Way ofWar • 381 the impression that civilian leadership did not have the best interest of the services at heart. An ar- ticle in Marine Corps Times noted: "The Army, which has borne the heaviest burden in Iraq in terms of workload and casualties, also is less approving than the rest of the military: 52 percent approved of Bush's Iraq policy, while about one in four opposed it." 7 This 52 percent decreased steadily as the insurgency war continued into 2005, and grew in intensity. Another attribute of the clustering of America was the formation of a new royalty, families whose name alone produces privilege, access, and opportunities. The American ethos of equality was sup- planted by a new reverence, respect, and awe for elite, wealthy families. The average American cannot become President. The line does not form at the rear. And merit is frequently subordinated to status. In the clustered world "name" and "wealth," more than "talent" and "tenacity," determines political leadership. The political elite and the military professionals have proven that they can prosecute limited wars achieving the political objectives of the White House without the American people as long as those wars are restricted to states which lack the capacity to generate significant combat power and the wars are fought in a conventional manner. The obvious conclusion of these developments and Weiss's cluster theory is that a small, affluent, political cluster decides which wars the professional military cluster will fight, and the military cluster endeavors to dispassionately execute the war as a surgeon would transplant a heart. The irony is that in the midst of the greatest wealth of military weapons and equipment the world has ever seen, in midst of the most destructive power ever created by man, fewer and fewer Americans are involved in employing that power and making the decisions on when and against whom to use that power. The emotions, the values, the beliefs, the ethics of the American people are not engaged the way they were in previous major wars. And this is a danger to the republic. In 2003, when it became evident that the Army and Marine Corps were too small to carry out all assigned missions, the White House and Pentagon could not call upon the American people to make up for its miscalculations and flawed planning, and intelligence and foreign policy failures. The military cluster would bear the full burden of the nation's war. Equality of sacrifice was no longer a consideration in the nation's procurement of manpower. This problem, that had plagued Admin- istrations since the Korean War, had finally been rectified. The nation had an all-volunteer fighting force. The removal of the American people from the war equation had a number of benefits for the Administration. Because the war cost the vast majority of the voting public nothing, there was no need for them to become concerned or involved in the conduct of the war,, and, they did not need to concern themselves with the causes of the war. The Administration, consequently, need not concern itself in a major way with political pressure from the people on the issue of war. There would be little protest of the actions of the Administration in regard to the conduct of war, as long as the profes- sional military cluster made all the sacrifices. While 9/11 clearly created the conditions for war, the cause and conduct of the war in Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9/11, exerted very little political pressure in the 2004 Presidential election. 8 Even when it was realized that the United States had gone to war for reasons other than those delineated by the Bush Administration; that the insurgency war was going badly; and that hundreds of billions of dollars were being spent in Iraq; other issues, such as, taxes, gay marriage, and abortion rights exerted greater political pressure. When President Bush and the Democratic candidate, Sena- tor John Kerry, debated both felt compelled to promise the American people that there would be no draft, that there would be no new taxes to pay for the war, and that, in fact, there would be additional tax cuts. In the midst of a "Global War on Terrorism" the President promised the American people they would not be called upon to fight the war. Rather than call upon the American people to serve, the Bush Administration chose to increase the burden on active duty, reserve, and National Guard personnel and live with the prospect of failure in the insurgency war in Iraq. American support for 382 • The American Culture of War Bush's war in Iraq did not translate into significant numbers of volunteers to fight the war, support for the draft, or support for taxes to pay for the war. In 2005 Congress increased the manpower authoriza- tions of the Army and Marine Corps; however, both service found it difficult to recruit up to this new manpower level, and both service started missing their monthly recruiting quotas. The removal of the American people from war left significant questions unanswered: can these tribal-nations that make up the United States come together to form a greater community in times of national crisis, and when external threats are real, palpable, and significant? What was to happen if the burden of war exceeded the capabilities of the military cluster? Would the government sacrifice the achievement of its political objectives? Would it reinstate the draft and call on the American people to fight America's wars? Is the world a less dangerous place with the removal of the American people from the conduct of the nation's wars? And did the professional military cluster make the decision to go to war easier to make? Consider the words of Jean Jaures: "Government will be far less ready to dream of adventurous policies if the mobilization of the army is the mobilization of the nation itself. . . . The nation in arms is necessarily a nation motivated by justice." While no social theory can accurately depict the complexity and dynamism of a modern nation- state, Weiss's theory provides a powerful tool for analyzing the American condition in the post-Viet- Civil-Military Relations: Who's in Charge? With the people, in large part, being removed from the nation's conduct of war, it can be argued that the triangular relationship became a bipolar relationship between political and military leaders. How- ever, this would be only a partially accurate. The third corner of the triangle, the Senate and House of Representatives — theoretically the political bodies that most represented the views of the American people— still functioned, at least in part, in the allocation of resources to the military. Congress was still involved in issues of base construction and closing; the purchase of ships, airplanes, tanks, and other equipment; the authorized strength of the services; and the budgets of the services. It was the decision for war and the conduct of war over which the people and the Congress relinquished much of their authority, influence, and responsibility. Congressmen and women became much more animated and invested considerably more time over issues of base closings, and the location and production of aircraft and ships than the decision for war and the conduct of war. Arguably, in the wake of Vietnam War civilian control of the military has declined, and the services exerted greater influence over national strategy, national military strategy, and foreign policy than ever before. Consider the words of Richard H. Kohn, a student of civil-military relations: Civilian control has deteriorated significantly in the last generation. In theory, civilians had the authority to issue virtually any order and organize the military in any fashion they choose. But in practice, the relationship is far more complex. Both sides frequently disagree among themselves. Further, the military can evade or circumscribe civilian authority by framing the alternatives or tailoring their advice or predicting nasty consequences; by leaking information or appealing to public opinion (through various indirect channels, like lobbying groups or retired generals and admirals); or by approaching friends in the Congress for support. They can even fail to implement decisions, or carry them out in such a way as to stymie their intent. The reality is that civilian control is not a fact but a process, measured across a spectrum— something situ- ational, dependent on the people, issues, and the political and military forces involved. We are not talking about a coup here, or anything else demonstrably illegal; we are talking about who calls the tune in military affairs [which involves war] in the United States today. 9 The New American Way ofWar • 383 And Carl Builder concluded: "The most powerful institutions in the American national security arena are the military services— the army, navy, and air force — not the Department of Defense or Congress or even their commander in chief, the president." Builder argued the Armed Forces in fact produce American national strategy: "The roots of modern American military strategies lie buried in the country's three most powerful institutions: the army, navy, and air force. Though many people outside the military institutions, including academics, and presidents may propose military strategies and concepts, these can be implemented only if and when military institutions accept and pursue them." 10 Russell Weigley in 1992 argued that General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, violated the principle of civilian control of the military. He wrote: When Congress, the 1992 presidential campaigners, and elements within the George Herbert Walker Bush administration were debating whether the United States ought to employ military force in Bosnia and Hercegovina in an attempt to save lives and to forestall the spreading of the war inside a splintering Yugoslavia to a wider area of the Balkans, General Powell interjected his judgment, purportedly based on his military expertise, that the available possibilities for insert- ing military force were unsound because, as the New York Times reported his views, "military force is best used to achieve a decisive victory." In the midst of the civilian policy debate, General Powell not only announced his views emphatically enough that he was quoted and paraphrased on the front page of the New York Times, but he summarized his reasons for opposing a Bosnian intervention on the op-ed page of the Times under his own name. 11 Powell, with the Vietnam War in mind, stated: "As soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me, 'surgical," I head for the bushes." 12 The "They" were Powell's civilian bosses, and as Weigley noted: "Such an assertion cannot possibly be an expression of professional military knowledge. . . . His opinions in the case were much more political than professional." Another student of civil-military relations, Oli Hosti, concluded: If being "political" means competing for roles, missions, resources, and the likes, then that does not represent a recent or especially worrisome change, although questions might be raised about the propriety of the military using Congress, such interest groups as defense contractors or vet- erans organizations, the media, and the public to gain leverage. More generally, we can see two trends that have an important bearing on relations between the military and civilian authorities, and the principle of control of the former by the latter: through changes in professional educa- tion, the military are becoming more politically sophisticated and adept, while the number of political leaders in the executive and legislative branches with military experience is declining. 13 The rise in the prestige of the Armed Forces in the wake of Operation Desert Storm did in fact increase the political power of the service. And it is a fact that military leaders have been increasingly adept in influencing Congress. Still, did this represent a fundamental change? President Bush and the services disagreed with the arguments of Kohn, Builder, Weigley, and Hosti. Bush wrote: "I did not want to repeat the problem of the Vietnam War . . . where the political leadership meddled with military operations. I would avoid micromanaging the military." Schwarzkopf in regard to a telephone conversation with the President during the Gulf War, wrote: "As I hung up the phone, I was struck by what the President had chosen not to say: he'd given me no orders and hadn't second-guessed the decisions I'd made, and the detailed questions he'd asked had been purely for clarification. His confidence in the military's ability to do its job was so unlike what we'd seen in Vietnam. . . ." 14 The Goldwater- Nichols Act, which increased the power of the Chairman of the JCS, in no way diminished the powers of the President. 384 • The American Culture of War Civilian control of the military, like most human interactions, has never been an absolute. As Kohn noted, civilian control is "a process, measured across a spectrum . . . ." The pendulum swings back and forth, within a narrowly defined area, depending upon the strengths or weaknesses of these various factors. There has always been some room for negotiation, for dissent, for revisions, and for redress. During the Truman Administration the services were frequently successful in derailing the President's directives and programs. Even Eisenhower was incapable of completely imposing his will on the Armed Forces. General George B. McClellan, during the Civil War, virtually ignored Lincoln's orders to the point when he was fired. General Douglas MacArthur disagreed with Truman's strategy for the conduct of the Korean War, and he too was fired. General John K. Singlaub publicly disagreed with President Carter's plan to reduce the number of Army forces in Korea, and thereby effectively ended his military career. Civilian control of the military was (and is) codified and structurally well-defined, but it was still a process that was contingent on a number of factors: the condition, peace or war; the personalities, character, and charisma of civilian and military leaders; knowledge of operations and doctrine; political skill; professionalism; the popularity of the President and his Secretary of Defense; the popularity of the generals and admirals; the state of interservice rivalry; personal relationships; and other factors. Still, generals could go only as far as Presidents let them. Second only to the Constitution, no other legislation has so thoroughly guaranteed civilian control of the military as the National Security Act of 1947. Prior to the Vietnam War, Samuel P. Huntington argued that civil control of the military was enhanced by interservice rivalry: "Interservice controversy substituted for civil-military controversy. . . . Service rivalry permitted the civilian agencies to pick and choose." 15 The National Security Act of 1947 has maintained a system of competing services. In the aftermath of World War II, the services became big business, maintaining relatively large forces to fight the cold war. As a consequence they have greater influence than in previous periods of American history. However, their influence is usually restricted to issues of missions, technologies, doctrines, bases, manpower and funding of the services. And these issues actually increase the power of civilian leaders because they exacerbate the interservice fighting. During the Vietnam War McNamara developed the theater strategy and strategic doctrine for the air and ground wars.. The services were divided and incapable of developing a comprehensive strategy for the conduct of the Vietnam War. Those divisions made McNamara the strategist and, arguably, the senior most operational commander. The Pentagon ran Operation Rolling Thunder to the point of selecting targets. Neither the Army nor the Air Force nor the Marine Corps would have fought the war in Vietnam the way it was conducted. However, as long as the services fought among themselves political leaders had the power to "pick and choose," or to ignore them. President Johnson bragged on more than one occasion that the Air Force could not bomb an "outhouse" without his permission. Too many senior military leaders sat silent as the nation committed its young men to a war that they believed could not be won with the strategy employed. Defeat in Vietnam motivated the subsequent behaviors of many senior political and military leaders. In the post-Reagan era generals and admirals endeavored to exert greater influence over the conduct of war and the decision to go to war than during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations. This was because Presidents, such as Reagan and George H. W. Bush, with the memories of Vietnam still fresh, were more willing to accept the generals' professional advice and leadership, and generals and admirals were more aggressive in rendering it. Both parties feared another Vietnam. Because of Vietnam the pendulum swung toward greater military control of warmaking. Unlike the Vietnam War, the generals developed the theater strategy and strategic doctrines for the Persian Gulf War— as they had in the Korean War. When asked "Who picks the targets in Desert Storm?" General Schwar- zkopf responded that President Bush had left the details of the war to his generals. Bush, he declared, had "allowed the commanders in the field to do what the commanders in the field think is correct. The New American Way ofWar • 385 Obviously, we brief them on what we're doing. Obviously, if they thought we were doing something dumb, theyd tell us about it, and wed change it." 16 The powers of the President to replace or relieve an officer, or an entire chain of command, to deploy forces, and determine how they would be used, had not changed. In the wake of the Gulf War the services still competed with one another for budgets, programs, and other limited resources. The Goldwater-Nichols Act did not change this. It did create a superfi- cial level of "jointness," of cooperation and accommodation, but it did not fundamentally change the driving forces that animate the behavior of the services. The services still had to sell themselves, and there were still winners and losers. Political military decisions still were not based on comprehension of the threats and maximizing the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces. Defeat in Vietnam did not change this. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War the Army fought the 40 percent reduction in force, but six of its divisions were deactivated. The Army lacked the political clout to maintain its force structure. Clearly there was little threat from the Army to civilian control of the Armed Forces. The Clinton Administration arguably marked a new low for civilian control of the military in the twentieth century. This new low probably motivated the work of Weigley, Hosti, Kohn, and others. However, was this a function of military initiatives or the failure of the Clinton Administration to exert its power and authority? The most blatant recent example of a President permitting the military to bully him into acquiescing to its will was the enactment of the policy of "don t ask, don't tell," regarding homosexuals in the military. When campaigning for the presidency Clinton indicated that he would issue an executive order permitting homosexual to serve openly in the Armed Forces. Clinton possessed the same powers that Truman possessed in 1948 when he signed Executive Order 9981, requiring the integration of the Armed Forces of the United States. 17 All the services opposed the integration order, all argued against, and all endeavored to impede it as long as possible. Nevertheless, Truman had the political courage to promulgate the order. And it must be remembered that in 1949 Jim Crowism was a strong force in America. Clinton faced considerable opposition. The services joined with influential members of Congress to block his initiative. Still, Clinton had the power to enact the policy, even if he, like Truman, did not have the power to insure it was immediately implemented. Clinton, however, chose subterfuge. He initiated a policy that caused considerable confusion, and did not deliver what he had promised. Whether or not one agrees with the policy is not the issue. Clinton failed to exercise the powers of the President. This was more a function of Clinton's character than the actions of the services. Clintons failure on this issue established the quality and character of his relationship with the military for the remainder of his Presidency. And, while it is true that the respect and deference that senior military leaders have traditionally shown elected political leaders had declined in the wake of the Vietnam War, it is equally true that this was not new, that this did not represent a fundamental change. General McClellan was frequently rude and insubordinate to President Lincoln. The factors that influenced civil-military relations at the end of the century were: the Vietnam debacle, the belief of the American people that political leaders were most responsible for the first American defeat in war, the rise in the popularity of the Armed Forces during Operation Desert Storm, the decline in the number of political leaders with military experience, the willingness of Congressmen and women to conspire with military leaders and against Presidents, the new political adroitness of the services and their lobbying organizations, and the personality and character of men such as Bill Clinton, George Bush, Colin Powell, John Shalikashvili, and other senior civilian and military lead- ers. The dynamic interaction of these and other factors influenced the power relationship; and hence, decisions on the conduct of war. Still, there were no fundamental changes in the system for civilian control. Civilian political leaders retained all the powers delineated under the constitution. The s£ were still fighting among themselves, enabling political leader to "pick and choose." 386 • The American Culture of War Those who make the argument that the power of the military to determine national policy endangers civilian control of the military, can point to no fundamental or structural change that supports this thesis, and no behaviors that do not have historical precedence. What they have is a brief period of time that does not represent the norm, but a periodic aberration caused by the confluence of a number of factors. In the next war, the Secretary of Defense would decide the theater strategy, strategic doctrine, operational doctrine, and the deployment plan. He would even get involved in the operational and tactical decisions. And he would, in large part, be the cause of the major failures. In the wake of 9/11 the pendulum swung decidedly toward greater civilian control. The attack on 9/ 1 1 changed power relationships in Washington. The American people, as they have traditionally done at the outbreak of war, rallied around the President. There was fear and uncertainty in the air. The power of the Bush Administration quadrupled in a matter of hours as Americans watched the twin towers of the World Trade Center collapse. The unpopular President, who was elected without a majority of the vote, within weeks was enormously popular, with an 80 percent approval rating. The deployment of military forces to Afghanistan and the outcome of the initial conflict further enhanced his popularity. The Administration operated in a new strategic environment with new powers that decisively shifted power away from the military. After 9/11, civilian leadership clearly dominated defense decisions and the conduct of war. Bush, Rumsfeld, and Cheney ignored the service chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the U.S. Congress. Two observers with close ties to the Pentagon, Michael Gordon and retired General Bernard Trainor, USMC, wrote: "During his short tenure at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld had established himself as an indomitable bureaucratic presence. It was a commonplace among the Bush team that the military needed stronger civilian oversight, and Rumsfeld exercised control with the iron deter- mination of a former corporate executive. . . . When he arrived at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld made clear that his goal was nothing less than to remake the U.S. military, to fashion a leaner and more lethal force . . . ." 18 Rumsfeld's, prejudices and biases, likes and dislikes, and strategic vision were soon evident in the leadership he selected and policies and strategies he put in place. In 2003 there was no doubt about who ran the Pentagon and the American conduct of war. While advancing the argument that the United States is not in danger of the Armed Forces taking over, or indirectly running the country, recently the argument has been advanced that a significant change in civil-military relations has in fact taken place. The decision for war in Iraq seems to have been influenced by a "think-tank" known as "The Project for a New American Century." In other words, organizations external to the U.S. government seem to be influencing the foreign and military policies of the United States. This issue has not been adequately study, and the exact nature of that influence has not been fully comprehended; however, this issue clearly demands more study. Another new element that appears to have influenced decision making in the Bush Administration is the Private Military Firms (PMF), particularly Halliburton, which had close ties to the Vice President, Dick Cheney. Again, this is new area that requires additional study; however, it can be argued that organizations external to the federal government are exerting an influence of U.S. military and foreign policies. Perhaps, the danger isn't from the military sector, but from the civilian, private sector. Americans are rapidly employing capitalism in war. The exigencies of the market-place may some determine the foreign and military policies of the United States. The Revolution in Military Affairs On March 5, 1994, Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan, in a letter to the Army's general officers, entitled "Force XXI," wrote: Today, we are at a threshold of a new era, and we must proceed into it decisively. Today the Industrial Age is being superseded by the Information Age, the Third Wave, hard on the heels The New American Way ofWar • 387 of the agrarian and industrial eras. Our present Army is well-configured to fight and win in the late Industrial Age, and we can handle Agrarian- Age foes as well. We have begun to move into Third Wave warfare, to evolve a new force for a new century— Force XXI. Force XXI will synthesize the science of modern computer technology, the art of integration doctrine and organization, and the optimization of our quality people. The goal is to create new formations that operate at even greater performance levels in speed, space, and time. Force XXI — not "Division XXI," and there is a message there about breaking free of old concepts— will use command and control technology to leverage the power of the Information Age. . . . Force XXI will represent a new way of thinking for a new wave of warfare. 19 At the dawn of the twenty- first century it was believed that new information technologies were revolutionizing warfare. The Army, like the other services, was caught up in a frenzy of activities dic- tated by the revolution in military affairs. The Army was going to do more with less. Every captain and sergeant was going to have a computer. Every Army leader was going to have near perfect, real-time battlefield situation awareness. Technology had again increased the rate, accuracy, and lethality of firepower. Some argued that the tank was obsolete, while others maintained the traditional view that man was the dominant instrument on the battlefield. All sought to adopt the technological trends in vogue for their way of war. The greatest advances in technology, however, were primarily in the air war — stealth, precision, and space sensor technologies. And the Army's biggest problems were the same problems identified by Ridgway and Taylor in the 1950s: the inability to get to battlefields around the world in a timely manner, in days as opposed to months; and the American preference and belief that everything can be achieved from the air with advanced technologies. This belief made Adminis- trations reluctant to employ ground combat forces. As a consequence, the United States continued a pattern established in the 1950s of conducting successful battles and operation, but failing to achieve strategic and political objectives. The most recent vision of the transformation of war was in fact not so new. In its objectives, it had changed little from the visions articulated from the 1940s through the 1980s. Americans envisioned war without ground combat forces; war fought with technology; war carried out by highly skilled, highly trained technicians; war from the air; war from space; war that was clean and neat, where Americans were not exposed to the nastiness of killing and the trauma of death. But, again, war did not acquiesce to the American dream. War had not changed. In its basic form, in People's Wars, it was and is the same dirty, nasty, bloody business it has always been. Consider these words: "The stagger- ing technological advances seemed to have altered the fact of military life overnight, and one natural result was the emergence of the Air Force as the Nation's first line of defense and weapon of offense. America accepted this development remarkably easily, for a weapon system made up of the nuclear bomb and the long-range aircraft to deliver it suited our traditional way of thinking on how wars ought be waged." These words were written in 1956, but by substituting "information technologies and stealth bombers" for "nuclear bomb and the long-range aircraft" they were as representative of American thinking in 2005 as they were fifty years earlier. No state on the planet has gone through as many so called revolutions in warfare and transformationsas the United States. No state has expended resources comparable to those the United States has expended in a search for the panacea for war. Consider these words: The more subtle and gradual forms of attack through infiltration, political persuasion, ii tion, and developing guerrilla war have found us with no adequate political or military answer. In struggles of this type there are seldom suitable targets for massive air strikes. Ground forces geared and equipped for large-scale war are notoriously ineffective against guerrillas. Militarily, such forces cannot bring their might to bear, and their efforts are all too likely to injure and alien- ate indigenous populations and thus lose an equally important political battle. In these situations 388 • The American Culture of War national power has meaning only in terms of its immediate application. Today, unfortunately, the sum of applicable American power is not always impressive. 10 These words were also written in 1956, and they too were applicable in 2005. The United States for half a century has planned and equipped itself to fight the type of war it wants to fight, not the type of war it is most likely to fight. American military leaders continuously fail to think strategically. All the services produce "operators" and "technicians," men who perfect fighting conventional forces and nuclear war. And given the enormous imbalance in U.S. military power vis-a-vis other states, these are the two least likely forms of war. The officers of the U.S. Armed Forces with few exceptions, don't study foreign cultures, don't study foreign languages, don't study human behavior, and don't study history beyond the battles and campaigns of successful Western military leaders. Courses at the war colleges teach nothing of Muslim religion and culture, nothing of Chinese history and society, nothing of the history of Africa and its numerous people. In the U.S. officer corps there is a profound and extraordinary ignorance of the world America seeks to police. The corps is too busy mastering machines, methods, and operational doctrines to study the peoples of the world. Ultimately it is the will of the people that has to be assuaged, incorporated, pacified, or destroyed in order to achieve political objectives. The United States with all its great power was stretched thin in the type of power "applicable" to the war it was fighting in Iraq. And, as a consequence, too many soldiers and marines again died or were wounded needlessly; and the United States is losing the real war for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi peoples. Cultural consistency has been killing American soldiers and marines for half a century. And without a major cultural transformation in American thinking about the conduct of war, in 2025 Americans can again expect to expend too many of the lives of its young men and women because it has prepared to fight the wrong war, while wasting billions of dollars on the most advanced aircraft ever produced to replace the most advanced aircraft ever produced: Aircraft that are incapable of stopping a man on the ground with a rifle, of discriminating between a determined insurgent and a scared mother or child, or of establishing the kinds of relationships with indigenous people to win their confidence and support. The American view of war is simply too narrow. As a consequence, America should expect to fail in Iraq. War is ultimately a human endeavor. War is more than killing. And the only thing that technology will ever do is make the act of killing more efficient. Unless the objective is extermination, a heinous objective, technology alone will never provide the answer to war. Technology alone will never stop a determined enemy. Man does not "make" the greatest weapon on the planet. Man "is" the greatest weapon in war. The human brain and the human spirit are the greatest weapons on the Earth. They enable people to adapt and produce the tenacity to sustain themselves in war and through other hardships. Human tribes may suffer terrible losses, but extinction is rare. In the post- World War II period, given the magnitude of American political promises to states in all corners of the planet, even in peace, the U.S. Army has been too small to do all that was asked and required. It has also been oriented toward the wrong type of war. American political leaders have continually robbed themselves of solutions less destructive, more humane, and more effective. The best way to spread Americanism, the best way to transform other societies is by the demonstrative superiority of the American way of life, and the stability the presence of the U.S. Army creates. American overreliance on firepower and technology from World War II to the Iraq war has been, in large part, a function of too few soldiers to do the job, and too few soldiers trained to fight people's wars. The US. Army and the services have failed to study the types of war they were most likely to fight. They have failed to study insurgency warfare, terrorism, guerrilla warfare. They have failed to organize and equip themselves to carry out counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping, and nation-build- ing operations. And, they have failed to learn the utter necessity of understanding the culture of the people they are fighting or trying to save from Communism or terrorism or dictators. Americans are The New American Way ofWar • 389 probably the least capable people for conducting nation-building operations. American culture, politi- cal and military power, and status in the world create a psychological blindness that makes it almost impossible for Americans to empathize with people in undeveloped regions of the world. And, the best way to influence people is not through military force, but through the demonstrated superiority of the American democratic and capitalist system. People around the world have shown great interest in the American way of life, but considerable disdain for U.S. policies. The U.S. government, not the American people, has too frequently supported dictators and tyrants, and too quickly sought military solutions. The government has championed the concept of "national sovereignty," but has been quick to violate the sovereignty of other nations. With great power comes great responsibility. America has not used its great power wisely, and has squandered numerous opportunities to transform the world without war. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War many military theorists believed a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) was taking place. 21 All the services emphasized transformation, however, they were not exactly sure what they were supposed to look like when the transformation process was complete. What was known was that American forces were to be "small, more lethal and nimble joint forces." Transfor- mation was based on new digital communications technologies, precision-guided munitions, stealth technologies, reorganization, "jointness," and "network- centric" warfare doctrine. 22 It was believed that America possessed the wherewithal to construct "the system of systems," a network that consisted of three major components: sensors, communications, and shooters. 23 The sensors were space based observation satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, manned surveillance airplanes, joint surveillance target attack radar system on aircraft, ground based radar systems, Special Forces, Rangers, and even soldiers and marines. The sensors enabled all the services to cut through the "fog of war," see the battlefield in real time, to have almost complete "battlefield awareness" to focus on any "grid square" on Earth, and detect, track, and engage multiple targets simultaneously. The sensors provided "in- formation dominance," the ability to see the battlefield far more accurately and completely than the enemy; and, as a consequence, to deprive the enemy of the information needed to effectively deploy, maneuver, and fight his forces. Sensors were linked through advanced communication channels to decision makers and weapons capable of delivering precision destructive power on specific, individual targets, with measured lethality. The sensors, decision makers, and shooters of all the services would all simultaneously, in real time be able to see the exact same battlefield. On-screen indicators would depict enemy forces and friendly forces. American tanks and airplanes were all to be equipped with transponders that emit signals that indicate their exact location. JSTARS, UAVs, space based spy satellites, and other sensors provided the location of enemy forces. The ability to immediately detect enemy forces and destroy them with multiple shooters, and with measured lethality and precision, was the vision. Speed, responsiveness, accuracy, flexibility, decisiveness, and reduced vulnerability were the objectives. Using the human body as an analogy, the objective of operations was to destroy the system of nerves that transmitted orders from the brain to the muscles, severing the links between the decision makers and the fighting forces. The emphasis was also on destroying the brain. If the brain could be destroyed it might be unnecessary to destroy the nerve system, the communications infrastructure of a state, or the muscles, enemy forces. Severing the many links between the brain and the muscles was no small task. Numerous systems transmit signals. Hence, the task was to temporarily stop the flow of instruc- tion, and then move rapidly, faster than the enemy could respond, to destroy the brain, or sufficient parts of the central nervous system to paralyze the enemy and thereby achieve military and political objectives. By controlling the flow of information the enemy received, by having almost complete 390 • The American Culture of War information in real time of enemy and friendly forces, and through speed and precision destruction, victory could be achieved without the mass armies or the enormous destruction common in war. The objective was not to fight directly the enemy's main forces, the muscles. By operating faster than an enemy with superior information, the enemy's options were taken away. His decision loop, the time it takes for him to react to changes on the battlefield, is too slow to compensate for the rate of change inflicted by fast moving American forces, causing partial paralysis, which creates the opportunity for the decisive destruction of the center of gravity, the brain, the political and military leadership. The services are working hard to achieve this vision of war. As might be expected the Air Force and Navy are leading the way in developing technologies and doctrine: "With gathering momentum, the Air Force is moving to implement its vision of 'network centric warfare' (NCW), working hard to extract as much information as possible from existing sources of data and streamline the means by which airmen can use the information in combat. . . . Finally, the Air Force is following a 'flight plan' that calls for USAF to realize even its most visionary NCW aims before 2014, potentially revo- lutionizing the way the services fights in less than a decade." 24 This, however, is a limited war strategic doctrine, and it assumes that major wars between nation-states, particularly Western nation-states are obsolete— an assumption not accepted in this work. In more total war destroying the enemy's central nervous system or brain will not end the war. Sustainability is also a major problem with this doctrine of war. Precision weapons are very expensive. In a high intensity environment against a sub- stantial enemy, depletion is a major concern. In Operation Desert Storm 9 percent of munitions were precision-guided, in the Iraq War, that figure was 70 percent. A bigger problem is the vulnerability of sensors and computer systems. The reconnaissance, communication, global positioning satellites, on which network-centric warfare depends, are defenseless against missile attack. And the vast network of Department of Defense computers is vulnerable at numerous points. Hackers implanting worms and viruses from across the globe can attack the system. Finally, network-centric warfare doctrine will not work in an insurgency war, in a people's war. This fact was apparent throughout the year of 2005, as Army, Marine, and Iraqi casualties mounted, and the most advance technologies ever produced sat motionless on runways or on the decks of enormous ships. After Operation Desert Storm the Army started transforming its divisions into digitally linked forces. The 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas was the Army's first "digitized" heavy division. The Army also started investing in Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV), establishing the Robotics Program Office at the Army Research Laboratory, which entered into contracts with General Dynam- ics Robotic Systems division to develop families of UGVs that were capable of finding and attacking targets with no human direction, conducting reconnaissance, and providing logistical and ambulance support. (UGVs have to be smarter than UAVs because they have to negotiate numerous obstacles, and differentiate between combatants and noncombatants.) In an article titled "Inside the Pentagon's Plan for a Soldier-Free Battlefield" it was noted that, "the real goal for UGVs is autonomous opera- tion with no human input whatsoever. . . ." 25 It was further noted that according to the 2001 Defense Authorization Act, "one third of all operational ground vehicles are supposed to be unmanned by 2015." Billions of dollars were committed to achieve this objective. Still, the Army was a long way from realizing network-centric war. This was a futuristic vision of war. Network-centric war worked best against states with highly centralized governments. Guerrilla and insurgency operations with highly decentralized chains of command, where the initiative rest with each fighter were not vulnerable to network-centric doctrine. Post-cold war operational think- ing did not reflect the realities in the world environment. The United States continued to design technologies and doctrines to fight the type of war it most wanted to fight, not the type of wars it was most likely to fight. While there has been an enormous body of official and unofficial scholarly work produced on the revolution in military affairs, the picture of what the Armed Forces were supposed to look like when transformed was still vague. Yet, there was one element of transformation that for The New American Way ofWar • 391 Americans was as consistent as war itself. One old tenet of the new revolution in military affairs was that technology could replace ground combat forces. This unbalanced preference for technological solutions continued to exert enormous influence on American thinking about the conduct of war. In the first year of the Bush Administration, the Rumsfeld Pentagon planned to cut two of the Army's ten remaining divisions— there were sixteen divisions in 1991 when the Army conducted Operation Desert Storm. Had these cuts been made before 9/11 it would have made it impossible to conduct simultaneous operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and maintain worldwide commitments. At the same time Rumsfeld was planning to get rid of better than 20 percent of the Army, he was planning to spend billions of dollars on three new jet fighters — one for each service. 26 Truman in the 1940s, Eisenhower in the 1950s, Carter in the 1970s, Bush in the 1980s and 1990s, and Bush in 2000, all sought to replace Army divisions with technology. Every decade, with the ex- ception of the Vietnam War Administrations and the Reagan Administration, new Administrations have endeavored to cut the Army to less than what was necessary given conservative estimates of the prevalent threats and worldwide commitments— the Army was forward deployed in Germany, Korea, Panama, and the Middle East and other parts of the world. For the past fifty years no tenet of American thinking about the conduct of war has been as consistently reproduced in policies and practice than the belief that airpower could replace manpower. And, arguably getting rid of the Army has been a consistent cultural tenet since the American Revolution, when the fear of the standing Army and the absence of significant enemies informed the behavior of political leaders. When the Armed Forces of the United States went to war in Iraq in 2003, the revolution in military affairs was well underway. Precision-guided munitions; satellite global positioning, navigation technol- ogy; satellite reconnaissance advanced notification systems; satellite intelligence collection and early warning technologies; cruise missiles; unmanned aerial vehicles; advanced satellite communication systems; laser-guided and optical-guided technologies; airborne radar; early warning and air control platforms; an unrivaled array of advanced aircraft; advanced antiaircraft and antimissile systems; thermo-imaging night observation; and other impressive technologies gave the United States the most advanced and expensive arsenals in the history of war. These advances enabled the Armed Forces to see more accurately and comprehensively; to engage targets at greater distances with greater precision; to respond with greater speed; to engage multiple targets simultaneously employing a wide range of weapons systems, many of which did not require Americans to enter the battlefield; and to measure the lethality, the degree of destruction desired with greater accuracy. And with new technologies came new operational and tactical doctrines, which sought to maximize the attributes of these new weapons and information systems. The Armed Forces of the United States trained and organized themselves to perfect the conduct of operations and tactics. They worked hard to become skilled technicians and operators. Men, ma- chines, organization, equipment, maximizing firepower, reducing casualties, accurate employment of weapons on target, all the palpable, physical, animated aspect of war were perfected. Strategic thinking, ethnic divisions, traditional relationships, ideology, religion, attitudes, nationalism, beliefs, family structure, customs, culture, all the intangibles human aspects of war were not studied, or were studied by only a few U.S. Army Special Forces. The American way of war emphasized positive ac- tions to achieve visible, almost instantaneous results. War, however, is a human endeavor and it is the intangibles that motivate people to fight. In Vietnam few Americans in uniform understood this. Since, Vietnam little has changed. Force Structure and Jointness Force structure reveals much about the services. Is "jointness" a fact, or just so much rhetoric? If the technologies and doctrines of the services are evolving in such a way as to compliment the strengths, 392 • The American Culture of War diminish the weaknesses, and expand the capabilities of the other services, it can be argued that jointness has in fact taken hold. However, if the force structures of the services are evolving in such a way as to duplicate the capabilities of other services, then, it can be argued that competition between the services trumps jointness. The story, however, is neither completely black nor white. There are indicators that the services are moving toward greater cooperation, but the strongest indicators are that they are not, and that "jointness" may need to be redefined. Jointness should not mean that the operational pie is cut evenly between the services, or that traditional relationships should be main- tained. It should mean that the most effective and efficient means for achieving objectives are employed, whether it be all Army forces, or all Navy and Air Forces, or all Marine forces. This, however, is not the dominant behavior. Jointness since Operation Desert Storm has meant that the services each get a fair share of the operational pie, without interservice fighting that required civilian interference. In other words, the services have agreed to cooperate and recognize the right of the other to exist; and thereby, minimize the involvement of civilian leadership. Having identified this new acceptance of one another, the services are not static. The Air Force and Marine Corps are in ascendancy, while the Army and the Navy are in decline. At least that was the case until the Army was needed to fight the war in Iraq. The Rumsfeld Pentagon was in the process of gutting the Army when it was called upon to fight the insurgency war in Iraq. With the demise of the Soviet Union came the demise of the Air Force's primary mission, strategic bombing. This mission had for decades formed the very identity of the Air Force. The Air Force had to rethink, reorient, and reconfigure its forces. For example, the primary missions for which the B- 1 bomber was built — attacking the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons— no longer existed. The B-l had to be reconfigured for conventional operations. The primary mission of the B-2 also had to be modified. Neither bomber was used in the first Persian Gulf War. The Air Force's strategic bombing mission, at least in the immediate future, was obsolete. In some ways the Air Force became like the Navy. The primary mission of the Navy, to fight other navies, arguable went away with the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II. While the Soviet Navy provided a reason for being, only its submarine fleet was a serious challenge to the U.S. Navy. The Air Force's air superiority mission while not completely eliminated was also greatly diminished. The United States has not fought an air superiority war against nation-states capable of producing, maintaining, sustaining, and training competitive fighter squadrons since the Korean War, and even that was a very limited campaign. In Vietnam the biggest challenge was from surface to air missiles (SAMs). With the demise of the Soviet Union the air superiority mission, while not eliminated, was substantially diminished. Hence, some have argued that the Air Force's new F-22 Raptor, which was designed for this mission, is no longer necessary. 27 It is also argued that in the not too distant future, UCAVs will reach a level of technological sophistication to remove man from combat aircraft. 28 While China, Russia, and the European Union provide a rationale for the continued development of air superiority aircraft, in the global war on terrorism, and wars against developing Third World states, there has been little or no need for air-to-air combat fighters. Developing states and terrorists prefer cheaper SAMs, which require little training. Hence, two of the Air Force's major missions no longer provided a reason for being. The U.S. Navy no longer fights navies, and the US. Air Force no longer fights air forces. That leaves only one dimension in which to fight, the ground war. At the dawn of the twenty- first century the primary mission of the Navy and Air Force in active combat is to fight the ground war. There are three missions in which the two air forces can fight, one strategic, two tactical. These were the missions carried out in the Persian Gulf War. Strategic attacks against targets significant enough to influence the outcome of the war, or tactical attacks against enemy ground forces either independently or in concert with ground forces. Thus, there are two doctrines for achieving victory without ground forces. The strategic mission of airpower has evolved in such The New American Way ofWar • 393 a way that little risk is involved. The targets can be selected from space or other intelligence sources. Ships and submarines can launch cruise missiles from hundreds of miles away. B-52s and B-ls can do the same. B-2s and F-117s engage targets at distances greater than fifty miles, and unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) and space are pointing the way to the future of strategic airpower. These are jobs that can be carried out by highly trained, highly skilled technicians. The attributes required by the men who flew B-17 missions over Nazi Germany or F-105s missions over North Vietnam are no longer required. If the current trends are not reversed in the future, private military firms (PMFs) will take on many of these missions. The use of PMFs diminishes political risk, a major incentive for politicians, and can do the job considerably cheaper than the Armed Forces because they do not require the same quality of technology demanded by the services. Arguably the primary missions of the U.S. Navy have not changed since World War II. The De- partment of Defense identified the following "functions" for the Navy: "seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and suppress enemy sea commerce; gain and maintain general naval supremacy; control vital sea areas and protect vital sea lines of communication; establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations; seize and defend advanced naval bases; and conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." 29 However, there are no serious naval challenges to the U.S. Navy, and the Armed Forces of the U.S. are forward deployed all over the planet. Private firms are primarily responsible for deploying the Army and other forces. Hence, the major missions of the Navy are to conduct limited independent opera- tions with its airpower, surface and submarine fleets (cruisers and submarine employing missiles); to provide rapid, emergency response to crises in various parts of the world; to maintain U.S. presence in contested regions; to deter actions opposed by the United States; to augment the Air Force in major wars; to deploy and support the Marine Corps; and to assist in the deployment of the Army. The greatest strength of the Navy, arguably, is that it has greater access to all regions of the planet for sustained air operations than the Air Force. "Arguably" because the Air Force since the late 1940s has consistently challenged this thesis. In the wake of the first Persian Gulf War, however, it was be- lieved that a new sense of jointness had changed the perspective of the Air Force toward the Navy's aircraft carrier. Commander James Paulsen, U.S. Navy observed that: "Following Desert Storm, the Air Force recognized the aircraft carrier's contributions and the independence they offer to global presence. In light of the restrictions of deployable basing rights, the Air Force reversed its 50-year stance against the need for naval aviation." 30 Paulsen noted that: "Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm brought together the tactical capabilities of naval aviation and the strategic capabilities of the Air Force. The air- tanking assets of the Air Force and the strike assets of the Navy brought extended capabilities to the table. This development became an important element of the air war over Iraq in 1991 and the beginning of a new joint relationship for the next decade." During the Persian Gulf War the Air Force was given the mission to provide air tanker support, "strat gas," to Navy aircraft. This new joint relationship was in effect in 2002 and 2003. Paulsen noted that: "When planning for Iraqi Freedom approached realization, it was clear the multicarrier presence being assembled would require vast numbers of tankers, and the Air Force would be called on to provide that airborne fuel." Had the Air Force, in fact, changed a view and position it had held for fifty years? Given the advancements in technology the Air Force's argument against the aircraft carrier were substantial stronger in 2003 than in 1949. Consider the following: First, the Air Force is forward deployed in various regions of the world, and thus, is capable of responding almost immediately to crises in these regions. Second, the Air Force can rapidly forward deploy to regions and countries that have the runway space required. With its C- 1 7s and C-5 transports the Air Force can package, transport, and construct its expeditionary requirements for a sustainable airfield. In the first Persian Gulf war Saudi Arabia had runways and other facilities required. All the 394 • The American Culture of War Air Force had to do was occupy them. Third, the Air Force has demonstrated the ability to circum- navigate the world without landing. In other words, the Air Force with its B-2s and B-ls and aerial refueling capabilities can strike any point on the Earth at any time with considerable firepower. The B-2, without anyone knowing it is there, from eight miles up, can strike any point on Earth with con- ventional or nuclear weapons within a twenty-four-hour period. The B-l, while relying on its great speed as opposed to stealth, can do the same. Fourth, Navy aircraft carriers are not as independent as they appear. The high demands of fifty strike fighters; the limited storage capacity for munitions, jet fuel, and other resources on board; the relatively small number of logistical support ships; and the high-intensity of modern combat operations, tie carriers to land support sources. Fifth, the Navy aircraft lack the range of capabilities of Air Force aircraft. The Navy, because of its reliance on one combat aircraft, the F/A-18, cannot perform the missions of the Air Force's B-2s, B-ls, F-l 17s, B-52s, and other aircraft. Finally, while the Navy has demonstrated a remarkable ability to "surge," to com- mit its forces to an operation at a relatively high rate of intensity it cannot sustain that rate for long periods of time. The Air Force, however, can sustain it forces at a high rate of intensity for the dura- tion of the war. The hazards of aircraft carrier operations are not prevalent. While the Navy's role in combat operations has changed little since the early days of the cold war, the Air Force's role in the conduct of war has changed significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Air Force has successfully reoriented and refocused. It has expanded its capabilities into areas operation previously dominated by the Navy. The Navy does a few things the Air Force cannot do: it can in some cases launch aircraft and influence situations in minutes as opposed to hours. And, its mere presence can "deter the outbreak of war" and "demonstrate U.S. resolve in foreign policy objectives." Still, while no one is predicting the demise of the carrier, this role alone cannot justify the cost of carrier battle groups (more recent terminology: carrier strike groups). The Navy has shown little imagination in advancing carrier technology and capabilities. The only advances in carrier design since the 1950s have been to make them incrementally larger and to add nuclear propulsion. The new jointness between the Navy and Air Force was a marriage of convenience. The Air Force is committed to expanding its capabilities, and in the process to demonstrate that it can in fact conduct every mission of the Navy with greater effect and efficiency. Post-Desert Storm doctrines emphasized joint operations, rapid force projection, advanced technolo- gies as force multipliers, the ability to shift rapidly from one types of operation to another, and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Joint doctrine was designed to respond to the "full spectrum" of potential operations, which included offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations, or more precisely under the heading of MOOTW, drug-trafficking, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping; and under the heading of war, regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, terror- ism, conventional conflict, and tactical nuclear war. 31 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the operational tempo of the services increased enormously as Presidents took on commitments in all corners of the planet (Iraq 1991; Somalia, 1992; Haiti, 1994; Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995; Kosovo, 1999; Afghanistan, 2001; Iraq, 2003). And there were numerous operations in various parts of the world that are not publicly known. The all-volunteer force disguised the actual cost of war, because only one community, the military cluster, felt the pain . The increased operational tempo and the ever- increasing range of MOOTW placed greater demands on the services to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate operations, maximize the use of limited resources, and exploit the unique abilities and technologies of a given service. In this new, rapidly changing environment joint training and joint doctrine were considered, by some, mandatory. A joint forces command was established to coordinate the doctrine and training of the si The New American Way ofWar • 395 The Army, like the Air Force, lost its primary enemy and mission with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Army and Marine Corps serve much the same purposes in war — they both fight the ground war. The Marine Corps forms a second land army, which maintains a manpower strength of about 35 to 40 percent of that of the ArmyBy law the Marine Corps maintains three divisions and three air wings on active duty, and one division and one air wing in the reserve. In the 1950s its manpower strength was roughly 10 to 20 percent of that of the Army. The Army and Marine Corps have many of the same capabilities. . The Army has a number of unique capabilities and missions that are not duplicated in the Marine Corps. The Army's airborne, air assault, armor/mechanized, Special Forces, and Rangers have no equivalence in the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps with its Navy amphibious ships and crafts, and vertical take off and landing aircraft have capabilities not duplicated in the Army. The Marine Corps' relation with the Navy provides access to the coastal regions of the world and unique methods of deployment. The Marines Corps new vertical take off and landing aircraft extends the operations range of the Marine Corps well beyond the horizon. And, of course, the presence of the Marines on ship enable them to respond rapidly to small crises. Sometimes the mere presence of the Navy and Marine Corps offshore is sufficient to achieve the objectives of the White House. The two services are organized differently, have different force structures, some different technology and doctrine, and different cultures and ways of thinking. Still, in recent years in some ways they have grown more alike. In the new world of "jointness" supposedly Army doctrine became joint doctrine; and thus, Ma- rine doctrine. And Marine doctrine became joint doctrine, and thus, Army doctrine. For example, on September 16, 2002 Joint Publication 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations was published. While the Marine Corps was the primary proponent of the publication, the document was produced in consultation with the Army and the other services, and was applicable to all the services. Joint forces commanders (JFCs) were to "synchronize the complementary capabilities of the service components that comprise the joint forces. . . . Synchronize joint operations in time and space . . . " 33 The Army's Operations Manual FM 100-5, has been replaced with a Joint Forces Manual. Still, jointness, while receiving considerable attention in the wake of Operation Desert Storm, is not the driving force for either the Army or Marine Corps. Maximizing combat efficiency also is not the driving force. The survival and continued health of the services is the primary driving force. Survival means getting a healthy share of the defense budget pie, war, and manpower authorization. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm the Army expanded its expeditionary capabilities and the Marine Corps expanded its mechanized, maneuver warfare capabilities. In Desert Storm the Marine Corps fought the largest tank battle in its history; however, Schwarzkopf, attached a heavy U.S. Army armor brigade to General Boomer's Corps. It thus, fought that battle with considerable support from the Army. In the wake of the war, the Marine Corps reevaluated its force structure. It had promulgated a new maneuver war doctrine prior to Operation Desert Storm, but was unable to use it. Its force structure lacked the mobility to fight a classic war of maneuvers. The Marine Corps refought the war in Iraq, correctly concluding that it would again have to fight against heavy Arab armor formations in Middle East desert terrain. As a consequence, the Marine Corps expanded its ability to fight more traditional maneuver warfare. Two students of Marine Corps operations wrote: "Under Maneuver Warfare, the aim was to strike at the enemy's command and control center, leaving the soldiers on the bypassed blocks without leadership or cohesion. The doctrine also stressed the need for speed — speed of decision-making first and foremost, then speed of execution as well; since speed was always relative, it meant being faster than your enemy above all else". Marine doctrine also emphasized the need for operational flexibility to achieve surprise. ." 34 To achieve speed and surprise deploying from sea the Marines depended on their new vertical take off and landing aircraft, the V- 22 Osprey. However in desert terrain deploying large units the Marine Corps need vehicles, ideally armored vehicles. Hence, it turned its AAV and LAV amphibious vehicles into the equivalent of armed 396 • The American Culture of War personnel carriers, added more track vehicles to its force structure, and replaced its aging M60 tanks with the new Ml Al. In 2003 the Marine Corps demonstrated the ability to maneuver more than three regiments across hundreds of miles of desert. This was a capability it did not have in Operation Desert Storm. The Marine Corps, by expanding its ability to fight an Iraqi armor force, looked more like the Army. It required more logistical and maintenance resources. In Operation Iraqi Freedom the Marine Corps had greater ability than ever before to fight armored formations, independent of the Army. The Marine Corps did not have the equivalent of the Army Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and had it gotten into a genuine tank battle its amphibious assault vehicles (Amtrac) would have proven inadequate. The Marine Corps also did not possess the tank killing ability of the Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. It did, however, have its own fixed-wing air force. A Marine fighter pilot observed, "For decades, Marines jealously have guarded Marine fixed-wing aviation for the near-exclusive use of the Marine air-ground task force commander. Operation Iraqi Freedom was no exception. As the war progressed from planning to execution, the maneuver commander had an impressive and at times overwhelming amount of coalition air supporting his scheme of maneuver." 35 The Marine Corps de- pended on its air wing of vertical take off AV-8Bs Harriers (soon to be replaced with the Joint Strike Fighter), F/A 18s, and its Super Cobra helicopters, an improved Vietnam era helicopter. The Marine Corps did not neglect its infantry; however, instead of focusing on storming the beaches, it emphasized military operations in urban terrain, war in cities. The Army in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War was again concerned about survival. It was again being said that the Army and the tank were obsolete. The Army needed a way to get to the battlefield. The Army needed to become an expeditionary force, more like the Marines. While the Army's Stryker Brigades looked nothing like Marine Corps units, they were designed for rapid deployment. With the Air Force's new C-17s for strategic mobility, the Army started developing independent brigade size organizations capable of generating more combat power than a World War II airborne division and operating independent of a division headquarters. Each brigade had attached logistical support units and indirect fire resources. Sustainability once on the ground was still a major problem. The Army still depended on the Air Force and, to some degree, the Navy. "Sea Basing," the maintenance of several divisions of Army equipment a float, provides the Army with an answer to its strategic mobility problem. Ships loaded with Abrams and Bradleys and the other equipment required for Army operations could be prepositioned, which greatly shortened the Army's deployment time. For intratheater mobility the Army experimented with high-speed vessels (HSV). One Navy observer wrote: "The Army views the HSV as a theater support vessel with a focus on logistics. . . . The Army has driven much of the interest in high-speed ships to help shrink its deploy- ment timeline." 36 The Army leased two HSVs, the Joint Venture and Spearhead, for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Navy, however, will not permit the Army to form its own navy of HSVs. In response to the Army's initiative, the Navy too started experimenting with HSVs. Private contractors with roll-on, roll-off ship and sea basing are the Army's long-term solution of strategic and operational mobility. Private military firms can also provide intratheater support. While much time and attention has been devoted to "jointness," indicators show that this trans- formation had not yet penetrated the core cultures of the services. 37 The Air Force still argues that it can generate greater combat power, faster, and at considerably less cost than the Navy, which has to maintain expensive aircraft carriers, that long-range precision munitions and airpower are substitutes for many of the ground force capabilities of the Army and Marine Corps, and that ground forces were, for the most part, auxiliaries. 38 The Marine Corps organized its own mechanized maneuver warfare force, and is developing and procured the V-22 Osprey that make it possible to carry out operations deep into the interior of countries, expanding its operational mobility, in many ways duplicating the Army's air mobile/air assault divisions. The Army is developing Theater Support Vessels (TSV), Inter- Theater Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift ships (SDHSS), and Stryker brigades with wheeled fighting The New American Way ofWar • 397 vehicles to quickly deploy a rapid response forces that generate as much or more combat power than similar size marine units. 39 The Army has invested billions in helicopter and artillery technologies to eliminate its dependence on the Air Force for close air support, and intraair mobility. And if it were scientifically and technically possible, the Army, to be sure, would construct helicopters to provide strategic mobility. Jointness is an idea, not a fact. Truman's dream has never been realized. Jointness needs to be redefined. Success of the conventional war in Operation Iraqi Freedom was considered a success of "jointness." Still, in operations conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces the first criterion is to insure that each service gets its piece of the pie. If the Air Force can perform the mission most effectively, naval aviation still has to be taken into consideration, and if possible a role found or created for it. The Marine Corps forms a second land Army. It is difficult to discern major differences in the missions and tasks required of the two services. General Tommy Franks initially wanted three heavy divisions to fight the war in Iraq. He got one, and one was at sea when the war commenced and ended. Whenever the Army is deployed for major operations no matter what type of operation, no matter what the force structure of the enemy the Marine Corps is also deployed. While observ- ers are unanimous in their praise of the conventional campaign and assessments of the quality and character of the coordination, synchronization, and integration of forces between the services; it was absurd to see Marine Corps amphibious vehicles hundreds of miles inland, and recognized that for maintenance, logistical, supply, mobility, firepower, force protection, command and control, and air defense purposes it made more sense to deploy another heavy Army division and possibly a brigade of light infantry. 40 Consider these words: By design, Marine Corps forces are not organized or equipped for sustained land combat, and certainly not for a campaign ashore lasting months in an offensive hundreds of miles into the interior of a country with a poor infrastructure and virtually no coastline. Accordingly, the Army provided significant reinforcement. ... At the time the Marines executed their initial operation ... in Iraq on 20 March 2003, the Army had attached more than 2,700 soldiers to 1 MEF to provided the capabilities not resident in Marine forces, including: a Patriot missile brigade and five Patriot batteries; an engineer group with two engineer battalions and three bridge companies; a military police (MP) battalion; a signal battalion: a civil affairs brigade; a psychological operations (PSYOP) battalion; a corps support group with seven transportation companies; and numerous smaller units. These units contributed to the success of 1 MEF. . . . 41 In this environment it made no sense to deploy amphibious tractors in Baghdad. The Pentagon would rather get marines killed than employ the forces appropriate for the job. After the war Franks responded to criticisms that he went into Baghdad with insufficient forces: "I will simply say that in this particular circumstance the force that entered Iraq— had it not had the 4th ID, the 1st Armored Division, and Armored Cav Regiment en route to and beginning to download its equipment in Ku- wait—this would have been a gamble. But the fact [that] the force that entered Iraq was the lead element of additional substantial combat power, the piece of which were already beginning to unload, took the gamble out to the equation and placed the level at what I call prudent risk." 42 An Army armor or mechanized division generated considerably more combat power than an Army or Marine infantry division, with technology that was considerably more survivable. Force structure and operational plans for war are not based on maximizing combat effectiveness. They are based on dividing the operational pie equally. The losers are the soldiers and marines that die on battlefields for the sake of splitting the pie. And while the Air Force and Army achieved a new level of jointness in Operation Iraqi Freedom, this was not a prediction of the future relationship. The cultures of the two services had changed little. The Air Force continues to believe it can fight and win wars without the Army, . The Goldwater-Nichols Act can be credited with producing senior 398 • The American Culture of War officers with greater understanding of the culture and capabilities of each service. However, service loyalty in an environment of declining resources trumped jointness. The services have overlapping responsibilities, and duplicate the capabilities of one another. The services continued the traditional practices of selling themselves, lobbying for weapons, conspiring with members of Congress, and op- posing changes to their force structure that are not in accordance with traditional ways of operating. And, there are still winners and losers. The New American Way of War: Operation Enduring Freedom Consider the recent American conduct of war: On March 24, 1999 the air forces of the United States (each service has its own air force) in concert with allied NATO forces initiated combat operations in the failed state of Yugoslavia. The Clinton Administration sought to employ military forces to stop "ethnic cleansing" and restore peace in the Kosovo region. Clinton declared: "We and our 18 NATO allies are in Kosovo today because we want to stop the slaughter and the ethnic cleansing. We cannot simply watch as thousands of people are brutalized, murdered, raped, forced from their homes, their family histories erased— all in the name of ethnic pride and purity." 43 Clinton and the nineteen members of NATO, initially decided the military task, and ultimately the political objective, could be achieved with airpower. They resisted putting ground forces into the region to physically and immediately stop the ethnic cleansing. One student of America's wars, Andrew J. Bacevich, wrote: In the annals of U.S. military history the war for Kosovo stands out as a singularly peculiar episode. Among other things, the war produced more than its share of "firsts." It was, famously, the first war that U.S. forces fought to its conclusion without sustaining a single combat casualty. Indeed, for the policymakers who conceived Operation Allied Force and the commanders who directed it, minimizing the risk to allied soldiers seemingly took precedence over both their obligation to safeguard Serb noncombatants and their interest in protecting the ethnic Albanians whose plight provided the ostensible rationale for intervention. American officials described that intervention as a moral imperative. Yet before the conflict had even ended observers were wondering if the United States had turned moral tradition on its head, with combatants rather than noncombatants provided immunity from the effects of fighting. 44 The campaign that was supposed to take days, took months — seventy-eight days. And, had Slobo- dan Milosevic been Adolf Hitler, the Albanian Muslim population would have suffered a holocaust. The use of ground forces was considered, even threatened, but ultimately political leaders decided to supplement its airpower, which was proving to be indecisive, with surrogate ground forces: "In Kosovo the U.S. utilized the KLA, which it had earlier denounced as terrorists, because it sought to win battles, and the KLA— criminals, terrorists, and all— was deemed indispensable. American of- ficials had ample proof of this, but they made a pact with it despite deep apprehension because they needed the KLA's help against the Serbs." 45 The United States and its NATO allies employed surrogate forces, on whose loyalty they could not depend, and airpower to achieve its objectives. Rather than employ their own ground forces they preferred to get in bed with the devil. Ethnic cleansing could not be immediately or effectively stopped at an altitude of 20,000 feet. Another student of the war, Michael Evans, wrote: The air war did not succeed in protecting the Kosovo population. Indeed, it worsened and ac- celerated the humanitarian crisis because the Serbs systematically depopulated the province of Albanians. While NATO struck at the heartland of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was subjected to mass terror reminiscent of German SS field units in Eastern Europe during World War II. In trying The New American Way ofWar • 399 to prevent genocide, the West used a military method— air power— which accelerated it. In an extraordinary paradox, a war based on the notion of discriminate force using dazzling informa- tion-age technology— B-2 bombers, cruise missiles, and joint direct-attack munitions— sacrificed the Albanian Kosovars to indiscriminate death at the hands of Serb forces using methods we associate with the Dark Ages. In humanitarian terms, the air war was an unmitigated disaster, and a cautionary warning for the West in employing force in future intra-state conflicts. 46 Evans correctly predicted that: "The humanitarian failure will not prevent Western air forces theo- rists from arguing that the war was a decisive victory for air power." 47 The American people had no part in the war, and little interest. Bacevich observed that, "By the time the war finally wound down in June, Americans had effectively decided that it no longer merited their attention. . . . Sports teams that lose the Super Bowl or the NCAA basketball championship receive a warmer welcome upon returning home than did the Americans who won the war in Kosovo." 48 On September 11, 2001 an Islamic terrorist network attacked the United States killing over three thousand people, causing President Bush to declare a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the first phase of which was Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. 49 The identities of the per- petrators and the government that supported them, the al-Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, were quickly established, but the Bush Administration moved slowly and cautiously to confront them, ultimately deciding not to employ significant American ground forces, opting instead to use surrogate forces — the Northern Alliance— American Special Forces, and airpower in Afghanistan. 50 Traditional ground warfare operations were avoided. The history and memory of failed Soviet campaigns in Afghanistan infected the new war Administration. As a consequence of not employing American ground forces, thousands of al-Qaeda forces were allowed to escape into Pakistan. The objectives of the surrogate force, the Northern Alliance, and the United States were not the same. Taliban and al Qaeda leaders— including probably Osama Bin Laden— were able to bargain and buy their way out of the various encirclements. At places such as Kabul, Kandahar, and Tora Bora, enemy forces were able to escape because the Northern Alliance was poorly trained, employed insuf- ficient forces, and lacked the will to stop them. In some cases Taliban and al Qaeda forces were simply released. Having no love for Americans, a kinship with their opponents, and centuries of operational methods that did not include the complete destruction of the enemy, the Northern Alliance acted pragmatically in its own best interests and in the process precluded the United States from achieving major parts of its political objectives. It is a fact that the American people, as a consequence of the failure to employ American ground forces, were less secure. And it is fact that long after the American air/special forces campaign in Afghanistan, Bin Laden was still planning and finding new ways to kill Americans, and still inciting Muslims to attack and kill Americans. In the years that followed the Bush and Rumsfeld again sought to employ this doctrine— against the arguments of senior Army leaders. The results were predictable. The United States is working tenaciously to eliminate man from war, to kill with technology from a safe distance, to fight war without casualties, and in the process of doing so it is losing sight of the objec- tives of war. 51 16 The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander has to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. . . . —Carl von Clausewitz 1 After all, this is the guy [Saddam Hussein] who tried to kill my dad. — President George W. Bush, Houston, 26 September 2002 Rumsfeld's team took over crucial aspects of the day-to-day logistical planning . . . and Rumsfeld repeatedly overruled the senior Pentagon planners on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "He thought he knew better," one senior planner said. "He was the decision maker at every turn." On at least six occasions, the planner told me, when Rumsfeld and his deputies were presented with op- erational plans ... he insisted that the number of ground troops be sharply reduced. . . . When it [the time-phased force-deployment list, or TPFDL] was initially presented to Rumsfeld last year for his approval, it called for the involvement of a wide range offerees from the different armed services, including four or more Army divisions. Rumsfeld rejected the package, because it was "too big," the Pentagon planner said. He insisted that a smaller, faster-moving attack force, combined with overwhelming air power, would suffice. —Seymour Hersh 2 In March 2003 Bush and his closest advisors elected to go to war against the regime of Saddam Hussein. They believed the war would be short and easy, that the power of the U.S Armed Forces was so over- whelming they could dictate the course of the war. They believed that unilaterally they could change the course of the history of a foreign state and culture, and, indeed, the entire Middle East region. They believed the war would pay for itself, with the oil wealth of the invaded state. They believed the Iraqi people would greet them as liberators. They believed they would be welcomed with open arms and cheers of joy. They did not try to understand the culture of the peoples they were invading, or the dynamic of their social and political systems. Nor did they seek to understand the nature of war in the Middle East against Muslims. They thought only of men and machines, technology and logistics, and their own plans. The war, however, was a chameleon. And by trying to impose their will upon Saddam Hussein, without consideration of the people of Iraq or the cultures of the region, Bush and his most 401 402 • The American Culture of War senior advisors totally failed to see what they were looking at. They totally misjudged the situation, and the cost of the war in lives and treasure. They missed and destroyed numerous opportunities to share the burden of the war with other states, to gain international legitimacy, and to preclude the current insurgency war; and in the process they created and stirred hate and anger in the Middle East that will influence world affairs long after they have departed from office. The conventional war that George W. Bush began has now evolved into an insurgency war. The objective of the second Bush Administration to create a stable, capitalist democracy in Iraq, based on American values and ethics that would serve as a model for other Middle East nations, has not been achieved, and is in fact beyond the means and resources of the United States. The United States not only lacks the military power to achieve such a transformation, it lacks the requisite cultural understanding. Hence, it employed the wrong type of power, the wrong doctrine, and the wrong strategy. The second Bush Administration placed too much faith in military solutions based on advanced technologies, and by doing so it grossly misread the situation in Iraq. The United States is not a nation at war. The vast majority of Americans, 99 percent, are not involved, nor are the Air Force and Navy fully engaged. The Army and Marine Corps are fighting the war, and they are grossly overextended. There are too few soldiers and marines to provide security, fight the war, maintain the other US. commitments around the world, and maintain a strategic reserve. The Army is under strength by more than 100,000 men— the equivalent of five divisions. If war broke out in Korea or some other part of the world now the United States would be totally incapable of meet- ing that threat, short of employing nuclear weapons, or airpower, which is not decisive. Yet, the Bush Administration has made no effort to call upon the American people to serve— no effort to reinstate the draft and no effort to raise taxes to pay for the war. From 1 973 to the present, the American people have lived with the convenient fiction that the all-volunteer force and its advanced technologies could meet all US. security needs and American interests around the world. This was not the way of war of the modern nation-state that emerged during the American and French revolutions. As noted in an earlier chapter, this was the way of war of the absolute monarchs of Europe in the seventeenth century. A small, professional, long-standing force and private military firms are fighting the war in Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Decision for War There is no shortage of arguments on the causes of the second American war against Iraq. The prob- lem is determining which argument, or arguments provide the most accurate explanation. Because the primary documents needed to develop a definitive explanation will not be available for decades, if ever, and because the war is still in progress and emotions are influencing opinions the best that can be achieved at this point in time is a delineation of the various arguments, and an assessment of the events on the road to war. What is now known is that the primary reason advanced by the Bush Administration for war, that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, was inaccurate, and the evidence supports the conclusion that the Bush Administration lied about WMDs. Hence, other motives motivated the decision for war. What were they? What follows is a brief discussion of the various arguments, most of which are not mutually exclusive, and a brief history of the events that led up to war: Some students of the Middle East have predicted a "clash of civilizations," or a clash of cultures. Samuel P. Huntington wrote the: "fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed." 3 In his book, The Clash of Civilization: Remaking the World Order, he wrote: "The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 403 the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world." He further noted, "The West's universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China . . . " 4 Those who accept this thesis believe that the Western, secular world and the Muslim, religious fundamentalist world are on a collision course. While some believe that Huntington's thesis is too simplistic, devoid of substantial data and systematic analysis, others believe the struggle is already underway. The Republican neo-conservatives, led by Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Pearl, accepted this thesis, but modified it. They argued that the only way to preclude a larger cataclysm was to transform the Middle East, a cultural transformation based on Western values, ethics, and beliefs. They believed that the United States, with or without allied support, possessed the power to transform Iraq, and through Iraq the entire Middle East. They believed that Iraq was the focal point for cultural and political transformation, and that a democratic, secular, capitalist Iraq would influence Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim, Middle East states, transforming the entire region. During the Clinton Administration members of a neo-conservative think tank, Project for the New American Century (PNAC), advanced a policy of regime change in Iraq. In a letter to President Clinton dated 26 January 1998 from the PNAC, signed by Donald Rumsfeld, Pauld Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle, and other "neo-cons." It was argued that: We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding. . . . We urge you to seize that opportunity [the State of the Union Address] to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. . . . That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power. ... As recent events have demonstrated, we can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades UN inspections. Our ability to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished. Even if full inspections were eventually to resume . . . experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to monitor Iraq's chemical and biological weapons production. 5 This letter was followed by a letter, dated 29 May 1998 to Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, advocating the same strategy and stressing the consequences for a failure to take action. In September 2000 PNAC published a document entitled, Rebuilding America's Defense: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century. It is argued that after 9/11 the Bush Administration adopted this document as its "blueprint for foreign and defense policy" 6 It is clear that many of the recommendations and proposals advanced in the neo-conservative document were implemented, and that members of this think-tank became powerful members of the Bush Administration. Donald Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, became the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle became an advisor to the Pentagon, and other members of the PNAC joined the Bush Administration. The neo-conservatives, it is argued, formed the ideological foundation of the Bush Administration. These were the true believers. 7 They had faith in America's mission, and after 9/11 they advanced a preemptive war strategic doctrine that provided the rationale for war with Iraq. Under this doctrine Bush promised to act unilaterally to strike enemies before they could attack the United States. Some argued that this was more accurately an illegal "preventive war" doctrine. 8 Bush, in his speech in Cincinnati stated: "If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today, and we do, does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?" This was an argument for preventive war. This thinking has started wars throughout history, and there is no end to it. Potential enemy states can always be accused of growing stronger. (In 2005 the neo-conservatives started advocating war against Iran and North Korea.) 404 • The American Culture of War The Bush Administration in the wake of 9/11, it is argued, accepted a modified Huntington the- sis. Bush in a speech before the American Enterprise Institute, a neo-conservative group, stated: "A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region by bringing hope and progress to the lives of millions. ... A new regime in Iraq could serve as a dramatic example of freedom for other nations in the region." 9 In the wake of the conventional war, in a speech before the UN, he stated: "Success of a free Iraq will be watched throughout the region. Millions will see that freedom, equality and material progress are possible at the heart of the Middle East. Leaders of the region will face the clearest evidence that free institutions and open societies are the only path to long-term national success and dignity. And a transformed Middle East would benefit the entire world. . . . Iraq as a democracy will have great power to inspire the Middle East." 10 And his National Security Advi- sor Condoleezza Rice argued that, "a transformed Iraq can become a key element in a very different Middle East in which the ideologies of hate will not flourish." 11 Many American supporters of Israel, the prime beneficiary of U.S. military and economic assistance in the Middle East, and the nation that stands to benefit the most from a transformed Middle East, also advanced the modified Huntington thesis. The British historian John Keegan observed: Many of the neo-conservatives were Jewish; almost all were Zionist and pro-Israeli. That was to prove unfortunate for it entangled their policies for the Middle East, which was generally rational and enlightened if not always realistic, with their ambitions for the future of the Jew- ish state, which were contentious and nationalistic. . . . They were particularly insistent that "regime change" in Iraq, the focus of their antipathies, would foster change for the better in its neighbours, including Syria and Iran. Paradoxically, however, several of the neo-conservatives supported extremist politicians in Israel, who rejected compromise with the Palestinians; they wanted a larger and stronger Israeli state. ... n In March 2006, Professor John Mearsheimer, a Political Scientist at the University of Chicago, and Stephen Walt, a Professor at Harvard University published a controversial article entitled, "The Israel Lobby," in which they concluded that Jewish American lobbies and Israel played a decisive role in the decision of the Bush Administration to go to war in Iraq: Pressure from Israel and the Lobby [the Jewish lobby organizations in the U.S.] was not the only factor behind the decision to attack Iraq in March 2003, but it was critical. [T]he war was motivated in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure. According to Philip Zelikow, a former member of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, and now a counselor to Condoleezza Rice, the 'real threat' from Iraq was not a threat to the United States. The 'unstated threat' was the 'threat against Israel,' Zelikow told an audience at the University of Virginia in September 2002. 'The American government,' he added, 'doesn't want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell. 13 Mearsheimer and Walt also noted that: "Israeli intelligence had given Washington a variety of alarming reports about Iraq's WMD programs. As one retired Israeli general later put it, 'Israeli intelligence was a full partner to the picture presented by American and British intelligence regard- ing Iraq's non-conventional capabilities'" They concluded: "There is little doubt that Israel and the Lobby were the key factors in the decision to go to war. ... If their efforts to shape US policy [con- tinue to] succeed, Israel's enemies will be weakened or overthrown, Israel will get a free hand with the Palestinians, and the US will do most of the fighting, dying, rebuilding, and paying." The US has been doing the "paying" for decades. For the millions of dollars the Jewish lobbies give to members of Congress each year, Israel has received more than $140 billion. While Mearsheimer and Walt have been severely criticized, not unexpectedly, by the Jewish lobbies and supporters of Israel, they present The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 405 considerable evidence to support their position. 14 In the wake of the conventional phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Bush stated: "If you're a supporter of Israel, I would strongly urge you to help other countries become democracies. Israel's long-term survival depends upon the spread of democracy in the Middle East." 15 One of the reasons the Bush Administration failed to win the support of its two most powerful European allies, France and Germany, is because these nations believed U.S. policy was decisively influenced by American Jewish "neocons" whose unquestioned support for Israel distorted American foreign and military policies, and American perceptions and behaviors in the Middle East. 16 But was this the primary reason for the war? Consider the argument from the Arab side. The Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Aldouri, in October 2002, told the general assembly that the United States was a hegemonic power: This American aggressive hysteria has nothing to do with putting an end to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world, for the United States of America is the state which owns the largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, and they have a long history which shows they have used these weapons against the people, starting with Hiroshima and Nagasaki and then Vietnam. . . . There will be many victims of this hegemonistic tendency if we do not put an end to it. The urgent task today is that of refusing Washington's attempt to hamper the return of the inspectors after Iraq has indeed adopted all the practical measures and arrangements and paved the way for the return of the inspectors to carry out their work easily. 17 From the perspective of Arab and Muslim states that had suffered nearly a century under the rule of Western powers, the U.S. is simply the newest imperialist power. The vision of war and the trans- formation of Iraq extolled by the Bush Administration hearken back to the dawn of the last century when the concept of "The White Man's Burden" and "Manifest Destiny" influenced the actions of Western imperial powers including the United States. 18 During this final phase of European imperi- alism, the Western world believed it was its duty to civilize the backward peoples of the world. From the perspective of the Middle East it appears that the United States has now "taken up" this "Burden." Some American scholars, with variations, some significant, support the argument advanced by the Iraqi ambassador. According to this argument, the United States maintains significant military bases in foreign states, it endeavors to control the natural resources of foreign countries, and it seeks to impose its cultural and political norms on other nation-states. Professors Andrew Bacevich, Chalmers Johnson, and Rasid Khalidi have each independently developed this thesis, providing considerable empirical evidence to support their arguments. In 2004, Rashid Khalidi, the Edward Said Chair in Arab Studies at Columbia University, published a book entitled Resurrecting Empire: Western Foot- prints and Americans Perilous Path in the Middle East, in which he delineated the major causes for the war in Iraq. He wrote: This was a war fought firstly to demonstrate that it was possible to free the United States from subordination to international law or the UN. Charter, from the need to obtain the approval of the United Nations for American actions, and from the constraints of operating within alliances. In other words, it was a war fought because its planners wanted to free the greatest power in world history from these Lilliputian bonds. . . . The Iraq War was fought secondly with the aim of establishing long-term American military bases in a key country in the heart of the Middle East: Pentagon officials still talk of retaining "fourteen enduring bases" in Iraq. ... It was a war fought thirdly to destroy one of the last of the third world dictatorships that had at times defied the United States and its allies (notably Israel). ... It was a war fought finally to reshape, along the radical free-market lines so dear to Bush administration ideologues, the economy of a country with the world's second-largest proven reserve of oil. This made Iraq a particularly attractive 406 • The American Culture of War target for leading members of the administration . . . who had all been intimately involved with the oil business. 19 Khalidi believes that the U.S. is an imperialist, expansionist, hegemonic power. In 2004, another distinguished professor, Chalmers Johnson published a work entitled, The Sorrows of Empire: Milita- rism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. He argued: By the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and with it the rationale for American contain- ment policies, our leaders had become so accustomed to dominance over half the globe that the thought of giving it up was inconceivable. Many Americans simply concluded that they had "won" the Cold War and so deserved the imperial fruits of victory. A number of ideologists began to argue that the United State was, in fact, a "good empire" and should act accordingly in a world with only one dominant power. . . . Americans may still prefer to use euphemisms like "lone superpower," but since 9/1 1, our country has undergone a transformation from republic to empire that may well prove irreversible. 20 Johnson concluded that 9/11 changed the thinking of leadership in Washington: "Americans like to say that the world changed as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It would be more accurate to say that the attacks produced a dangerous change in the thinking of some of our leaders, who began to see our republic as a genuine empire, a new Rome, the greatest colossus in history, no longer bound by international law, the concerns of allies, or any constraints on its use of military force." The objectives of transforming Iraq and the Middle East, some have argued, are less a function of neoconservative ideology, and more a function of the continuation of American foreign policy and worldview since the end of the nineteenth century when America became an empire with possessions in the Pacific. The American empire seeks to spread Americanism. It is based on the belief that ulti- mately the rest of the world has to look like the United States. Globalization is, in fact, Americanization. Andrew Bacevich, a proponent of this thesis, argued that President Woodrow Wilson articulated the vision that has animated American policy and behavior for a century: In a speech delivered to the U.S. Senate in January 1917, but directed over the heads of foreign governments to people around the world, Wilson spelled out the details of his proposed New Diplomacy. Sketching out a preliminary version of what would emerge a year later as his Fourteen Points — to include self-determination, freedom of the seas, economic openness, disarmament, nonintervention, and replacement of the balance of power with a "covenant of cooperative peace. . . ." Wilson assured Congress in his peroration, "These are American principles, Ameri- can policies. We could stand for no other. "Indeed," he concluded, "they are the principles of mankind and must prevail." Our own day has seen the revival of Wilsonian ambitions and Wilsonian certainty, this time, however, combined with a pronounced affinity for the sword. With the end of the Cold War, the constraints that once held American ideologues in check fell away. Meanwhile, in more than a few quarters, America's unprecedented military ascendancy, a by-product of victory in the Cold War, raised the alluring prospect that there at last was the instrument that would enable the United States to fulfill its providential mission. 21 Bacevich argued that both major political parties embraced this Wilsonian ideology, and that there was very little difference in their rhetoric and behavior in foreign policy. 22 He argued that the war in Iraq was, "undertaken with expectations that such a demonstration of American power offered the shortest route to a democratic Iraq and a more peaceful Middle East. . . ." He further argued that The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 407 a uniquely American form of militarism had infected the country, and that attributes of American culture influenced decisions for war: "Out of defeat . . . emerged ideas, attitudes, and myths conducive to militarism. But this militaristic predisposition alone cannot explain the rising tide of American bel- licosity that culminated in March 2003 with the invasion of Iraq. For that we must look also to interests and, indeed, to the ultimate in U.S. national interests, which is the removal of any obstacles or encum- brances that might hinder the American people in their pursuit of happiness ever more expansively defined." 23 American happiness is dependent on Middle East oil, because American consumption is dependent on Middle East oil. The American standard of living is based on inexpensive oil. However, American security is ultimately dependent upon remaking the rest of the world in Americas image. "Globalization" and "the New World Order," are euphemisms for Americanization. The final factor in this worldview is disarmament of the rest of the world. The United States is to be the only significant world military power, the final guarantee of American happiness. Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter was in many ways a rephrasing of Wilsonian ideology that was embraced by Reagan, George H. W Bush, and George W. Bush. The Huntington and Bacevich theses are not mutually exclusive. Both see the struggle in Iraq as part of a larger global war, with the effort directed at transformation, to remake the Middle East more in the image of the United States, or something acceptable to the United States. Another significant factor in the decision for war was the assessment of the Bush Administration that the war would be short and easy. The civilian leaders in the Pentagon told Army leaders who disagreed with their war plans that the war would be short and they would be welcomed as liberators. North Korea and Iran were greater and more powerful threats than Iraq, yet Iraq was the target. It is useful to consider American foreign and military policy. Geography greatly influences the behavior of Administrations. Small nations that are politically and geographically isolated are vulnerable. Had the Soviet Union still existed and supported Iraq, the war would have been impossible. North Korea is safe because it has a contiguous border with the People's Republic of China. War against North Korea would require the approval of China, which would not be forthcoming. If Taiwan were a peninsula attached to mainland China the United States would not have sought to defend it. Its geographic isolation and the dominance of the U.S. Navy are the only reasons America is willing to guarantee its security. The geographic and political isolation of Iraq greatly influenced the decision for war. Obviously there is, at this time, no agreement on the causes of the war. Hence, no definitive ex- planation is advanced. There are multiple arguments none of which are exclusive. However, the road to war can be outlined. In 2002, President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice made the argument for war against Iraq. 24 They argued that Saddam Hussein's Iraq possessed and was producing chemi- cal and biological weapons, that Iraq was seeking and moving closer to producing nuclear weapons, that Iraq had links to terrorist organizations including al Qaeda, and that Iraq was unique because its "brutal dictator" had used weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and "hated America." They further argued that the credibility of the United States and United Nations were at stake, and that by not act- ing the UN. risked finding itself irrelevant. They also advanced a moral argument. They argued that human rights and dignity would be restored to the Iraqi people, and that the lives of the Iraqi people would improve with the removal of Hussein. An argument that was not advanced, but influenced the decision for war, was that it looked easy. The Iraqi Armed Forces were only a third as powerful as they were in 1991. 25 The President and his advisors fed the atmosphere of fear that was created on 9/11. On September 12, 2002 the White House issued a study entitled, "A Decade of Deception and Defiance." This document outlined the many transgressions of Saddam Hussein in defiance of United 408 • The American Culture of War Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). Sixteen resolutions were identified. UNSCR 687, April 3, 1991, required that: — Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal of rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities." — Iraq must "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear- weapons-usable material" or any research, development of manufacturing facilities. — Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities. — Iraq must not "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction. — Iraq must affirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. — Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. (UNSCR 1284, December 1999, created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Com- mission, UNMOVIC, to replace UNSCOM; and required "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to Iraqi officials and facilities.) — Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs. — Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Because it was known that Saddam Hussein had violated a number of the UNSCR, other resolu- tions were passed in effort to force compliance. Thus UNSCR 707, condemned "serious violation" of UNSCR 687. And UNSCR 7 1 5 stated that, "Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors." UNSCR 1060 stated that, "Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allows immedi- ate, unconditional and unrestricted access." Other UNSCR condemned Saddam Hussein's treatment of the Iraqi people. UNSCR 688 condemned repression of Iraqi civilians and required the immediate end to such practices. It also required Iraq to allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to render needed assistance. The many UNSCR violated by Saddam Hussein were used to support Bush's argument for war. In his speech in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002 the President told the American people "we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." (Rice and Cheney repeated this "smoking gun" line frequently.) The President tied Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks on the United States. He accused Iraq of supporting, training, financing, and equipping terrorist organizations. 26 Cheney was the Administration's "point man" and strongest advocate for war. He argued that: After his defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam agreed... to U.N. Security Council Resolu- tion 687 to cease all development of weapons of mass destruction. He agreed to end his nuclear weapons program. He agreed to destroy his chemical and his biological weapons. He further agreed to admit UN. inspection teams into his country to ensure that he was in fact complying with these terms. In the past decade, Saddam has systematically broken each of these agreements. The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago. These are not weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq; these are offensive weapons for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so that Saddam can hold the The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 409 threat over the head of anyone he chooses, in his own region or beyond. . . . [W]e now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. . . . Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. . . . And far from having shut down Iraq's prohibited missiles, the inspectors found that Saddam had continued to test such missiles, almost literally under the noses of the U.N. inspectors. 27 In a later speech he stated: "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction; there is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambition will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors, confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has today and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth." 28 This was an argument for "preemptive war," or more accurately "preventive war." To prove their argument Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and other advisors told the world they had irrefutable intelligence from numerous sources, including spy satellites and aircraft, Iraqi defectors, weapons inspectors, and Iraqi purchases of technologies from abroad that it was believed could have only one purpose. They said their intelligence was confirmed and supported by British, UN, and other intelligence agencies. On Meet the Press, Paul Wolfowitz told the American people, "I've never seen the intelligence community as unified." In November 2002 the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate passed a resolution authorizing the President to use military force to enforce UN resolutions and to disarm Iraq. The House voted 296 to 133, and the Senate 77 to 23. In the House 126 Democrats and six Republicans voted against the resolution, while in the Senate the vote was 2 1 Democrats and one Republican against. The Senate "rubber-stamped" the war, as it had the war in Vietnam with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 29 Just as no member of Congress wanted to be seen as "soft on Communism" during the cold war, in the post-cold war era, after the attack of September 11, 2001, no politician wanted to be seen as "weak on terrorism." The Congressional debate that preceded the war resolution was remarkable for its hyperbole, superfi- ciality, and absence of critical thinking. 30 While some Senators and Representatives were thoughtful, reflective, and articulate, others were an embarrassment to their states, constituents, and the United States, demonstrating little knowledge or understanding of the region or the issues. Saddam Hussein was compared to Hitler countless times, invoking the Policy of Appeasement that had started World War II, yet few took notice of the fact that Iraq was not comparable to the technologically advanced, industrialized, nation-state of Germany, and thus, totally incapable of generating the combat power necessary to threaten the West. 31 In fact, Iraq could not produce the parts required to keep its tanks running. Its infra-structure had been substantially degraded during Operation Desert Storm in the subsequent years during the economic embargo. Some members of Congress argued that it was neces- sary to show a united front, to support the President, to show the world that the American people were behind the President, essentially arguing that the job of Congress was to "rubber stamp" presidential foreign policy decisions. It was virtually impossible for Republicans to oppose the resolution and war. Those Senators and Representatives who voiced serious opposition to the war risked being pegged as "unpatriotic." And, once Congress passed a resolution for war its responsibilities in terms of reality ended, though not its constitutional responsibilities. 32 Democrats too feared they would emerge on the wrong side of history and possibly suffer the consequence in the next election. The White House expected this lack of courage. Those who did rise to argue against the resolution noted that there was no definitive proof that Sad- dam Hussein had supported the al Qaeda terrorist network; that the Administration had provided little proof that Hussein possessed WMDs, and if he did he totally lacked the delivery systems to threaten the United States; that Iraq had been effectively "contained," with UN sanctions and American and British airpower patrolling the skies over Iraq; that little had changed in the last couple of years to 410 • The American Culture of War warrant such a major shift in U.S. policy; that UN inspectors were making progress; that Bush had already achieved a major victory by getting the inspectors back into Iraq; and that the problem ought to be handled by the UN through diplomacy and other means short of war. It was further argued that other nations had WMDs and were more advanced in their goal to acquire nuclear weapons; that war would further alienate Arab and Muslim peoples, creating more terrorists and a greater threat; that war could destabilize the region and moderate Arab governments friendly to the United States; that America had a unique position of trust around the world, and had never used its power to take over another country without a significant act of aggression, and had never adopted a policy of "preemptive war;" and that the cost and course of the war was unknowable. Some feared a long-term commitment, a Vietnam-like quagmire, and the open-ended expenditure of billions of dollars. 33 The argument that the United States was alienating its traditional European allies, and possibly creating new alliances between those allies and Russia and China, was given little attention. Issues of sovereignty and the American unilateral approach to issues of national security limited such discussions. The outcome of the vote was known before the debate took place: It was simply pro forma. The President's popularity rating was high, 58 percent, when the debate took place, rising to 60 to 70 percent when the war took place. The war had the support of the majority of Americans. The Congressional Resolution was followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1441. The Security Council vote was 15-0. Even Syria, the only Arab nation on the Council, voted in favor. Both resolutions supposedly gave the war legitimacy. There was debate over exactly what the UN Resolution authorized. While some nations argued that an additional resolution was required for war, Bush interpreted it differently noting that the phrase "will face serious consequences" was sufficient. 34 Bush, however, had already decided on war, concluding that Saddam Hussein "has made the United Nations look foolish," and promising that, "If the United Nations doesn't have the will or the courage to disarm Saddam Hussein . . . the U.S. will lead a coalition to disarm Saddam Hussein." 35 Bush did not put his words in context. He did not note that numerous others nations had violated more UN resolution than Iraq, and that Israel, even with the numerous U.S. vetoes, has violated more UN resolutions than any other state. The war against Iraq was going to take place with or without the United Nations, and quite possibly with or without the approval of the Congress of the United States. 36 And, nothing Iraq could do was going to stop this war. 37 In December 2002 Hussein readmitted inspectors; however, it was too little too late. In a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 26, 2002, Cheney stated: "A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow 'back in his box.'" 38 ' 39 The journalist Seymour Hersh argued that the decision for war was made as early as February 2002: "There was little doubt among some White House insiders about what the President wanted to do, and about when he had made his decision. . . . White House talking points always noted that no deci- sion had been made, the N.S.C. staff member added, but all involved knew it was a done deal. As of February 2002, he said, 'the decision to go to war was taken."' 40 On February 5, 2003 Colin Powell, using his considerable prestige and credibility, made the final sell before the UN. Powell told the world that, "every statement I make here today is backed up by sources, solid sources. . . . These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence." He noted the numerous sources of intelligence to include: intercepted telephone conversations, Iraqis who "risked their lives" to get information out of Iraq, satellite and aerial photography, and U.S. and foreign intelligences agencies, particularly the British. 41 Powell stated, "Hussein made no effort, no effort to disarm." He accused Iraqis of "concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction." He accused Iraq of lying in its declaration. He played intercepted telephone conversations, none of which mentioned WMDs. He then interpreted these conversations, The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 411 inserting what he believed the participants were talking about. He showed satellite photos, cautioning the audience that it took years of study to be able to interpret these photos, letting his audience know that they did not know what they were looking at; hence, he had to interpret for them. He showed "active chemical bunkers," "decontamination vehicles," and "ballistic missile" production facilities, stating time after time they had been moved before the inspectors arrived. He accused Iraq of playing a "shell game" by moving chemical weapons and missiles around the country to keep them hidden from inspectors. He showed what a tiny vial of the biological agent anthrax looked like, and stated that Iraq had not accounted for 8,500 liters of this dangerous substance. He said, "This is evidence not conjecture." He stated Iraq has "sophisticated" mobile biological agent production facilities, and showed pictures of what they looked like. He stated he had eyewitness evidence of their existence. He said Iraq had modified jets to spray these deadly agents and had developed unmanned aerial vehicles to dispense them, technologies that even the United States did not possess. He said Iraq had not accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical weapons, that it had dual use chemical production facilities, that Iraq had reconstituted its infrastructure for its chemical weapons program, and that it was hiding these chemical weapons from the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commis- sion for Iraq (UNMOVIC). Powell then turned to nuclear weapons and said Iraq had not abandoned its program to develop nuclear weapons. He said defectors had confirmed the existence of this program, and that Hussein had two of the three key components necessary to construct a nuclear bomb, the scientists with the required expertise, and a bomb design. All Hussein needed was the fissionable material. He showed aluminum tubes that he said were for a centrifuge that would be used to refine uranium to produce fissionable material. He concluded: "There is no doubt in my mind . . . Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile material . . . ." Finally he turned to terrorism and accused Hussein of training terrorists and providing al Qaeda terrorists with sanctuary 42 It was a virtuoso performance that effectively sold war to the whole world. But it was, for the most part, a lie. It was not gross incompetence, and it was not an intelligence failure. Following the war to remove Saddam Hussein, the White House deployed teams of investigators to find Iraq's WMDs. After two years of searching, a bipartisan presidential commission had no option but to conclude that: "the intelligence community was dead wrong in almost all of its prewar judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. . . . This was a major intelligence failure" The commission endeavored to identify the main causes for the failure: "inability to collect good information about Iraq's WMD programs, serious errors in analyzing what information it could gather, and a failure to make clear just how much of its analysis was based on assumptions rather than good evidence." This argument is not believable. The United States employs fifteen major intelligence agencies, and expends $40 billion annually to maintain them. 43 The National Reconnaissance Office possesses the most sophisticated spy satellites, aerial photography aircraft and cameras; and the most talented, skilled, experienced photographic interpreters on Earth. It is not credible that they totally misread the numerous satellite and aerial photographs. The United States possesses the most advanced nuclear physicists of any country in the world, and it is not credible to argue that they did not know the types and quality of materials required to construct nuclear facilities and weapons. The United States pos- sesses the most extensive and expensive intelligence organizations of any country in the world. All of them could not have been wrong. Too many, not all, of America's intelligence agencies, told the Bush Administration what it wanted to hear, or were silent about what they knew. Some individuals, not all, in the CIA were loyal to the Administration, not to the American people or to the principles of the organization. These individu- als selected and exaggerated the information that supported war, and discarded or deemphasized 412 • The American Culture of War the information that did not. They allowed themselves to be used. They were pressured to produce intelligence estimates that supported war. Before the war there were challenges to the U.S. intelligence estimates. Hans Blix, the UN Chief Inspector for Iraq's WMDs challenged Powell's assessment of the findings of the inspectors. "Mr. Blix took issue with what he said were Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's claims that the inspectors had found that Iraqi officials were hiding and moving illicit mate- rials within and outside of Iraq to prevent their discovery. He said that the inspectors had reported no such incidents." 44 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demonstrated that documents showing Iraq had tried to purchase uranium from overseas were forged, fabricated by some agency or government. And it disputed CIA allegations that aluminum tubes were for a nuclear program. The State Department intelligence sources also challenged the CIA's assessments. On January 28, 2003 the President gave the State of the Union address, stating that, "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." This statement was known to be inaccurate before it was put in the President's address. It was later retracted, but it was indicative of the lengths to which the White House would go to sell the war. The WMDs, however, were a facade. There was a deeper rationale and system of beliefs that were not emphasized, but in fact motivated the decisions and behavior of the Bush Administration. One of the major problems with the thinking and behavior of the Bush Administration was that it lacked historical perspective, and everything was "either-or." The Bush Administration approached the world as if it had been made anew by the attack on 9/ 1 1 and the status of the United States as the lone superpower. It seemed ignorant of the history of two world wars and the cold war, of the history of the behavior of nations, states, and people. It completely failed to see the various shades of gray in the Middle East, the nuances in each situation, and the range of outcomes between victory and defeat. The world was either good or evil. Other nation-states were either with us or against us. The UN either supported the United States or was irrelevant. Wars were either won or lost. Congress- men and women were either patriotic or unpatriotic. While such simplistic formulations are easy to explain to the American people and create a macho, tough guy image that appeals to certain clusters of Americans, the world was and is considerably more complex. The transformation mission from an evil Iraq to a good Iraq and from an evil Middle East to a good Middle East; the environment of fear created by the attacks on 9/11, and the influence of the neo-conservatives, which feed that fear; the geographic and political isolation of Iraq; the diminished capabilities of the Iraqi Armed Forces, and the greatly expanded conventional capabilities of the US Armed Forces, and the so-called revolution in military affairs; Bush's beliefs about leadership, faith in his destiny to lead, and religious beliefs, provide a deeper more comprehensive explanation for the causes of war than the facade of WMDs and Iraq's unsubstantiated links to terrorist organizations. The consequences for this war have only been glimpsed. In 2006, after three years of war, the cost in lives (American and Iraqi), treasure, and credibility, had already exceeded the expectations of the Bush Administration and the American people, and the end was not in sight. 45 War is an ugly thing, but nothing is as ugly as unnecessary war. Operational Doctrine: Shock and Awe On March 19, 2003 President George W Bush committed the United States to a second war in Iraq. 46 The verdict on the conventional campaign has been unanimous— it was a stunning victory: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was one of the most decisive U.S. victories. A dictatorial re- gime ruling a population of 25 million was defeated in only 21 days of fighting instead of the The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 413 planned campaign of 125 days. U.S. forces showed remarkable improvement in their conduct of joint/combined warfare since the Gulf War in 1990/1991. New technological advances were integrated successfully with sound tactical and operational concepts. The coalition commanders displayed a high degree of operational flexibility and agility 47 Of course, the larger question is, did the United States and Bush's "coalition of the willing" achieve their political objectives? The immediate political objectives were to topple the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The larger objective was to establish a stable democratic, capitalist Iraqi nation-state. Saddam Hussein and his senior leaders were removed from power. The larger objective, however, has not been achieved, and throughout 2005 and 2006, the violence escalated. The insurgency was growing in strength and vigor, and there were ample signs the war was evolving into a civil war between the Sunni and Shia sects. On September 26, 2005, the cover page of Time magazine pessimistically asked, "Iraq: Is It Too Late to Win the War?" The conclusion could be deduced from the story: "Although U.S. officers had known for months about the atrocities taking place in Tall 'Afar, they were powerless to do anything about them. Stretched thin, fighting rebels in places like al-Qaim and Mosul, the military dedicated just a single infantry battalion to an area twice the size of Connecticut." 48 To fight the war in Iraq, the Pentagon put into practice new operational doctrine based on new technologies, that were built on the long held tenets of American culture. The second Bush Admin- istration believed that the most technologically advanced Armed Force on the planet would produce a quick, decisive victory in Iraq, as they had in 1991. However, the Rumsfeld Pentagon had no inten- tion of fighting a war under the Weinberg/Powell Strategic Doctrine and AirLand Battle Operational Doctrine. Rumsfeld believed these doctrines represented the past, cold war era thinking. With the revolution in military affairs fully underway he believed that with advanced technologies and new ways of operating a small ground force could accomplish what was required of a much larger force in the mid- 1990s. The Pentagon recognized that Iraqi forces were considerably less capable than they were in 1991, having suffered from the embargo, economic constraints, and a lack of technological knowledge and infrastructure. They also recognized that the Iraqi Army was in fact, culturally, an Arab army. The respect and awe bestowed on Iraqi forces in the days prior to Operation Desert Storm were gone. The Rumsfeld Pentagon well understood that in the first Gulf War there had been substantial overkill. The mission could have been accomplished with half the forces deployed. In addition because of the "no-fly" zones, Special Forces and CIA operations, and large identifiable opposition groups (the Shia and Kurds), Iraq's defenses had been substantially weakened in the decade before OIF. The mission in 2003 was also very different from that of 1991, when the objective was to restore Kuwait and destroy the Armed Forces of Iraq. Killing Saddam Hussein would have achieved one of the immediate objectives of OIF. Still, the political objective of removing a government was more total, entailing the march to Baghdad, the capture and occupation of the city, the removal of all Ba'thist political leaders, and the establishment of a new government. The United States did not want to fight the Iraqi Armed Forces if it could be avoided. However, the potential for a much wider war existed— a war with the Iraqi people, or one of the large ethnic, tribal groups, for example, the Sunnis. Still, the services and the Pentagon were considerably more confident of success in 2003 than in 1991. While the services were substantially smaller, they were the most respected forces on the planet. However, the Army in 2003 was 40 percent smaller than it was in 1991, and it was more widely spread around the world. Rumsfeld did not plan to fight a conventional ground war. He planned to use a variant of the doctrine used in Operation Enduring Freedom, which relied heavily on Special Forces— airpower, surrogate forces; small, flexible ground forces; and the new concept, Shock and Awe: 414 • The American Culture of War The goal of Rapid Dominance will be to destroy or so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military objectives. To achieve this outcome, Rapid Dominance must control the operational environment and through that dominance, control what the adversary perceives, understands, and knows, as well as control or regulate what is not perceived, understood, or known. ... To affect the will of the adversary, Rapid Dominance will apply a variety of approaches and techniques to achieve the necessary level of Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and military leverage points. This means that psychological and intangible, as well as physical and concrete effects beyond the destruction of enemy forces and supporting military infrastructure will have to be achieved. 49 All the axioms of "Shock and Awe" were not employed, but this doctrinal thinking deeply influenced the actions of the Pentagon. Shock and Awe was modified, and became known as the "Rumsfeld Doc- trine." It was based on speed, maneuver, shock effect, extensive covert preparation of the battlefield, precision strikes at strategically significant targets, and information dominance. This doctrine was based on the premise that the United States was fighting a state, not a nation, and that it was possible to maintain the separation between the people and the government. Thus, the preservation of Iraq's infrastructure, the preservation of Iraq's oil fields, and the minimization of damage to cultural facili- ties, homes, schools, and other public areas was of strategic importance. Many in the Rumsfeld Pentagon believed that the awesome, overwhelming demonstration of U.S. airpower attacking multiple targets simultaneously would strike such fear that the enemy would, to some degree, be paralyzed; that intelligence sources would locate key leaders, including Saddam Hussein, who could then be targeted and killed with precision weapons (i.e., "decapitation strikes"); that the destruction of the enemy's communication systems would deprive him of the information necessary to fight effectively; and that multiple intelligence sources and digital communication sys- tems would allow U.S. forces to act and react faster than the enemy, and respond with greater agility and flexibility. Air Force General Richard Meyers, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated that U.S. forces were going to deliver "such a shock on the system that the Iraqi regime would have to assume early on that the end is inevitable." 50 It was further believed that psychological operations (PSYOPs), and Saddam Hussein's own brutal- ity, would separate the Iraqi people from the Iraqi Armed Forces, and the Iraqi Army from the "elite" Republican Guard and other special units loyal to Hussein, rendering them inactive or ineffective. It was believed that the use of indigenous, surrogate forces would facilitate the overthrow of the Hussein regime and win the support of the people; and that the shock created by the rapid advance of small, highly trained, ground forces, including Special Forces, would cause the enemy's will to collapse. The objective was not to destroy the enemy's main forces, but to destroy his will to fight by attacking and destroying "the brain," "the inner circle," and the "central nervous system" in a short, intense war. Theater Strategy: Franks vs. Rumsfeld Political and natural geography virtually dictated the war plan. Basing rights, lines of communication, military overflights, temporary staging areas, and border crossing were greatly restricted. The access and support provided by Saudi Arabia in the first Gulf War was gone. Iran and Syria were overtly hostile to the United States, and very likely to provide covert support to terrorist and guerrilla forces fighting against the United States within Iraq. Jordan, a friend of America, had to maintain its neutral- ity, and would not provide access. This left only two strategic options for ground forces, Turkey and Kuwait. Turkey was a NATO nation and long time ally of the United States in the cold war. Turkey had provided America with permanent facilities for air bases, and radar and listening stations during the cold war. The Bush Administration believed that with a $6 billion aid package and political support The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 415 "TURKEY Figure 1 B.I Operation Iraqi Freedom, Area of Operation. for admittance of Turkey into the European Union, the government of Turkey could be persuaded to permit the passage of a U.S. heavy division, the 4th Infantry Division, across its land to northern Iraq. However, anti- Americanism in the Islamic world was at an all-time high. While Turkey was a secular, democratic state, it was also a Muslim nation. On March 1, 2003, the Turkish Parliament sided with the nation, against the United States. Thus, Kuwait provided the only strategic avenue of approach for ground forces. Iraq had a small area of coastline on the Persian Gulf, which made possible an amphibi- ous assault. A vertical envelopment with airborne forces was also possible. However, both approaches meant a much longer war, requiring considerable time to build up forces. Kuwait was thus of strategic importance, providing the primary staging area for the ground war and access to Iraq. While the limited access problem dictated the axis of advance, the size of the ground force, and the 416 • The American Culture of War timing of the operation— when to initiate the ground war (G-day) and when to initiate the air war (A- Day) — were sources of considerable friction. The initial invasion plan advanced by Franks was based on Operation Plan 1003, which was based in part on the successful 1991 invasion. It called for a large invasion force of 200,000 to 250,000 men attacking from Turkey and Kuwait, securing the northern and southern sectors of the country, winning and maintaining the support of the Kurds and Shia, and then advancing on Baghdad from the north and south. It also called for an air campaign that started weeks before the ground war to shape the battle space. 51 On October 12, 2002, The New York Times reported: "Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said today that he had ordered the military's regional commanders to rewrite all of their war plans to capitalize on precision weapons, better intelligence and speedier deployment. That way, he said, the military could begin combat operations on less notice and with far fewer troops than thought possible . . . ." 52 In January 2003 Time magazine reported: "Despite being told not to do it, [Franks] basically sent up a revised Gulf War I plan. Rumsfeld couldn't believe it," says a senior Pentagon official. . . . While Franks said he needed at least 250,000 troops, Rumsfeld wanted no more than 100,000 thousand. ... The final number split the difference: war with Iraq could begin with as few as 150,000 U.S. troops in the region. . . . Franks wanted Air Force bombers to pound Iraqi positions for 10 to 14 days before starting a ground war. . . . Rumsfeld balked at that request. . . . And Rumsfeld pushed his foot to the floor on a ground war too, insisting that once the real shooting starts, U.S. tanks and other armored vehicles should race ahead of their supply lines toward Baghdad in days, if not hours. . . , 53 wersial article, Seymour Hersh observed that Rumsfeld had thrown out Franks's plan: "Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his inner circle of civilian advisers . . . had insisted on micromanaging the war's operational details. . . . On at least six occasions, the planner told me, when Rumsfeld and his deputies were presented with operational plans ... he insisted that the number of ground troops be sharply reduced . . . ." 54 General Franks, in his book, disputes this assessment. Franks, however, was a man concerned with his own reputation and place in history. He wanted to be seen as the architect of the victory 55 However, the official history of the U.S. Army supports Hersh's assessment. It notes: "The executors of Iraqi Freedom wanted more internal flexibility than the TPFDL tended to allow. . . . Unfortunately, dramatic changes on short notice in the midst of a wartime deployment did not work well. The finite physical hardware of airlift and sealift could not morph as quickly as force packages could be redesigned: hasty reconfigurations typically did not allow for appropriate combat service support. . . ." The Rumsfeld Way wasted time and money, and damaged morale. The authors of the Army's history found that, "To many a guardsman and reservist, the result seemed to be chaos, with soldiers mobilized in accordance with the TPFDL waiting idly for weeks and months, rushing overseas only to find they had not been time-phased with the arrival of their equipment, or finding an imbalance between the scope of their mission and the resources available. The situation got worse when troops already away from their jobs and families for months awaiting deployment were told they would have to stay at least a year in Iraq to meet force requirements." 56 Rumsfeld believed that a new approach to how America goes to war was necessary. He believed that in the aftermath of 9/1 1 all war plans had to be reassessed, to respond to the new terrorist threats and "rogue nations" possessing biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. He believed that "too many of the military plans on the shelves of the regional war- fighting commanders were freighted with outdated assumptions and military requirements, which have changed with the advent of new weapons and doctrine." 57 He believed that new doctrines, new technologies, and the revolution in military affairs had dramatically changed the conduct of war. He believed that the Army was a dinosaur, unwilling to change, and incapable of looking beyond its traditional ways of doing things. Rumsfeld's beliefs, The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 417 attitude, and prejudices against the Army mandated a new plan. Rumsfeld, however, planned to fight the wrong war. Franks's thinking and war plans were also off the mark. Franks characterized his war plans, "This will be a campaign unlike any other in history. . . characterized by shock, by surprise, by flexibility and by the employment of precise munitions on a scale never before seen, and by the application of overwhelming force." Franks further noted that, "We would put our faith in maneuver." 58 However, it is more accurate to note that this was the type of plan Franks was forced to adopt. His initial plan called for considerably more ground combat power in the form of heavy Army divisions. He wanted overwhelming combat power. His initial plan called for an extensive air war prior to the ground war. He explained: "During months of planning, the length of air operations in preparation for the ground attack had steadily decreased. Two months earlier, we had projected sixteen days and nights of air and SOF operations to 'shape the battlespace' before the first Coalition armor crossed the berm. Now our Abrams and Bradleys would already be deep inside Iraq when . . . airmen delivered a possible knockout blow to the regime in Baghdad on the night of Friday, March 21." 59 Remarkably Franks, still believed a long air war was necessary. Given the extraordinarily one-sided armor battles in the first Persian Gulf War, and the degraded state of Iraqi armor forces, Franks dis- played an incredible lack of imagination in developing his operational plan. He didn't lack confidence in his Army, he lacked confidence in his ability to move beyond the limitations of his experience. Hence, he sought a replay of the first Persian Gulf War. In Operation Desert Shield/Storm Brigadier General Tommy Franks served as the Assistant Division Commander for Operation and Maneuver in the 1st Cavalry Division, a heavy armor division out of Fort Hood, Texas. As such, he was intimate with Schwarzkopf's operational plan. The safest thing for him to do was to duplicate it as much as possible. Like Omar Bradley, who also lacked confidence, and used the Sicily invasion plan as a model for the Normandy invasion during World War II, Franks took the Schwarzkopf plan as a model. In both cases the situation and enemy were very different. The extended air campaign was dropped for a number of reasons. First, it wasn't necessary. Ground forces could slice through Iraqi armor formations considerably faster than airpower. Second, Franks and the Pentagon concluded that Saddam Hussein would anticipate a replay of the first Gulf War. Hence, he would initiate the destruction of Iraq's oil fields and infrastructure when the air campaign began. Those fields were supposed to pay for the war and finance the Iraqi recovery. To preclude their destruction, it was argued that, the extensive air campaign had to be eliminated. The oil fields had to be seized in the opening hours of the war. Third, Franks concluded that by operating in an unexpected manner, tactical and operational surprise could be achieved. Finally, the air campaign had actually started long before the initiation of hostilities on March 20. The air campaign actually started in the summer of 2002 when Rumsfeld directed UN-sanctioned air patrols to conduct operations that focused on the destruction of Iraq's air defense system. Between June 2002 and March 2003, roughly 4,000 sorties were flown to destroy radar and communication systems, surface-to-air missiles, and other threats to allied airpower. And, during the twelve years of combat air patrols in the two Iraqi no-fly zones, America and Britain had periodically attacked the Iraqi integrated air defense system, slowly eroding its capabilities. Air Force General Moseley observed: "We've been involved in Operation Northern Watch well over 4,000 days . . . [and] Southern Watch for well over 3,800 days. . . . We've certainly had more preparation, pre-hostilities, than perhaps some people realize." 60 The air war was won before Operation Iraqi Freedom started. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Jumper, observed that, "By the time we got to March, we think that they were pretty much out of business." Franks and others in Washington hoped that the ground war would be un- necessary, that the air campaign alone would achieve the political objective on day one of the war by killing Saddam Hussein and many of his most senior advisors. 418 • The American Culture of War Terrain greatly influences the conduct of battle. In the open desert, the Iraqi forces were extremely vulnerable to long-range fire from American air and ground forces. Even though American forces were vastly outnumbered, expectations for rapid victory in the desert were high. The major concern was the fight for Baghdad, and possibly other Iraqi cities. Military operations in urban terrain greatly diminished the effectiveness of American technology. Airpower is considerably less effective. In ground war, the range of engagements is substantially reduced. Fighting is at close quarters and the killing typically takes place within a fifty-foot radius. Small arms and infantry dominate the battle- field, and operations are manpower intensive. Ammunition and water are used at a higher rate than in other forms of combat, and it takes considerably more manpower to secure an area. And once an area is secure it has to be guarded, or the enemy will backtrack and reoccupy the area. Command and control is difficult in urban terrain. Operations are decentralized and greater initiative is required at the small unit level. Tanks and other vehicles are channeled through narrow streets, making them more vulnerable to attack. Resupply and the evacuation of wounded and dead are extremely difficult and hazardous. In this environment, it was better for the defenders to wound a man than to kill him. Wounded soldiers force other soldiers to risk their lives retrieving and evacuating them. Civilians are exposed to war, and could be used as shields. The destruction of hospitals, schools, public facilities, mosques, and cultural sites becomes unavoidable. Guerrilla warfare becomes more likely; enemy soldiers can simply change their clothing and appear as noncombatants. The likelihood of killing in- nocent civilians increases greatly, as does the likelihood of alienating the people. Caches of weapons can be planted throughout a sector making it possible for an unarmed civilian to rapidly become a guerrilla fighter. Children can be used as sources of intelligence for enemy fighters. Booby traps and snipers become important instruments of war, greatly impeding the attackers' advance and frustrating their soldiers. Tall buildings provide excellent perches for harassing and sniper fire. The psychological strain on soldiers of combat in urban terrain is enormous. The sights and sounds of the battlefield are up close and personal. This is not the preferred American approach to war. There is one major factor that decisively influences the ability of a state to fight urban, guerrilla, and insurgency warfare. The fighters must be believers. They must believe in some ideology, religion, or leader. With the decentralized nature of these types of wars, soldiers or guerrillas who do not believe in the cause for which they are fighting can simply quit, take off their uniforms, hide their weapons, and go home. Combatants in urban terrain have to act on their own initiative. Hate and anger are great motivators. Foreigners in your home are great motivators. Enemy forces that are seen as invaders and occupiers can ignite the passions that move soldiers and civilians to fight with great tenacity. The primary concern of soldiers and marines in coalition forces was that the war would devolve into a fight for every building, every street, and every block in Baghdad. The fact that Iraq was not a nation reduced the ability of Saddam Hussein's regime to fight such a war. However, coalition forces did not want to create a nation by alienating the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein's strategy for war was, at least in part, based on getting Americans to fight in the cities, where they might inflict heavy casualties on Iraqi civilians and structures. Such destruction, with the help of the media, had the potential to influence Iraqi, American, and world opinion. In other words, the United States could lose the war for the hearts and minds of the people, and create a nation where there was none. Urban terrain also offered Saddam Hussein the greatest opportunity to inflict heavy casualties on U.S. forces. The model of Vietnam and Somalia influenced his plans for war. A large part of the war was over before the first shot was fired. Special Forces were deployed months before the opening of major combat to shape the battlefield, develop and assist indigenous forces (the Kurds and Shiites), locate key facilities and leaders, enhance the accuracy and lethality of airpower; and conduct PSYOPs. Information Operations included electronic warfare, computer network attack, deception plans, psychological operations, and operational security. These operations were also initi- ated well before the formal shooting war. The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 419 PSYOPs deserve special attention: They were on a scale and of a sophistication never conducted before. They were designed to influence the behavior of Iraqi generals and key leaders, soldiers, and civilians. In the run up to the war PSYOPs were used to shape the battlefield. The very name of the operation, Iraqi Freedom, was part of the PSYOPs plan to inform the Iraqi people that the war was not against them, but the regime of Saddam Hussein. Leaflet drops, radio and television broadcasts, and e-mail were part of a multimedia campaign. EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft of the Air Force National Guard's 193rd Special Operations Wing out of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania broadcast messages on commercial AM/FM, short wave radio bands, and vhf/uhf television. The Mobile Radio Broadcast System and Mobile Television Broadcast System operated out of Kuwait. A translated excerpt of a Commando Solo broadcast informed: People of Iraq. The standard of living for Iraqis has dropped drastically since Saddam came into power. Every night, children go to sleep hungry in Iraq. The sick suffer from ailments that are easily treatable in the rest of the world. Saddam has built palace after palace for himself and has purchased fleets of luxury cars— at the expense of the Iraqi people. . . . Saddam has exploited the Oil for Food Program to illegally buy weapons and materials intended to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and for lavish gifts for his elite regime members. . . . Saddam has built monuments to promote his legacy at your expense. . . . How much longer will this cor- rupt rule be allowed to exploit and oppress the Iraqi people? 61 Other themes encouraged Iraqi soldiers to desert, and warned them not to use WMDs, not to destroy the oil infrastructure, and not to damage the environment. Civilians were warned to stay at home and not to interfere. In the days just prior to the invasion, twenty million leaflets were dropped. Leaflets repeated the same themes as the broadcasts. One stated: "Any unit that chooses to use weapons of mass destruction will face swift and severe retribution by Coalition forces. Unit Commanders will be held accountable if weapons of mass destruction are used." Iraqi Generals and key leaders were called and e-mailed. Starting in January 2003, the Pentagon "began sending thousands of e-mail messages to commanders, promising protection for those who comply with the order to not use weapons of mass destruction against allied forces." 62 They were told to keep their units at home. Even President Bush and his cabinet took part in the PSYOPs campaign, threatening Iraqi generals on television, endeavoring to separate them from Saddam Hussein, telling them not to follow Saddam Hussein's orders to use WMDs, and that if they did there would be severe consequences. After the war, Gen- eral Tommy Franks "revealed that senior Iraqi officers accepted bribes for a promise not to engage coalition forces. Consequently, US and UK forces met light resistance in many locations that might have otherwise been heavily defended. 'I had letters from Iraqi generals saying: I now work for you,' General Franks said." 63 The biggest strategic planning failure of the coalition forces was not having in place a significant plan to win the peace. Because the Rumsfeld Pentagon believed that U.S. forces would be welcomed into an Islamic nation, a Middle East state, as liberators, it thought only about the conventional war. Because so little thought had gone into postconflict planning, numerous horrendous decisions were made that facilitated the rise of the insurgency. Opposing Forces The Iraqi Army in 2003 was considerably smaller and less capable than in 1991. 64 While consider- able forces had survived the 1991 war, they had been significantly degraded over the years. In 2003, Iraqi forces were poorly trained and equipped. The inability to purchase new equipment and repair parts made inoperable, "deadlined," many vehicles, causing their cannibalization— taking parts from 420 • The American Culture of War one vehicle to make another vehicle operational. The absence of French and Soviet technical advi- sors damaged the ability of Iraqi forces to maintain their tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other equipment. The lack of ammunition for training eroded their ability to accurately engage targets with artillery, small arms, and main tank guns. The lack of field training damaged their ability to construct defensive fighting positions, maneuver forces, conduct operations in urban terrain, or employ weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein employed four types of forces: the regular army, the Republican Guard, the Spe- cial Republican Guard, and the fedayeen (martyrs). The most formidable force was the Republican Guard (RG). It numbered roughly 60,000 soldiers, and had priority for equipment, training, and other resources. The RG was believed to be capable of generating significant combat power. It was organized into six divisions: three stationed north of Baghdad along the main highway leading to Turkey, and three stationed south along the main highways leading to Kuwait. Those forces north of the city formed the I Corps and those south of it, the II Corps. Two RG divisions — one from each Corps— defended in the immediate vicinity of Baghdad, forming an outer perimeter. Expanding out from Baghdad, the other divisions were located in the vicinity of major cities, for example Tikrit and Mosul. Saddam Hussein expected Turkey to cooperate with the United States, providing access from the north. Inside Baghdad was the Special Republican Guard, a force of roughly 15,000 soldiers. It was responsible for the defense of the city. These men were lightly armed, but were believed to be well trained and equipped. They were selected because of their loyalty to Saddam Hussein, and were commanded by Saddam Hussein's son Qusay. The Regular Army (RA) was in the worst condition. It numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 soldiers, organized into seventeen divisions. It was believed that these forces, for the most part, would not fight, and if they did would be incapable of generating significant combat power. Much of their equipment was old and obsolete, and desertion was common, particularly among the Shia. Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, could not trust these forces. Still, there were ar- mor divisions among the RA forces that were capable of doing considerable damage. CENTCOM could not dismiss them. The presence of RG forces to some degree strengthened the will of the RA forces. According to General Franks, the fedayeen, was, "a group of ill-trained but fanatical regime loyalists; Al Quds, local Baath militia commanded by party leaders and national Baath Party militia members; and the volunteers known as the 'Lions of Saddam,' a group of Sunni boys eighteen and younger who had received rudimentary military training." 65 These forces were based on the ideology of suicide bombers, and the operational doctrine of fast hit and run shock raids akin to those attacks employed by Somali warlords against U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu in 1990. 66 The fedayeen fought in pickup trucks mounted with machine guns and other light weapons, such as RPGs, rocket grenades. They were called technicals, a term that originated in Mogadishu. These forces were ineffective against Mis and Bradley's, but could do considerable damage to thin skin vehicles, such as trucks and Humvees. CENTCOM had not planned to fight the "technicals." Franks wrote: "Our lack of HUMINT [human intelligence] had given us a nasty surprise: We'd had no warning that Saddam had dispatched these paramilitary forces from Baghdad. Our analysts had seen reconnaissance images of pickup trucks, their cargo bays covered by tarps, and civilian buses loaded with passengers moving south, but this had raised no concerns." The strength of the fedayeen was unknown. Franks estimated as many as forty thousand fighters. These forces created more concern due to the element of surprise than from real military effectiveness. American invasion forces consisted of two corps commands, the V U.S. Army Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), both of which were under the command of Lieutenant General David D. McKiernans Third Army. Kiernan, not Franks, was the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander. The axis of advance was from Kuwait to Baghdad, with the Army conducting the main The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 421 attack on the left flank and the Marines conducting the supporting attack on the right. In reality, there was no main attack or supporting attack. It was a three-hundred-mile race to Baghdad with the expectation that the two forces would remain within supporting distance of one another. The prize was the capture or killing of Saddam Hussein, an event that national and world media would cover extensively. Given the historic relationship between the Army and Marine Corps, Americans could expect a competitive race, with issues such as supporting distance being secondary matters. Lieutenant General William Wallace commanded V Corps. It was based on the 3rd Infantry Di- vision (Mechanized) out of Fort Stewart, Georgia, commanded by Major General Buford C. Blount III, like Franks, a native of Texas. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) under the command of Major General David H. Petraeus, and a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division under the command of Major General Charles H. Swannack, Jr. supported the operation. In addition, the 10th and 5th Special Force Groups (SFG), the Ranger Regiment, the 4th PSYOP Group, and the 173rd Airborne Regiment were deployed. The Army deployed 233,342 soldiers, including 8,866 National Guardsmen and 10,683 reservists, roughly half the active Army and half the total forces deployed. When the opera- tion kicked off, the Army was not fully deployed; hence, its total personnel count is a bit misleading. At sea was a third corps-size organization based on the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) out of Fort Hood, Texas as well as other forces. 67 The Army's V Corps was also not fully deployed and ready for combat when the operation was initiated. Combat forces and combat service support forces were still in various stages of deployment. This fact influenced the conduct of the operation. Lieutenant General James T. Conway, USMC commanded the 1 st MEF, a joint and combined force of 81,500 men, based on the 1st Marine Division, which consisted of three regimental combat teams (RCT), under the command of Major General James Mattis, and the 1st (UK) Armoured Division, under the command of Major General Robin Brims. The UK division consisted of the 7th Armoured Brigade, the 16th Air Assault Brigade, and the 3rd Commando Brigade. A brigade size force from the Second Marine Division formed Task Force Tarawa. The Marines deployed 74,405 marines, in- cluding 9,501 reservists. In reference to the command situation and joint and combined operations, Conway concluded, "It worked and was jointness in its finest sense. I had a solid relationship with General McKiernan. The staffs had the inevitable friction over pop-up issues, but level heads always prevailed." 68 Conway's total ground combat forces numbered 1 15,000 marines and soldiers, and 26,000 British soldiers. The air forces deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom included those of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army, and those of coalition nations: the Royal Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force, and Canadian Air Force. The U.S. Air Force, however, provided better than half of the combat aircraft employed (51 percent), and almost half of the support aircraft (45 percent). Air Force Lieu- tenant General T. Michael Moseley headed CENTCOM's Air Forces, serving as Combined Force Air Component Commander. The Air Force deployed 293 fighters, including F-15s, F-16s, and F-117s; fifty-one bombers, including B-52s, B-ls, and B-2s; 182 tankers, including KC-lOs and KC-135s; 111 Airlift aircraft, including C-130s, C-17s, and C-21s; sixty intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveil- lance (IRS) aircraft, including E3Bs, E8Cs, EC-130, RC-135s, and U-2s; 131 SOF aircraft, including MH-53s, UH-60s, and HH-60s, and UAVs, including Predators and Global Hawks. The Air Force deployed 54,955 airmen, including 7,207 National Guardsmen, and 2,084 reservists. The 4th Air Sup- port Operation Group (ASOG) provided the Army's V Corps close air support, performing not as a supporting arm, but as a cocombatant. 69 The 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), and Naval aviation supported the 1st MEF. Speaking in March 2004, Admiral Vern Clark outlined the Navy's contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom: "A year ago, we had 164 Navy ships and almost 78,000 sailors at sea in support of OIF and the global war on terrorism. ... In all, 221 of our then 306 ships, about 73% of our total force, were under way. Seven of 12 carrier strike groups, 9 of 12 expeditionary strike groups, 33 of 54 attack sub- 422 • The American Culture of War marines, and some 600 Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft were forward deployed in support of the national commitment and policy." 70 Some these forces supported Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; however, the vast majority supported OIF. The carriers, USS Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Constellation, Harry S. Truman, Carl Vinson, George Washington, and Nimitz supported OIF. The Navy provided 293 fighters, primarily F- 1 8s and F/ A- 18s and the Marine Corps 1 30 fighters, pri- marily F- 1 8s. Navy aviation flew more than 7,000 sorties. The Navy's surface warships and submarines launched more than 800 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Navy expeditionary warships deployed 60,000 Marines. Navy SEALs conducted convert operations. Navy Special (mine) Clearance Teams cleared 913 nautical miles of waterways, using dolphins and other resources. While transporting the Army to the battlefield is not a Navy responsibility, it was involved in delivering equipment and other materials to Kuwait. The Navy was able to "surge" during the operation, stressing men and machines. 71 The Air War The air war did not open as planned. The CIA believed it had pinpointed the location of Saddam Hus- sein, his sons Qusay and Uday, and other senior leaders. This information caused Bush to approve a raid to kill them. The Air Force rapidly deployed two F- 1 17 Nighthawks, stealth fighters, from Qatar, each loaded with two EGBU-27 precision-guided bombs (laser guided bombs enhanced with guidance systems that used Global Positioning satellites). The Navy responded by firing dozens of Tomahawk missiles from six warships. 72 The decapitation strike failed. Saddam and his sons lived. (The CIAs evi- dence may have been based on the location of one of Saddam Hussein's many look-alikes.) Still, Major Mark J. Hoehn, one of the F-l 17 pilots, concluded, "We knocked the regime off balance, and we kept them off balance. Whether or not we got [Saddam], he was never a significant factor after that." 73 Intelligence also caused Franks to advance the ground war. Reconnaissance and satellite images appeared to show that Iraqi forces were preparing to torch the Rumilyah oil fields— an operation that would have taken substantially more than twenty- four hours. Franks advanced the ground war eight and a half hours from 0600 Friday, March 21, to 2130 March 20, to get forces into the field as soon as possible. The Marines were able to secure the fields before substantial damage occurred. The air campaign, "Shock and Awe" was not moved up, and went off as scheduled at 2100 on March 21. In the first few days of the air campaign, Air Force and Navy deployed their full array of airpower, flying 15,000 sorties against enemy targets. B-52s flying out of Britain launched cruise missiles. Sub- marines and surface ships launched more than eight hundred Tomahawk cruise missiles. F- 1 17s flying out of al-Udeid Air Base, Qatar dropped precision-guided bombs. F/A-18 flying from carriers in the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean, and Air Force F-15Cs and F-l 6s flying out of Kuwait dropped and launched precision munitions. B-2s flying out of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean dropped JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) and other ordnance. B-lBs attacked targets with precision-guided weapons. KC-135s refueled Air Force, Navy, and coalition aircraft. C-17s delivered men and material. C-130Js provided theater transport. E-8C Joint JSTARS radar aircraft provided twenty-four-hour-a- day battlefield reconnaissance. EC- 1 30Es broadcast AM/FM radio and VHF/UHF television messages critical to limiting Iraqi casualties. MH-53M from the 21st SOS, Special Operations Forces supported special and conventional operations. By every standard the air forces employed demonstrated capa- bilities unparalleled in the history of warfare. Outer space was used as never before in war. The array of satellites and their capabilities was as im- pressive as the airpower employed. 74 Major General Franklin J. Blaisdell, the Air Force director of space operations and integration during OIF observed: "We are so dominant in space that I pity a country that would come up against us." Global Positioning System Satellites directed precision-guided weapons on target through sandstorms, rain, and wind. Imaging radar satellites detected and pinpointed the movement of Republican Guard forces so they could be destroyed by airpower. Satellites listened in The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 423 on Iraqi communications, providing usable battlefield information. Satellites provided photographic information for planning and conducting special operations; provided communications facilitating command and control, and reducing the response time of shooters; provided weather data for pilots and Navy ships; directed UAVs such as the Predator and Global Hawk; and even facilitated logistical efforts, tracking supplies and making possible more precise coordination of the delivery of supplies. The dependency of the U.S. Armed Forces on space-based systems is complete. Command and control facilities, suspected locations of top leaders, and Republican Guard head- quarters were targeted initially. More specifically, the Ministry of Information, the Baghdad Presi- dential Complex, the Council of Ministers Building, Republican Palace, Al-Salam Palace, Al-Sijood Presidential Palace, and the Ministry of Planning were all targets. The effort was to destroy the brain and by so doing paralyze the arms and legs, the fighting forces. In the first forty-eight hours of the air war, over fifteen hundred targets across Iraq were struck. Time recorded: For the allied command, the hope remains that the mere demonstration of American air power will persuade large numbers of Saddam's best trained and most loyal soldiers, the Republican and Special Republican Guard, to surrender before the U.S. and British forces begin a siege of Baghdad. A senior Administration official told Time that the military has "killed a significant number of the Republican Guard, we're trying to break their will and get them to go home." Defense officials predicted last week that up to a quarter of the Republican Guard troops would surrender if the details were worked out. "They're using the psychological instrument to collapse [the enemy's] will through intimidation and the creation in his mind of inevitable defeat." 75 Airpower, the "shock and awe" campaign, did not produce the immediate collapse many had expected and hoped for. While it produced partial paralysis of the brain, the limbs, the Iraqi ground combat forces, were still active. The ground war was still necessary. With the advance of the V Corps and 1st MEF, tactical airpower dominated the air war effort. By all estimates, Army and Air Force operations achieved a higher level of proficiency than in any previous war. The 3rd Infantry Division and 4th Air Support Operations Group (ASOG) fought in- tegrated battles against Iraqi armor formations. One Army observer concluded: "V Corps' Cobra II drive to Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) broke fresh ground in a number of areas, but perhaps none [was] so important as the conduct of joint operations. ... It was not merely the parallel functioning of two armed services; it was the almost flawless operation of a thoroughly integrated combat-arms team. Army officers of the V Corps staff described the result in superlatives: it was the best, most efficient, most effective and most responsive air support the Air Force has ever provided any US. Army unit." 76 And Air Force Magazine noted that: "Gulf War II . . . took integration to new highs, and now some view it as the distinguishing feature of the warfare, U.S. Style . . . ." Vice Admiral (retired) Arthur K. Cebrowski, director of the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation concluded, "When the lessons learned come out, one of the things we are probably going to see is a new air-land dynamic. ... It is as if we will have discovered a new sweet spot in the relationship between land warfare and air warfare." 77 The conventional war was considered a major success for "jointness" between the Army and the Air Force because of the "unprecedented degree of air-ground coordination." 78 In the V Corps area of operation the 4th ASOG conducted 886 battlefield-shaping missions and 606 close air support missions. In urban terrain the Air Force destroyed 225 buildings, 105 bunkers, and 226 various other targets. Army artillery and airpower were closely coordinated. Special Operations, PSYOPs, Iraqi memories of Operation Desert Storm, and the psychological influence of the air campaign probably deserve the lion's share of the credit for strategic decisiveness in the conventional war of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The vast majority of Iraqi forces decided not to fight, and many of those forces that fought, did so without determination. However, it must be remembered 424 • The American Culture of War that Iraq was not a unified, cohesive nation. It was a state with deep fractures that precluded a more total war effort from the Iraqi people. The air war in Operation Iraqi Freedom was not the first network- centric war. It was, however, considered a positive step in that direction. In Air Force Magazine it was noted that: Air warfare tactics are on the verge of what many believe will turn out to be a far-reaching revolution. . . . OEF in Afghanistan and OIF in Iraq pioneered a more extensive use of airborne networks to distribute senior information, share tactical messages, and exert command and control over forces. The May 2003 end of major combat operations in Iraq led the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. John P. Jumper, to observe, "We've learned the value of things such as networking." The power of nearly all major strike platforms — from B-2 bombers to A-10 at- tack aircraft — was multiplied by fresh intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) data or updated CAOC [combined air operations center] communications and tracking. ... In OIF the "networking was crude." 79 Jumper further noted that, "It was machine-to-machine interfaces, but it was crude. Our kids did it on the chat networks at the speed of typing, not the speed of light." The Ground War On March 20 the Army's 3rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division, and the 1st Marine Divi- sion and 1st UK Armoured Division crossed into Iraq to destroy the armed forces of Iraq that decided to fight, and to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The Army's V Corps advanced from Kuwait up the Euphrates River valley south of Nasiriyah, to Samawah, to Najaf, to Hillah and Karbala, and into Baghdad, while the 1st MEF advanced from Kuwait up Route 1 north, between the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers to Numaniyah and Route 6, and into Baghdad. The Army entered the city from the southeast and the Marines from the northeast. The V Corps' lead division, the 3rd Infantry Division, moved through the desert and along unimproved roads, parallel to the Euphrates River, securing logistical and air bases, and the road networks, which comprised its lines of communication (LOC). The 1st Marine Division had better roads, but more urban terrain to move or fight through. By April 9, 2003, organized resistance had ended. Both the Army and Marine Corps attribute the success of the operation to bold, rapid maneuver warfare. Neither the Army nor the Marine Corps sought to maneuver to find, fix, fight, nd destroy the enemy's main force. They maneuvered to avoid enemy forces. The objective was Baghdad. Hence, they bypassed enemy strong points, leaving behind elements to eliminate or contain these forces. The lead elements would keep going, no matter what. In hindsight either ground force could have won the conventional war without the other. The vast majority of Iraqi forces decided not to fight. One Army assessment concluded: Of course, no plan survives contacts with the enemy, and the Iraqi defenders offered a few sur- prises of their own. The widely expected mass capitulation of the regular army never material- ized. Generally, they did not surrender or even vigorously defend. Instead, the majority of Iraqi soldiers just melted away, offering relatively light, if any resistance. Yet, it was unclear whether this was a deliberate tactic to preserve the force, the result of the extended PSYOP campaign, the result of the ongoing attacks on their command and control systems, the result of their fear of coalition combat power, or simply as close as the soldiers could come to a formal capitulation given the tight control imposed by the layers of security services. 80 By just melting away, Iraqis kept the weapons and ammunition required to fight the insurgency war that emerged soon after the conventional war ended. Instead of the expected 50,000 prisoners of war, The Second Persian Gulf War: The Conventional War • 425 Figure 16. 2 Operation Iraqi Freedom, V Corps and I MEF maneuver to Baghdad. only 6,200 surrendered or were captured. When the conventional war ended the United States had suffered 122 killed, the British 33. The real war had become the insurgency war, which by November 2005 killed over 2,000 U.S. soldiers and marines, and at this writing the end is not in sight. A comprehensive history of the Army and Marine Corps advance north is not possible in these few pages. 81 However, the Army's assessment of the campaign can be found in the 3rd Infantry Division's After Action Report, which in part read as follows: » The American Culture of War TRANSPORTED CLI Notes Michael J. Weiss, The Clustered World (Boston: Little, Brown, 2000), 10-17. Weiss argued that the United States is made up of "sixty- two distinct population groups each with its own set of values, culture, and means of coping with today's problems. ... [T] he term cluster . . . refers to population segments where, thanks to technological advancements, no physi- cal contact is required for cluster membership.... [T]he clusters simply underscore realities already apparent, such as in vvic mi pb i ii i idlest and poorest Americans...." Andrew Marshall with the support of Rumsfeld developed a plan called "A Strategy for a Long Peace" February 12, 2001. The plan cut two active duh 1 I Infantry Divi i ii n I I Iraq in 2003, and 4th Army National Guard Division. Peter Boyer, "A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?" The New Yorker, July 1, 2002, 54-67. American interest in the war peaked during the conventional war in the spring of 2003. It declined rapidly after the conventional war morphed into an insurgency war. During the Presidential elections matters such gay marriage, abor- tion, the economy, and other domestic interests led the discussion. The fact that the United States had gone to war based on bad intelligence and misleading information did nol political!; damage the President. Chapter 1 Robert O'Connell, "The Origin oi Viu inExpi iena • Wi ir, ed. Robert Cowley(New York: Laurel, 1992), 11. John A Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 196, 197. Margaret Mead, And Keep the Powder Dry (New York: William Morrow, 1965), 21. J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur in 1782 published a letter titled "What is an American," in which he wrote: "Men are like plants; the goodness and flavor of the fruit proceeds from the peculiar soil and exposition in which they grow. We are nothing but what we derive from the air we breathe, the climate we inhabit, the government we obey, the system of religion we profess, and the nature of our emplouiun aLettci it i (New York:E. P. Fox, Duffield, 1904), 56; See also: Richard Maxwell Brown, No Duty to R (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Richard Slotkins, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), ai i igh r 1 < irion (New York: Harper, 1986); John Shy, "The Cultural Approach to the History of War," special issue, The Join n if MM listory 57 (October 1993): 13-26; Colin Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988) and War, Peace and Victory (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrisim (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979); and Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," in Strategic Power: USA/USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Macmillan, 1990). Bronislaw Malinowski, 'An Anthropological Analysis of War," in War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology Anthropology, rev. ed., ed. Leon Bramson and George Goethals (New York: Basic Book, 1968), 256 Clifford Geertz Ih 1 1 i tit n s (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5. I 'ill pBabcocl lii i i I >i Ii I i n i t MA: Merriam, 1971), 552. Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, Military Sociology: A Study of American Mill 1 i i (MD: Social Science Press, 1965), 26, 27. Colin Gray, War, Peace, and I Hi tory (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 45, 46. Pierre Bourdieu i ' fl (1 Ion: Cambri In Iv Pi I ) Ibid., 72, 78. 'ell Brown, No Duty to Retreat, 37. a, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 131-35. 15. Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," in i/.v Turner thesis: Concerning the Role of the Frontier in American History, ed. George Roger Taylor (Boston: D.C. Heath,, 1956), 2. Also see: Frederick I l I n i loll.Rineharl & Winsion, 1 i ' Selected Essays of Frederick Jackson Turner (NJ: Prentice Hall, 1961). 16. Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, 43. Also see: Colin Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945-1991," in The Making o trat . d ' \ llhamson Murray, MacGregeor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 579-611. 17. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 129. 1 8. Vasquez, The War Puzzle, 206, 207. 19. Ibid., 202 20. Ibid., 207. 21. Victor Davis Hanson (, i U Iture (New York: Random House, 2001), 7. 22. John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), xiv. 23. Hanson, Cam, . u < Itu 4 John Lynn in the introduction to his book, Battle, is critical ofthe way in which Hanson uses the concept ofculture. He believes that emphasizing Tlie U i / i i \ u Hanson I I llimately... replace the notion of an all encompassing universal soldier not with variety and change but with a universal and eternal West- ern soldier and, by implication, with an equally universal and stereotyped non-Western, or 'Oriental,' warrior." Lynn concluded that Han .'ii orl < leeply flawed." 24. Russell F. Weigley, "Amen n ii I i m Its Beginnings through the First World War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 408. 25. D. W. Brogan, The American Character (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944), 150. In a chapter titled, "The American Way in War," Brogan wrote: "Space determined the American way in war, space and the means to conquer space. Into empty I th » Ju lu feeling theii y si i ireful! imidly if you like. The reckl lost then ![ II ireful the prudent, the rationally courageous survived and by logistics, by superiority in resources, in tenacity, in numbers." 26. Norvell De Atkine, "Why Arab Armies 1 l 1 1 1 i Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 23-40.. 27. Kenneth Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness" (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996), 259-261, 759. 28. Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 574. Also see, Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind, rev. ed. (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002). 29. In the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Egypt, under the leadership of Anwar Sadat, employed new strategy and doctrine against Israel that took into consideration the attributes of the Eg\pti in n Israeli ullui loii 1 pt tought a very limited conventional war, with modest military objectives, ami a major political war, which involved the superpowers. Sadat achieved his political objectives. 30. Albert Axell and Hideaki cKtimi t idi Gods (New York: Pearson Education, 2002). 31. Victor Davis Hanson, Ripples of Battle (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 15, 16. Hanson put this tenet in historical con- But rarely do we appreciate battles as human phenomena or the cumulative effects — the ripples — that change cc for years, or centuries even, well after the day's killing is over. ... In this regard I plead guilty to the classical notion — more or less continuous since Herodotus and Thucydides to the close ofthe nineteenth century— of the primacy of military history. In theory, of course, all events have equal historical importance. . . . Yet in reality, all actions are still not so equal. We perhaps need to recall the more traditional definition ofthe craft of history — a formal record of past events that are notable or worthy of remembrance. Whereas I Love Lucy might have i ransformed the way thousands of Americans in the 1950s and 1960s saw suburban life, women's roles or Cubans, it still did not alter the United States in the manner of Yorktown, Gettysburg, or Tet— in creating, preserving, or almost losing an entire society. 32. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: The Modern Library, 1937), 739. Adam Smith wrote: "Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use towards the defence of the society, yet to prevent that sort of mental mutila- tion, deformity, and wretchedness, which cow auhei n nil nvolvi nil i n spreading th m Kes through the great body ofthe people, would still deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and offensive disease . . . from spreading itself among them 33. William McDougall, "The Instinct of Pugnacity," in War, ed. Leon Bramson and George W Goethals, (New York: Basic Books, 1964), 33-64, McDougall wrote: "The Germanic tribes were perhaps more pugnacious and possessed of more military virtue in a higher degree than any other people that has existed since. They were the most terrible enemies . . . they could never be subdued because . . . they loved fighting, that is, because they were innately pugnacious." McDougall's in i J ed bei u In Ui ibul dill ren in tin instinct of pi uicil I 1 1 rgi hat some races, like some dogs, are naturally more aggressive than others. While his observation that some nations have been more warlike than others is essentially correct, he failed to recognize that culture, not race, was the primary cause, and that culture was influenced by numerous factors, and thai as a consequence, the so-called "instinct oi pugnacity" was not a permanent condition. Japan and Germany are noteworthy for the cultural change that was initiated out ofthe trauma of World War II. In the year 2000 both nations were considered among the least pugnacious on the planet. 34. Michael C. Desch, "Explaining the Gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization ofthe South, and the End ofthe Mass Army," in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Peter D Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 290-324; 295. 35. Weiss, The Cluster World, 10, 11, 21, 22. 36. Ibid., 13, 14. Weiss defined clusters: "Clusters, which were created to identify dcmographically similar zip codes around the U.S., are now used to demarcate a variety of small geographic areas, including census tracts (500-1,000 households) and zip plus 4 postal codes (about ten households). Once useu mi rcl n ibl ilh hboi i vpc however, the term cluster now refers to population segments where, thanks to technological advancements, no physical contact is required for cluster membership. . . . The cluster system serves as a barometer in this changing world, monitoring how the country is evolving in distinct geographical areas." 37. Norvell De Atkine, "Why Arab Armies Lose Wars," 26. 38. Total war, absolute war, is a theoretical construct. Imperfect human beings in their imperfect political and military or- ganizations are incapable of absolute war. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres, 1976), 76. 39. L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Paolo Menozzi, and Alberto Piazza, The History and Geography of Hit, mm Genes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), Introduction. Also see Steve Olson, Map, i ; Ham , History I • w 1'ork: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 3-7. Olson wrote: "Every single one of the 6 billion people on the planet today is descended from the small group of anatomically modern humans who once lived in eastern Africa. . . . Human groups are too closely related to differ in any but the most superficial ways. The genetic study of our past is revealing that the cultural difference between groups could not have biological origins. Those differences must result from the experiences individuals have had. . . . Genetic research is now about to end our long misadventure with the idea of race. We now know that groups ovei lap genetically to such a degree that humanity cannot be divided into clear categories." 40. Nurture is defined in 1U( 1 1 ^ is the sum of the influences modifying the expression of the genetic potentialities of an organism." 41. I i i l i I i 1 i 1 ( I li i nl oris, ] 10. 42. Jeffrey Kluger, "Ambition: Why Some People Are Most Life I o Su i ' e, 1 mber 14, 2005, 48-59. Kluger noted that: "Ongoing studies of identical twins have measured achievement motivation — lab language for ambition — in identical siblings separated at birth, and found that each twin's profile overlaps 30% to 50% of the other's. In genetic terms, that's an awful lot . . . ." 43. David H. Hackworth, About Face (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 47. 44. Henry G. Gole, Colonel U.S. Army Retired, "Combat in Korea: Reflections by a Once Young Si ildier," Unpublished paper (italics added). 45. It is important to disassociate the capacity to engage in battle from the predisposition for pugnacity. Individuals with zero capacity to risk their lives can be extremely bellicose. And, the Army and Marine Corps do not produce warmongers, quite the contrary. 46. L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza etal., The History and Geo}, Hmntii i ' i tlli few noli Ihi i placement of an old allele by a new one (the 'fixation of a new mutant) is the elementary process of evolution. It may take a great many of generations, on the average, tens or hundreds of thousands." 47. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 221. 48. For a survey of the literature on the role of hunting in human development see: Matt Cartmill, A View to a Death in the \ / t Nat ' h i a i ibri ! 1A: Ha rd University Pi 1 Inch of thi.slitei ilu has been discredited because of developments in genetic science. Also see: Barbara Ehrenreich, BloodRites: Origins and History of the Passions of War (London: Virago Books, 1997). 49. Infantry Journal Staff, "Army Ground Forces," Infantry Tow nal lune (1946): 17-23. 50. William H. Kelly, Major U.S. Army, "War Neuroses," Infantry Journal August (1946): 20, 21. 51. Lord Moran, Anatomy of Courage (New York: Avery Publishing, 1987), 151. 52. Charles MacDonald, "The Qualities of a Soldier," TheArm) \nfo) natU Digest December (1950): 7-13. 53. Audie Murphy, To Hell and Back (New York: Henry Holt., 1949), 13, 14. 54. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 454, 455. 55. John C. McManus, The Americans at D-Day (New York: Tom Doherty, 2004), 98, 99. 56. Within the U.S. Army and Marine Corps at all times there have been systems for the elimination of men considered unfit. No sergeant or officer with average intelligence who has trained soldiers foi w ar for more than six months believes that all men are created equal. The ability to observe men in difficult, strenuous circumstances over long periods of time rapidly destroys this myth. The elimination of soldiers from combat arms, and the Army, was and is routine. The means of elimination were long ago established and institutionalized. The system for producing combat soldiers from the point of entry to the battlefield was a constant process of weeding out. Even in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the nation and Army were desperate to find and draft men to send to Vietnam, the Army recognized that some men were "un-trainable" and eliminated them. Is/'. I nil 1 i ' 1.1 llurd A J pringliekl, MA: M riam, 1971). 58. Victor Krulak, Lieutenant General, USMC, First to Fight (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), xv. 59. It is human nature to compare and assess value based on some scale, which is at least in part culturally imbued. Hence, no matter how much an individual has it is relative to what others have. Perceived disparity causes people to covet, and li i ariti in] ,>\ disparities between the weak and the strong, motivate actions to take what is coveted. Fighting to get is fundamental to human existence. For a more complete anal} sis and bibliography of the unchanging factors in hu- man nature, the human condition, and war see, Adrian R Lewi it i 1 u i i f er'sGuid Military History ed. Charles Messenger (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), 81-85. Chapter 2 1. Harry Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman 1945, vol. 1 (1955; New York: Da Capo,1986), 506. 2. John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 279, 280. 3. Robert E. Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 29, 30. T. R. Fehrenbach < i i\ , u i ill m 1989), 161. U.S. Army, N. A. Skinrood, Colonel, U.S. Army, Officer Assignment Division, Subject: Data for Comment on Recom- mendation of Reserve Officers Association, Main Library, USMA. Numerous studies have characterized the American way of war. See: Maurice Matloff, "The American Approach to War, 1919-1945," in The Theory and Practice of War (New York: Praeger, 1965), 213-43; John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed, 272, 273; Russell Weigley, II (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988); and others. For the studies on the adaptability of the U.S. Army see: Michael Doublci ( ' ii nam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994); Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); and Russell Hart, Clash of Arms (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). Thetenet was restricted to white men until the latter half of the twentieth c ntu Oth racial roups were believed to lack the martial spirit and even the ph\ si, I i] bililii >1 white men. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, Inaugural Address, January 20, 19:0, Congressional Record. George M. Fredrickson, The Black Inn , i il Wl Vli '• (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1971), 99. Fredrickson wrote: "Such were the beginnings of a nationalistic glorification of the dominant stock, a tendency to make America's virtues racial rather than historical or environmental in origin. But antebellum "Anglo-Saxonism" can be distinguished from the late nineteenth-century variety by its lat , i lusiven il d in a general unwillingness to acknowledge significant and enduiin ihnic divisi I il i t i ' II i inplied, as a rule, that all whites in the United States could readily be assimilated by the dominant stock without altering basic national characteristics ...." Also see: David Roediger, Working Toward Whiteness (Now York: Basic Book, 2005). Herbert McClosky and John Zallei Iln I ndD ic) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 82, 83. McClosky and Zaller in The American Ethos, 85. Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army, rev. ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 16. nder Hamilton, 'II 'I in i t ill lian (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 155. Hamilton's miht i In I 1 i Works, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge, federal ed., 12 vols. (New York: 1904). Weigley, History of the U.S. Army, 154. Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1917), vii. U.S. Army Ground Forces, "AGF Job: To Build Units Fit to Fight," Infantry Journal June (1946): 17-23. U.S. Army, CMH Pub 104-9, The Personnel Repla , t m the US (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), 247-53. Russell Weigley, "The Aim i i hi 1 1 rincipl lian utroll 1 McClcllan lo Powell i The Journal of Military History 57, (1993): 52. Charles Kirkpatrick in his study, Writing the Victory Plan, uses slightly different figures. He uses the figure of 138,389,000 for the population of the United States. Charles B.MacDonald, "The Qualities of a Soldier," The Ai myl m tioi D r December (1950): 7-13; UP. Williams, Lieutenant.Colonel, U.S. Army, "They May Not Die— But They Wither Fast," Military Review July (1950): 17-23; Audie Murphy, To Hell and Back (New York: Henry Holt, 1949), 13, 14. Warren P. Munsell, Jr., "The Story of a Regiment: A History of the 179th Regimental Combat Team," Unpublished Manuscript,© 1946, 1, The 45th Infant r\ Division Museum, Okalahoma City, Okalahoma. Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army, "The Army and Public Service" based on the Stafford Lecture, "Public Service, Present and Futuic Infoi i > Inly ( 1 m; i i ickl Ii D. J. Carrison, Commander U.S. Navy, "Our Vanishing Mihtai \ 1 ol ion Military R t lime (1954): 59-62. Christopher Buckley, "Viet Guilt: Were the Real Prisoners of War the Young Americans Who Never Left Home' Esquire, September 1983, 68-72. Buckley quoted Myra MacPherson of the Wash a igt on Post, who wrote: "Now there is some meager measure of reconciliation; some who used to taunt them (the homecoming soldiers) at army camps and airports— the student deferred taunting those less privileged draftees of those who felt compelled lo serve their country— admit guilt and shame." Manton Eddy, Lieutenant General, US.Army, "Military Power and National Policy," Army Information Digest April (1950): 42-46. I ii ; i I I ! n j i i lips (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1985), 77. Vegetius advanced this thesis Fishermai iwlei on don i and in general all whose professions more properly belong to women should, in my opinion, by no means be admitted into the service. On the contrary, smiths, carpenters, butchers, and hunts-men are the most proper to be taken into it. On the careful choice of soldiers depends the welfare of the Republic," 79. R. C. W Thomas, "The Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea," Military Review February (1953): 87-91. James H. Toner, "American Society and the American Way of War: Korea and Beyond,' Parameters 11, no. 1(1981): 78-89 (italics added). David Halberstam, The Fifties, x (italics added). Robert E. Osgood, Li nun a' War (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1957), 33 (italics added). John A. Hannah, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel), "Doctrine for Information and Education," Army Information Digest | u lv (1953): 3-7. Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 484, 485. James B. Twitchell, Living It Up: Our Love Affair with Luxury (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 4, 5, 28-38. I n h 11 i in l i h i ho I 1 1 it the vast majority of the nations college student aspired to be millionaires with all the prestige and privilege that wealth produces. Very few millionaires -bow up on battlefields. Nowhere was this more evident than the compensation awarded the families oi the victims of 9/1 1. There was no pretence of equality. Each life was assigned a value, and janitors were worth considerably less than corporate e 35. Results of the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 1999-2000, http://www.cdc.gov/nccd- php/dnpa/obesity/trend/maps/index.htm Also see, Susan Brink, "Eat This Now!" U.S. News and World Report, March 28, 2005, 56-58. Brink noted: "A national team of researchers reported in last week's New England Journal of Medicine thai obcsit\ already reduces the current life expectancy in the United States by four to nine months." During the last three decades of the I wentic i h century obesity increased dramatically, afflicting America's children. The percentage of children and adolescents who were defined as overweight doubled between 1970 and 2000. Diabetes, high blood pressure, and numerous other serious bodily disorders were on the rise as a result of weight gain. 36. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, 190-93. 37. Infantry Journal Stall, "Once Again.. . " Infantry journiil October (1945): 6,7. 38. Ibid. 39. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: The Modern Library, 1 L) 133 S3 \lso see note 40. 40. HugoA Meiei [he h >L oi L'echnolc in Tet olog I Social Ci nA rica,< I I mii Layton, Jr. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 79-97. 41. John A. Warden III, Col. USAF, "Special Review," Proceedings, 130, no. 9 (September 2004): 66. Chapter 3 1. Arthur G. Trudeau, Lieutenant General U.S. Army, Chief of Research and Development, "Man — The Ultimate Factor," Army Information Digest November (1959): 10. 2. Henry H. Arnold, General, USAF, "Air Strategy for Victory," Flying 33, no. 4 (1943): 50. 3. Jan C. Smuts, Lieutenant General British Army, "The Second Report of the Prime Minister's Committee on Air Organi- zation and Home Defense against Air Raids," August 17, 1917. Quoted in Phillip S. Meilinger, Colonel USAF, The Paths of Heaven lint i / II Ai Base, AL: Air Universil Pre s, 1997), 43. 4. The list of histoi ical works on the ah war is extensive, including: Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 7 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Richard J. Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945 (New York: Scarborough Book, 1980); Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New rk: Oxford University Pi 19 liehael hen 4 i i ( (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987); Conrad C. Crane / / ( tndCivii \ canAirpowt i i i Wi "l n I mi eisitv Press of Kansas, 1993); Geoffrey P rel H nged Victor) "i \i my Air Force in World War II (New York: Random House, 1993); Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing 1914-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); John Gooch, ed., Airpower: Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Alfred C. Micrz iewski, 'llie Collar w < < i'i omv, 1944-1945: W I A i i i i iu/1 / / / v (Chapel Hill: lire Uni rsil > orth Carolina Pi 1 M berl Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinkinginthe United States Air Force 1 907- 1 960 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989); Stephen L. McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910-1945 (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian inslitution Press, 1995). Biographies and autobiographies also provide important information and insights: Sir Arthur Harris, Marshal of the RAF, Bomber Offensive (California: Presidio Press, 1990); Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Center of Air Force History, 1993); Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor, Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965); Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949); Thomas M. Coffey, HAP: The Story of the U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built It, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold (New York: Viking, 1982); Dik Alan Daso, Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000); Thomas M. Coffey, Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of I i i rk: Crown, 1986); Charles Griffith, 'llie Quest: Hay\ Han i i Bombing in World War II (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1999); Dik Alan Daso, Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000); and Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949). 5. See: Stephen Ambrose, Citi::ei> Soldiers {'Sew York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); Michael Doubler, Closing with the Enemy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994); James M. Gavin, On to Berlin (New York: Viking Press, 1978); Peter S. Kindsvattei A///( Lawi I i \ Kan it Ir ules MacDonald, The Mighty Endeavor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 969); Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Bantam Books, 1 984); Peter R Mansoor, The G.I. Offensive in Europe (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999); S.L.A. Marshall, Men against Fire (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978); Audie Murphy, To Hell and Back (New York: Henry Holt, 2002); Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to be Won (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000), Geoffrey Perret, There's A War to be Won (New York: Random House, 1991), and Russell Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). Also see the official histories of the U.S. Army in World War II. 6. Rangers are special trained to operate behind enemy lines to conduct raids to destroy enemy command and control facilities, unit headquarters, and logistical bases; to rescue captured soldiers; and to conduct reconnaissance patrols. They are also used to seize and hold objectives behind enemy line., such as airfields and other high value targets, until more substantial forces can be deployed. Ranger units have been part of the Army since the American Revolution; however, modern Rangers can also conduct airborne, air assault, and light infant] ) opei itions. Rangers also conduct special operations typically in conjunction with Special Forces. 7. The Army has also fulfilled many other tasks from serving as a con .i.ibul ir; foi < executing [In national Indian policies, to putting down union and veteran riots, to occupation of the South during Reconstruction, to exploring the West, to the construction of roads and waterways. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America's First Battles 1 776-1 965 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 142, 143. Brian M. Linn, Eric M. Bergerud, and others are critical of Weigley's thesis, believing that it is too simplistic, thai ii fails to explain the American conduct of numerous more limited wars. However, in regard to more total wars, within the narrow confines of this work, Weigley's work is \ alid. Russell Weigle) described war as practiced by General U S. Grant: Grant proposed a strategy of annihilation based upon the principle of concentration and mass, hitting the main Confederate armies with the concentrated thrust of massive Federal forces until the Confederate armies were smashed into impotence. ... In the spring of 1864 he took the field with the Army of the Potomac. ... It was the grim campaign to destroy the Confederacy by destroying Lee's Army. . . . His method of achieving the destruction of the enemy Army was not to seek the Austerlitz battle [a single decisive Napoleonic battle] . . .but rather an extension of the concept of battle until the battle became literall; synonymous w il li I he whole campaign: he would fight all the time, every day, keeping the enemy Army always within his own Army's grip, allowing the enemy no opportunity for deceptive maneuver, but always pounding away until his own superior resources permitted the Federal armies to survive while the enemy Army at last disintegrated. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present (Washington, DC: CMH, 1990), 107. U.S. Army, FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations, Operation (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1941), 5. U.S. Army, Field Service Regui itions,( >p< / . ions, FM 100-5 (Washington, DC: War Department, 1941), 18. U.S. Army, FM 22-10 Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1951), 5. U.S. Army, AFHQ, "Training Memorandum Number 22, Training to Kill," March 20, 1943, RG 407, Box 148, Archive II. Joseph Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 89, 86. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, 27. "Intelligence Annex to Army Group B," War Journal October 23 (1944): 1-3, Microcopy T-31 1, Roll 1, Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Also reprinted in Peter R. Mansoor, The G.I. Offensive in Europe (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 184, 185. 18. Adrian Lewis, Omaha Beach (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), chapters 5 and 6. 19. The term Blitzkrieg was created by the allies not the Germans. And some historians argue that blitzkrieg was a myth developed to explain the fall of France. See the works of Robert Doughty. 20. Willis Crittenberger, General, U.S. Army, "Armor's Role in National Si urit I Informa Digest July (1953): 35-41. 21. Combat power is the cumulative force of all the resources: technologies, doctrines, talents, skill, intelligence, genius, luck, cultural understanding, and every other factor, that in fluenc es the a bility of a unit to destroy enemy forces. Combat power consists of not only palpable, measurable components, such as tanks and airplanes; but also, intangible components, such as, courage, esprit de corps, patriotism, and numerous other very real but invisible factors. Combat power changes moment to moment and is different with every enemy, every geographic region, e\ci\ ci Itu u I i society Relative combat power is measured in the heads of commanders and political leaders, not on computers. 22. Reprinted in "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," in Airpower, ed. lohn Gooch (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 92. The complete text is in AIR 6/19, Public Record Office, London. 23. John Lukacs, Five Days in London May 1 940 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 104, 184; Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 142. 24. Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Their Finest Hour, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 458. 25. Harris, Bomber Offensive, 54. 26. Winston Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 281. 27. Charles P. Snow, Science and Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 47-51. 28. Christopher R. Browning equated the bombing of Germany and Japan with other atrocities including the Holocaust. Browning wrote: "Other kinds of atrocity, lacking the immediacy of battlefield frenzy and fully expressing official gov- ernment pohev d idedly w , tandard opei i, >n 1 procedures.' The fire-bombing of German and Japanese cities, the enslavement and murderous maltreatment of foreign laborers in German Camps and factories ... the reprisal shooting of a hundred civilians for every German soldier killed by partisan attack. . . these were not the spontaneous explosions or cruel revenge of brutalized men but the methodically executed policies of government Brow ing, Ordinary i (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 161. 29. The U.S. Strategic Bombinj lurvi ' Nummary Report, The Civilians." 30. John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 15. Buckley noted: "It has been argued that Germany and Japan were able to resist air bombardment on such a huge seal., because of the nature of their regimes— authoritarian, regimented and conditioned by excessive propaganda. However, before the Second World War, similar analysts claimed that totalitaria n dictatorships were brittle and especially prone to morale-sapping air raids, saddled as they were with alien and unnatural forms of government which evoked little deep-rooted support. ( lonversely, liberal democracies could endure the excesses of total war. . . .Airpower was simply not capable of bringing about the destruction of whole modern societies in the manner envisaged in the interwar era . . . ." 31. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 132, 133. 32. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 24. 33. Quoted in Jerome Kuehl tal in Woi Id at War, Video (New York: Thames Television). 34. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 132, 133. 35. Ibid., 132. 36. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "Narrative Summary," in The U.S. Air Service in World War 1, 4 vols., ed. Maurer Maurer, (Washington, D.C.: Office of AF History, 1978), 4: 501-502. Reprinted in Tami Davis Biddle, "British and American Ap- proaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," in Airpower, ed. John Gooch, 108. 37. Conrad Crane, Bombi Cit ddvilii J ren < meisitv Press of Kansas, 1993), 19. 38. John Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps 1931-1935, The United States Air Force General Histories (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 216. 39. Crane, Boml 40. W. Hays Parks, "'Precision' and Area' Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?" in Airpower., ed. John Gooch, 148. 41. The U.S. Strategit Bombing Survey iummary Report the Civilians." 42. Alfred Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 178-82. 43. W. Hays Parks, "'Precision' and Area' Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?" in Airpower" ed. John Gooch, 146. Parks concluded that: "the image conveyed by the word precision is inappropriate to describe USAAF heavy bomber practice. Enemy defences kept the American daylight bombers from achieving the results the; sought, and the consistently poor European weather regular!) forced the Americans to bomb using radar aids— a practice that inevitably led to unsat- isfactory results as the Americans were not as well trained, equipped, or experienced as the Bi ilish in radar-bombing techniques." 44. Crane, Bom' Civil LJ 45. Historians and airmen have produced numerous studies on the fire bombing of Japan, including: Martin Caidin, A Torch to the Encni) (New York: Ballantine, 1960); Wilbur H. Morrison Po i t ' Air Force (New York: Times Books, 1979); Robert Guillain, / Saw Tokyo Burning: An Eyewitness Narrative from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, trans. William Byron (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981); Haywood Hansell, Jr., Strategic Air War Against Japan (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.: Airpower Research Institute, 1980); Haywood S. Hansell, |i., The Strategic Air War Against German) and Japan: A Memoir ( Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986); Kevin Herbert, Maximum Effort: The B-29s Against Japan (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1983); Hoito Edoin, The Night Tokyo Burned (New York: St. Martins Press, 1987); Curtis E. LeMay and Bill Yenne, Superfortress: The Story of the B-29 and American Air Power (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988); E. Bartlett Kerr, Flames Over Tokyo (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1991); Kenneth Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over Japan 1 Hiring World War II (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996); and, Daniel Haulman, Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against iapan (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999). 46. Richard Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999), 13. 47. Ibid., 19. 48. RufusE. Miles Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half aMillion American Lives Si vi .1 1 ei tational Security 10 (Fall 1985): 121-40. Miles challenges the assessment of half a million casualties. This figure did not come from the Army or the Navy. See Frank, Downfall, chapter 9. 49. Curtis LeMay, Mission With LeMay: My Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 347-52. 50. Crane, Bom' Cith mil Civil 51. John Dower, Wai With ttM n i ( NewYork: Pantheon Books, 1986), 11. Dower fails to take into consideration numerous other factors that influenced, the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. 52. Otto D. Tolischus, "False Gods-False 1 ! t Corps I November (1944): 14-21. This line ofthought was not unique. See: Samuel B. Griffith, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, "The Man Suntzu," Marine Corps Gazette, August (1943): 3-6; and George Amburn, Corporal, USMC, "A Marine Considers the Jap," Marine Corp-; Gazette" July (1945): 19. 53. Quoted in Martin Caidin, A Torch to the Enemy: The Fire Raid on Tokyo (New York: Ballantine, 1960), 23. 54. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 138,139. 55. Gerald Linderman, The World Within War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 150. 56. Pape, Bombing to Win, 10 57. Ibid., 124. 58. Frank, Downfall, 347. 59. Ibid., 348. The historiography on the decision to drop the atomic bombs is extensive. See: Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Codename Downfall (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Gar Alperovitz. Atomic Diplomacy (New York: Penguin Books, 1985); Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); Richard Frank, Downfall t Iri l-'o\ Cultun Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Martin Shcrwin, World Destroyed (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1975); John Skates, The Invasion of Iapan. Alternative to the Bomb (Columbia: University Press of South Carolina, 1994; Paul Fussell, Thank God for the Atomic Bomb and Other Essays (New York: Summit Books, 1988); Vincent C.Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, U.S. Arm) in H WI1 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1985); Barton Bernstein, "The Atomic Bomb Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs 74 (January-February 1995): 135-142; Barton Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation," Political Sci ence Quarterly 90 (1975), 23-69; Thomas T. Hammond, "Atomic Diplomacy' Revisited," Orbis 19 (1976), 1403-28. For a more comprehensive bibliography see, Samuel J. Walker, "The Decision to Drop the Bomb," Diplomatic Histor) 14 (1993), 97-114. 60. Quoted in part in, Harry Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1(1956; New York: Da Capo, 1 986), 422; and Robert Donovan, Conflict and Crisis (New York: W W Norton, 1977), 96. 61. Ernest King, U.S. Navy at War 1941-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy), 169-70. 62. Senate Committee on Naval Aftaiis t Ij ces 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 79. 63. Alexander De Seversky, Victory Through Air Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1942), 182-83. 64. For studies on the Marine Corps and Marine culture see, Allan Millett /, i Ci aig M. Cameron, A Samurai; Holland Smith, Cum! and linns (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1949); and Victor H, krulak, Lieutenant General, USMC, First to Fight: An Insider View of the Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984). 65. See Robert Burrell, "Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology," The Journal of Military History 68, no. 4 (2005): 1161. 66. See Julian Corbett, Some Principles ofb laritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 17. Corbett wrote: "Unaided, naval pressure can only work by a process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow. . . . For a firm dccisi< m a quicker and more drasl ic ioi m of prcssui c is required. Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, gnat issue;, between nations at war have always been decided— except in the rarest cases— either by what your Army can do against your enemy's territoi y and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your Army to do." 67. There is much myth about the development of amphibious warfare doctrine during World War II. The Marine Corps is typically given too much credit and the Navy, the Army, and the British too little credit. In fact, two amphibious warfare doctrines were developed: the Central Pacific Marine-Navy doctrine and the British- U.S. Army Mediterranean Theater doctrine. See Adrian Lewis, Onuilui Bench, chapter 2, and George Carroll Dyer, \ ice Admiral, U.S. Navy, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Ri h ondl UyTu < Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 202-203. Dyer quoted Turner, who wrote: "No one Service invented amphibious warfare. The Marines contributed much (pat- terned on Japanese methods) to its development in recent years. But so also did the Navy, including Naval Aviation. Furthermore, beginning in 1940, the Army contributed a great deal. We should not forget that the biggest operation of all— Normandy — was very largely a U.S. Army and British affair. The Marines had nothing to do with th Europi a and African findings, and the U.S. Navy was not the controlling element." 68. Marines fought in American Expeditionary Forces under General Pershing d tiring World War I. However, the United States did not enter the war until 1917, and the war ended in 1918. 69. The 1st Marine Division is the one exception. It was in combat for 382 dai s It s li ngi st campaign was at Guadalcanal, 152 days. 70. The 2nd Marine Division was activated on February 1,1941 at San Diego, CA. It fought at Guadalcanal for 178 days, Tarawa, five days, Saipan twenty-five days, and Tinian for eight days. 71. The 4th Marine Division fought for four islam 1 K aj I in ! lipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. 72. Dower, War Without Mercy (New York: Pantheon Book, 1986). 73. Roosevelt and the War Department recognized that the Pacific was a secondary theater, and that the only way for Japan to achieve victory was for Germany to win the war in Europe. If the Germans lost, there was no way for Japan to win. 74. Frank, Downfall, 140-147. 75. Ibid. 76. The Navy and Marines argued that speed was necessary to reduce the vulnerability of Navy vessels supporting landing operations; however, the principle of speed was more a function of the Navy's desire to advance to the next operation, than tactical or operational necessity. 77. Quoted in Norman Cooper, "The Military Career of General Holland M. Smith, USMC," (PhD diss., University of Alabama, 1974), 119. 78. Smith, Coral and Brass, 14, 17, 52. 79. Cameron, American Samurai, 148. 80. The battle for Peleliu went on for seventy-five days. The Army's 81st Infantry Division relieved the 1st MD. 81. See Jon T. Hoffman, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Chesty (New York: Random House, 2001), 289. 82. Cameron, \mi i L> ' neron udyiocu ificallv on the 1st Marine Divisi n i oue\ei, he states that the attitudes and cultural tenets identified are common to a lesser or greater degree throughout the Marine Corps. 83. Allan Millett, Semper Fidelis, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 460. 84. Cameron, American Samurai, 155, 1 35. Cameron explained; Army troops, as a result of their basic organization and indoctrination, were generally less well suited to the Pacific War than the marines. . . . The Army's orientation toward fighting an extended, attritional type of warfare as was necessary in Europe and the larger landmasses . . . required an emphasis on conserving manpower and unit effectiveness thai was inimical to the type of combat necessary to seize small, heavily fortified islands." The second argument: "maintained that the marines were more effective than their Army counterparts on an individual k el i 1 i I tessiven ill pn it lacking in the soldiers. It was not simply that the Marine Corps provided its men with better training, the argument ran, but that the Marines recruited from men who were better than the soldiers in every respect." Cameron concluded: "This attitude was carefully cultivated by the Marine Corps through recruit indoctrination, promotion, and public relations." Cameron's work was much maligned. Still, his chapter on Marine attitudes toward the Army is well documented. 85. Cameron, American Samurai, 150. At Peleliu 12,000 Japanese fought the 1st Marine Division to the point that it became combat-ineffective. Consider the following exchange between the senior operational commander, General Geiger and the 1st Marine Division Commander: "Shocked by what he had seen, Geiger met with Rupertus, told him that he considered the 1st Marines [Regiment] to be ineffective as a fighting unit, and suggested that Puller's men be replaced with an Army regiment. At this,' Ci ileman observed, General Rupertus became greatly alarmed and requested that no such action be taken, stating that he was sure he could secure the island in another day or two.' Geiger finally overruled Rupertus, and by the afternoon of the twenty-third elements of the 321st RCT were already relieving units of the 1st i n (1 i il I I i t ill i 1 I 1 igical hero of the Corps — the very icon of the entire institution. His 1 r than life in I 1 indelibly in t larii i lost horn the first day of boot camp or officer candidate school." 86. Charles Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present (Washington, DC: CMH, 1990), 101-15. 87. Russell Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," special issue, The Journal of Military History 57 (1993): 54. 88. Robert R. Palmer, Tin Mobil I my (Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, Study No. 4, 1946). See: Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: The I I) i hoops, United States Army in World War II (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, U.S. Army, 1947), and Robert R. Palmer, Belli. Wiley, and William R. Keast, The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement a ,' i'ii' of Ground i oiubai 1 oops United Slut: i i u V nld War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1948). 89. By comparison, the Germans, with a population 79.5 million, manned 304 divisions, the USSR with a population of roughly 170.5 million, manned over 400 divisions. The strength of German divisions changed during the war from 17,734 men in 1939 to 12,700 in 1944. See I. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot, The Oxford Companion to World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1207. Chapter 4 Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 456. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 454. Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 3, 4. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 455, 456 (italics added). Winston Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 443, 444. Ibid, (italics added). Harry Truman, George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 24, no. 4 (1947): 566-82. Omar Bradley, General U.S. Army, Chief of Staff, Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "The Strategy of Map," Army Information ! Hgest September (1949): 8-10 (italics added). Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "Military Assistance for Mutual Security," AID September (1949): 3-7. Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff U.S. Army, "One Round Wont Win the Fight" AID April (1949): 31-35. Ibid. Report of the President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age (Washington D.C.: GPO). Parts of the report were published in Army lnj I t, March (1 ) 16. The members of ll ommission were: Thomas K. Finletter, Chairman, forme 1 1 [ ial i I ant to Secretary of State Cordell Hull: George P. Baker, Vice-Chairman, Professor of Transportation, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration; Palmer Hoyt, Publisher, Denver Post; John A. McCone, President, Joshua Hendy Iron Works; and Arthur Whiteside, President, Dun and Bradstreet. Ibid. Harry Truman, Memoirs ofHarr) Truman, vol. 2 (1956; New York: Da Capo, 1986), 306. From a statement by the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 25, 1948; see, "Armed Forces Needed to Keep the Peace," AID May (1948): 57-58, for extracts from the address. J. Lawton Collins, General U.S. Army, "The Postwar Military Establishment and Its Manpower Problems," January 17, 1947: 1-5; Collins's Papers, The Cold War Army, Box 25, File 4, Eisenhower Library. Ibid., 5 (italics added). Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 474. Bradley, "Our Military Requirements— III," AID July (1948): 74-78. From an address by General Bradley before the House Armed Service Committee on April 14, 1948. Raymond McLain, Lt. Gen. U.S. Army, "Old Weapons and New," AID March (1948): 29-30. James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, "First Report of the Secretary of Defense" December 1948. Also published as "The State of the National Military Establishment," Military Review 29, no. 1 (1949): 3-13. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 552. In May Forrestal killed himself. J. Lawton Collins, General, U.S. Army and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army during the Korean War, "Our Global Responsibili- ties," AID February (1952): 3-6. Omar Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs, "Toward a Long-Range Manpower Policy," AID March (1951): 11-15. Extracted from statements made before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Sen ices Committee on the Problem ol ililil ii I iwc-r, Januai 22, 1951. For a more complete study of UMT see, James Gerhardt, 'Ihc I ' t .< 'lie Pol i (< >lumbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971). Walter Mills, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, 388. Forrestal recorded in his diary on March 8, 1948 that: "The effect of the Finletter report and of the Brewster Hinshaw Board [this was the parallel Congressional Aviation Policy Board which reported on March 1, 194.8] has been to convince the country that by a substantial increase in appropriations for Air there would be no necessity for UMT... "(italics added). W Stuart Symington, "Facing Realties," AID May (1950): (emphasis added). The Soviet atomic bomb was based on the American design. A German-born scientist, Klaus Fuchs, had stolen the plans. 32. On September 22, 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb, followed by Britain on October 3, 1952, France on February 13,. 1960, and the People's Republic of China, on October 16, 1964. For decades these five powers were members of an exclusive dub; however, India, Pakistan, and Israel later joined the club. Other states will acquire nuclear weapons. 33. NSC 68, "Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of 31 January 1950," April 7, 1950, FRUS 1950, 1:235-92. Reprinted in i S > I I I I \ SimSarkesian with Robert Vitas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 38-43. Quoted in Steven L. Rearden's History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), 528-31. ~ ' Robert McBane, Major, U.S. Army, "The Proposed Defense Budget," AID May (1949): 54-60. For a concise, excellent assessment of NCS 68 see, Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1993). Collins, "The Postwar Military Establishment," 8. Curtis LeMay, General, U.S. Air Force, with MacKinlay Kantoi V on i LcM VI i il Curtis E. LeMay (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 431 (italics added). Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 40, 41. Harry Truman, "The President's Stand on Korea," AID August (1950): 3-9. Fifty-two of the fifty-nine UN member na- tions supported action to restore peace in Korea. laUhewRk ' 1 i J I ! Harper, 1956), 191. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 69, 70. Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War (Harrisburg, PA: 1964), 500. See Jeffrey Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center), 1994. The Revolt of the Admirals was an organized movement to subvert the will of civilian political leaders, who had canceled the construction of the supercarrier the USS United States. 44. Between January 1 and June 30, 1950 the authorized strength of the regular Army was cut from 677,000 to 630,000 to meet budgetary limits. In January 1950, the actual strength was 638,824. By June, the month the Korean War started, it had dropped to 591,487, or 38,513 below the authorization. 45. Dwight Eisenhower, "The Long Pull for Peace" AID April (1948): 33-41. From the "Final Report of the Chief of Staff, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower." 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Omar Bradley, General, U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs, "The Path Ahead," AID October (1950): 24-26. 49. Frederick J. Kroesen, General U.S. Army, "Korean War Lessons," Army August (2002): 7; Clay Blair, in The Forgotten War (New York: Times Books, 1987), 4-12, supports Kroesen's conclusions: "Trumans trench-level military outlook combined with his fiscal conservatism and contempt for generals and admirals had led him to weaken gravely the armed forces of the United States during his first, inherited term as commander in chief. He chose this course notwithstanding the almost day-by-day intensification of Soviet bellicosity and adventurism in the postwar years and the onset of the cold war. Moreover, Ihc weakening continued unabaledly despile Iranian's own ever-tougher cold war foreign policy, which clearly demanded substantial military strength to give it credibility. The president's sins against the military in his first three years and nine months were legion." 50. Blair, The Forgotten War, 4-9, 29. 51. Mark Clark, Gen., Chief of Army Field Forces, "The Payoff in Training," AID January (1950): 3-8. 52. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, "Materiel and Money," AID July (1953): 8-16. Chapter 5 1. Douglas MacArthur, General, U.S. Army, Reminiscences (New York: Da Capo, 1985), 335. 2. Bruce C. Clarke, "Ground Forces in Warfare," AID January (1948): 37. 3. Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army, "Long-Range Strategy for a Lasting Peace," Arnrr Information Digest June (1952): 27-32 (italics added). Bradley's words were as applicable at the dawn of the twenty -first century as they were in the midst of the fighting in Korea. 4. For discussions on the origins of the Korean War see Bruce Cummin ( t I i i) 1 O I. 1, 1 II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Bruce Cummings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983). And see, Carter J. Eckert et al., Korea: Old and New: A History (Seoul: Il-chokak, 1990); Kathryn Weathe i \ it \oikmg Paper No. 8 (Washington, D.C: Cold War International History Project, 1993); and Allan Millett, "Introduction to the Korean War," The Journal of Military History 65 (October 2001): 921-36. 5. Mathew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Da Capo, 1967), 2. 6. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W Lewis, and Xue Lit u I'm / I U <» (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), see chapter 5, "The Decision for War in Korea," 130-68, specifically 144. 7. Figures on the size of the NKPA vary considerably from a low of 100,000 to a high of 165,000 men. When the 120,000 men of the Soviet 25th Army withdrew from North Korea, they left behind all their equipment. The NKPA also inherited the equipment of the defeated Japanese 34th and 58th Armies. Stalin provided more weapons and equipment to NKPA than it did to the PLA during the Chinese Revolution. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs oj Harry S. Truman, 1946-52: Years of Trial and Hope, vol. 2 (1956; New York: Da Capo, 1986), 338, 339. Douglas MacArthur, General U.S. Army, Reminiscences (New York: Da Capo, 1964), 332, 333 (emphasis added). Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Da Capo, 1967), 21, 22. James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, CMH, 1972), 78. Douglas MacArthur, General U.S. Army, Reminiscences (1964; New York: Da Capo,), 334. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 331. Truman, Memoirs, 2: 463. Ibid., 2: 341. For an excellent study on the campaign for Pusan see Uzal \\ linl the i D he Pusan Perimeter (Paducah, KY: Turner, 1996). Wilson A. Heefner, Patton's Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker (Shippensburg, PA: 2001), 134. Also see "Old Pro" (cover story on General Walker), Time Magazine, 56, no. 5 (July 31, 1950), 18-20. Thomas E. Hanson, "The Eighth Army's Combat Readiness before Korea: A New Appraisal," An ik d Forces and Society 29, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 176. U.S. Army, Eighth U.S. Army, War Diary, Section I: Prologue, June 25, 1950 to July 12, 1950, RG 407, Box 1081, NA II. U.S. Army, EUSA, "Strength of Units of Eight Army," June 30, 1950, RG 407, Box 1081, NA II. Roy K. Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1 950," in America's First Battles 1776-1965, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A Stoffi (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas), 269-272. Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1964), 506, 507. William F. Dean, General Dean's Story: As told to William L. Worden (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 17. 23. Leon B. Cheek, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Artillery, "Korea, Decisive Battle of the World," Military Review March (1953): 20-26. 24. This order was controversial. See Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 126; and D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 446. James recorded the assessment of General Almond that Walker's "to stand or die" order was motivated by MacArthur's order to Walker not to withdraw from Teague. Also see: Courtney Whitney, Major General U.S. Army, MtieArtluit : His Rendezvous with History (New York: Knopf, 1956), 344. Whitney made a similar argument. 25. Edward M. Almond, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army and MacArthur's Chief of Staff in Japan, "Conference on United Nations Military Operations in Korea, 29 June 1950-31 December 1951," Carlisle, PA, Army War College, 8. 26. U.S. Army, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Training Bulletin No. 1, Combat Information" March 20 (1953), MHI. 27. Fritzsche, Carl E, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, "Physical Fitness— A Must!" AID July (1955): 41-43. 28. Forthe ofhual i am hi lory a nun i I I Lpplcman out ot ( . , N h i Yalu, U.S. Army in the Korean War (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1986), 194. Appleman wrote: "The tendency to panic continued in nearly all the 24th Infantry operations west of Sangju. Men left their positions and straggled to the rear. They abandoned weapons on positions. On one occasion the 3rd Battalion withdrew from a hill and left behind 12 .30-caliber and 3 .50-caliber machine guns, 8 60-mm mortars, 4 3 5 incl rocl I lui h i and 102 rifles." It is hard to believe that soldiers— no matter how poor!)' trained and motivated — left their rifles, their only form of protection; however, Appleman's major argument was in keeping with the general feelings of the time — black men were racially inferio 1 kin tl |n Jiti i i character necessary to make good soldiers. For another assessment by a black officer »in> fought with the 24th Regiment in Korea see: Charles M. Bussey, Lieutenant Colonel US Aim Firefigl fecho (New York: Brassey's, 1991). Bussey wrote: "After my firefight at Yechon the colonel told me that I should receive the Medal of Honor, but because I was a 'Negro,' he could not let that happen. Other controversy has raged over the role and performance of black soldiers in Korea. The white press emphasized stories about Negroes bugging out. In those early days in Korea, the black 24th Infantry Regiment performed better than the regiments of the white 24th Infantry Division and just as well as the other regiments that came later to Korea. The U.S. Army's official history of the first part of the Korean War ... by Roy E. Appleman, strikes me as uniaii an J nol i cpresenting what I saw personally. His book suggests that the Negro soldiers and their units were no good. The official history cites twenty-four instances of poor behavior by the 24th Infantry that I served in. Mr. Appleman was never in the combat zone, and some of the interviews upon which his account is based took place as much as five years afterward. Mr. Appleman interviewed only one black officer and no black enlisted men. He never talked to me." Ihis conlrovers) was addressed in William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGamgle I J / i a ( Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996). 29. Blair, The Forgotten War, 554-55. 30. William Glenn Robertson, Counterattack on the Ntiktong, I9a0, Leavenworth Pupae. (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Arm; Command and General Staff College, December 1985), 108. 3 1 . MacArthur, Reminiscences, 346. 32. U.S. Army, Headquarter X Corps War Diary, Operation Chromite, August 15 to September 30, General Edward M. Almond, RG 407, Box 1089, NA II. 33. For the Marine Corps interpretation of the Inchon Landing see the Marine Corps' official history by Lynn Montros and Nicholas Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953, The Inchon-Seoul Operation, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3, U.S. Marine Corps, 1955); Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Colonel, USMC, Victory at High Tide: The 1 i i/i fork: J B. Lippincott, 1968); and Edwin H. Simmons, Brigadier General, USMC, Over I \\ { ishingion, D.C.: GPO ) From Walt Sheldon's interview with Galloway, for Hell or h bur's 1 Nlw York: Mac- millan, 1968), 49, quoted in Ronald Carpenter, "Did MacArthur Save the Marines' i igs, 12i 8/ 1,1 70, August 2000, 66. For an excellent study of tidal conditions at Inchon see: Harold A. Wintci J Elements: 1 ith a and Terrain in the Conduct of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 207-214. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 349. See also, D. Clayton James 1 lacArthur: Trim Usastet 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 469. Admiral Robert L. Dennison, oral history, interview by John T. Mason, March 27,1973, Annapolis, MD, U.S. Navy Institute Oral History Program, Dennison #5, 203.. Reserve Officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps Reserve: A History (Washington, D.C.: Division of Reserve, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1966), 164. Ronald H. Carpenter, "Did MacArthur Save the Marines?" 70. Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953, The Inchon-Seoul Operation, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1955), 134-136. Montross, 'the Inchon Seoul Operation, 129. Robert Debs Heinl, Victory at High Tide, 38, 39. Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999) 92, 93. See also, Alonzo Hamby, "Public Opinion: Korea and Viclnam," Wilson Quurtt i ly Summer ( 19'. Si: : Karl G. Larew, "Inchon Not a Stroke of Genius or Even Necessary," Army, December (1988); and Bruce Pirine, "The Inchon Landing: How Great Was the Risk?" Joint Perspectives 3 (Summer 1982). 44. Ridgway, The Korean War, 44. 4-i. Sehnabel, Polk) and Direction, I'/b. 46. Hal D. Steward, Major U.S. Army, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), "Rise and Fall of an Army," Military fleview February (1951): 32-35. 47. U.S. Army EUSAK, War Diary, September 1, 48. Quoted in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: A (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 71. 49. Quoted in Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 118 (emphasis added). Also see, Mat- thew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Da Capo, 1967), 45; and Allen Guttmann, ed., Korea and the Theory of Limited War (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1967), 9. 50. Sehnabel, Policy and Direction, 199. 51. Rosemary Foot in her book, The Wrong War (74-87), provides the best assessment of the American decision to cross the 3 8 1 h pa rallel. Foot wrote: "As for China, Washington concluded that it was unlikely to enter the war because of the PRC's inappropriate and low military capability, its domestic problems, Us desire lo lake its seal in the UN., and it reluctance to become further dependent on Moscow, militarily and diplomatically." 52. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, 362. Sehnabel, Policy and Direction, 200. NCS 73/1 (July 29) and NSC 73/4 (August) delineated the actions to be taken if the Chinese entered the War: "as long as action by UN military forces now committed or planned for commitment in Korea offers a reasonable chanc ofsu full I uch a i >n should be continued and extended to include authority to take appropriate air and naval action outside of Korea against Communist China." 53. James, Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964, 488, 489; Ridgway, The Korean War, 45. 54. Quoted in Sehnabel, Policy and Direction, 194. 55. Truman's recollection of this meeting differs from MacArthurs. See, Truman, Memoh s, 366; and Major General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 392. General Whitney, who was at Wake Island during the conference, wrote: "MacArthur promptly replied that his answer would be purely specula live, but that his guess would be 'very little.' He then explained this viewpoint. Obviously he could only speak from a military standpoint, with a political decision. But as a backdrop to his military speculation, MacArthur proceeded from the premise . . . that there was no evidence from Peiping even suggesting that Red Chinese intervention was under serious consideration." 56. For a concise assessment of CPV see, Scott R. McMichael, Major U.S. Army, A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, CSI, Research Survey No. 6 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987), 51-80. For a mo detailed stud J I it 1 he CI • u i J [a i 1 < J / i (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). Quoted by James H. Tate, "The Eighth Army's Winter Campaign," Army Information Digest, August (1951): 42-57. Quoted in Whitney, MacArthur, 421. Oral Reminiscences of Governor W Averell Harriman, Interviews with D. Clayton James, June 20, 1977, RG-49, Ma- cArthur Archives and Library, Norfolk, Virginia. Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to General Douglas MacArthur. Reprinted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 377. MacArthur'a response to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 30, 1950. Reprinted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 379. CS response to MacArthurs proposal for expanding the war. Reprinted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 380. Quoted in Life magazine, May 12, 1952, 111. Ridgway, The Korean War„S3. Ridgway, quoted in Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 7. 66. Ridgway, 'lite Korean War, 8:i. Quoted in James F. Sehnabel, "Ridgway in Korea," Military Re\ lew March (1964): 7. Margaret A. Mailman, Captain U.S. Army, "Korean Brawn Backs the Attack," Army Information Digest December Quoted in James F. Schnabel, "Ridgway in Korea," 7. Ridgway, Soldier, 206, 207. Quoted in Schnabel, "Ridgway in Korea," 11. Quoted in Life magazine, May 12, 1952, 114 (cover story). "Also see, Ridgway, Soldier, 208. Dennis J. Vetock ! > led: A Hi >/' I [nny Lesson Leiirni Carlisle) i < leks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988), 76. U.S. Army, EUSAK, G-2, Periodic Intelligence Report, No. 150, Inclosure No. 2, RG 407, Box 1133, NA II. S. L. A. Marsh ill i igt in Korea (London: Greenhill Books, 1988), 5-7, 128-30, 133-35. Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Action in Korea (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1970), 100. Frhrenbach, This Kind of War, 393-94. Apple-man, Ridgway Duels Lor Korea, 258. The Chinese Communist Force (CPV) was in fact the People's Liberation Army. The PLA was renamed to disassociate it from the People's Republic of China, to maintain a limited war. U.S. Army, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Training Bulletin Quoted in James H. Toner, "American Society and the American i (Spring 1981): 78-89. Chapter 6 1. Curtis E. LeMay, Mission VithLeM i (G den City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 463,464 (italics added). 2. Robert Futrell, The U.S. Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 193. 3. Futrell, The U.S. Air Force in Korea, is the standard work on airpower in the Korean War. For a more recent study see, Conrad A Ci u r i 1950-1953 (Lawrence: Universil Press of Kansas, 2000). 4. John W. R. Taylor, "What Has Korea Taught Us?" Military Review August (1954): 86-89. Taylor observed, "Their [the U.N. Air Force's] failure to stem the flood of the North Korean invasion in 1950 and the later Chinese onslaught was regarded by some armchair critics as proof of the inability of air power to play a significant role in tactical warfare. The critics -hose to forget that the enemy in Korea was usually an infantry man, moving without vehicles and artillery, at night, carrying only a rifle and a bowl of rice, over mountain I rails where the front line was never held long enough to permit proper close air support. . . ." In other words, the Air Force was unprepared for the type of war it had to fight in 5. Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History, 1995), 396. 6. L Ma i •/ sio i] a, i Vj j 462 16 7. Crane, Amti u m Airpow i 1 8. Quoted in Futrell, The U.S. Air Force in Korea, 186 (italics added). 9. Allan R. Millett, "Korea, 1950-1953," in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1990), 374. Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer commanded the Far East Air Force until June 1951, and General O. P. Weyland for the remainder of the war (italics added). 10. Millett, "Korea, 1950-1953," 350, 351. 1 1 . Admiral Charles D. Griffin, oral history interview by John T Mason, April 14, 1 970, Annapolis, MD, U.S. Navy Institute Oral History Program, #5 Griffin, 231. 12. Futrell, The U.S. Air Force in Korea, 705. Futrell argued that, the differences in pel formance between the Air Force and Marine Corps were the result of "fundamental philosophical differences between the USAF-Army and the Marine systems of air-ground operations." The Army tended to rely more heavily on its artillery than the Marine Corps' ground force, resulting in different techniques for dcpl n el < ir support. 13. For a description of the system see Futrell, The U.S. Air Force in Korea, chapter 3, "Drawing the Battleline in Korea," 77. 14. Edward M. Almond, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, "Mistakes in Air- Support Methods in Korea," U.S. News and World Report March 6 (1953): 58-61. 15. Edward M. Almond Papers, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, interview by Captain Thomas G. Fergusson, Anniston, AL, six-tape series of typed transcripts (Carlisle, Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, March 25-30, 1975), Tape 5, 57. 16. The F-80 was the Army Air Force's first jet, and the F-86 was the Air Forces' first swept-wing fighter. It was rushed to Korea to take on Soviet-made MIG jet fighters flown by Soviet pilots for the most pai i. See Mareelle Size Knaaek, Lucy clopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems, vol. I, Post World War LL Fighters 1944-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978), 23, 52. 17. Admiral John J Hyland, Jr., oral history program, interview by Paul Stillwell, May 31,1984, Annapolis, MD, U.S. Naval Institute, #6 Hyland, 379. 18. Millett, Close Air Support, 359. 19. Ibid., 381. 20. William W. Momyer, General U.S. Air Force, Airpower in Three Wars I M WII, Korea, Vietnam) (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2003), 128. 21. Futrell, The U.S. Air Force in Korea, 695, 696. 11. i inn Zhang, lied Wings 0\ I i Korea (< illege Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 122. 23. Zhang, Red Wings Over the Yalu, 138. 24. Crane, American Airpowcr Strategy in Korea, 1', 6. 25. Andrew M. Jackson, Admiral U.S. Navy, oral hi oi program interview by , February 7, 1972. Annapolis, MD, U.S. Naval Institute, Jackson # 5, 173-82. 26. Norman Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 256. Naval historian Friedman wrote: "The revival of c ai nor construction was very much a consequence of the Korean War. The North Koreans attacked on 25 June 1950, vindicating Forrest Shermans plea that one carrier be maintained in the Far East at all times. On 1 1 July the Joint Chiefs agreed to postpone further consideration of reductions in the carrier force level, and the following day Secretary of Defense Johnson, the man who had killed the [ USS] United States, offered Admiral Sherman a new carrier." B. S. Bhagat, Brigadier British Army, "Military Lessons of the Korean Conflict," Military Review December (1952): 71-79. Gen. O. P. Weyland, "The Air Campaign in Korea," Air University Quarterly Review 6 (Fall 1953): 27-28. Quoted in Crane, American Airpowcr Strategy in Korea. [', I. J. Thomas Schneider, Chairman, Personnel Policy Board, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "The Need for Understand- ing," Army Information Digest June (1951): 3-6 Floyd L. Parks, Major General, "Army Public Relations— A Review of 1952," Army Information Digest March (1953): 3-13. The Big Picture film series stai ted in 1951 with thirteen half-hour programs devoted to the Eighth Army in Korea. Of the 111 television stations, 97 broadcast the program. The Army Signal Corps produced the se ries and distributed it without cost. It was believed that the program reached 90 percent of the viewing audience, estimated at fifty million viewers. It was considered one of the Army's most successful public relations program. In 1955 there were only thirty-five million tele\ isions in the United States; however, each week fifty thousand new sets went into American homes. Television was rapidly becoming the most ubiquitous and important means of communicating with the public. It was estimated that seventy-five million people attended twenty thousand theaters in the United States each week in 1952. A "hit" picture could reach as many as forty million people. The objectives of the Army Motion Picture Section were to help the American people gain a better understanding of war, Army life; and the 1 1 i irt hip and courage of soldiers. The Home Town News Center was established in July 1951 in Kansas City, Missouri. Its purpose was to "improve, supervise, and control the flow of informational material to home town news media" in accordance with AR 360-20. At the end of the war, in 1953, the Center was in contact with more than, 1 1,950 newspaper, radio, and television editors. 32. Karl A. Von Voigtlander, Major, U.S. Army, "The War for Words," Arm Inform ioni Hgest January (1953): 54-59. 33. EdwardFWn li U i i< cncral, U.S. Army, Adjutant General, "The Casually Report Tells iheSlory," Army Information Digest" November (1950): 7-10. 34. M. P. Echols, Colonel, U.S. Army, "Information in the Combat Zone, li rj I brm tionD » nil (1951): 60-64. 35. Von Voigtlander, "The War for Words," 56 (italics added). 36. Ibid., 57 (italics added). 37. Floyd L. Parks, Major General, U.S. Army, "The Commander and the Press," Army Information Digest May (1953): 17-20. 38. Julius Ochs Adler, Major General, USArmy, "The Free Press— Weapon of Democracy," Army Information Digest June (1953): 17-21 (italics added). 39. Douglas MacArthur, Testimony before the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate, 26-28. Reprinted in Korea and the Theory of Limited War, .ed. Allen Guttmann (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1967), 17-18. 40. Quoted in Gu ( i h II i i / 1 Lechanicsburg, PA I Books, 2002, 93, 94. 41. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Record, Chairman, Joint Chiefs, Omar N. Bradley, Subject: Relief of General Douglas MacArthur, 25 April 1951. Washington, D.C: JCS Declassification Branch, June 8, 1977. Bradley wrote: "I felt that proper action was to let General Marshall write a personal and confidential letter to General MacArthur, pointing out the difficult position in which he was placing the government. We went so far as to draft a copy of such letter. I furnished part of the draft and General Marshall filled in the rest of it." " Ibid. 43. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) 403. Ibid., 404. Ibid. Almond, "Mistakes in Air Support Methods in Korea," 58-61. HarryS. Truman, "Limiting the War in Korea is Essential to Avoid a Woi Id in 7/i i \\ i i Documents, ed. Dennis Nishi (New York: Greenhaven Press, 2003), 95-97. For Ridgway's assessment of the relief of MacArthur see, Mitchell, Matthew B. Ridgway, chapter 9. George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 104-109. See Irving W. Hart, Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army, "On Extending Selective Sei \ ic I irj Info itionDig i May (1950): 31-35. All the Chiefs of the services argued for extending the draft. 50. Hart, "On Extending Selective Service," 31-35. 51. The Selective Service Act of June 24, 1948 obligated enlisted men to serve for twenty-one months on active duty and afterward to remain in the inactive reserve for five years. In the event of an emergency, men in the inactive reserve could be recalled to active duty. If a man enlisted for one year of active duty as an 18-year-old, he had a six-year obligation in the inactive reserve. And, if a man sei \ ed thirty-three months on active duty he acquired no reserve obligation. Reserv- ists were recalled to fight the Korean War, 140,000 from the National Guard and 230,000 from the Organized Reserve Corps. Congress revised these requirements several times during the 1950s. Elva Stillwaugh, Major, U.S. Army, "Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict." (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History), 22. J. Lawton Colhns, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, "Our Global Rcsp nsibilil 1 Inj D lebiuary (1952): 3-6; based on an address at the annual autumn Convocation, Tulane University, 1952. In fact, the Army released 809,000 in 1953, and the Selective Service provided 746,000. The end strength was 1,533,815. J. Lawton Collins len, Materiel and Mon 1 > IK (1953): 8-16. J. L. Frink, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "The Shipment of Replacements m ( ou] lilit ' w Augusl (1950): 45-51. 1 1. Haig, |r., General, U.S. Arm 1 Clia I k: Warnei Books, 1992), 68, 69. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), 10. Stillwaugh, "Personnel Policies in the Korean War," 29. Hill, The Minnie Man in Peace and War, 507. Hill wrote: "The eight activated Guard Divisions ... would have been far more valuable to the Nation had they been kept intact, filled with personnel for the dura tion and stral egically positioned in the Far East Theater, or deployed on the line in Korea, for a prompt, field solution to that unwanted imbroglio. All their officers, except some of the Lieutenants, and the key enlisted personnel, had seen service, many in cutting-edge units, in one to sc\e" n li ns, repi j n [I'll i flhei i nth -ended World War II." 61. Charles G. Cleaver, 1st Lieutenant, U.S. Army, "History of the Korean War Personnel Problems," Prepared in Military History Section Headquarters, Far East Command, Tokyo, Japan, August 15, 1952. Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 75 (italics added). 62. Ibid., 74 63. William H. Patterson, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "The Personnel Function Within the United States Army," Military Review January (1951): 16-24. 64. David Curtis Skaggs, "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs April (1974): 53-58. 65. Cleaver, "Personnel Problems," 93, 94 (emphasis added). And see: Herbert H. Andrae, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "Rotation," Military Review November (1950): 21-28. 66. Lloyd R. Moses, Colonel U.S. Army, "The Training of Loss Replacements," Military Review December 1951, 37-44. Moses noted: "Maximum combat efficiency is reached at the fourth or fifth month and, thereafter begins to drop. The new replacement reaches the average level of combat efficiency after about 3 months of combat. After reaching that point he is a full fledged veteran for the next several months and is even more valued as a combat soldier than men of longer battle experience." 67. U. P. Williams, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "They May Not Die— But They Wither Fast," Military Review July (1950): 16-23 (emphasis added). 68. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941 (Washington. D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990), 78, 98. 69. mu 1 mi ill c im i ii I: Pi i i I in elMh Press, 1949), 3-4. 70. J. Lawton Collins, "Men, Materiel and Money," The Army Information Digest July (1953): 8-16. 71. Mark Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (Summit, PA: TAB Books, 1954), 187, 192. 72. John Montgomery, Jr., "Unit Rotation — The Long View," Military Review, September (1951): 11-14. 73. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, 192 (emphasis added). ',' i. Stillu augh, "Personnel Policies in the Korean War," chapter 4, "Rotation," 4 (emphasis added). 75. Cleaver, "Personnel Problems," 101,110. Cleaver wrote: "Large-scale rotation not only involved a rapid turnover of basic soldiers but also removed from the theater key men whose training required a long inn. i [ i lists, officers, and noncommissioned leaders. . . . Nobody knew how long basic soldiers could continue to replace trained men, includ ins'. noncommissioned officers and specialists, at a rate of 20,000 a month before the saturation point would be reached." Still, General Van Fleet concluded: "t h is high enlisted rotational turnover has had a highly beneficial effect on the combat effectiveness of the Eighth Army." 76. Stillwaugh, "Personnel Policies in the Korean War," chapter 4, "Rotation," 38. Also see: Roger W Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance 1 I i I mowitz (New York: Norton, 1964), 197. 77. S. L. A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action Korea, Spring, 1953 (New York: William Morrow, 1956), 14. 78. Anthony Herbert, Soldier (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), 57. 79. Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance," 221. 80. Stillwaugh, "Pel sound Policies in the Korean War," chapter 4, "Rotation," 39. 81. Quoted in Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War, 512. 82. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill, 18 (emphasis added). Marshall concluded: "I could not believe in the policy of individual rotation then in use. ... To my mind, it was ruinous to morale and to good administrative order within an armed force. Whatever it gave the soldier, it sacrificed most of the traditional \ allies, sir Ii is earned promotion and citation, pride in unit, and close comradeship." 83. Andre Fontaine, "You and I, USA," Army Information Digest December (1953): 14-25. 84. Floyd Parks, General, U.S. Army, "Defense Begins at Home," Army Information Digest Innuan (1953): 11. 85. J.P. Womble, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, "The Womble Report On Service Careers," Army Information Digest February (1954). 86. Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 593. 87. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Da Capo, 1967), 192. 88. Quoted in Morris MacGregor, Jr. Integration of the Armed Force, 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1985), 312. 89. Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 242-43. See MacGregor, Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1960; and Gail Buckley, American Patriots: The Story of Black m th Mill i ' < w York: Rand n House, 2001). 90. Quoted in U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, H h Cong., 2nd sess., 1948,995-96. 9 1 . Ridgway, The Korean War, 1 93 (italics added) . 92. Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity and Safety Policy, Department of Defense, Black Americans in Defense of Our Nation (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985), 66. 93. Walter Hermes, Truce Tent and Fight Korean Wai (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 58. For a recent assessment of Marine Corps operations in the final phases of the war see Bernard C. Nalt\ () I larines in the Korean War Commemorative Series (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2003). 94. Ridgway, The Korean War, 167; Robert Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 185. 95. Van Fleet was a veteran of the Normandy invasion and operations in Western Europe. His son, an Air Force pilot was killed during a mission over North Korea. 96. Osgood, Limited War, 182. 97. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper, 1956), 219. 98. Charles Turner Joy, Admiral U.S. Navy, How Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 173-74. 99. Futrell, The U.S. Air Force in Korea, 648. 100. Msg, V0022, Gen. O. P. Weyland to Gen. Earle Partridge, January 19, 1954, Weyland Official Correspondence, 50/00/00- 53/00/00, File 168.7104-50, AFHRA, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. Quoted in Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 171. 101. Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate of Information Operations and Reports. 102. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 312. 103. Department of the Arm;, S mi i u I al Report of the Secretary of the Army (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951), 2. Chapter 7 1. John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," Department of State Bulletin 30 (March 29, 1954): reprinted in \merx > ei Polk) ed. Harold Karan Jacobson (New York: Random House, 1960), 376. 2. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (New York: Times Book, 1 987) , 97 1 . 3. Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," 371. 4. Ibid., 374, 375 (emphasis added). 5. Department ofState, National Security Policy: NSC 162/2, October 30, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952- 1954, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 577-97; reprinted in U S Nation i I i i I ed. Sam C. Sarkesian with Robert A. Vitas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 48-52. 6. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 82. Eisenhower wrote: "I thought the decision to intervene was wise and necessary." 7. Ibid., 180. 8. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisi nhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 144. 9. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The President's News Conference on March 17, 1954," in U.S. National Security Policy ami i II l. Sam like lan with Robewrt A. Vitas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 55-58. 10. James M. Gavin, Lieutenant-General U.S. Army, War in Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper, 1958), 150. 11. Quoted in Emmett John Hughes, Tht Living Presidency (New York: Coward-McCann & Geoghegan), 15, 16; and E. BruceGeelhoed haiicsP.W i the Pan 1 953 to 1 957 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979), 102. Eisenhower, "The Long Pull for Peace" The Aran Info ition D ill 948) 33-41. 13. John F. Kennedy, "Conventional Forces in the Atomic Age in The S i i ( 1 illen Nevin (New York; Harper, 1959), 184. Mark W Clark, General U.S. Army, From the Danube to the Yalu (Summit, PA: TAB Books, 1954), 196. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper, 1956), 275. Ibid., 191. 17. Ibid., 312. Matthew B. Ridgway, "Trends in Modern Waif an. I > ! inuary (1950); 63. On September 11, 2001 the U.S. Air Force was incapable of deplo; ing and sustaining one armor brigade into Afghanistan or anywhere else. Kennedy, "Conventional Forces in the Atomic Age," 184-85. Ridgway, Soldier, 296, 3 1 1 . Ibid., 286. Wallace C. Magathan, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "In Defense of the Army," Military Review April (1956): 3. 24. James E. Cross, "What is the Army's Job," Military Review June (1956), 43. H. P. Storke, Major General U.S. Army, "Speak Up for the Arm;," Army Information Digest July (1959); 2-9. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), 18. Ridgway, Soldier, 316. MaxwellD. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, "Development of Basic Guidance for Army Pro ran In ' rmat Di I June (1957): 3-19. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 170. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959), 5, 6. Robert E. Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957). Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 171. T. A. Weyher, Brigadier General U.S. Army, "What's New in Firepower," Arm) Information Digest May (1957): 3-8. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 152, 153. Theodore C.Malaxis and Seymour L. Goldberg, Nuclear Tactics: Weapons, and Tin-power in the Pentoinic Division, Battle Group, and Company (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1958), 104. Paul F Yount, Major General U.S. Army, "Transportation for Tomorrow's Aim\ 4 n Digest February (1958): 12-19. Maxwell D. Taylor, "The Army of the Future," Army In i t January (1957): 15-16. U.S. Army, "U.S. Army Deterrent Force" Army Information Digest March (1958): 35-40. The Army noted: "The use of small-yield nuclear weapons by tactical forces for a tactical purpose would not necessarily transform limited war into general war. However, the clear abandonment by either side of the "least possible destruction" principle [of limited war] I i i ii i ill] khood of general war." William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 32. Maxwell D. Taylor, "The Race for Technological Superiority," Army Information Digest August (1959): 23, 24, and 26. James E. Hewes, Jr., From At o, a \1 niara Army: Oi , n , i a i 1900 1 963 (Washington. D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), 306-307. Andrew J. Bill i i lgton, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), 98, 99. Harry H. Ransom, "Scientific Manpower and National Strate / i u Deeember (1956): 57-62. Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Walker, 2001), 2, 3, 4, and 224. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General, U.S. Army, "Looking Ahead with the Arm J i j 1 st lune (1959): 14 (italics added). Bruce C. Clarke, General, U.S. Army, "Strengthening Our Readiness Capabilities," Army Information Digest June ( 1959) : 15. Moody, Bmldi s < i ! i lone, 416, 417. In 1957, to insure that the bombers were not caught on the ground, Strategic Air Command (SAC) implemented a new alert and readiness system. Bombers were loaded with nuclear bombs and maintained in the air. A second strike force was placed on a fifteen-minute alert status. While the system was modified over the years, and the numbers of aircraft in the air varied with the level of tension between the superpowers, the program was eventually eliminated. The stress on aircraft and men was enormous. Still, SAC maintained a so to war" state of readiness throughout the cold war. In 1957, when LeMay gave up command of SAC, it consisted of 34,1 12 officers; 199,562 airmen; 25,029 civilians; and 3,040 aircraft, including 22 B-36 Peacemakers, 380 B-52s Stratofortresses, 1,367 B-47 Stratojets, 176 RB-47 Stratejets, and hundreds of refueling aircraft, KC-135s and KC-97. 49. Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 5. 50. On May 1, 1960, Gary Powers' U-2 was downed over the Soviet Union., creating a major diplomatic crisis— the pilot lived— ending the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, ending any chance of a new relationship with the Soviet Union in the immediate future, and embarrassing the Eisenhower administration in its last year in office. That same year the first images from a satellite provided the United States with intelligence. This technology, which ihe Soviets were also developing, was in its infancy, but its promise for the future was enormous. 51. Conrad Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 172. 52. Quoted in Norman Friedman, V S iircrafti In i I ' tor) (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 244. 53. Ibid., 248. 54. Ibid., 244. Freidman recorded the Navy's view: "il 'is [he smallest plane which can carry the atomic bomb and it taxes the ability of the CVB to the utmost. In other words the AJ design was forced to suffer considerably due to the size of the elevator, hangar deck height, catapults, etc' Hence the need for a new bomber (of over a 700-mile combat radius) and a new ship to carry it. In a sense the navy could consider the presidential authorization for carriers to project nuclear strikes an authorization for the big strike carrier." 55. The need for bigger aircraft to employ nuclear weapons and the advent of the jet aircraft placed new demands on the carrier, making most of the Navy's World War II fleet obsolete. Aircraft carrier design was the function of a series of trade-offs between the size and weight of aircraft, the numbers of aircraft, the endurance and capabilities of the ship, and the maximum cost that Congress was willing to fund. The intensity of aircraft carrici operatii >ns increased with the speed of aircraft. The increased weight and size of je1 aircraft demanded greater space, larger elevators, larger hangars, and an overall more muscular ship. The increased rate of fuel consumption and ultimately the more varied types of ordinance, including missiles, also created new demands for space. 56. The British designed . angled deck made possible the employment of larger aircraft, a forward park space for aircraft, a safer operational environment, and theoretically the ability to launch and recover aircraft simultaneously. The ship employed the British designed steam catapult to launch aircraft, and mirror landing air system to facilitate the recovery aircraft. Elevators were located at the edge of the deck, as opposed to the center elevators of World War II. With the exception of larger size, the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan, commissioned in 2003, looked very much like the Forrestal. Over the years the propulsion system changed with the advent of small nuclear reactors. The U.S.S. Enterprise, commissioned in 1961 was the first nuclear powered aircraft carrier. Nuclear power meant aircraft carriers could sail for years w ithout refueling. New aircraft, missiles, radar, communication systems made the can icr more capable primarily in the tactical role. With the development of the nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) and the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBN) the strategic nuclear mission ofthe aircraft can lei was . on id i bl ci ninished di raft n m s were employed primarily in the tactical support of ground forces and in sustained bombing campaigns coordinated by the Air Force. 57. Brodie, Strategy in the /'. lissile Age, 394. Chapter 8 1. OmarN. Bradley, General, U.S. Army, "Ad. Ire ssal i he : Third National Industry Army Day Conference," February 4, 1949. Published as "Creating a Sound Military Force," Military Review 29, no. 2 (August 1949): 3-6. 2. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 121. 3. Anthony C. Zinni, General, USMC, "A Commander Reflects," US Nai 11 u Proi 1- i 7/1, no.169 (July 2000): 35. 4. National Security Act of 1947, United States Statutes at Large. Reprinted in U.S. National Security Policy and Strategy: Documents and Policy Proposals, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian with Robert A. Vitas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 9-15. See also Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization 1944-1978, 35-50. 5. Walter Goerlitz, History ofthe German General Staff: 1657-1945 (New York: Praeger, 1957); T. N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Gordon A. Craig, The Politics ofthe Prussian Army 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955); Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussit lExpt net 1660-1815 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958). 6. While aspects of the German system were adopted in the nineteenth century following the impressive victories of Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891), in the twentieth century it became "an object of hatred, fear, and revulsion." 7. See Alan F \\ ll ' , / / > ' D II Bloomingl Indiana University Press, 1990); Mark A. Staler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Adrian R. Lewis, Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 8. Harry S. Truman, "Message to the Congress — 19 December 1945," in Tht 1 pi Defen cumen it enta I ! I I on 1944-1978, ed. Alice C. Cole, Alfred Goldberg, Samuel C Tucker, and Rudolph A. Winnacker (Washington, D.C.: Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1978), 9, 10. Also see Truman, "For Unification," / , . try I nn ml Fcbruai (1946) !3 16 9. "Why Was the U.S. Unarmed?" Time Magazine 56 (October 2, 1950): 18. 10. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987), 4-6. 11. The Officer's Guide, 20th ed, 1954, 263. 12. S. L. A. Marshall, The Armed Forces Officer, 1950, 8. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, 1967, 234. General W R. l i ii i ! ) li i li I ii i I i Incident, 1970 13. Senate Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee lh[ t ' J / / lj il \ear 1951, 8/12, 1950, 15-16 (italics added). Also quoted in Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963, 14. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, Wat in Pt i I Lesso ea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 73 (emphasis added). 15. Ibid., 72. 16. Ibid., 74. 17. Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds Assessing th \ hington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987). 18. In 2004 the future of the people of Iraq was a function of the strength, or lack thereof, of the U.S. Army, and again, a president had Tailed to provide all that was needed to secure a stable, democratic peace. 19. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper, 1956), 288. 20. Maxwell D. Taylor, General U.S. Army, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959), 19. 21. John K. Singlaub, Major General U.S. Army with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the immit Books, 1991), 381-405. General Singlaub publicly voiced his disapproval of President Carter'., plan to withdraw the 2nd Infantry Division from Korea. Carter immediately recalled him to the United States and personally informed him, "General I've lost confidence in your ability to carry out my instructions. So I've asked the Secretary of Defense to have you reassigned. ... I have decided, however, not to have you disciplined." Of course, reassignment « as punishment, and Singlaub had no chance for another promotion. 22. William C. Westmoreland, General, U.S. Army, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 135, 136. 23. Ibid., 417. 24. Russell Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," special issue, The Journal of Military History, 57 (October 1993): 27-58. 25. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1985), 83. 26. Keith D. Mc Farland, "The 1949 Revolt ofthe Admirals," Parameters 11, no. 2 (June 1981):57. See, Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1994). 27. Bradley, A General's Life, 510. 28. See Lynn Montross, Major Hubard D. Kuokka, USMC, and Major Norman W. Hicks, US Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953, vol. 4, The East-Central Front (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1962), 187. Montross etal, wrote: "the atomic bomb of Hiroshima rendered obsolescent in 10 seconds a: systi mof amphibious assault tactics that had been 10 years in the making. Obviously, the concentrations of transport, warships, and aire ra U carriers that had made possible the Saipan and Iwo Jima landings would be silting ducks for an enemj armed with atomic weapons." 29. Quoted from Eisenhower's Diary in Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life, 499. 30. Louis Johnson i QVfei 1 i I i rplfrom"'! i I toft] I il ! i Army Information Digest February (1950): 1 1-22. 31. GeorgeBaer, One Hundred Years ofSea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 313. Note, Bradk n II l niioi I 1 nphibiou peration i li i li inland n I Sicily invasions. He did not argue that small scale operations were no longer practical. Bradley is frequently misquoted. 32. Quoted in E. Bruce Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon 1 953 to 1957 (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1979), 138. 33. For a more complete discussion on the "Revolt of the Admirals" see: Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carrier and B-36 Bomb- ers: Appropriations, Strategy and Pohtit in Ameri Mil " ii i tud'u cd Harold Stein (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1963); Andrew L. Lewis, LCDR, USN, "The Revolt of the Admirals" (master's thesis, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1998); Nor- man Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983). Nick Kotz, U ihl i i Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3, 35. Keith Smith, Lieutenant General, USMC (Retired ), "\ 22 Is Right for War on terrorism," U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding, 128/1/1, 187 (January 2002): 42-44. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNinniirti, the Joint Chiefs of Stuff, and the Lies that Lett to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 333, 334. Douglas Kinnard, "A Soldier in Camelot: Maxwell 'la; lor in die Kenned)' While House," Parameters, 18, no. 4 (December 1988): 15. Senator Barry Goldwater. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Commands" from a series of six, Senate floor speeches. 98th Congress, 1983. lichacl S. Shcn i 1 ' i i i (New H CT: Yale University Pi 1987), x.xi. Matthew B. Ridgway, General U.S. Army, "Army Troop And Public Relatioi i \nny Inf i rf August (1954), 3-5. Cecil J. Gridley, Colonel U.S. Army, "A Battle for Men's Minds," Army Information Digest November (1954): 3-8 (italics added). Maxwell D. Taylor, General U.S. Army, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 171. New York Times, June 27, 1957, 8. George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea, 414, 415. Jim G. Lucas, Washington Daily News, July 29, 1959, quoted in Hearings Enip ymeiitofl Urea Military and Civilian \i | I I ii i I' mill n i I it \ ii] i it ion md the Political Roles of the Armed Services," The American Political Science Review 55, no. 1 (March 1961): 40-52. 46. Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, rev.ed. (New York: Free Press, 1991), 520. 47. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, The President, vol. 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 612. 48. Alfred Vagts, "Introduction," in A History of Militarism: Civilian anil Military, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1959), 15-17 (italics added). 49. Harry S. Truman, "Message to the Congress— 19 December 1945," in Tht >q enti Defensi documents on Estab- lishment and Organization 1944-1978 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1978), 11-15. 50. David I. Walsh, Committee of Naval Affairs, United States Senate, Carl Vinson, Chairman, Committee of Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, Letter to the Secretary of the Navy outlining their objections to S. 2044, The Department of Defense.Doa < sy4-i978(Washington,D.C.:OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense, Historical Office, 1978), 18-20. 5 1 . Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 457, 458. 52. Quoted in Millett, Semper Fidelis, 460. :->3 I i I i ( 1 L iiidiii (New York: Greenwood Press, 1961), 228-29. 54. James V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 270. 55. Life, June 5 (1944): 41-44. 56. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 280. 57. Forrestal served as a naval aviator in World War I. He served as Undersecretary of the Navy in the Roosevelt Adminstration and in 1944 was promoted to Secretary of the Navy. During World War II Forrestal fought hard to secure the resources required to build the world's largest navy. See, Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life: An Autobiography by General Omar N.Bradley (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 497. 58. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 464. 59. James Forrestal, Diaries, 392, 393 (emphasis added). 60. Ibid., 393. 61. Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 492. The copyright on this book was 1983. Bradley died in April 1981; hence, he did not approve the final version of this book. The final chapters were written with extensive work from author Clay Blair. 62. Carl A. Peterson, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "Ground Forces— Key to Survival," Military Review August (1956): 3-5. 63. The nation's fleet of C5A transports is rapidly aging, with nothing comparable to replace it under construction. The new C17 does not have the same capabilities. 64. In 1940 following the fall of France, Britain fought an air campaign that saved Britain from a German invasion. The Brit- ish developed an integrated system that included fighter command, radar .systems, command and control headquarters, and the antiaircraft command. This organization greatly multiplied the combat power of various components. 65. Victor H Krulak, Lieutenant General, USMC li i I / ' I /is (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), xv. 66. Senate Armed Services Committee, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, Hearing, 81st Con., 1st sess., p. 9. Quoted in Hammon 1,0/ , , lot Defense, 239. 67. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, "Strengthening the Defense Team." Army Information Digest October (1949): 3-14. 68. National Security Act Amendment of 1949, U.S. Statutes, vol. 63, part 1, 1950, 579-583, reprinted in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., U.S. National Security Policy and Strategy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 15. Also see, Alice C. Cole, Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, and Rudolph A Wmn ser,ed /' rti D m Do: uuentsi Establishment and ( ' •, tion 1944-1978 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978). See also, "National Security Act Amended," A) nn In] >/ initio > i eplej ib i ( 1949); 59-60. 69. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, "Strengthening the Defense Team." At nn la rm i (' , sf October (1949): 3-14. 70. Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 498, see note 61. 71. Ibid., 595. 72. Public Law 85-599, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, reprinted in Sarkesian, U.S. National Security Policy and Strategy , 22. Chapter 9 1. John F. Kennedy, U.S. Senator, "The Missile Gap", Senate speech, August 14, 1958, in The Strategy of Peace, ed. Allen Nevin (New York: Harper, 1960), 38, 39. 2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75. 3. Ibid., 313 (italics added). 4. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 325-27 (italics added). 5. Basil Liddell-Hart, "Are Small Atomic Weapons the Answer," in ,' deterrent or Defence, 1960. Quoted in Michael Carver, "Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age," Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (N J: Princeton University Press, 1986), 785. 6. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," Foreign Affairs 31, no. 4 (July 1953): 529 (italics added). Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, Tin ii t'NucI ti \ \ \ larlin Pi ess, 1983), 94. U.S. Army, USMA., Cadet Notebook (West Point, NY: Department of History, 1989-90), 19. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Da Capo Press, 1967), 245. U.S. Army, FM 100-5 Field Service Regulation Opi ration (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1954), 7 (italics added). U.S. Army, FM 100-5 Field Service Regulation Operation (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1949), 21. Henry Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the Grey Areas,"' Foreign Affairs 33, no. 3 (April 1955): 427. Robert E. Osgui) I I in The Chall erican Sh g) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 1, 2. Ibid., 191. Ibid., 183 Kissinger, "Defense of the Grey Areas,'" 421, 427. Osgood, Limited War, 22-27. Ibid., 271. Kissinger, "Defense of the Grey Areas,'" 421. Osgood quoted Kissinger. Osgood, Limited War, 55, 56. The Kennedy Administration and the Pentagon under the leadership of Robert McNamara later adopted a strategy of "graduated response" lhat was based on these same tenets of war. Osgood, Limited War, 242, 243, 270. Ibid., 186. Kissinger, "Defense of the Grey Areas,'" 420, 421 Henry Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons ami 1 oreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), and The Necessity for Choice (New York: Harper & Row, 1961);Brodn / Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959). Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). Douglas Kinnard, "A Soldier in Camelot: Maxwell 'la; lor in the Kennedy White House," Parameters. 18, no. 4 (December 1988): 13-24. John F. Kennedy, "The Missile Gap," 39 (emphasis added). Robert E. Osgood, Limited War, chapter 2. John F. Kennedy, "Conventional Forces in the Atom i ,n Th ategyofl < ice, ed. Allen Nevin (New York: Harper &Row, 1960), 183-85. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959), 6. Ibid., 6, 7 (emphasis added). Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nucleai Sti u is1 I I nn a NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 752. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 394. John F. Kennedy, President of the U.S., "Radio and Television Reporl lo the American People on the Berlin Crisis July 25, 111 ' ' i ' i i ( I ii ill i Vitas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 119-23. 33. James E. Hewes, Jr., t'ron i i > i i 1 900-1963 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), 321, 358. 34. Quoted in Jam I ' I 1 1 » of Hubert N / i i ' i University of Miami Press, 1970), 98. 3.1. I 1 i I i ' Duty: I k Robert A e joint ( the Lies that Led i en Harpci Colli I < ilian military ll i nil li m< i nicks on nuclear war than most senior military leaders. This, however, does not mean that they had a clearer vision of war or more comprehensive understanding of strategic planning. The strategic thinking of generals and admirals was not readily available to the public in books and articles. It was, however, published in speeches, addresses lo Congress, and in their actions and programs initiated within the limits of their authority. The writings of senioi Army and Air Force leaders, delineated in this work, show a clear capac ily for slralegic thinking. 36. Curtis E. LeMay, Mission with LeMay (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 5, 553. 37. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 ( New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 89. 38. Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough, 93, 95. 39. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 9-11. 40. General Anthony Zinni was sent to Israel to negotiate peace be: « eon the Israelis and Palestinians. 41. The Army is more oriented toward the leadership of men under the most trying human conditions. The Air Force and Navy are more oriented toward perfecting the employment of machines. The way they do business in peacetime changes little during war. A reading of Air Force General Curtis LeMay 's books reveals an opposition to most Army and Navy initiatives. Airpower was his preferred solution to every problem. 42. Charles G Cooper, Lieutenant General USMC, "The Day It Became the Longest War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings May (1996): 77-80. 43. Rohertv, ftu ons J >. AJ a a i 44. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), x, xi (emphasis added). 45. Ibid., 60 (emphasis added). 46. Ibid., 59 (emphasis added). 47. Ibid., 82. 48. CONARC was established on February 1, 1955 under the command of General John E. Dahlquist at Fort Monroe, VA. The new command replaced the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (1948), which replaced the World War II Army Ground Force (1942), which replaced General Headquarters, U.S. Army (1940). 49. For an organizational chart of the ROAD Armored Division see, Jonathan M. Hon s. Towardd a tied Arms W'arfcin A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization, Combat Studies Institute, Research Survey No. 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined and General Staff College, 1984), 158. Also see, William A. Brown, Major, U.S. Army, "ROAD Doctrine: Battalion in the Defense," Infantry 52, no. 1, (January-February 1962): 31-37. 50. For a brief but excellent study of Revolutionary Warfare see: John Shy and Thomas W Collier "Revolutionary War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 815-62. 51. BernardB. Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsiii m aval] Coll leview April (1965): 271. Also see FMI 3-7.22 Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2004), 1-1. 52. Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Couni m j 53. Clausewitz, On War, 480. 54. William C. Westmoreland, General U.S. Army, "Address before a Joint Session of Congress, April 28, 1967," Department of State Bulletin May 15 (1967): 738-41. Reprinted in, U.S. National Security Policy and Strategy: Documents and Policy Proposals, ed. Sam Sarkesian with Robert Vitas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 153-57. 55. Mao Tse-tuiiL' leetea ' r 11 i 1 i tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 229, 230 (emphasis added). 56. Ibid., 249. 57. Clausewitz, On War, 248 (emphasis added). 58. Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoples War People's Army: The Viet Coin i in ei Mai al for Urn tlevelo it Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); see Douglas Pike, People's Army of Vietnam (New York: Da Capo Press, 1986), and Viet Cong: 'Ihe Organization ami 'Techniques of the National Liberation Trout of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Ihc MIT Press, 1966; The Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in \ ietuarn: 'Ihe Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence Univei i1 Pi - of Kansas); and, Bernard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege ofDien Bien Phu (New York: Da Capo, 1966). 59. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84. 60. I'll i ip/i I of Vict it 126 61. Francis John Kelly, Colonel, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: De- partment of the Army, 1973), 5, 6. 62. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, rev. ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 156. 63. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) 100-107. 64. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, IS'/. 65. Krepinevich, lite Army and Vietnam, 112. 66. Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977), 100. Chapter 10 1. Harold Moore, We Were Soldiers Once. ..And Young (New York: Random House, 1992), 314-15. 2. William Westmoreland, "Vietnam in Perspective," Military Review 59, no. 1 (January 1979): 36. 3. Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 85. Lewy wrote: "The same basic criti- cism has been made by the British expert. 'The American forces,' Sir Robert Thompson has written, 'fought a separate war which ignored its political and other aspects, and were not on a collision course with the Vietcong and North \ ietnamese, who therefore had a free run in the real war.' There was much talk about the significance of the 'other war,' about winning the hearts and minds of ihc people, die importance of defeating the enemy's insurgency through political and social reform and so forth, but in reality pac ification took a back seat and the efficacy of psychological operations uas commonly measured by the number of leaflets dropped and the number of loudspeaker broadcasts made. ...The Kennedy administration had tried hard to get the military [the Army] to develop an understanding of and capacity foi counterinsurgency. The nature of guerilla warfare and the mcas ii i irylom li hall n ic studied at the Spec ial forces School at Fort Bragg and the war colleges, bull lie mil ilary never developed counterinsurgency capabilities on any major scale.' McNamara supports this argument in his book, In Retrospect. Also see, Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Universily Press, 1986) and John Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons front Malaya and Vietnam. 4. For a discussion of the range of arguments that explain American defeat in Vietnam see, George C. Herring, "Amei ic an Strategyin Vietnam: The Postwar Deb ik J) i 46 (April 1982): 57-63. Also see, William E.DuPuy, "Vietnam: What We Might Have Done and Why We Didn't Do It," Army 36 (February 1986): 22-40; Harry Summers and Russell \ I Lessons from Vietnam: A Debate," in \ ietn is I to Vashington, D.C.: Wilson Center/University Press of America, 1984); Jeffrey Clarke, "On Strategy and the Vietnam War," Parameters 56 (Winter 1986), 39-46; Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984); Harry Summers, Jr., On Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 23, 1982); Andrew KrepincMch lr„ 'it Vietnam U. S. G. Sharp, Strategy For Defeat (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978); and William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976). For a more complete bibliography on the Vietnam War see the "Selected Bibliography"). 5. See Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), chapters 1-3. 6. President Roosevelt opposed the reestablishment of the French empire in Southeast Asia. In a letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in January 1944 he wrote: "I saw Halifax [the British ambassador to the U.S. ] last week and told him . . . that it was perfectly true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China should not go back to France ... it should be administered by an international trusteeship. France has had the country. . . one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning." Quoted in Ronald Spectoi Kdvam , ppoi t (New York: Free Press, 1985), 22. FDR believed that imperialism was one of the causes of war, and opposed it. Truman had a different vision and believed that maintaining the alliance in Western Europe was of the utmost importance. 7. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: WW. Norton, 1969), 671, 672. 8. George Eckhardt, Comma t ,(i an >0- 1969, \iet in V i hington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974), 6. 9. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Importance to the United States of the Security and Progress of Viet-Nam: Address at Get- tysbury College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, April 4, 1959. Published in Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Hearings on Bad ig to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967), 96-97. I I i i ' ' / ' /) ' ) In I I ( GPO, 1958), 381-90. 11. For a discussion on Eisenhower's decision not to intervene see, Spector, Advance and Support, i hapter 1 1, "The Question of Intervention," 191-214. 12. Matthew Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs (New York: Harper, 1956), 275-78 (italics added). 13. Halberstam, The Fifties, 408. In a discussion on intervention between Winston Churchill and Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs, the Admiral was informed that in 1947 Britain had given tip India, its most important imperial possession, without fighting a war. There was no way Britain was going to fight a war to save a French possession. Besides Churchill reasoned that the most important task was to defuse tensions with the Soviet Union. 14. A reproducti lofth t t nil) ilii t I I / ' ' i D anient, De- partment of State Publication 6446, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957), 1:750-67. Quoted in Spector, Advice and Support, 219. 15. John Kennedy, "Conference of the American Friends of Vietnam June 1, 1956," in The Strategy of Peace, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Harper, 1960), 64. 16. U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 11, 331-42. Quoted in David knsu i ( in hi ulge MA: The Belknap Press, 2000), 106. 17. Maxwell Taylor, "The U.S. Commitment in Viet-Nam: Fundamental Issues: Statements by Secretary Rusk and General Maxwell Taylor Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations" February 17, 1966, in Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967), 207. 18. Ball was appointed Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and later Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy Administration. In the Johnson Administration Ball was the "devils advocate." Quoted in Robert J. McMahon, Mtijui Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1995), 217-18. 19. Lyndon Johnson, The \ mi • 1:1 Oct m the P J , 19(. ! '69 ( \ i irk Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 148. 20. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Letter from President Eisenhower to President Diem, October 1, 1954," in U.S. National Security I icy and Si egy,e< i u sun with Robert Vitas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 133, 134. 21. Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, I hailand, Britain, and the United States signed the Treaty in September 1954, in Manila;. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate B i round Info i Rclatingto Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 3rd rev. ed. (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1967), 85. 22. Article 16 of the Accord prohibited the introduction into Vietnam of troops and other military personnel that had not been in the country at the time of the cease-fire. Articles 17 to 19 contained n friction i irdin w< ] urns, equipment, ammunition, bases, and militarj alliances. The introduction of new types of arms, ammunition, and material was forbid- den. Exchanges of weapons piece-by-piecc were permitted. An International Control Commission (ICC) was established to monitor compliance. See George S. Eckhardt ( o u ( re 1 19 >9, 17 i I i ishington, D.C: Department, of the Army, 1974), 15; Spector, Advance and Support, 260-62. 23. Clark M. Clifford, "A Viet Nam Reappraisal: The Personal History of One Man's View and How It Evolved," Foreign Affairs 47, no. 4 (July 1969): 601-22. 24. President Kennedy, "Exchange of Messages between President Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic ofViet-Nam, December 14 and December 7, 1961 inBuel I Informal R i to Si hcust Asia ti Vietnam Committee of Foreign Relations, US .Senate, 3rd rev. ed.. (Washington, D.C: GPO, July 1967), 99-100. 25. This increase in personnel violated the 1954 Geneva settlement. 26. Francis Kelly, Colonel, U.S. Army Special Forces, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971: Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, 1973), 4-7. Special Forces were first deployed to Vietnam in 1957. The 1st Special Forces Group trained the Vietnam Army at the Commando Training Center in Nha Trang. This was a small effort, but it was the embryo from which Vietnamese Special Forces units developed. 27. Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie (New York: Random House, 1988), 203-65. 28. David Halberstam, The M, o) ' nire, lev ed. (New York: Alfred AKnopf, 1988), 72, 79. 29. Ibid., 24. 30. It has been argued that Kennedy had planned to withdraw from Vietnam. McNamara in his book, In Retrospect (New York: Times Book, 1995), 102, wrote that: "Johnson felt more certain than President Kennedy that the loss of South Vietnam had a higher cost than would the direct application of U.S. military force, and it was this view that shaped him and his policy decisions for the next five years." He further stated in a film, The Fog of War, that Kennedy planned to withdraw from Vietnam, removing all 16,000 advisors by 1965. Other students of the war have also advanced this thesis. i )a\ id Kaiser, American Tragedy, chapter 5. Kaiser wrote: "Kennedy never regarded Southeast Asia as a propitious place to deploy American power." While, Kennedy may have been reluctant to deploy additional forces, he still expanded America's commitment If kuiii \ i jut 1 by 1 ion ihi imenl i ill ult to sustain. 31. For the most comprehensive study of the Gulf of Tonkin incident see, Edwin E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 32. Ibid., 205, 239, 240. Moise charged: "There is evidence that a number of senior American officials could provide no rational motive for the action they believed Hanoi had taken on the night of August 4. They tended to read Hanoi's motives as a mirror of their own — based more on pride than on concrete national interest, and reacting to immediate changes in the short-term situation rather than to long-term goals." He quotes William Bundy: "The Administration simply had no clear theory at all, did not know what to make of the attacks, and in default of any coherent motive could only conclude that Hanoi wished to make a gesture of how strong and tough it was." Hanoi believed that the Johnson Administration fabricated the incidents to "carry the war to the North." 33. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Background Information, 120-22. 34. Ibid., 126 (italic added). Also published in Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines, ed., "Takiri it to the Streets": A Sixties Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 162, 163. 35. Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb, The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993 (Washington, D.C: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 2. Also see, John T. Correll, "Disunity of Comman J 1 (Jam 005) 34-39. 36. Maxwell Taylor, Ambassador to Vietnam, "The U.S. Commitment in Viet-Nam: Fundamental Issues." Statements by Secretary Rusk and Gen. Maxwell Taylor before the Senate Committee on 1 i Re] 54, no. 1393 (March 7, 1966): 1-17. Also published in Background Information, 194-214 (italics added). 37. Foracompich nsi In u in Vietnam tarkClodiellei / 4 \iiili lean Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989). 38. Michael Beschloss, Reaching for Glory (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 175. 39. Quoted in Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention, rev. ed. (New York: WW Norton, 1973), 19. 40. Marshall Michel III, Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam 1 965-1 972 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 1, 2. Walter J. Boyne, "Route Package 6," Air Force Magazine November (1999): 56-61. Also see: Kenneth Bell, 100 Mission North: A Fighter Pilot's Story of the Vietnam War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1993). i mi i ' \ i > i Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, 4. Berger, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 81, 82. Francis Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), 161. John Schlight, The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia, The War in the South: The Years of the Offensive 1965-1968 (Wash- ington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 292. Walter Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 153, 154. McNamara and his "whiz kids" had adopted the Robert Osgood theory of limited war outlined in 1957. See, Robert Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 242. Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, 199. U. S. G. Sharp, Strategy for Defeat (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 2 (italics added). Quoted in Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 145. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 410. Quoted by John Correll, "Rolling Thunder," Air Force Magazine 88 (March 2005): 58-65. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 138. Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, 347. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 136-45. Pape, Bombing to Win, 189, 190. Robert McNamara, "Tuesday, April 20, 1965, 7:15 P.M." in Reaching for Glory, ed., Beschloss, 282. President Johnson, "To Robert McNamara, June 21, 1965," Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, 343. John A. Cash, John Albright, and Allan W Sandstrum, Seven Firefights in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Office of the CMH, 1985), 22. U.S. Army After Action Report, la Drang Valley Operation, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, November 14-16, 1965 (Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), APO San Francisco, California 96490, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA. 61. U.S. Army Infantry School, Operations of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, lsl Ca.\ airy Di\ ision (Airmobile), In the Airmobile Assaull of Landing Zone X Ray, la Drang Valley, Republic of Viet Nam, November 14-16 1965, (Personal Experience of a Company Commander). 62. George Herring, "The 1st Cavalry and the la Drang Valley, 18 Oct.-24 Nov. 1965," Americas First Battles 1776-1965, ed. Charles Heller and William Stoffi (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 300-26. 63. Harold Moore, We Were So Idiers Once ... And Young (New York: Random House, 1992), 314- 15. 64. The Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 171. 65. Ibid., 171. 66. The Republic of Korea provided the largest contingent offerees to assist the [ nilcil States. The Republic of Vietnam provided two divisions, the Republic of Korea, one A lai inc bi igade, and support units. A total of 4,407 Republic of Korea soldiers and marines were killed in action. 67. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595-96. 68. U.S. Army, Headquarters, USMACV, Directive Number 525-4, Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam, W. B. Rosson, Major General, Chief of Staff, 17 September 1965, Westmoreland History files, August 29-24 to October 1965, U.S. Army CMH, (Washington, D.C.: CMH); reprinted in John Copland, "Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents," The Journal oj Military History 68 (April 2004): 553-74. 69. Quoted in Edward Doyle and Samuel Lipsman, America Takes Over 1965-67 (Boston, MA: Boston Publishing, 1982), 60. Also see, USMACV, Directive Number 525-4, Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. her Join i / \ l J i l London: Pracgei 1/4 William Corson, The Betrayal (New York: WW Norton, 1968), 176-81. Victor Krulak, First to Fight (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 189, 183. Krulak, First to Fight, 188. William C. Holmberg, Major, USMC, "Civic Action," Marine Corps Gazette June (1966): 20-28. See: Lewis W. Walt, General, USMC, "Civil Affairs," Marine Corps Gazette September (1968): 1 1; H. G Lyles, Captain, l. : SMC, "Civic Action Progress Repoit i Corps Gazette Sq mber (1969): 52; George Wilson, MSgt.etal, "Com- bined Action," Mai ine Corps Gazette October (1966): 28-31; Holmberg, "Civic Action," 20-28. Articles, published after the war, are also useful. See: Raymond C. Damm, Jr., Lt. Col., "The Combined Action Program: A Tool for the Future," Marine Corps Gazette October (1998): 49-53; T P. Schwartz, "The Combined Action Program: A Different Perspective," Marine Corps Gazette February (1999): 63-72; Charles L. Armstrong, Lt. Col., USMC, "Combined Action Program Variations in El Salvador," Marine Corps Gazette August (1990): 36-39. 76. J. E., Samples, 1st Sergeant, USMC, "Civic Action vs. Fighting," Marine Corps Gazette 50 (August 1966): 10. 77. Jones, Elements of Military Strategy, 180. 78. Quoted in Lewis Soiiev, Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. lohnson and the Ethics of Command (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 227. 79. Ibid., 237. 80. The hamlet evaluation system was a questionable method of rating hamlet and villages to ascertain the level of pacifica- tion. See House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Healings on Measuring Hamlet Security in \ 'ietnani, Report of the Special Study Mission, 90th Cong. (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1969). 81. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, 165. Kelly noted: "In many instances the success or failure of an operation i ilidatedbytl tatistical onsideiations attending it. The usual method of determining the efficacy of psychologi- cal operations, for example, was by counting the number of leaflets dispensed or the number of loudspeaker broadcasts 82. David Hackworth, About Face (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 572, 573. Also see: Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (NJ: Avery Publishing, 1985, 72-75. 83. Powell, My American Journey, 149. 84. Dave Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978), 180, 182 (italics added). 85. Roy Flint, General U.S. Army, "Experience of a Battalion Commander in Vietnam," oral history taken by the 25th In- fantry Division in Vietnam after a command tour, used at West Point to educate cadets. For an excellent, detailed study of the combat operations of the 25th Infantry Division see hi k I I ng [lie World of a Combat Division in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993). Il urn' W i , Lo i U HI Quoted in Bergerud, Red Thunder T) opii Lightning, J i 2. Quoted in ibid., 295. Quoted in John J. Tolson's Airmobility 1961-1971, 65. John Hay, Jr., ii i / lateriel In tit Vietnam Studies I hin Ion D.C: Department of the Army, 1974), 91. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, 180, 182. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 166. '< H 1 in lou i LJ Palmer, The 25-Year War, 205. Chapter 1 1 1. Robert Elegant, "How to Lose a War: Reflections of a Foreign Correspondent," Encounter August (1981): 73-90. 2. William M. Hammond, The Military and the Media 1962-1968 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Army CMH, 1988). 3. Winant Sidle, Major General, U.S. Army, "A Battle Behind the Scenes: The Gulf War Reheats Military- Media Contro- versy," Military Review 71, no. 9 (September 1991): 4. Peter Bra Imp .i ' oi Ho\ th l,n/i Pn a ' '1'elevisioi "; ted a 'In , ' a Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978); Hammo id 'i Mil i a i and the Media, 385-87. 5. Sidle, "A Battle Behind the Scenes." 54. 6. Hammond / i / the Media, 138. 7. Ibid., 140. 8. Ibid., 144. 9. John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973), 167. Also see: Braestrup, The Big Story; Daniel C. Hallin, [he "Uneensored War" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Clarence Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: Jhe American Press and thi \ ietnam War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Hammond, The Military and the Media. 10. George Herring, "The 1st Cavalry and the la Drang Valley, 18 October-24 November 1965," in America's First Battles 1776-1965, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 320. Herring wrote: "Army spokesmen refused to admit an ambush." 11. Moore, We Were Soldiers Once. . .And Young, 25. 12. Lewis Soik\ I \ Ethics of i Lawrence: University ] Kansas, 1998), 212. 13. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The \ ietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 23,1982). 22. Summers wrote: "The student draft deferments, along with the decision not to ask for a declaration of war and not to mobilize our reserve forces, were part of a deliberate Presidential policy not to arouse the passions of the American people. The effect of this was that we fought the Vietnam war in cold blood'' 14. Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War, 204-205. 15. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 163-64. 16. Robert N. Young, Major General U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, "Rotation Plus Stability: Operation Gyroscope," Army Information Digest March (1955): 2-5. See also: William O. Quirey, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "ROTATION," Military Review November (1954): 31-35; John P. Morgan, Major, U.S. Army, "Turn and Return," Army Information /» ptember (1958): 13-18. 17. Morgan, Ibid.18. 18. Bergerud, .Ru thunder, Tro i (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993) 115. 19. Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 205. 20. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing, 1985), 111. 21. See: George Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993); Robert Griffith, Jr., The U.S. Army Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974 (Washington, D.C: CMH, 1997); Christian Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and [let nam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); lames Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy (Columbus: Ohio Slate University Press, 1971); and Michai l ; ok Confn iitatton: The War in I ipel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). "The Draft: The Unjust vs. the Unwilling," Newsweek, April 11 (1966): 30-34. Appy, Working-Class War, 6. Colin Powell, General, U.S. Army, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 148. Alexander Haig, Jr., Inner Circles (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 185. Quoted in Bergerud, 272. Quoted in ibid., 265. Joe P. Dunn, "Draft," in The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, ed. Spencer Tucker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 107. Michael Shafer, "The Vietnam Era Draft: Who Went, Who Didn't and Why It Matter! in Thi Le± . i Pic Vietnam War in the American Imagination (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), 67. Ibid., 67-69. Ibid., 69. 1 was drafted in 1972. At Fort Polk, Louisiana in basie naming there were men from Mississippi who signed their names with an X.. Marilyn Young, The Vietnam War 1945-1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 320. Robert Griffith, The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974 (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1995), 158. Michael Beschloss, Reaching for Glory (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 141 (emphasis added). Flynn, The Draft, 229. George H. W Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 486. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Declaration of Independence from the War in Vietnam," in "Takin li lo the Streets": A Sixties Reader, ed. Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 186-91. 38. Fact Sheet: Negro Participation in the Armed Forces and in Vietnam, Tab. C to Memo, Director of Military Personnel Policy to Chief of Staff, sub]: Evaluation of Marshall Report Pertaining to Negro Distribution and Casualties. Casualty figures are from Tab. C. "Extract from the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service." Copies in CMH. Harry G. Summers, Jr., in his book, Vietnam War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, 1985), 98, wrote: "Ironically, the Vietnam war was the first war in which black American servicemen and women participated on an equal basis with whites, and initially they paid a high price for that long-sought goal. Although black service personnel made up 10.6% of the total U.S. force in Vietnam, compared with 13.5 percent propoi lion of military age blacks in the general popula- tion, a disproportionate number of black servicemen initially served in front line combat units. As a result, they at first suffered a higher percentage of combat fatalities than whites. In 1965-66 black soldiers constituted over 20 percent of the U.S. battlefield deaths. The Army and Marine Corps took specific personnel actions to overcome this problem . . . and by 1967 the proportion had declined to just over 13 percent." Also see, Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, All That We Can Be: Black Lc I Racial 1m i It rl ie Books, 1996. 39. Arnold Barnett, Timothy Stanley, and Michael Stone Amen ietnamt i In \'i i mis of a Class War?" Operations Research 40 (September-October 1992): 856-66; 865. 40. Flynn, The Draft, 233. 41. For discussions on both sides of this issue see the following works: James Fallows, "Low-Class Conclusions," The Atlantic Monthly April (1993): 38-42; "Conscription: The Fairness Doctrine," The Economist January 12 (1991): 21; George Flynn, The Draft 1940-1973; "The Draft: The Unjust vs. the Unwilling," Newsweek April 11 (1966): 30-34; Eric Bergerud, Red Thunder; "James Fallows Reflects on the Drafts Inequities (1969), 1975"; Robert J. MaMahon, ed., Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1995), 477-80; James Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971); Buckley, "Viet Guilt" Esquire September (1983): 68-72; and Vietnam Veto I / t i i i : ielnan ns Memorial fund, Washingl D.< In i hi ) ' " Quoted in Flynn, The Draft, 231. Ibid., 227. Powell, My American Journey, 144. "We Refuse to Serve," in "Takin It to the Streets" 195-96. Noted in Hoopes, 'Ihi Limits of Intervention, 97. Robert McNamara, In Retrospect (New York: Random House, 1991), 266-69. Ibid., 273. Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," The Journal of Military History 60, no. 4 (October 1996): 731-62. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 332. Quoted in George C. Herring, Ami rica's Longest War, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 232. Quoted in Peter Braestrup, Big Picture, 135. Ibid., 118. Peter C. Rollins, "Television's Vietnam: The Visual Language of Television New s fi , I ei lean Culture 4 (1981):114-35. Ibid. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 334. Braestrup, Big Picture, 471. Elegant, "How to Lose a War," 73-90. Braestrup, Big Picture, 471. George Herring, America's Longest War, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), ix. Lewis W. Walt, General, USMC, "Civil Affairs," Marine Corps Gazette September (1968): 11. Austin Hoyt, Martin Smith, and Richard Ellison, Vietnam A Television History, vol. 4, Tet 1968 (Boston: WGBH Boston Video, 1983). 63. Ibid. Clifford, "A Viet Nam Reappraisal," 601-22. Abrams departed Vietnam in June 1972 to assume the position of Army Chief of Staff. He died on September 4, 1974. Richard Nixon, "Vietnamization," in \ it > I ed larvin E. Gettleman, Jane Franklin, Marilyn B. Young, and H. Bruce Franklin (New York: Grove Press, 1995), 434, 436. Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 348. Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 41. Nixon, Memoirs, 298. H. R. Haldeman, The End of Power (New York: , 1975), 81. Davidson, Vietnam at War, 612-15. Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined \ ic to audi al'l \ >i 1 i . Last] s in \ tnam (New York: Harcourt, 1999), 23. Jeffrey Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1988), 362-63. Sorley, A Better War, 348. H ring \ , i i i ' / ii est \\ HI ' '"1 Spencer Tucker, ed., The tn ycloped I Vt u (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 58. Mark Clodfelter, Limits of Air Power: The America I orth Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989), 166-76;. Phillip Davidson, Vietnam at War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 699- 705. John Sherwood, Aftu bun I A l / a (New York: New York Univei P 1' ( li ' Herring, America's Longest War, 308. Clodfelter, Limits of Air Power, 161-66. See Sherwood, Afterburner, 2; and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, June 1991), 263. 82. Arnold R. Isaacs, Wiihout Honor: Defeat in i ietntnn and Cambodia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 61. Isaacs noted: "Before the agreement was even signed, the legend began to be created: the bombing had done it. . . . Yet the events did not really show that the bombing forced North Vietnam to any new decision." This work contains an excellent an analysis of the Paris Agreement. 83. Davidson, Vietnam at War, 723. 84. Fred Wilcox, Waiting For an Army To Die: The Tragedy of Agent Orange (New York: Vintage, 1983). 85. Tucker, ed 1 I "ietnum \\ 86. Powell, My American Journey, 148. 87. Roy A. Werner, Captain, USAR, "Down the Road to Armageddon?" Military Review 55, no. 7 (July 1975): 30-31. 88. For contrast see, Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1931). 89. In 1979 Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer used this term to define the Army, recognizing that it was unprepared to meet its global commitments. 90. Kenneth Ingram, Ninety 'llmv Strong? A Battalion Commander's Perception of the All- Volunteer i'oree, National Security Affairs Issue Paper No. 83-2 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1983), 19. Chapter 12 The second President Bush endeavored to copy this formulation of the world with his "Axis of Evil" State of the Union address. Quoted in Edward Flangan Jr., "The 100-Hour War," Army 41, no. 4 (April 1991): 24. The B-2 was not ready of service in the first Persian Gulf War. Glosson, War With Iraq, 289. Ibid., 12. Ibid., 291. Ibid., 289. Ibid., 129. The assassination of political leaders was not legal by national and international law. The United States, thus, used ter- minology that disguised its true intent. Glosson, War With Iraq, 291, 292. Ibid., 27, Ibid., 21. Ibid., 14. Diane T. Putney, "From Instant Thunder to Desu I Developing lire Gul r ( in American Military History, ed. James M. Morris (NJ: Pearson, 2004), 367-78; also see, John A. Warden, III. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988). 17. Paul H. Herbert, Major, U.S. Army, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5 Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, July 1988), 1 RomieL.Brownlee and William J. Mullen ill i h, , ■' \ganAn n Am in I Histoi vufC mil 1' ///«/» ! '.i'm; USARetired (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979), 190. John Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982 (Ft. Monroe, VA: Historical Office U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984). In 1973 Army Chief of Staff General Abrams sent Major General Starry to Israel to study the armored warfare battlefield and to incorporate lessons learned into the design of the Ml main battle tank. I I I i ll i I I I A / H i i in and Don A. Starry (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 199) 549, 550 (italics added). U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May 5, 1986), 14-17. FM 100-5 de- fined these terms: "Initiative means setting or changing the terms of battle by action. It implies offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. ... In the attack, initiative implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of the attack. Agility— the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy — is the first prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. Such greater quickness permits the rapid concentration of friendly strength against enemy vulnerabilities. This must be done repeatedly so that by the time the enemy reacts to one action, another has already taken its place, disrupting his plans and leading to late, uncoordinated, and piecemeal enemy response. . . . Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, and resources. Through the use of depth, a commander obtains the necessary space to maneuver effectively; the necessary time to plan, arrange, and execute operations; and the necessary resources to win. Moment t in he ail id elasticity ii rive iroi lepih i hi nization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. Synchronization includes but is not limited to the actual concentration of forces and fires al the point of decision." For an excellent discussion of the development of AirLand Battle Doctrine see, Richard Swain, "AirLand Battle," in Camp Colt to Desert Storm, 360-402. 23. U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, April 29, 1977), 8-2. 24. Anne Chapman, The Army's Training Revolution 1 973-1990 (Ft. Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- mand, 1991). Also see Del' u I J i i benefited from the work conducted under DePuy's leadership. Starry initiated a number of studies to transform Army training, the Review of Education and Training of Officers (RETO), the Army Training Study, and the Long Range Training Base Study. 25. This was a semiofficial Air Force doctrine because General W L. Creech, TAC Commander, could not speak for the entire USAF, and TAC was not a warfighting command. It provided forces for the theater commanders. 26. One A-10 pilot, Douglas N. Campbell, recalled: "In the late 1980s I flew A-10 weapons and tactics tests as part of the Air Forces fighter test unit at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. In so doing, I went from relative isolation inside my A-10 wing to active exposure to the rest of the tactical air force. The encounter was unpleasant, because the A-10 was not popular with many fighter pilots. To them, its slow speed and ugliness made it a tactical liability and a visual embarrassment. I also arrived as the Air Force tried to replace the A- 10s with modified F-16 fighters for the close air support role." See, Douglas Campbell, The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), x. 27. Robert Sunell wrote: "In spile of criticism, the All lank, although evolutionary, included many revolutionary innovations that would make it one of the most survivable tanks ever produced. First was the special armor package that provided unprecedented crew protection from both chemical and kinetic energy weapons. Second, the ammunition compartment was designed to blow out and aw ay from the crew should a detonation occur. . . . Third was the fire control system, which included a ballistic computer that stabilized the tank cannon, allowing the crew to shoot on the move. This ballistic computer system — along with the Abrams exceptional I normal sight— played a key role later in the Gulf War. The fourth innovation was the turbine engine and the mobility it provided. The enhanced transmission and! suspension system provided high cross-country speed with acceptable crew comfort." The Ml had a 105 mm gun. It was up-gunned to a 120 mm smoothbore gun in the M1A1 upgrades. 28. For a short but excellent summary of the design and production or the Ml see, Robert J. Sunell, "The Abrams Tank System,"in Camp Colt to Desert Storm, ed. Hoffmann and Starry, , 432-73. The British developed Chobham armor. Snell wrote: Chobham armor's layers of ceramic, steel, and titanium, laminated between layers of ballistic nylon would resist penetration by both kinetic and chemical energ; ammunition." Studies have shown that while front armor of the Mis sustained hits from enemy tanks, not one was destroyed during the war. Firepower was a problem in the first production model of the Ml, which mounted a 105-mm main gun. The Army recognized its limitation, but in order to keep the cost down; and thus the tank palatable to Congress, the Army stuck with the same gun that was in the M60 tank. The main gun problem was corrected in later models by adopting the German 120-mm smoothbore gun, which gave the M1A1 greater range, accuracy, arid destructive power. In the Gulf War all Army divisions were equipped with MlAls, with the exception of one brigade of the 1st ID. 29. James Kitfield, Pro, ,1 Idiei hi '<>n DC: Brassey's, 1995). 30. It added \citic ]l it 1 i In troo] ier aircra i n i i i reran makes i il the Marines to project power deep into the interior of a country, to move far beyond the littoral regions. It also made possible intratheater sustainability. However, the V-22, Osprey, is enormously expensive and has been plagued with technical problems. 31. USMC, FMFM 1 Warfighting (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USMC, March 6, 1989), 29, 58, 59. 32. USMC, FMFM 1-1 Campaigning (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, January 25, 1990), 64, 65. 33. Kenneth Estes, "Mounted * i 1 i in il larin r] nG Col 1\ > d George Hoffmann and Donn Starry, 484. 34. Harry Summers, Colonel, U.S. Army, retired., was the author of an influential book, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle, Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1981). He used Clausewitz's work, On War, to explain the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. 35. William Westmoreland, "Vietnam in Perspective," Military Review 59, no. 1 (January 1979): 34, 35. 36. At West Point I had the opportunity to teach a course on the evolution of U.S. Army doctrine. During that course I was fortunate to have a number of combat arms officers talk to my cadets. As they spoke, a number of things came through consistently. They had committed their lives to this war and these people. They had lost good friends and soldiers who had served under their command, creating in some cases a sense of survivor's guilt. They had killed for their country, and in almost every case had disagreed with the conduct and administration of the war. However, ultimately, they had failed. The effort had been in vain. Vietnam was lost. And there had been no welcome home and no victory parade, and until more than a decade after the war, there had been no monuments built to the memory of those who had died.. While the evidence is anecdotal, it does not require a huge leap of faith to come to these conclusions. 37. Westmoreland, "Vietnam in Perspective," 34 (italics added). 38. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man, 10. 39. Reprinted in Michael Handel, Masters of War (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 311. 40. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 81. 41. Colin Powell, General U.S. Army, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 149, 434. 42. In April 1 980 the U.S. Army's Delta Force supported by the Navy, Air Force, and Marines tried to rescue fifty-two Ameri- cans who had been held hostage in Tehran since the islamic Revolution in November 1979. In the Iranian desert before the rescue operation commenced a helicopter collided with a C-130 aircraft, killing eight servicemen and ending the rescue operation. It was a miserable failure and surprisingly amateurish given the quality and experience of individuals involved. 43. Anthony Zinni, General, USMC, "A Commander Reflects," Proceedings, 126/7/1, no.169, (July 2000): 35. 44. National Security Act of 1947, U.S. Statutes at Large, in U S \ ! ntiunnl Seenrit) o n \ I * Kiiments and Policy Proposals, ed. Sam Sarkesian with Robert Vitas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 9-15. 45. David Jones, Written Statement of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs before Investigations Committee of the House Com- mill i i ji J ices, 9','th Con Henri oposal for the joint ( / 1, i 1982, 52-60 (italics added). 46. "Public Law 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986," reprinted in part in U.S. National Security Policy and Strategy: D I f i Sarkcsian i h Robert Vitas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 25. 47. "Public Law 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986,"reprinted in part in U.S. National Security Policy and Strategy: Documents and Policy Proposals, 31. 48. General Frank Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The 16th Chairman's Guidance to the Joint Staff: Shaping the Future," October 1, 2005. Available online at the Pentagon's website. 49. For a comprehensive discussion on the passage of this Act see: James Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater- Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2002). 50. Quoted in James Locher III, "Goldwater-Nichols: Fighting the Decisive Battle," Joint Forces Quarterly Summer (2002): 38-47. 51. Ibid., 38-47. 52. Ibid. 53. Edward Meyer, "The JCS— How Much Reform is Needed \rmed J ' I i I i n -pill (1982): 82-90. Reprinted in the House Investigations Committee of the Committee of Armed Services, 97th Congi Hi rii s on Reorganization Proposal for the JCS, April-August, 1982, 7-14. 54. Hammond, ()i i . / D feme, 256-59. 55. See Charles Cogan, "Desert One and Its Disorders," Journal of Military History 76, no. 1 (January 2003): 201-16. Chapter 13 1. George H. W. Bush, U.S. President, and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Book, 1998), 354. 2. For the Army's view of Operation Desert Storm see, Robert H Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 1994); Stephen Bourque, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, 2002); H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995); Harry Summers, Jr., A Critical Analysis of The Gulf War (New York: Dell, 1992); and Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr., U.S. Army, Into the Storm (New York: Berkeley Books, 1998). For the Air Force's view see, Buster Glosson, War M ith Iraq: Critical Lessons (Charlotte, NC: Glosson Family Foundation, 2003); Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1992); William Andrews, Airpower Against an Army (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: ir Universi Pi 1'ebru 1 >9S) andTomClancy with General ChuckHorner, General, U.S. Air Force, £Vci y Man a Tiger (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1999). For the view from the White House see, George H. W Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A U oi I'Tnmsfo For critical anal < Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC, The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995); U.S. News & World Report, ,i umph i ith ut \ i tor) (New York: Random House, 1992); and Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Les- sons of Modern War, Vol. 4, The Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). 3. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 484. 4. Kuwait has a population of 2.2 million, approximately 45 percent are nali' In itis eogiaphic area of 6,880 square miles (about the size of New Jersey); and its major industry is oil. Kuwait's government is a constitutional monarchy. The Iran-Iraq War has also been called the "Persian Gulf War." Foi this study the term Persian Gulf War refers only to Operation Desert Storm. 5. USMC, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 3-203; M. P. Caulfield, Major General, USMC, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War, vol. l(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USMC, December 10, 1990), 65. Also see, Abbas Alnasrawi, The Economy oj Iraq (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994). 6. In 1979 Mohammad Reza Shah was overthrown in an Islamic Fundamentalist Revolution, establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran, a theocracy under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomaini. 7. Michael Klare, "Arms Transfers to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 and the Origins of the Gulf War" in The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered, ed Andrew Bacevich and Efraim Inbar (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 3-24; 17. Also see, Gregory Gause, "Iraq's Decision to Go to War, 1980 and 1990," Middle East Journal 56 (2002): 47-70; Musallam liMusallam, 'Ik I i H nil Power 1 (London: British Academic Press, 1996); and Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 214-16. 8. Iraq claimed the territory on the grounds that it had been part of the Iraq Ottoman province of Basra. 9. Quoted in, Edward Atkcson, "Iraq's Arsenal: Tool of Ambition," Army 41, no. 3, (March 1991): 22-30. 10. PBS Frontline, The Long Road to War (PBS Video, 1999). 11. Gordon and Trainor, The General's War, 20-22. 12. Klare, "Arms Transfers to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 and the Origins of the Gulf War," 3-24; 16. Ails is an excellcnl summary of the causes of the war. 13. C. G. Jacobsen, The New World Order's Defining Crises (Dartmouth, VT: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), 27. 14. In 1985 the Reagan Administration secretly sold arms to Iran, the funds from which were used to assist the Contras. Aii a duplicity became known at the Iran-Contra Affair. The West also supported Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons, creating a double standard, one for Western nations and another for non-Western nations. See Avner Cohen , Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 341. Cohen wrote: "It would have been nearly impossible for Israel, technologically and financially, to develop a plutonium-based nuclear infrastructure on its own." The West, thus, created the motivation for Iraq, Iran, Egypt and other Middle East states to seek nuclear weapons. 15. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991). 16. Quoted in Johi L Anlal, Major, I my, 'llw 1 \i in ( War, I nenworth, KS: U.S. Command and General Staff College), 7-18. 17. John F. Antal, Major U.S. Army, "The Sword of Saddam an Overview of the Iraqi Armed Forces," Distributed at the U.S. Military Academy in 1990. Also see: U.S. Army Battle Command Training Program, Iraq: "How They Fight" World Class OPFOR (Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Army Infantry School, 1990). Figures on the size, organization, and technology of the Iraq Armed Force vary slightly because of differences in sources of information. 18. USMC, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 3-203, Lessons Learned, 99. 19. Atkeson, "Iraq's Arsenal: Tool of Ambition," 26-27. 20. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Identifying the Iraqi Threat and How They Fight," Cdr, USCAC, Attn: ATXL-CST-C, LTC Bisles, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 66027. 21. Stephen Pelletiere, Douglas Johnson II, and LeifRosenbci^u , ' randi i Middle East (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1990), ix. 22. Richard Jupa and James Dingeman, "The Republican Guards: Loyal, Aggressive, Able," Army 41, no. 3 (March 1991): 54-62 23. USMC, Fleet Marine ton l I iceP blication (FMFRP) 3-203; Lessons Learned, v. 24. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, 467. 25. The British and French deserve the lion's share of the credit for the political and military turmoil and misery that has plagued the Middle East for a century. However, the United States deserves some credit. In 1953 the CIA-British backed coup in Iran overthrew the Mossadegh government installing a dictatorship under the Shah, who insured that the oil flowed at prices acceptable to the United States and Britain. 26. Effraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein : A Political Biography (New York: Free Press, 1991). 27. Antal,"The Iraqi Army," 17. 28. Bush and Sco roi \ World '1 29. Ibid., 418. 30. Egypt for example was released from its $7 billion debt. 31. George H. W Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 418. 32. Ibid., 332-33. 33. Israelis correctly argue that when Israel was formed there was no "Palest created a unified Palestine. The people were formed into a nation by opr. also concluded that the only way it will ever be secure in the Middle East is by bringing about a cultural transformation. Arab nations and states need to adopt Western values and ethics, capfl alism and democracy. The United States has more recently adopted the Israeli view of the Middle East, and is engaged in a fight to transform the Middle East by planting seeds of democracy and capitalism. 34. CENTCOM had no permanently assigned units. Horner commanded the 9th Air Force at Shaw AFB, SC, which was designated to provided airpower for CENTCOM operations. 35. The area became known as the "Black Hole" because of the secrecy and the long working hours. Officers that went in seemed never to be seen again. 36. Quoted in Diane T. Putney, "From Instant Thunder to Desert Storm: Developing I he Gulf War Air Campaign's Phases," Air Power History 41, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 38-50. 37. Glosson, War With Iraq, 55. 38. Ibid., 203-204. Glosson quoted a discussion he had with Schwarzkopf: "Unless you tell me differently, I'm going to ignore any request that Waller makes that violates youi direct guidance to me, or where the conditions have changed and the intel that he was using to make that decision is no longer accurate, or the target is no longer there." Waller too would have supported this statement. 39. Ibid., 35. 40. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, J.4. Ha I lion wrote: "Unfortunately, some naval proponents charged after the war that naval aviation could have been used more significantly, but the CENTAF staff had been unwilling to do so." One student of the air campaign noted: "Navy integration into ATO was limited, mostly for technical reasons, and the Marines referred to the JFACC as the joint force "air coordinator" instead of the "air component commander." See John T. Correll, "The Strategy of Desert Storm," Air Force 89, no. 1 ( ): 26-33. 41. Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (London: Brassey's, 1994), 106. 42. George H. W. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 381. 43. Ibid. 44. The V and VII Corps were stationed in Germany. The III Corps was at Fort Hood, Texas. Each corps consisted of two 1 \ di ion rmoi u m 1 1 tanized, and an armored cavalry regiment, which could generate almost two-thirds the combat power of a heavy division. 45. William F \n I nl Colonel, I 1 \ \ « pome in CENTAL Duel with the Republican Guard (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1998), 24. 46. Andrews, Airpower Against an Army, 25. 47. Bourque, JayhawM, 184. 48. John A. Nagl, "A Tale of Two Battles," Armor 101, no. 3 (May-June 1992): 8. 49. A World War II battle where the 101st Airborne was completely surrounded during the Battle of the Bulge. The division did not surrender. 50. Correll, "The Strategy of Desert Storm," 26-33. Chapter 14 1. Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 2. Eric C. Ludvigsen, "The 'Expansible Army," Army 41, no. 4 (April 1991): 27-29. 3. Glosson, War With Iraq, 26. 4. Ibid., 20-21. 5. U.S. News and World Report, noted, "On the final night of the war— within hours of the cease-fire — two U.S. Air Force bombers dropped specially designed 5000-pound bombs on a command bunker fifteen miles northwest of Baghdad in a deliberate attempt to kill Saddam Hussein. This took place despite President Bush's repeated denials that Washington had ever targeted Saddam Hussi 1 1 i onall sec US New and World Repon triumph without Victory, viii. 6. Andrews \ir\ I noted thai luchof the planning was quantitative in nature, using computer models and spreadsheets. The Checkmai i [plannin - 11 1 il ulaiion con id i ed multiple quantitative and qualitative factors. Quantifications included munitions available in the theater, aircraft numbers, sortie rates, target types, objec tives, and expected success per sortie (based on Saber Selector, and advanced computer program modeling weapons deliveries). " 7. President Bush and others praised the patriot missile system during the war. Out of forty-two fired it was believed that forty-one had hit their targets. Postwar studies showed that they were considerably less effective. 8. See Gulf War Air Power Survey; see also, Barry R. Schneider, "Counterforce Targeting: Capabilities and Challenges," / i / Si (its no. 22 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, August 2004), 13-19. Glosson, War With Iraq, 33, 212. Ibid., 193. Gordon and Trainor, The General's War, 318. Schneider, Counterforce Targeting, 14. United States General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, GAO/NSIAD-97- 1 34 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 1997), 158. Glosson, War With Iraq, 185-89, 197. Ibid., 195. The Navy League of the U.S., "White Papers: The Sea Services' Role in Desert Shield/Storm," Congressional Record 137, no. 108 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 16, 1991). Angelyn Jewel, "Carrier Firepower: Realizing the Potential," Proceedings, 126/6/1, no.168 (June 2000): 38-41. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, 255. Ibid., 256. For a personal account of the Marine F/A-18 air war see, Jay A. Stout, Hoi m ts Over Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997). Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Luke a Hero. 434, 435. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, 253. There was a minority view in the Air Force: "Iraqi weapons systems were diminished by CENTAF attacks. That there was ground fighting, and in some cases very intense fighting, suggests the 50 percent attrition figure was not of primary importance. Lt. Gen Frederick Franks, VII Corps commander remarked, "50 percent didn't mean much to Capt. Mc- Master" (a company commander at 73 Easting). Airpower's value to the RGFC battle seems to reside in the options it took away from I he enemy com mander. O insti ained logistics meant he couldn't go far or fight long; damaged C2 meant he couldn't coordinate his actions; airpower blinded his artillery and pinned his units, setting the Republican Guard for the coup de grace to be administered by combined air and ground forces during phase IV." See, Andrews, Airpower Against an Army, 70, 71. 24. General Accounting Office, Opei atio Desert Stot i 4 r 1,31 This is the best study avail- able on the air war in Operation Desert Storm. 25. The Army was willing to support the Marine Corps acquisition of MlAls; however, the Marine Corps decided not to I ransition just before going into hostilities. 26. Scales, Certain Victory, 41, 42. 27. Peter C. Luui u [ I 1 i i i rol for Desert Sloi litary Review'/ i no. 9 (September 1991): 40-51. Also see: Jimmy D. Ross, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, "Victory: The Logistics Story," Army 41, no. 10 (October 1991): 128-40. 28. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, 453, 454. 29. Ibid., 455. 30. Ibid., 456. 31. Gordon and Trainor, 'lhe General's War, 26' -88. They wrote: "Khafii was one of a series of border engagements at the end of January that took Schwarzkopf and his top commanders completely by surprise. Although characterized at the time as a minor skirmish, the two-day clash was the war's defining niom i h rzkopl 1 dure to grasp the significance of Khafii was one of the general's greatest oversights. His war plan was never revised to take account of the lessons of the battle and that omission contributed mightily to the escape of the Republican Guard when the allies' land offensive was launched more then three weeks later." They concluded that: "the ground generals who controlled the war — Schwarzkopf and Powell — were not inclined to accept the notion thii i invading army coul i the air.. ..The consequences ... an incomplete victory...." Also see: David Morris, Storm on the Horizon: Khafii- 'lhe Battle that Changed the Course of the Gulf War (New York: Free Press, 2004). Schwarzkopl !) i a Hero, 46] Bourque, Jayhawk!, 292-93. Clancy with Genci il I i 1 Franks, ) > i Iraq, 339-40. Michael D. Krause, Colonel, U.S. Army, "The Battle of 73 Easting 26 Feb. 1991: A Historical Introduction to a Simula- tion," U.S. Army, CMH and Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, May 2, 1991. Richard Bohannon, "1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting," Armor 101, no. 3 (May-June 1992): 11-17. The 2nd ACR also fought a battle that has been called "73 Easting." Scales, Certain Victory, 261, 262. Ibid., 293 Cordesman and Wagner, The Lesson \ 1,4, The I War, 651 Quoted in Clancy, Every Man a Tiger, 469. Cordesman and Wagner, 'lhe Lessons of Modern War, 4: 651. Note: Tom Clancy uses different estimates in his works. See Every Man a Tiger, 468. Bourque, Jayhawk!, 291. Cordesman, The Lessons c el < ill 651 Also see, Bourque, Ja\ Int ' 6 Powell, My American Journey, 519-21. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, 469-70. Thomas Mahnken, "A Squandered Opportunity? The Decision to End the Gulf War," in The GulJ War of 1991 Reconsid- ered, ed. Andrew Bacevich (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 121-48. Mahnken, "A Squandered Opportunity," 143. Also see: Jeffrey Record, Hollow Victory: A Contrary View oj'iiie Gulj Wai (Washington, DC: Brassey s, 1993); and Gordon and Trainor, The General's War. Gordon and Trainor, The General's War, 477. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 489. Quoted in Jeffrey Recoid D \ i J sf Iraq (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), x. Powell wrote: "Norm Schwarzkopf was, deservedly, a national hero. And the criticism that the fighting had stopped too soon had chipped his pedestal. He did not like it. . . . Schwarzkopf had been a party to the decision, and now he seemed to be distancing himself from it." {My American Journey, 525). 51. For a more detailed discussion see, Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004). 52. Stephen D. Cooper, "Press Controls in Wartime: The Legal, Historical, and Institutional Context," American Connnu niealion journal 6, no. 4 ( Summer 2003): 2-22. Cooper noted: "During the war, journalists were denied free access to the theater of operations during deployment and combat, and were restricted by a system of military escorts, pooled coverage, and military review of copy for it potential to disclose classified information." This work has an excellent, "Works Cited and Notes" bibliography. 53. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 17. 54. U.S. Army FM 3-61.1 Public Affairs Operation. http://www.globalsccuiii i raili u hi i , )lic\7army/fm/3-61.1 Chapter 2, page 1 of 6. 55. Winant Sidle, Major General U.S. Army, "A Battle Behind the Scenes: The Gulf War Reheats Military- Media Controversy," Military Review 71, no. 9 (September 1991): 52-63. 56. Pete Williams, Assistant Sei retary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Gov- i ui ii ml i i ' i li/ id Hedri nit] (Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press, 1992), 33-44. 57. Sidle, "A Battle Behind the Scenes," 57. 58. Ibid., 58. 59. FM 3-6.1, AppendixX. 60. U.S. News and World Repoit, li i i , W'ithou Victory, hi 61. Eric C. Ludvigen, "The 'Expansible' Army," Army . 41, no. 4 (April 1991) 62. Daniel Bolger, Death Ground: Today's American Infantry in Battle (Noval Chapter 15 1. Michael Weiss, The Cluster World (Boston: Little, Brown, 2000), 10-15. 2. Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1965), 977. 3. Ole R. Holsti, "Of Chasm and Convergence: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilian and Military Elites at the Start of the New [ill ii! im ni ' < Civil ■Mililitry Gap and Aimrit liional ity, ed. Peter 1 d Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 27. 4. Thomas E. Ricks, "The Widening Gap between the Military and Society," The Atlantic Monthly 280, no. 1 (July 1997): 66-78. 5. Gordon Trowbridge, "Today's Military: Right, Republican and Principled,' Marine Corps Times 5 (January 2004): 13-15. 6. Aaron Gilbert, Corporal U.S. Marine Corps, serving on the USS Saipan, Persian Gulf, March 2003. The poem is titled "THE MARINE" (italics added). Available at stutzblackhawk@bellsouth.net. 7. Trowbridge, "Today's Military,," 13-15. 8. U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., The 9/1 1 I i i o pot t (New York: W W. Norton, 2003), 334-38. Also see: Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2004), 30-31. Clarke, in a conversa- tion with Powell stated: "Having been attacked by al Qaeda, for us now to go bombing Iraq in response would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor." 9. Richard Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," Naval War College Review 55, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 8-59. Carl Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: 1989), 3. Weigley, "The American Military," 28. Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, October 8, 1992, A35, col. 4. Holsti, "Of Chasm and Convergence," 97. Norm Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 460. hum I Hui iii i ii ni| ill i i i 1 i 1 I ii i Review 55, no. 1 (March 1961): 40-52. Quoted in Flangan, "The 100-Hour War," Army, 24. Morris MacGregor, Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, 1985), 291-342. While liuman demonstrated ihe political courage to publish the executive order, he lacked to courage to implement it. The Armed Forces ignored the order until the Korean War. IS. Michael Gordon and Bernard Tumor, Cobra 11: the Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Book, 2006), 4. 1 9. Gordon Sullivan, "Force XXI," The Collected Works of the Thirty-Second Chief of Staff United States Army: June 1 991 -June 1995 (Washington, D.C: CMH, 2004), 316. 20. James Cross, "What is the Army's Job," Military Review June (1956): 43-47 (italics added). 21. Thomas G. Mahnken, "Transforming the U.S. Armed Forces: Rhetoric or Reality," Naval War College Review j4, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 86-99. 22. The debate on the RMA has been ongoing for more than a decade. The professional journals of all the services since the mid-1990s have published articles addressing network centric warfare, iointness, information dominance, digital com- municalions, precision guided munitions, the "system of systems," and other such topics. See Proceedings; joint lorecs Quarterly; and U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Parameters; Naval War College Review, Army, Air force, and others. 23. See Art Cebrowski, Vice Admiral U.S.N., and John Gartska, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future," Proceed- ings (January 1998): 28-35; and William Owens, Admiral U.S.N., Lifting the Fog of War; and "The Once and Future Revolution in Military Affairs," Joint Forces Quarterly Summer (2002): 55-61. 24. John Tirpak, "The Network Way of War," Air Force 88, no. 3 (March 2005): 26-31. 25. Preston Lerner, "Robots Go to War," Popular Science 268, no. 1 (January 2006): 42-49. 26. Andrew Marshall, with the support of Rumsfeld, developed a plan called "A Strategy for a Long Peace" February 12, 2001. The plan cut two active duty heavy divisions, like the 3rd ID that invaded Iraq in 2003, and four Army National Guard Division. The other services were also to have reductions in force. Had these cuts gone into effect the situation in Iraq in 2005 would have been much worse. The Navy acquired the F/A 18E/F Super Hornet, the Air Force, F/A 22, Raptor, and the Marine Corps, Joint Striker Fighter (JSF). The Navy and Air Force were also to acquire the JSF. 27. The F-22 incorporates stealth and Harrier VTOL technologies and the most advanced radai systems. Hence, it is capable of seeing enemy aircraft before its presence is detected, allowing it to launch missiles at greater range and well before opposing aircraft. As a consequence, it is argued that one F-22 can take on as many as five F-15s. It is also faster and more agile than any of the competing fighter aircraft, including the F/A-18. Since World War II the difference between Air Force and Navy fighter aircraft has been marginal, with the Navy sometimes producing a better fighter. However, the F-22 represents a significant advancement. The F-22 is also an F/A-22, a ground attack aircraft or F/B-22. This dual role helps justify its tremendous cost. The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) has been working on and testing the Boeing X-45C and Northrop Grumman X-47B. See Bill Sweetman, "Is This the Future of Air Combal t i 267, no. 1 (July 2005):; and Nathan Brasher, U.S. Navy, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Future of Air Combat Pn s 131 I no. 229, (July 2005): 36-39. The UAV has a number of hurdles to cross before they can compete with piloted aircraft. These include landing on aircraft carriers, air to air refueling, and sharing aii space with military ami civilian aircraft. In addition, tactical and operational doctrines have to be developed. However, the biggest hurtle facing the UCAV are the cultures of the Air Force and Navy, which hold that nothing will ever replace manned aircraft. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, August 1, 2002. James Paulsen, "Naval Aviation Delivered in Iraq," Proceeding 129/6/1, no. 204 June (2003): 34-37. John Romjue, American Army Doctrine the Post-Cold War (Ft. Monroe,: TRADOC, 1997), 113-19. The U.S. Atlantic Command morphed into the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) responsible for joint doctrine and training; however, it was later reestablished as the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is reviewed every two years in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Title 10 U.S. Code 161. The review establishes military combatant commands and the missions, functions, and geographic area of operation ( AOR) of each. The UCP is changed based on changes in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS). Under the 2002 UCP, the JFCOM was responsible for transformation, experimentation, joint training, and interoperability for all the services. The command is to introduce new doctrine and streamline future military operations. FM 3-0, chapter 1, p. 8 of 15. Bing West and Ray Smith, The March Up (New York: Bantam Books, 2003), 220. L. R. Roberts and J. P. Farnam, USMC, "Airborne Recon Supported Marines' Advances in Iraq," Proceedings 130/6/1, no. 216 (June 2004): 40-43. Frank Mulcahy, "High-Speed Sealift: Is a Joint Mission," Proceedings 131/1/1, no. 223, 34-3, . FM 3-0, chapter 1, p. 8 of 15. Col. John Warden III, U.S. Air Force, "Special Review," Proceedings 130/9/1, no. 219 (September 2004): 66. U.S. Army, General Eric K. Shinseki,, "A Statement of the Posture of the U.S. Army 2003," before Committees and Sub- committees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, 108th cong., 1st sess., The maintenance requirement foi ehiel di i in Ifoi imphibiou till il it is, to traverse water and littoral regions, increased as they perform tasks for which they were not designed. Fontenot, On Point, 64. Quoted in Joseph L. Galloway, "General Tommy Franks Discusses Conducting the War in Iraq," Knight Ridder, Wash- ington Bureau, June 19, 2003; also quoted in Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory, 103. Quoted in Michael Evans, "Dark Victory," Proceedings 125/9/1, no. 159 (September 1999): 35. Andrew Bacevich, "Neglected Trinity: Kosovo and the Crisis in U.S. Ciul Militai i\l. ions in War Over Kosovo, ed. Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 155. Gabriel Kolko, Another Century of War? (New York: The New Press, 2002), 76. Michael Evans, "Dark Victory," 33-37. See Christopher Haave, Colonel, U.S. Air Force and Phil Haun, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, A-lOs Over Kosovo: The Victory ofAirpower Over a Fielded Ann)' (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, December 2003). In the "Foreword" it states: "This event marked a milestone for airpower, as it was, arguably, the first time airpower alone was decisive in achieving \ ictory in combat." 48. Bacevich, "Neglected Trinity,"159. 49. See Sean N n 1 > ) i i rkelev Caliber 1 2005). 50. Charles Busec I ill ! hroder, and Kal i t ( \ in Afghanistan (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, October 2003). 51. The Army should have traded in one of its heavy divisions for another air assault division, forming a corps of two air assault divisions and one airborne division, an idea ad\ anced prior to the Vietnam War. These light forces should have been oriented toward a Vietnam type battlefield. Instead of saying "never again," the Army should have continued to build on the experiences gained in ten years of war. Such a force would have served the nation well in Afghanistan and Chapter 16 1. Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), first book, last section (section 28) on "The Con- sequences for Theory,"89. The English translation differs in nuance somewhat from the German original. The original is, "Der Krieg ist ein Chamaeleon," and it refers to the "trinity" of war (1) violence, (2) as imaginative activit) of the Feldheer (military leader), and (3) as political instrument. 2. Seymour Hersh, "Offense and Defense," New Yorker, April 7, 2003, 43. 3. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization," Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49; 29. 4. Samuel Huntington, lln ( / ( ' i > tin i n Order I \ ink Simon & Schuster, 1996), 20. 5. Project for the New American Century, Letter to President William J. Clinton, 26 January 1998, Subject: Removal of Saddam Hussein's Regime, www.newamericancentury.org/inHjelinlonlctlei.hlm. Donald Rumsfeld also signed this document. 6. The Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America's Defense: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century, September 2000, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 510, Washington, DC, 20036. Wolfowitz had served as the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the first Bush Administration. Jeffrey Record, "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq," Parameters 33, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 4-21. "In the President's Words: 'Free People Will Keep the Peace of the World.'" Transcript of President Bush's speech to the American Enterprise Institute, AEI, Washington, D.C., February 26, 2002. Quoted in Jeffrey Record, "Bounding the Global War on Terrorism," Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, December 2003), 20. George W Bush, "In Bush's Words: Advance of Democratic Institutions in Iraq Is Scl i i I nple Tlie New York Times, 23 Sept. 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/24/international/middleeast/24PT Condoleezza Rice, "Transforming the Middle East," Washington Post, August 7, 2003. John Keegan, The Iraq War ( New York: Al fred A. Knopf, 2004), 96. European nations, America's traditional allies, believe that the seven million Jews in the United States exerted enormous political influence on the U.S. government, distorting its Middle East policy. This view is substantiated by American military and economic assistance to Israel, which is well over $100 billion since the Yom Kippur War in 1973. America's aid to this one small nation of five million Jews substan- tially exceeds all its aid to the entire continent of Africa. In fact, no state in history has been as generous to another. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby," London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 6, 23 March 2008, http:// www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/print/mear01_.html. Mearsheimer and Walt were brutally attacked by the supporters of Israel. See Alan Dershowitz, "Debunking the Newest — and Oldest — Jewish Conspiracy: A Reply to the Mearsheimer- Walt "Working Paper." Also see Benny Morris, "The Ignorance at the Heart of an Innuendo: And Now Fro Some Facts." The New Republic Online, 8 May 2006, http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?I=20060508&s=morris050806. "Text of President Bush's Sp t , L i Chi •< . - Monitor, December 12, 2005, http://www.csmonilor.com/c-aiived/ earlyUS1212a.htm Howard M. Sachar, Israel and Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999). Also see: J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside die iewisi: American Establishment (New York: Basic Books, 1996). Mohammed Aldouri, Iraqi Ambassador to the UN, "In Iraq's Word: White House Seems to be Caught in 'Hysteria of War'" New York Times, 17 October 2002. The term the whitt i < >mes from a poem written by Rudyard Kipling. 1 hi i 1 li reeling Empire: \ i i i i i i Boston: I i Press, 2004), x-xii. Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), 3,4. Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 10, 11. Andrew Bace\ ich n ml dgc MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), chapter 8. Bacevich, The New American Militarism, 176. The works on the causes of the second war in Iraq is extensive and growing. No definitive analysis of this debate is possible in these pages. Interested students should read: Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 004): Chalmers I ohnsoi i i / / \ i i I lork: H til 2004); Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command (New York: HarperCollins, 2004); Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004); and the other works cited in this section. The reason North Korea has nuclear weapons, and has not been attacked is because it has a contiguous border with the People's Republic of China. The reason the United States can extend protection to Taiwan is because ii is geographically isolated from mainland China. Geograph reafl) infill uees the decision for war. An investigative report published in Newsweek concluded that: "But they described the Office of the Vice President, with its large and assertive staff, as a kind of free-floating power base that at times brushes aside the normal polk \ making machinery nndei national security advisor Condoleezza Rice. On the road to war, Cheney in effect created a parallel government that became the real power center." It was further noted that: "Cheney often teams up with Defense Secre tary Donald Rumsfeld to roll over national-security adviser Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell." See "How Dick Cheney Sold the War" Newsweek, November 17 (2003): 34-40. Also see: "Dick Cheney: The Man Behind the Curtain," U.S. News and World ReportOctober 13 (2003): 26-32. Project for a New American Century website, http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-082602.htm. p. 5. New York Times, "Full Text: In Cheney's Words," www.nytimes.com/2002/ . . . ternational/middleeast/26WEB-CHENEY. htm. John Dean, Worse than Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Little, Brown, 2004), 140-56. The debate was broadcast on National Public Radio. See The New York Times, November 6, 2002, for "Text of the U.S. Resolution of Iraq." Maleness, macho egos, may have played some part in the debate. Intellectually, women Senators and Representatives tend to give the strongest arguments against war. Every nation on Earth pi od 1 1 tlei the mai ii i i i I ll individuals ai 1 Hid i s Gei many are: one, they do not normally become heads of state; and two, that if they do become head of state, it is a state incapable of generating tremendous combat power. If the United States goes to war to remove all the so-called Hitlers on Earth, the U.S. Armed Forces are going to be extremely busy. The Pentagon and White House informed Congress of only what they wanted it to know. Congress had little knowledge of how defense funds were allocated once it approved the spending Con i frequ nth informed of important military and international problems through the pages of the New York Times. And, arguably, Bush and Rumsfeld in 2003 and 2004, like Johnson and McNamara in 1964 and 1965, deliberately deceived the Congress and the American people on the cause and necessity for war. "Excerpts From the Debate in the Senate on Using Force Against Iraq," The New York Times 10 September 2002, http:// www.nytimes.com/2002/10/09/politics/09STEX.html. "Excerpts from House Debate on the Use of Military Force Against Iraq," The New York Dines, September 10, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/09/politics/09HTEX.htm. 34. See Richard W. Stevenson with Julia Preston, "Bush Meets Blair amid Signs of Split on U.N. War Role," The New York Times, January 31, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ . . . /international/middleeast/01PREX.html. They wrote: "Amerk i ilicial h said the resolution adopted unanimousl) In !he Security Council in November, No. 1441, not only calls for Iraq to comi ]\ ii ice ilel ilhc raand that il i n bu i o n i mis the use of force against Mr. Hussein's government by stating that Iraq 'will face serious consequences' i il d< ( nol ;i e up its weapons of mass destruction. 'Should the United Nations pass a second resolution, it would be welcomed if it is yet another signal that we're intent on disarming Saddam Hussein,' Mr. Bush said at a joint news conference with the prime minister. 'But 144 1 gives us the authority to move without any second resolution, and Saddam Hussein must understand that if he does not disarm, for the sake of peaee \ don with oil ill go ii '■ ! ji 1< m Hi i 35. David E. Sanger, "Iraq Makes UN. Seem 'Foolish,' Bush Asserts," New York Times, October 29, 2002. 36. In 2002, the Bush Administration put into practice a new National Security Strategy, the "Bush Doctrine of War," which called for "preemptive war," but in essence amounted to "preventive war," which is illegal under the laws of war. The introduction stai . jk! a i malterofcommon sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging lb re .its before they are fully formed. . . . Finally, the U.S. will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe." Under this doctrine the U.S. Armed Forces are going to be very busy. See "Full Text: Bush's National Security Strategy," New York Times, September 20, 2002; and David Sanger "Bush's Doctrine for War" New York Times, Marchl8,2001 i i >u I lesident Bush thus turned America's first new national security strategy in 50 years — the doctrine of pre-emptn e military action against foes — into the rationale for America's latest war." 37. See "Text: Bush's Speech on Iraq" New York Times, March 18, 2003. 38. Project for a New American Century website, hhi v.ne\ in n n mm oig/uaq 082602.htm. p. 5. 39. Tim Russell Ah t the Pn I BC Transcript for March 1 03, hit] \ in i i ni/ni 60( is] | 1 On Meet the Press on March 16, 2003, when asked by Tim Russert: "What could Saddam Hussein do to stop war?" Cheney replied: "Well, the difficulty here is it's— he's clearly rejected, up till now, all efforts, lime after time. And we have had 12 years and some 17 resolutions now. Each step along the ua\ he had the opportunity to do what he was called upon to do by the UN. Security Council. Each time he has rejected it. I'm not sure now, no matter what he said, that anyone would believe him. We have . . . been down this effort now for six months the UN. with the enactment of 1441. We asked for a declaration of all his WMD come clean. He refused to do that. He's again, continued to do everything he could to thwart the inspectors. I'm hard-put to specify what it is he could do with credibility at this slage that would alter the outcome." 40. Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 188. 41. In a fifty-page Intelligence estimate Tony Blair, the Britain's Prime Minister, argued that Iraq could launch chemical and biological weapons within "45 minutes,' ihal "Intelligence shows that the Iraqi program is almost certainly seeking an indigenous ability to enrich uranium to the level needed for a nuclear weapon," and that Iraq was trying to acquire sig- nificant quantities of uranium from unspecified countries in Africa. See: Warren Hoge, "Blair Says Iraqis Could Launch Chemical Warheads in Minutes," The New York Times, September 24, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/25/inter- national/middleeast/25BRIT.html Also see: Patrick Tyler, "Britain's Case: Iraqi Program to Amass Arm's 'Up and Running,'" The New York Times, September 24, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/ . . . l/middleeast/25ASSE.html. 42. Powell's speech before the UN was shown on national television. 43. Kevin Whitelaw, "Getting It Dead Wrong," U.S. News and World Report, April 1 1 (2005): 32-33. 44. Judith Miller and Julia Preston, "Blix Says He Saw Nothing to Prompt a War," The New York Times, January 30, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/international/middleeast/31BLIX.html. Also see, Hans Blix, "Report to the Se- curity Council by the Chief UN. Weapons Inspectors," The Avn York Times, February 15, 2003, http://www.nytimes. com/2003 ... 5BTEX.htlm. 45. See Jeffrey Record, Boundi i i i 'alWi nl <' rlisl PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Report, December 2003), v. Record concluded: "Of particular concern has been the conflation of al-Qaeda and Saddam in in'slra I ingle undifferentiated terrorist threat. This was a strategic error ofthe first order because itignored i ritical differences between the two in character, threat level, and susceptibility to U.S. deterrence and military a( tion. The result has been an unnecessary preventive war of choice against a deterred Iraq that has created a new front in the Middle East for Islamic terrorism and diverted attention and resources away from securing the American homeland against further assault by an undeterrable al-Qaeda. The war against Iraq was not integral to the GWOT, but rather a detour from it." Also see, Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory. 46. At this point in time with the fighting still in progress no definitive history ofthe war is possible. Hence, the objective here is to outline only what is known about the conventional campaign, and to consider some of the salient factors in the insurgency war. A number of works have appeared on the war. See: Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, D.C Officeofthei hi ui 2004); Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Ji The h I litary History (C ambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2003); John Keegan, The Iraq War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004); Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004); Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra IT. The Inside Stoi r 1 > i i i 1 I in i I 2006). The Gordon and Trainor book is the most comprehensive study available to date. Also see, U.S. Army, Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, available online. 47. Milan Vego, "Learning from Victory," Proceedings, 129/8/1, no. 206 (August 2003): 32-36. 48. "Chasing the Ghosts," Time, September 26(2005) : 33-40. 49. Harlan Ullman and James Wade, Shoi k a / in ichit • Rapid D • i c (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, 1996), xv. 50. Mark Thompson, "Opening With a Bang," Time March 17 (2003): 32-39. 51. Battle space expands the concept of battlefield to include air and sea, and even space where satellite technologies greatly influence the American conduct of war. 52. Thorn Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Orders War Plan Redone for Faster Action," The New York Times, October 12, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/13/international/middleeast/13MILI.html. 53. Mark Thompson and Michael Duffy, "Pentagon Warlord" Time January (2003): 22-29. 54. Seymour Hersh, "Offense and Defense," 43 55. James Conway, Lt. Gen., USMC, '"We've Always Done Windows,'" Proceedings 129/11/1, 32-34. Conway, while arguing that only Franks can answer the question of Rumsfeld's micromanagement approach, gave an indication that supported H i 1 1 i i \\l spent probably about six weeks, over three different conferences, preparing the time-phased force deployment data. When it came time to deploy, it actually was done by requests for forces. And each of those was scrutinized, not necessarily by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, but by his office. They were lumped and approved in "groupments" offerees for deployment. Not the way we would i pi |i lo hin i p not the way we would advocate doing them in the future." 56. Richard Stewart, American Military History, vol. 2, The U.S. Army in the GlobalEra, 1917-2003. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 496. 57. Shanker, "Rumsfeld Orders War Plans Redone for Faster Action." 58. Franks, American Soldier, AAA, 465. 59. Ibid., 439, 440. 60. Quoted in Suzann Chapman, "The 'War' Before the War," Air Force 87 (February 2004): 52-57. Operation Southern Watch commenced on August 26, 1992. It protected the Shia from Saddam's repression. Operation Northern Watch started January 1, 1997. It protected the Kurds. These operations were training grounds for Air Force and Navy pilots, and familiarized commanders with the battle space. 61. Cherilyn Walley and Michael Mullins, "Reaching Out: Psychological Operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM," Veritas, Journal of At >u\ I i PB 31-05-1 (Winter 2005): 36-41. Matthew French, "DOD Aims PSY-Ops at Iraqi Officers," Federal Computer Week March 24 (2003): OIF Information Operation Lesson Learned — First Look http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil/warfarestudies/iwac/Down- loads/W250%20Reading.doc. Fontenot, On Point, 99. Franks, American Soldier, 486. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down (New York: Penguin Books, 1999). For a complete Order of Battle for Combined Forces Land Component Command see Fontenot, On Point, 441. Also see, U.S. Army, Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, OIF, 2003. James Conway, General, USMC, "We've Always Done Windows" Proceedings 129/1 1/1, no.209 (November 2003): 32-34. Robert Dudney, "The Gulf War II Air Campaign by the Numbers," Air Force 86 (July 2003): 36-41. Scott Turner, "U.S. Navy in Review," Proceedings 130/5/1, no. 215 (May 2004): 80-82. Michael Malone, Vice Admiral; James M. Zortman, Rear Admiral; and Samuel J. Paparo, Commander U.S. Navy, "Naval Aviation Raises the Readiness Bar," Proceedings 130/2/1, no. 212,39-41. Romesh Ratnesar, "Awestruck," special edition, Time, March 2 1 (2003): 38-53. Under international law it is illegal to target the leader of a country for assassination. Adam Herbert, "The Baghdad Strikes," Air Force 86 (July 2003): 46-50. Robert S. Dudney, "Space Power in the Gulf," Air Force, 86 (June 2003): 2. Time, March 21 (2003): 52-53. Retired Army General Robert Scales was quoted in the article. Charles Kirkpatrick, "Joint Fires as They Were Meant to Be: V Corps and the 4th Air Support Operations Group During OIF," Land Warfare Papers (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Oct. 2004). Rebecca Grant, "Hand in Glove," Air Force Magazine 86 (July 2003): 30-35. Fontenot et al., On Point, Introduction. F ci i < i nl ' i! v ill in TiansiUon I c ' i i , i (D nib 2004) 1 -:i0. Fontenot et al, On Point, 102. For a detailed assessment of the Army's view of the campaign see On Point, by Gregory Fontenot et al. U.S. Army Third ID (Mechanized) After Action Report: OIF, 2-5. Bing F. J. West, "Maneuver Warfare: It Worked in Iraq," Proceedings 130/2/1, no.212, 36-38. Franks, American Soldier, 497, 498. Richard Newman, "Ambush at Najaf," Air Force 86 (October 2003): 60-63. David Rude and Daniel Williams, "The 'Warfighting Mindset' And the War in Iraq," Army 53 (July 2003): 35-38. The Apache, AH-64D Longbow, carries 16 Hellfire missiles each capable of knocking out a tank, is able to fly under the enemy's radar, and is capable of tracking and processing over a hundred targets at once. These targets could be relayed to other aircraft and weapons systems. Thomas Collins, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "173rd Airborne Brigade in Iraq," Army 53 43-46. Michael Gordon, "The Test for Rumsfeld: Will Strategy Work?" The New York Times, April 1, 2003. Franks, American Soldier, 511, Ibid., 503. Grant, "Hand in Glove," Air Force, 34, Ironically the inn i ' ' ' ' ' l " that had been so influential in the first Persian GulfWar were not available for the more spectaculai and decisive campaign of the second Gulf War. This was because in OIF the Air Force employed more precision weapons that were guided by Global Positioning satellites. Laser directed precision weapons required visual target identification. They made possible the impres.sh c t< 1. -vision pictures. The Air Force destroyed the Iraqi armor division u i 1 1 I m i niii 10 i nil i nlilication.systemsthatcutthroughfhesandstormasifitweren't 93. West and Smith, The March Up. 94. F. J. Bing West, "Maneuver Warfare: It Worked in Iraq," Proceedings 130/2/1, no.212, 36-38. 95. Franks, American Soldier, 517. 96. David Zucchino, Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad (New York: Grove, 2004), 1 17, 1 18. 97. John Keegan, The Iraq War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 186, 193. 98. John Keegan, "Saddam's Utter Collapse Shows This Has Not Been a Real War," London Daily Telegraph, April 8, 2003. 99. Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama in December 1989, was undertaken in order to remove General Noriega. The war in Iraq in 2003 was primarily to change the regime. Chapter 17 1. Osama Bin Laden et al., "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the lews and Crusaders," February 23, 1998. Quoted by Michael Knapp, "The Concept and Practice of Jihad in islam." Parameters 33, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 82-94. The word jihad literally means, to trug h oi n in Islam to ii u ;gleinfhe wayofGod." A jihad is a "holy i 1 i i formal and authorilali [slam legal decree on civil or religious issues thai is formulated and promulgated by a mufti, a qualified and respected Islamic theologian-jurist who has the authority to interpret Islamic law. It is based on the Quran. See Mir Zohair Husain's Islam and the Muslim World (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006). 2. See Tony Zinni, General, USMC, The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and David S. Cloud and Eric Schmitt, "More Retired Generals Call for Rumsfeld's Resigna- tion," New York Times, April 14, 2006, 1A. 3. Mark Mazzetti, Julian Barnes, and Edward Pound, "Inside the Iraq Prison Scandal," U.S. News and World Report May 24 (2004): 18-30. 4. Secretary of Defense, "Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/ Depart- ment in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR)," February 10, 2003. 5. Army FM 3-61.1 Public Affairs Operations (Ft.Mead, MD: Army Public Affairs Center), chapter 1. 6. Gordon Gaskill, "Bloody Beach," American Magazine, September (1944): 7. Dan McSweeney, Captain.USMC, "Clowns to the Left of Me . . . ," Proceedings 129/11/1, no.209 (November 2003): 46-48. McSweeney wrote: "I would be surprised if our reporters did not consider the embedment program a success. Being stuck in the middle with these reporters showed most of us that while there are worlds of difference between the military and the media, both groups share many traits." Conway, '"We've Always Done Windows,'" 32-34. Cherilyn A. Walley, "SOF and the Media During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Veritas loin in o] \ ipeeialOp, itions History PB 31-15-1 (Winter 2005): 32-36. Conway, '"We've Always Done Windows," Proceedings ( November 2003): 32-34. Conway credited Marine Corps doctrine with creating the conditions for peace. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, televised Pentagon News Briefing, April 11, 2003. David Hubner, Lieutenant Colonel, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, "Commanders in Iraq: Seine Lessons Learned," ed. Dennis Steel, Army 55 (June 2005) : 24-30. The Committee to Protect Journalists noted that from 1955 to 1975 66 journalists had been killed in Vietnam, compared to 61 in Iraq from March 2003 to January 2006. McSweeney, "Clowns to the Left of Me ..." 47. See Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004). Blix headed the UN weapons inspection team. In his book he traces the move to war showing that the Bush Administration wanted war. Weapons of mass destruction were a ruse. He also shows that the American media did little to challenge the supposed reasons for war. Dana Milbank and Claudia Deane, "Hussein Link to 9/ 11 Lingers in Mam Mind Wa hingtonPost September 6 (2003): Harold D. Lasswell, "Organization of Psychological Warfare Agencies in World War I," A Psychological Warfare Casebook, edited William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1958), 121. See the documentary film, OUTFOXED E i rt Murdocl Wan ijou ' Pi oduced and Directed by Robert Gre- enwald. Murdoch's media networks gave him access to 280 million Americans. In 1996, Roger Ailes, the former media strategist for the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush Sr. presidential campaigns, became Fox News CEO and Chairman. The film makes the argument that viewers of Fox News are the most misinformed viewers. Philip Seib, "The News Media and the "Clash of Civilizations," Parameters 34, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 71-85. Howard Kurtz, "For Media After Iraq, A Case of Shell Shock," The Washington Post, April 28, 2003, Al. L. Paul Bremer III, Ambassador, My Year in Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 106. Ibid., 10 Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 92. In another influential woik 1 1 ' \ L mn y (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997) part of the RMA debate, Douglas A. Macgregor, argued for the reorganization of the Army into "mobile combat groups." The basic combat unit was to shift from the division to the brigade size organization that was self sustaining, and that could be augmented with additional forces. Part of the effort was to get forces to the battlefield faster, and to take advantage of advanced technologies. In 2004 the Army started reorganizing its divisions into "Brigade Units of Action." 25. Gregg Zouna oldi Divo i I Up Sharp] Separation, Stress Erode Marriages," USA 'i'ochiy June 8 (2005): 1. 26. Quoted by David Crary in "Army Divorce Increase With Deployments," Denton Record June 30 (2005): A3. 27. Jim Tice, "Keeping Soldiers In Service," Army Times June 13 (2005): 8-9. 28. See Petei \\ in n Sin iors: 'llie 1 litiiry Industry (111 ( oinell University 11 i I II I lusc Vice President Dick Cheney formerly led the firm, which received $6 billion in no-bid contracts. Charges of abuse of power, a lack of oversight, and price gouging have been made. 29. Patrick Radden Keefe, Defense and Arms, Iraq: America's Private Armies, 2004. 30. Pelei -Singer, Corporate Warriors, 9. 31. Peter Singer, "Warriors for Hire in Iraq," Defense The Brookings Institution April (2004): Singer noted the American taxpayer was the biggest employer of PMFs, a $100 billion dollar industry, and that the U.S. government had signed over 3,000 contracts in the last decade. These PMFs employ lobbyists, and expend tens of millions of dollars annuall) to buy influence in Washington. 32. National Sc ni ( u il i 1 200 33. Text of President Bush's Speech, Source Associated Press and It Chi i cm I itoi December 12, 2005, http:// www.csmonitor.com/earlyed/earlyUS1212a.html. 34. During the Iraq-Iran War the United States helped arm Iraq. The United States, has propped up the royal families in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The United States, unofficially, and along with other Weslei n nations, assisted Israel with its nuclear development program, giving Arab nations in the region a legitimate reason to seek similar technology. The United States arms Israel, lis policies in the region have not been balanced, making it totally impossible for the United States to act as a neutral pail) in regional discussions. 35. What people say and what they do can be very different. While man} Iraqis claim to hate the U.S. occupation force, they have no desire to see it leave, and apply for jobs with U.S. business, agencies, and armed forces. It is also possible to hate and be angry at the U.S. and still believe it offers the best solution for the future of the country. 36. Bernard Weinraub with Thom Shanker, "Rumsfeld's Design for War Criticized on the Battlefield," New York Times, April 1, 2003. Weinraub noted, "Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, the V Corps Commander, who said the military faced the likelihood of a longer war than many strategists had anticipated." 37. Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force's Size," The New York Times February 27, 2003. Rumsfeld's Pentagon was in many ways like McNamara's Pentagon with civilian 'whiz kids," exerting undue influence. While Army officers cannot public!-, sa; what they think, the e dtical works that have come out of the Army War College, and the words of General Shinseki and "I he is are indicators of the dissatisfaction in the Army for the Rumsfeld conduct of the war. 38. Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Philadelphia Inquirer November 17, 2002. 39. Time, September 26 (2005): 49. 40. One study compared the cost of the war in Iraq with the cost of the war in Viei nam: "c( insider that late last summer the Pentagon was \j j, , i 6 billion per month on operations in Iraq, an amount that exceeds the average cost of $5.1 billion per month (in real 2004 dollars) for US operations in Vietnam between 1964 and 1972." In 2005 the war in Iraq was costing $6 billion per month. The Bush Administration told the American people the war would cost about $70 billion dollars. In January 2006 one study predicted that the war in Iraq could cost as much as a thousand billion dollars, or US $1 trillion. See, David Isenberg, "Iraq, the Mother of All Budget Busters," Asia Times January 14 (2006): 41. Franks, American Soldier, 44 I . Franks wrote: "A functional plan and policy to pay Iraqi military units so they can be immediately co-opted and put to work for the Coalitf kept in coherent units, commanded by their own officers, and p; and cash.]" 42. Time September 26 (2005): 46. 43. Only the British provided significant forces, 30 to 40, 000 combat soldiers and air support. The other thirty nations of Bush's "coalition of the willing" pro\ ided almost nothing that enhanced combat power. 44. Seymour M. Hersh, "Annals of National Security, Offense and Defense: The Battle between Donald Rumafeld and the Pentagon," The New Yorker, April 7 (2003): 43-45. Herseh noted: "Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his inner circle of civilian advisers, who has been chiefly responsible for persuading President Bush to lead the country into war, had insisted on micromanaging the war's operational detail. ... On at least six occasions, the planner told me, when Rumsfeld and his deputies were presented with operational plans — he insisted that the number of ground troops be sharply reduced." Also see, Seymour M. Hersh, i Inn o < oi , and The Road from 91 1 1 to Abu Ghraib (New York: HarperCollins, 2004). 45. Tony Zinni, General, USMC, "Understanding What Victory Is," Proceedings 129/10/1, no. 208 (October 2003): 32, 33. 46. It was remarkable that the White House was able to convince the British to join the coalition. During the planning phase of the war Rumsfeld in essence told the British it did not matter whether they participated or not. Chapter 18 1. Peter Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 73, 80. 2. Michael Walze t l 1 Citizens! unbridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 99. Walzer, Obligations, 114. Walzer hastens to add: "there are no states willing to admit the reality of alienation among Ihcir inhabitants or to recognize the alienated resident as a moral person." R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National Wai in Mi / iderni. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 92. Palmer, "Fredrick the Great...," Make: < irateg) 92:119. Monarchical states too need citizens to function, bu l ci1 izensh ip is restricted to a very narrow few. And the vast majority of the people are excluded from participation as sovereign members. I kom\eau, xi. Plato, The Last Days of Socrates (New York: Penguin Classics, 1993), 86-91 (emphasis added). Also see: Plato, Republic, trans. B. Jowett, 2 vols. (Oxford: University Press, 1921); and Laws, trans, and ed. Thomas Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980). 10. Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, 92. 11. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Penguin Classics, 1987) 185, 186, 190. According to Hobbes, the state had no right to take an individual's life or to risk it in war. Under such conditions the contract was void: "A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force by force, is always voyd. For ... no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wound, and Imprisonment, (the avoyding whereof is the onely End of laying down any Right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. . . . For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men. . . ." 12. Marshal Maurice de Saxe, My Reveries Upon the Art of War, trans. Thomas R. Phillips, in Roots of Strategy, ed. T. R. Phillips (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 193, 194 (italics added). Maurice de Saxe benefited from the work of Niccolo M ilIi li i I \ i Machiavelli argued that the power of the Prince and the security of the city-state were best maintained by conscripted citizens, that mercenary and auxiliary armies (foreign armies) were untrustworthy, and hence, a danger. 13. Harry M. Kemp, Colonel, U.S. Army, The Regiment: Let the Citizens Bear Arms! (Austin, TX: Nortex Press, 1990), 307. Private Slovik was the only American put to death for desertion in World War II, 2,864 were tried by general court- martial for desertion, and the sentence of di th was appro\ ed for 49. 14. Hobbes, Leviathan, 185, 186, 190. Hobbes concluded that the natural state of man was the condition of war and that only the power of the sovereign, which was capable of keeping men in "awe" precluded war. Men entered into society and gave up some of their freedoms in exchange for the security provided by the social order and the sovereign— a so- cial contract. Security created the conditions for civilization and all human advancements in industry, science, and ai 1. Hobbes observed that: "In such condition [the state of nature], there is no place for Ind i iti \ bee us< the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation ... no Knowledge of the face of the Earth ... no Arts... no Letters ... no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasi',, brutish, and short." 15. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 221, 235. See Allan Bloom's "Introduction" to Emile for an expanded discussion on concept of amour-propre. Also see, Jean-Jacques Rous- seau, On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters, ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 64. 16. Hobbes, like Socrates, well understood that nothing proceeded without some basic level of security. While recognizing that contracted individuals had certain obligations and duties, Hobbes concluded that the contract between the state and the individual could be void under certain conditions. For Hobbes what was most important was the life of the individual, not the life of the state. "The Hobbesian Man" valued his own life above all else. According to Hobbes the preservation of one's own life was the primary motivator of all human behavior. Man entered into a social contract for self interest, out of the fear of death that was prevalent in the state of nature, the state of war. If man entered into the contract to presen e his life, it was unreasonable for him to give it up or risk it for the states. Hobbes wrote: "That every man ought to endeavour Peace as Jarre as he has hope of obtaining it: and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and iclps, and advantage of Warn:... I i hi our selves." 17. Lydialyle Gibson "Mirrored Emotion," University of Chicago Magazine 98, no. 4, April 2006, 34-39. 18. See: Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly 12 (Summer 1948): 230-315; Omar Bartov, Hitler's Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Omar Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); James M. McPherson, What They Fought For 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994); James McPherson lot i i i Vhy Men Fougl \ai (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Charles Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), 147. There is a large body of work on this issue. 19. S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978), 167 (italics added). This work has been con- troversial; however, even with its limitations, it remains an important, insightful work. 20. The United States is considered the first modern nation-state because its diverse population, unlike that of Japan, for example, is supposedly connected not by "race" and ethnicity, but by beliefs, ideology, and shared experiences. "Race," according to in m\ n i enti I i i llui ally produced, not biologically produced. 21. J ames E. Rudder, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Letter to Mrs. Caperton, July 13, 1944, James Earl Rudder Files, Cush- ing Memorial Library and Archive, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas. Selected Bibliography The American Culture of War Primary Sources Government Documents Edward M. Almond, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army. "Conference on United Nations Military Operations in Korea, 29 June 1950—31 December 1951." Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Army War College. Chapman W., Anne. The Army's Training Revolution 1973-1990: An Overview. 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Ashton, Arthur H., Commander, U.S. Navy. "Public Information — A Command Function." AID May (1953): 21-24. Bradley, Omar N, General, U.S. Army Chief of Staff."Our Military Requirements— III, The Army's Role." AID July (1948): 74-78. . "The Challenge of Leadership." AID August (1948): 22-24. . "New Strenghth to Old World Ramparts." AID May (1949). . "The Hazards of Second-Rate Leadership." AID July (1949): 63-64. . "One Round Won't Win the Fight." AID April (1949): 31-35. . "The Path Ahead." AID October (1950): 24-26. . "The Strategy of Map." AID September (1949): 8-10. . "Toward a Long-Range Manpower Policy." AID March (1951): 11-15. . "Long-Range Strategy for a Lasting Peace." AID June (1952): 27-32. Brucker, Wilber, Secretary of the Army. "Determined Deterrence— America's Best Safeguard Against Aggression." AID June (1959): 13. Carson, J. M., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army. "The Man Behind the Trigger." AID February (1955): 2-11. Clark, Bruce C, General, U.S. Army, Commanding General, U.S. Army Continental Army Command. "Combat Readiness Is Our Job." AID March (1959): 3-13. . "Ground Forces in Warfare." AID January (1948): 37. Clark, Mark W, General, U.S. Army, Chief, Army Field Forces, "The Payoff in Training." AID January (1950): 3-8. . "The Training of a Soldier." AID December (1950): 3-6. Collins, J. Lawton, General, Army Chief of Staff. "The Challenge to Us All." AID March (1950): 3-7. . "Modern Weapons for Today's Army." AID June (1950): 3-9. . "New Approaches to World Peace." AID January (1951): 3- 9. . "Our Global Responsibilities." AID February (1952): 3-7. . "Understanding Our Nation's Global Role." AID May (1952): 3-8. . "Soldiers and Scientists— Partners in Defense." AID February (1953): 7-13. . "Men, Material and Money." AID July (1953): 8-16. Crittenberger, Willis D, Lieutenant General. "Armor's Role in National Security." AID. July (1953): 35-41. Devers, Jacob L., General, U.S. Army, Chief, Army Field Forces. "Training the Army of Today." AID April (1949): 3-9. . "AFF Makes Its Postwar Report." AID December (1949): 23-33. Dorn, Frank, Colonel, U.S. Army. "Briefing the Press." AID May (1951): 36-41. Douglas, James S., Captain, U.S. Army. "The Army's Newspaper Chain." AID June (1951): 33-37. Echols, M. P., Colonel, U.S. Army. "Information in the Combat Zone." AID April (1951): 60-64. Eddy, Manton S., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army "Military Power and National Policy." AID April (1950): 42. Eichelberger, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army. "Holding the Far East Line." AID November (1949). Eisenhower, Dwight D., General, U.S. Army Chief of Staff. "The Long Pull For Peace." AID April (1948): 33-41. . "Inaugural Address." AID April (1953): 15-20. . "One Year of Progress in European Defense." AID June (1952): 3-8. Fontaine, Andre, "You and I, USA." AID December (1953): 14-25. Forrestal, James, Secretary of Defense. 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A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Shalci , Michael D., ed. The Legacy: The Vietnam War in the American Imagination. Boston: Beacon Press, 1990. Sharp, Grant U.S., Admiral, U.S. Navy. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978. Sorley, Lewis. Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and ihe billies of Command. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years of the US Army in Vietnam 1941-1960. New York: Free Press, 1985. Part of the official history of the U.S. Army in Vietnam series. . After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1993. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Summers, Harry G. Jr., Colonel, U.S. Army. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. New York: Dell Book, 1982. . Vietnam War Almanac. 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Brask, James J., "Counterinsurgency as an Instrument of American Foreign Policy: A Framework for the Analysis of Vietnam Counterinsurgency Evaluations," Northern Illinois University. ;e numbers in italics Index Abrams, Creighton, 287-288, 288 Vietnam, 287-288, 288 Abu Ghraib prison scandal, 438 Accommodationists, 5 Acheson, Dean, 76 Active Defense, U.S. Army, 300-301 Advanced Base Strategic Airpower Doctrine, 74 Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 161 Affluence, cultural tenets, 29-32 1950s, 30-31 Afghanistan, 399 Agents, defined, 3 Agriculture, 1 Aircraft carriers, 156 nuclear weapons, 165-166 World War II, 57 AirLand Battle Doctrine, 301-304 FM 100-5, 302 U.S.S.R., 302 Air Policy Commission, Truman Administration, 70 recommended strategy and doctrine, 70 report, 70 Airpower, 156-157, see also U.S. Air Force Churchill, 46-49 destruction of means of production, 45-56 destruction of the people's will, 45-56 development, 39 extermination warfare, 45-56, 48-49 ground war conflict of value, 37-38 World War II, 38-40 history, 39 Korean War, 113, 115-116 restrictions from Washington, 117 in support of ground war, 115-118 Kosovo, 398-399 as new way of war, 45-56 Operation Desert Storm, 318, 339 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 421, 422-424, 431 political leaders' will, 46, 48-49 public belief in, 74 post-World War II, 75-76 Kidgway, 154 theories, 45-56 Truman Administration, 69, 70 U.S. Army opposition, 79-82 Vietnam, xviii, 244-251, 292 doctrine, 249-251 effectiveness, 250-251 objectives, 244-245, 249 World War I, 39 World War II, 37, 45-56 British approach, 46-49 role of naval aviation, 5/ strategic bombing campaign, 47-49 AhQaeda terrorists, 399 Amphibious warfare, 38 Amphibious Warfare Doctrine, U.S. Marine Corps, 58,59 Anderson, George W, 214 Anticommunism, 76-77 Appeasement, 80 Arab culture, Iraqi Army, 324-325, 367 insurgency war, 7-8 Armistice, Korean War, 143 Armor warfare, World War II, 3S Arms race, U.S.S.R., 160-161 Artillery, Korean War, 113 Atlantic Charter, 65 Atomic bombs, 56, 63-65 Korean War, 143 Truman Administration, 56 Authority, respect for, 139 Avoiding combat service, 15 Bay of Pigs, 182 B-l Bomber, development, 181 Behavior, subcultures, 10 Berlin Crisis, 212 Bill S.2044, 189 interservice rivalry, 190 U.S. Navy's objections, 189-190 Bin Laden, Osama, 399, 437 Biological weapons, 73, 319, 411 Blacks, Korean War, 139-141, 140 Blind faith, 456-457 citizen-soldiers, 457 cultural tenets, 457 empathy, 457 Bomber Gap, 165 Bonds of affection, 455-456 Bourdieu, Pierre, 3-4 Bradley, Omar N., 69, 73-74 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 197 interservice rivalry, 179-180 Korean War, 80-81 Bush, George H.W. first Persian Gulf War, 325, 325-328 Congressional support, 326, 328 convincing foreign nations, 326 decision to go to war, 325-328 end to hostilities, 368-369 support of American people, 326-327 lack of vision, 375 media, 371 Bush, George W after 9/11, 386 Iraqi insurgency war, Strategy for Victory, 446-448 Operation Desert Storm, 381-382 Operation Iraqi Freedom beliefs, 401-402 clash of civilizations, 402-403 Congress, 409-410 decision for war, 402-412 globalization as Americanization, 406-407 imperialist power, 405-406 intelligence agencies, 411-412 Jewish American lobbies and Israel, 404-405 misjudgments, 402 modified Huntington thesis, 404 neoconservative ideology, 403-404, 406 Powell, 410-411 Project for the New American Century, 403 regime change, 403, 404 short and easy war, 407 Strategy for Victory, 446-448 United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 407-408 United Nations vote, 410-411 weapons for mass destruction, 407-412 war on terror, 445-446 Cambodia, 229 Vietnam, 288-289 Censorship compulsory, 125 Korean War, 123 MacArthur, 124-126 Vietnam, 266-269 rejection, 267-268 voluntary, 124, 125 Central Pacific campaign, World War II, 58-60 Japanese way of war, 58-60 U.S. Marine Corps, 58-61 Chain of command Korean War, 106-107 loyalty, 130 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 197 Bradley, 197 interservice rivalry, 197 powers, 197 Change, failure, 6 Character, nurturing, 12 Chemical weapons, 319, 320-321, 323, 370 first Persian Gulf War, 342 China, see also Peoples Republic of China Korean War, 83-84, 88, 112, 143 human wave tactics, 113 loss of, 102 Vietnam, 279 Chosin Reservoir, 60 Churchill, Winston airpower, 46-49 Atlantic Charter, 65 Citizenship alienated residents, 432 axii mis of generalized Western theory, 452-454 concept, 432 importance, 452 nation-state's political system, lack of participatioi 452 new concept, 451-457 theory of, 452-453 Citizen-soldiers, 21 blind faith, 457 demise, 35 elimination from combat arms, 26 offensive strategy, end to, 84-85 only guarantee of security, 457 U.S. Army, 21 Civilian control of military, 169, 381-386 Clinton Administi al ion, 383 national policy, 385, 386 National Security Act of 1947, 384 post-Reagan era, 384-385 Powell, 333 Vietnam, 384 Civil-military relations, 172-183, 381-386 factors, 385-386 Civil War, 8 Clark, Mark, 152-153 (lass discrimination, draft, 273-275, 276 Clausewitz, Carl von, 203-204, 401 revolutionary war, 222 Clifford, Clark, Vietnam, 283-285, 284 Clinton Adminis Ira I ion civilian control of military, 385 Kosovo, 398-399 Coalition warfare, Osgood, 209 Cohen-Nunn Act, 315 Cohesion, 16 Cold war characterized, 66 senior officers overtly and directly challenge President's authority, 178-179 transformation in American thinking, 66 Collins, J. Lawton, 72, 175-176 Combat effectiveness, rotation system, 136-137 Combat power, technology, 34 Combat soldiers elimination from combat arms, 26 hardship, 29 martial spirit, 29 iring, 11 2,13-1 physical attributes, 13 poverty, 29 risk-seeking genes, 12-13 standing army, 24-25 universal fitness fallacy, 1 1 variations in human abilities, 1 1 Command and control systems challenged administration'authority, 178 communication technologies, 171 organizing for defense, 170-172 tests, 171 types, 170 Command structure historical development, 310-311 Truman, 172-173 U.S. Navy, Revolt of the Admirals, 179 Common identities, 136 Communication technologies, command and control systems, 171 Communism, xviii Eisenhower Administration, 224-225 ideology, (V, Kennan thesis, 67 Korean War, 130 Revolutionary War Doctrine, 221-227 will of American people, 28-29 Comptrollers, 196-197 Conduct of war equality, 23 all men can perform equally well on battlefield, 23 gifted amateur thesis, 23-24 traditional American thinking, 19-37 Conflict initiation, Eisenhower, 83 Conscription, xix, xx, 36 class discrimination, 273-275, 276 cultural diversity, 379 Korean War, 130-131, 133 race, 274-275 Vietnam, 272-277 pacification of Americans, 276-277 will of American people, 28-29 World War II, 26 Consumption, 29-32 Core cultures, jointness, 396-397 Counterinsurgeni. v warfare Kennedy Administration, 225 U.S. Special Forces, 225 U.S. Army, resistance, 226-227 Vietnam, 225-226 Counterrevolutionary War Doctrine, U.S. Army, 221-227 Credibility gap, 177 media, 269 Crisis mobilization, 21 Cuban Missile Crisis, 183 Cultural arrogance, Korean War, 113-114 Cultural dissonance, 377 Cultural diversity, draft, 379 Cultural programming, 4-5 Cultural tenets, 5 affluence, 29-32 1950s, 30-31 all men capable of being soldiers, 23-26, 34 blind faith, 457 consumption, 29-32 culture of inequality of outcome, 26-29 equality, 11,22-26 equality of opportunity, 34 equality of outcome, 34 equality of sacrifice, 22-26, 34 inconsistencies damage war effort, ') individualism, 35 Iron Triangle, 183-184 isolationism, 35 limited war, 29 manhood, 11 in peacetime for losers, 34 i, 35 posttraumatic stress disorder, 14 powerful military forces as aberration, 77 Southerners, 9 talented do not serve, 26-28 technology, 32-34, 35, 219-220 unilateralism, 35 U.S. Marine Corps, 195 value of human life, 34 varying degrees of strength, 9 Vietnam, 9, 291-293 wealth, 29-32, 35 World War II, 9 Cultural theory, axioms, 6-11 Cultural transformation, 378-382 Culture, 2-6 denned, 2-3 dissemination, 5 functions, 5-6 genes, 11-15 last major war, 5 manifested in, 6 necessity of understanding, 9 priority in historical time, 8 timeless, 7 ubiquitous, 7 Culture of war, 5 Decision making, subcultures, 10 Defense Intelligence Aeency, 219 Defense Reorganization Act, 198, 311-312 Defensive war of attrition, Korean War, 141-143, 142 Delusion, caused by war, 16-17 Diem assassination, Kennedy Administration, 239-240 DNA, slight differences, 11 Doctrine, 40 defined, 8 Eighth Army Korean War, 91-92 strength, 92 training, 92, 96 unprepared to fight, 96 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 148 vision of war, 148-152 different from other World War II officers, 152 Eisenhower Administration, 147-169 Communism, 224-22;> conflict initiation, 83 cost, 150-151 damage to U.S. Army, 152 Iron Triangle, 187-188 Korean War, 79-80, 143-144, 147-148 military force ideology, cultural change, 162 New Look military policy, 148, 150 peripheral areas, 151-152 readiness of U.S. Army post- World War II, 79-80 Ridgway's analysis of war in Indochina, 234-235 Vietnam, 149, 237, 238 counter-force at every point axiom, 149 Empathy, blind faith, 457 Enclave Strategy, U.S. Marine Corps, 256-259 Enculturation, 15 Enemy culture, importance of understanding, 10 Equality, 11,22-26 conduct of war, 23 all men can be soldiers, 23-24 gifted amateur thesis, 23-24 135 of opportunity, 23, 34 of outcome, 23, 26-29, 34 post- World War II, 33 power in Americ an Hi of sacrifice, 22-26, 34 military cluster, 381 technology, 32-33 World War II, 33 Europe, Old Regime, 452 Extermination warfare, airpower, 45-56, 48-49 Failure, change, 6 Fairness, limited war, 135 Far East Air Force, Korean War, 116, 117-118, 119-120 little operational control of Navy aviation, 119-120 Fehrenbach, T.R., 19, 20-21 Firepower infantry, 42-43 World War II, 42-43 Flexible Response, 211-212 Kennedy Administration, 201 McNamara, 218 FM 100-5, AirLand Battle Doctrine, 302 Force structure, 391-398 faults, 186 Force XXI, 387 Forrestal, James Vincent, 191-192, 193-194, 196 Fragmentation, see also Clusters American society, 9, 10 effects, 9-10 limited wars, 9-10 Franks, Tommy, 414-419, 430 French-Indochina War, 233 Frontier theory, 4 culture and, 11-15 genetic predisposition for certain roles, 13 physical attributes, 13 risk seeking genes, 12-13 Germany, World War II, bombing effects on civilians, 55-56 Gifted amateur thesis, 23-24 Global War on Terrorism, xx, 399 Bush, George W, 445-446 Iraqi insurgency war, 445-446 Glosson, Buster, 296-300, 340-341, 343, 344-345, 347 Goldwater-Nichols Act, National Command Structure, 310-313 military opposition, 313-315 Gorbachev, Mikhail, Operation Desert Storm, 347 Graduated Response Doctrine, xviii, 212 Johnson Administration, 229-230 McNamara, 218, 242 Osgood, 208-209 Vietnam, 244-251 objectives, 244-245 Gray, Colin, 4-5 Great Britain airpower in World War II, 46-49 American way of war, 84-85 Ground combat forces airpowei conflict of value, 37-38 interservice rivalry, 118-119 World War II, 38-40 Korean War, 79, 90 Operation Desert Storm, 348-349, 350-351, 354-355, 358-359, 360-361, 364-365, 366 evacuating Kuwait, 354-357 evaluation of Iraqi defense, 353 launching, 346-347, 352 pursuit, 354-363 VII Corps' main battle with Republican Guard, 357-363, 360-361 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 424-435, 425, 426, 427, 428, 433 Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 297 substitutes for, 62 Vietnam, 251, 251-264, 252 troop strength, 251, 252, 255 U.S. Marine Corps vs. U.S. Army, 251-264 Guerrilla warfare, 222, 418 outside support, 223 Gulf of Tonkin attack, 240-241 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 241 H Habitus, defined, 3 Hard-liners characterized, 5 defined, ,i Hardship combat soldiers, 29 military service, 29 Helicopters, 302 Vietnam, 262-263 Honour, 4 myth of old west, 4 Hussein, Saddam, 298 characterized, 318-320, 324 decision to invade Kuwait, 318-321 strategic objective, 324 weapons systems, 319-320 from U.S., 319 Hydrogen bombs, 76 value, 204 Inchon landing, 97-102, 101 changing Sherman's assessment Joint Chiefs of StafT, 100-102 MacArthur, 97-98, 98-102 objections to, 98 U.S. Navy's arguments against, 98-99 Individualism, cultural tenets, 35 Infantry, 32, see also U.S. Army on defensive, 39 firepower, 42-43 Korean War, 83, 88 World War II, 40-41 Information technologies, 387 Infrasl i uclure destruction, 297-298 Insurgency war, Arab states, 7-8 Insurgency War Doctrine, 221-227 eharaclerized, 221-222 Korean War, 139-141, 140 Truman, 139, 140 U.S. Army, 139-141, 140 Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, 167 International Atomic Energy Agency, 370 Interservice rivalry, 169-170, 187, 195 Bill S.2044, 190 Bradley, 179-180 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 197 chaotic aria-,' of nuclear deterrent forces, 163-167 ground support, 118-119 limited war, 172 loyalty, 182-183 McNamara, 215 National Security Act of 1947, 310 Operation Desert Storm, 299-300, 330 Vietnam, 182 Iran, 321 nuclear weapons, 370 pre-first Persian Gulf War, 319 revolution in military affairs, 391 United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency, 370 United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament, 370 Iraqi Air Force, 321-322 Iraqi Army in 1990, 321-325 Arab culture, 324-325, 367 failures, 340 U.S. military's evaluation of, 321-325 Iraqi insurgency war, 437-450 Bush, George W, Strategy for Victory, 446-448 early stages, 442 Iraqi-ization, 446-449 media, 438-442 nation building, 443, 446-447 outsourcing war, 444 Private Military Firms, 444 public opinion, 438-442 reasons for, 437-438 retention, 444 Rumsfeld, 437-438 doctrine for defeat, 449-450 strategy, 449-450 528 . Index Iraqi insurgency war (continued) U.S. Army, 443-444 war on terror, 445-446 Iron Triangle, 171, 183-188 American people as part of, 187 Congress, 186-187 cultural tenets, 183-184 development, 183-188 Eisenhower, 187-188 Isolationism, 65 cultural tenets, 35 Israel, 404-405 J Japan, World War II, 233 bombing effects on civilians, 55-56 invasion decision, 60 Japanese culture, 8 racism, 54-55 strategic bombing in approach, 52-55 in cultural norms motivating, 54 reasons for, 54 Japanese way of war Central Pacific campaign, 58-60 U.S. Marine Corps, 58 war of attrition, 58-60 Jet air-to-air combat, 120 Johnson Administration Graduated Response Doctrine, 229-230 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 216 loyalty, 180-181 media, 265-266 Vietnam, 236-237 ground troops, 251-252 Gulf of Tonkin attack, 240-241 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 241 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 98 Chairman's authority, 312 Chairman's responsibilities, 312-313 characterized, 192-193 Johnson Administration, 216 Key West Agreement, 193-194, 196 Korean War, 106-107 MacArthur, relief of, 12/ National Military Establishment, 192-193 National Security Act of 1947, 177 Jointness, 391-398 core cultures, 396-397 Kennan, George E, 66-67 thesis axioms, 67 Kennedy, John E, 202 assessment of international environment, 212-213 invalid American assumptions, 210-211 Kennedy AdminisUalion characterized, 201-203 counterinsurgency warfare, 225 U.S. Special Forces, 225 Diem assassination, 239-240 Flexible Response Doctrine, 201 limited war, 155, 201 Massive Retaliation, 201 opposed cuts in Army strength, 211 Vietnam, 235-237, 238-239, 240 battle ofApBac, 239 Diem assassination, 239-240 Key West Agreement, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 193-194, 196 Kissinger, Henry limited war, 206, 207-210 Vietnam negotiations, 290-291 war of attrition, 207, 209-210 Korean War, 20-21, 29 1950-51,83-114 1951-53,115-145 airpower, 113, 115-116 restrictions from Washington, 117 in support of ground war, 115-118 American offensive operations, 1 1 3 area of operations, 86 armistice, 143, 147-148 artillery, 113 atomic bombs, 143 Blacks, 139-141, 140 Bradley, 80-81 breakout from Pusan perimeter, 101 censorship, 123 chain of command, 106-107 Chinese forces, 78, 83-84, 88, 105-109, 107, 112, 143 Communism, 130 cost, 144 cultural arrogance, 113-114 defensive war of attrition, 141-143, 142 draft, 130-131, 133 Eighth Army, 91-92 Eighth Army and X Corps advance, 105 Eighth Army and X Corps retreat, 1 08 Eisenhower, 79-80, 143-144, 147-148 enemy-developed tactics, 112 evaluation of enemy soldier, 103 Far East Air Force, 116, 117-118, 119-120 little operational control of Navy aviation, 119-120 final phase, 141-143, 142 geography, 85-88, 86 ground war, 79, 90, 109-112 historical background, 85 Inchon landing, 97-102, 101 changing Sherman's assessment, 99-100 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 100-102 MacArthur, 98-102 objections to, 98 U.S. Navy's arguments against, 98-99 increased military spending, ', '/, V8 infantry, 83, 88 integration, 139-141, 140 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 106-107 MacArthur, 83, 89, 91, 91-92 relief of, 127-130 views on conduct of war, 127-130 media, 123 National Guard, 132 reofte n, 8; negotiations, 113-114 Korean Armistice Conference, 142-143 outbreak, 77 personnel policies individual replacement system, 132 results of transformation, 130-141 l, 134-1 physical environment, 85-88, 86, 87 political objectives, 113 public opinion, 123, 124, 127 Pusan perimeter, 93-94 racism, 97 Ridgway lessons of, 153 takes command, 109-112 segregation, 97 surrender of Japanese forces, 85 Task Force Smith, 92-93 38th parallel, 85, 102-105, 104 troop strength, 130-131, 133 Truman Administration, 78 conduct of war, 129-130 decisions based on American cultural te limited war objective, 90 operationally, 90 relief of MacArthur, 127-130 strategic objectives, 90 total war objective, 90 United Nations, 103 forces retreat, 107, 108 U.S. actions legitimacy, 89, 90 United Nations Security Council, 89 unpreparedness, 76-77, 174 unreadiness, 78-79, 82 U.S. Air Force, 121, 122 U.S. Army Korean Augmentations, 133-134 unprepared, 153 weaknesses, 84 U.S. Marine Corps, 96-97 U.S. Navy, 88, 121-122 U.S.S.R., airpower, 120-121 Walker battle for Pusan, 91-97 delay and defend operation, 93-96 Kosovo air war, 398-399 Clinton Administ: Kuwait, 318-321, 33 media, 373-374 Land based missiles, 1 i, 398-399 The Last Days of Socrates, Plato, 453-454 genetic predisposition for certain roles, 13 willingness to accept human losses, 55-56 LeMay, Curtis, 115-116 Lemnitzer, Lyman L., 161-162 vision of limited war, 162 Limited nuclear war, 205 Limited war, xviii, 20-21, 35, 74 Americans questioned the need for service, 138-139 artificial creation, xviii, 203 cultural contradictions, 27-28 cultural tenets, 29 equality, 135 fairness, 135 fragmentation, 9-10 interservice rivalry, 172 Kennedy Administration, 155, 201 Kissinger, 206, 207-210 Lemnitzer, 162 military service, 27-28 nuclear weapons, 203 Osgood, 206-210 Powell, 383 prerequisites, 381 recruiting, 27-28 Ridgway, 205-206 Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 116 Tactical Airpower Doctrine, 118 Taylor, 157-158 theories, 203-210 traditional American way of war, 22 U.S. Army, 205-206 Vietnam defensive strategy, 260-261 tactics, 260-261 Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, 444 Love of country, 455-456 Love of unit, 455-456 Loyalty, 174 to administration, 175, 176 chain of command, 130 conflict, 174-175, 176-178 :e rivalry, 182-183 national strategy, 182 Ridgway, 176-177 to service, 176 strategic doctrine, 182 Lying, institutionalized, 176 M MacArthur, Douglas, 83, 89, 91, 91-92 censorship, 124-126 Inchon landing, 97-98 Joint Chiefs of Staff, relief, 127 media, 124-126 relief of, 127-130 views on conduct of war, 127-130 MacArthur, Douglas (continued) Wake Island meeting with Truman, 105 as dominant weapon, 16 as greatest weapon, 388 not means to end, but end ilsclf, 62 Maneuver warfare, U.S. Marine Corps, 304-307 definition, 305 Manhood cultural tenets, 1 1 posttraumatic stress disorder, 14 Mao Tse-tung, 223-224 Marketing Congress, 186-187 military, 183-184 weapon systems, 186, 187 Marshall, George, 154 Martial spirit, 9 combat soldiers, 29 military service, 29 Massive Retaliation, 70, 151 Kennedy Administration, 201 revolutionary wars, 234-235 Ridgway, 153 Taylor opposed, 157 U.S. Air Force, 122 U.S. Army opposition, 152-153, 177 McCaffrey, Barry M., 430 McNamara, Robert S., 213-221, 284 accomplishments, 213 background, 213-214 core conclusions, 217-218 faults, 216-217 Flexible Response Doctrine, 218 graduated deterrence, 218 Graduated Response Doctrine, 242 interservice rivalry, 2 15 opposition to, 214-215 reorganization of Department of Defense, 218-219 reorganization of U.S. Army, 214, 219-221 strategic forces, 219 Vietnam conflict, 278-279 course change, 277-279 ground troops, 251-252 Bush, George H.W., 371 credibility gap, 269 Iraqi insurgency war, 438-442 Johnson, 265-266 Korean War, 123 Kuwait, 373-374 MacArthur, 124-126 National Media Pool, 372 Operation Desert Storm, 371-374 press pools, 373 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 438-439 Department of Defense National Media Pool systen 440 embedding reporters, 440-441 Public Affairs Guidance, 438 Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, 371 Tet Offensive, 280-283 Vietnam, 265-266, 266-269, 372-373 Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 237, Milium assistant c programs, Truman Doctrii 68-69 Military cluster, 10 belief in moral superiority, 380-381 demographic, 379-382 distrust of civilian leadership, 380-381 equality of sacrifice, 381 formation of new royalty, 381 more conservative, 379-381 more politically active, 379-381 representative -200 ei also National 0-381 Military Command Structure, Command Structure administrative/logistics chain of command, I 99 Unified Command Structure, 200, 200 Military expenditure, Eisenhower, 150-151 Military force ideology, Eisenhower Administration cultural change, 162 Military-industrial complex, see Iron Triangle Military map symbols, 459 Military operations other than war, 394 se for se e, 27 cultural tenets, 1 1 extended tours of duty, xx hardship, 29 increased operational tempo, 394 limited war, 27-28 martial spirit, 29 National Command Structure, 169 Operation Desei i Storm, deactivation after, 374 organization rationale, 194-195 political power, 383 poverty, 29 prestige rise post-Operation Desert Storm, 383 revolution in military affairs, 386-391 service loyalty, 310-312 values, 27 Military strategy U.S. technological and material abundance, 62 Vietnam, 230-233, 23 1 Military training Eighth Army, 92, 96 professional mililar; education, U.S. Arm;, 303 study of culture, 10 U.S. Army, 74-75, 81-82, 302-303 Vietnam, 269-270 Militia, 23-24 Mining of Haiphong, 290 Mobility, technology, 158-159 Modernization, 71 Nation concept, 2 state, contrasted, 452 National Command Structure, Goldwater-Nichols Act, 310-313, see also Military Command Structure military opposition, 313-315 National Guard Korean War, 132 Operation Desert Storm, 350-352 Vietnam, 270, 273 Nationality, denned, 2 National Media Pool, 372 National Military Establishment, 192 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 192-193 National policy civilian control of military, 385, 386 organizations external to U.S. government, 386 National preparedness, Ridgway, 153-154 National Security Act of 1947, 189 civilian control of military, 384 faults, 169, 171 interservice rivalry, 310 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 177 relationship of elements, 193 Vietnam, 182 National Security Council, 193 National Strategic Doctrine intellectuals, 202 think tanks, 202 National strategy loyalty, 182 U.S. technological and material abundance, 62 Nation building, 226 Iraqi insurgency war, 443, 446- 44, Nation-state modern, 2 political system, citizen lack of participation, 432 Natural laws, 455 Negotiation, Korean War, 113-114 New American citizenship, 451-457 responsibilities owed, 451 New Look military policy Eisenhower, 148, 150 U.S. Army opposed, 177 Nitze, Paul H., 76 Nixon, Richard M., 286 Nixon Administration, Vietnam, 285-291 Christmas Bombing campaign, 290-291 diplomatic offensive to neutralize China and U.S.S.R., 287 intensified bombing campaign, 286 Kissinger's negotiations, 290-291 mining of Haiphong, 290 One-War approach, 287-288 secret plan to end the war, 286 Vietnamization, 287-290 winning hearts and minds, 287 Nonaligned nations, 152 NSC-68, 76-77 NSC-162/2, 149 Nuclear powered submarines, 166 Nuclear weapons, 38, see also Specific type aircraft carriers, 165-166 chaoti u | ifnucl ai deteirent forces, 163-167 First Use Doctrine, 148 Iraq, 370 limited war, 203 public belief in, 74 post-World War II, 75-76 survival of retaliatory force, 212 tactical, 204 Taylor, 158 U.S. Navy, 165-167 Nurturing character, 12 combat soldiers, 11-12, 13-14 risk seeking genes, 13-14 O Objective civilian control, 178-179 Offensive ground war, Vietnam, 230 Offensive strategy, citizen-soldier relationship, 84-85 Oil, 327 Operation Desert Storm, 296-299, 317-338 as aberration, 318 airpower, 318, 339, 340-345 Bush, George H.W, 325, 325-328 Congressional support, 326, 328 controversy, 325, 325-328 convincing foreign nations, 326 decision to go to war, 325-328 end to hostilities, 368-369 support of American people, 3.26-32, Bush, George W, 381-382 chemical weapons, 342 Colonial Rule, 1920, 332 destruction of morale, 364-365 end of coalition war, 369 Gorbachev, 347 Ground Offensive Plan, 336-337 ground war, 348-349, 350-351, 354-355, 358-359, 360-361, 364-365, 366 evacuating Kuwait, 354-357 evaluation of Iraqi defense, 353 launching, 346-347, 352 pursuit, 354-363 VII Corps' main battle with Republican Guard, 357-363, 360-361 interservice rivalry, 299-300, 330 Iraqi Order of Battle, 334-335 media, 371-374 press pools, 373 military deactivation after, 374 military victory, 367-371 National Guard, 350-352 oil, 327 Opcralion Desert Slorm (continued) phases, 329-338 political failure, 367-371 Powell, 345, 346-347 end to hostilities, 367-368 Powell Doctrine, 331 public opinion, 371-374 reasons for going to war, 381 removal of American people from, 381-382 Schwarzkopf, 328-338 line of Iraqi retreat, 335-338 supported cease -fire decision, 368 theater strategy, 328-338, 332, 334-335, 336-337 stealth technology, 297-299 tanks, 352, 353, 361-362 technology, 361-362, 367 troop strength, 348-352 unit)' of command, 330 U.S. Air Force, 340-345 accuracy, 343-344 claims of decisiveness, 339-340 closing backdoor, 338 enemy's ground combat forces, 341, 344 intelligence, 343 killing Hussein, 341 U.S. Army, 317-318 claims of decisiveness, 339-340 technology, 367 U.S. Marine Corps, 306 U.S. Navy, 342, 345 Operation Enduring Freedom, 398-399, 399 Operation Gyroscope, 27 1 Operation Iraqi Freedom air war, 421, 422-424, 431 area of operation, 4i5 Bush, George W. beliefs, 401-402 clash of civilizations, 402-403 Congress, 409-410 decision for war, 402-412 globalization as Americanization, 406-407 imperialist power, 405-406 intelligence agencies, 411-412 Jewish American lobbies and Israel, 404-405 misjudgments, 402 modified Huntington thesis, 404 neoconservative ideology, 403-404, 406 Powell, 410-411 Project for the New American Century, 403 regime change, 403, 404 short and easy war, 407 United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 407-408 United Nations vote, 410-411 weapons for mass destruction, 407-412 Bush, George W., Strategy for Victory, 446-448 conventional war, 401-436 decision for war, 402-412 clash of civilizations, 402-403 Congress, 409-410 globalization as Americanization, 406-407 imperialist power, 405-406 intelligence agencies, 411-412 Jewish American lobbies and Israel, 404-405 modified Huntington thesis, 404 neoconservative ideology, 403-404, 406 Powell, 410-411 Project for the New American Century, 403 regime change, 403, 404 short and easy war, 407 United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 407-408 United Nations vote, 410-411 weapons for mass destruction, 407-412 ground war, 424-435, 425, 426, 427, 428, 433 insurgency war, see Iraqi insurgency war invasion forces, 420-422 media, 438-439 Department of Defense National Media Pool systen 440 embedding reporters, 440-441 Public Affairs Guidance, 438 Rumsfeld, 413-414 Shock and Awe Operational Doctrine, 412-414 theater strategy, Franks vs. Rumsfeld, 414-419 U.S. Navy, 421-422 U.S. Special Forces, 418 weapons of mass destruction, 419 opposing forces, 419-420 psychological operations, 414, 419 Rumsfeld i lo-c logisl I plannii 0J doctrine for defeat, 449-450 strategy, 449-450 strategy vs. Franks, 449-450 theater strategy, Franks vs. Rumsfeld, 414-419 uninvolved Americans, 402 Operation Just Cause, 323 Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, media, 371 Optimism, cultural tenets, 35 Osgood, Robert E. coalition warfare, 209 graduated deterrence, 208-209 limited war, 206-210 war of attrition, Southeast Asia, 207, 209-210 Outsourcing war, Iraqi insurgency war, 444 Peleliu, 60, 61 Pentomic Doctt division st requirements, 159 Taylor, 158 Westmoreland, 159 Peoples Republic of China, 76 Korean War, 78 Peoples War strategy, 221-227 Personnel policies, Korean War individual replaccmenl system, J 32 results of transformation, 130-141 rotation system, 134-139 Physical attributes combat soldiers, 13 Physical fitness, 31-32 Physical training programs, 31-32 Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, 219 Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, 453-454 Policy of Containment, 20, 67 cost, 173-174, 175 permanent state of military readiness, 67-68 Political leaders, cultural noi ins, inconsistencies damaging war effort, 9 Political objectives after World War II, xvii Korean War, 113 Political power, military, 383 Posttraumatic stress disorder cultural tenets, 14 development, 15 manhood, 14 Poverty combat soldiers, 29 military service, 29 Powell, Colin L., 328, 339 civilian control, 383 Operation Desert Storm, 345, 346-347 end to hostilities, 367-368 Powell Doctrine, 310 Operation Desert Storm, 331 Power, 35 Practices, defined, 3 Precision bombing, history, 49-50 Preparedness, 69 Prim i pons syssl U.S. Air Force, 181 U.S. Navy, 181 Private Military Firms, xx, 386 characterized, 444 Iraqi insurgency war, 444 new form of mercenaries, 444 Professional military education, U.S. Army, 303 Psychological operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 414, 419 Public opinion Iraqi insurgency war, 438-442 Korean War, 123, 124, 127 Operation Desert Storm, 371-374 Ridgway, 184 Taylor, i, 263, 2 -269 Racism, 54-55, 139-141 Japan, 54-55 Korean War, 97 World War II, 54-55 Readiness, U.S. Army, 175 Reagan Administration, 295-296 Recruiting, limited war, 27-28 Republic of Korea, 83 Retention, Iraqi insurgency war, 444 Revolutionary war, 19 Clausewitz, 222 Massive Retaliation, 234-235 Ridgway, Matthew B., 109-112, 153-157, 154 ability to assess fighting spirit, 110-112 airpower, 154 goals, 155 improving morale, 111-112 Korean War, lessons of, 153 limited war, 205-206 advoc s, 153 loyalty, 176-177 Massive Retaliation, 153 national preparedness, 153-154 public support for war, 111-112, 184 Ridgvvay's analysis of war in Indochina, 2 34-2 33 Risk socking genes, 12-13 combat soldiers, 12-13 nurturing, 13-14 Roosevelt, Franklin D., Atlantic Charter, 65 Rotation system, 134-139 combat effectiveness, 136-137 unit cohesion, 137-138 ROTC programs, 9 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 454-456 Rumsfeld, Donald, 386 increased power, 450 Iraqi insurgency war, 437-438 doctrine for defeat, 449-450 strategy, 449-450 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 413-414 doctrine for defeat, 449-450 Iratcg) ! 19-430 Persian Gulf War, second, day-to-day logistical plan 401 technological U.S. Army, destructive olu -, 44') Race, draft, 274-275 Saudi Arabia, defense of, 329 Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, 328 Operation Desert Storm, 328-338 line of Iraqi retreat, 335-338 supported cease-fire decision, 368 Science, cultural tenets, 32-34 Search and Destroy Operational Doctrine, Westmoreland, 255 Segregation, Korean War, 97 Selective Service Act, 130-131 Self-preservation, 455 Senior military officers cold war, overtly and directly challenge President's authority, 178-179 culturally impaired, 214-216 loyalty to their service, 214-216 technology, 214-216 Vietnam, duties as advisors to ihc commander-in-chief, 308 Sherman, Forrest, 98-100 Shock and Awe Operational Doctrine, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 412-414 Social control, 1 Socrates, 453-454 Southerners, cultural tenets, 9 South Korea, 194-195 Soviet expansion, see Communism Spaatz, Carl, 70-71 Standard of living, 29-32 Standing army, 24-25 combat soldiers, 24-25 not needed myth, 24-25 small, 77 concept, 451 loss of legitimacy, 452 nation, contrasted, 452 negative duties to, 452 positive duties to, 452 selfless service to, 453 Stealth technology, Operation Desert Storm, 297-299 Strategic Air Command, 71, 147, 163-164 Iralegii ll\ d fensive > i ol lution, culturally un-American, 84-85 Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), 74 Strategic bombing, 50-52, 163, 184, 392 Army Air Force, 50-52 effectiveness, 51-52 American approach, 52-55 American cultural norms motivating, 54 reasons for, 54 World War II, 50-52 effectiveness, 51-52 Strategic Bombing Doctrine ground combat forces, 297 limited war, 116 new doctrine, 296-300 post- Vietnam, 296-300 Strategic defense, American way of war, 114 Strategic Doctrine, loyalty, 182 Strategic mutual defense alliances, 66 Strategies, defined, 3 Structures, defined, 3 Subcullurcs behavior, 10 decisionmaking, 10 Subjective civilian control, 178-179 Superpowers, 66 Tactical Air Command, 164-165 Tactical Airpower Doctrine, limited war, 118 Taliban, 399 Tanks, 300-301 Operation Desert Storm, 352, 353, 361-362 U.S. Army, 43, 44-45 World War II, 43, 44-45 Taylor, Maxwell D., 153, 155, 157-160, 211-212 limited war, 157-158 nuclear weapons, 158 opposed Massive Retaliation, 157 Pentomic Doctrine, 158 public opinion, 184-185 technology, 158-159, 160 U.S. Army decline, 157 Team players, requirement for Technology, 388 combat power, 34 cultural tenets, 32-34, 35, 219-220 equality, 32-33 evaluation, 34 faith, 296 mobility, 158-159 Operation Desert Storm, 361-362, 367 overreliance, 451 replacing ground combat forces, 390-391 revolution in military affairs, 385-386, 387, 389 senior military leaders, 214-216 as substitute for manpower, 263 Taylor, 158-159, 160 U.S. Air Force, 390 U.S. Army, 158-159, 160, 303-304 U.S. Navy, 390 n,261-: 1, 292 Terrorism, Arab nations, 8 Tet Offensive, 280-285 media, 280-283 psychological victory, 280-282 Think tanks, National Strategic Doctrine, 202 Traditional American way of war, 19-37 limited war, 22 post- World War II environment, 19-21 Transculturation, 15 Traumatic events, 8 Tribes, 13, 456 defined, 2 factors for unity, 2 genetic predisposition for certain roles, 13 Troop strength, Vietnam, 289, 289-290 Truman Administration, 19, 20, 64, 78 accomplishments, 64-65 Air Policy Commission, 70 recommended strategy and doctrine, 70 report, 70 airpower, 69, 70 Armed Forces reorganization, 64-65 Army demobilized, 73 atomic bomb, 56 decision to use, 64 command structure, 172-173 conduct of war, 129-130 decisions based on American cultural tenets, 79 defense of foreign shores, 65-66 influence, 64-65 integration, 139, 140 limited war objective, 90 MacArfhur relief of, 127-130 Truman met at Wake Island, 105 need for modernization of armed forces, 71 new U.S. role, 65-66 operationally, 90 reduced Army, 69, 73, 77, 78-79, 82 strategic objectives, 90 total war objective, 90 Truman's opinion of military leaders, 81 unification plan, 188-191 U.S. Air Force, 190-191 U.S. Army's state of readiness, 80 U.S. Marine Corps, 191 Truman Doctrine military assistance programs, 68-69 military strategy, 68-69 Trust, military cluster, 380-381 Turner, Frederick Jackson, 4 U Unification plan Congress, 200 service opposition, 189-192 system of competing services, 191-192 Truman, 188-191 U.S. Secretary of Defense, 196 Unilateralism, cultural tenets, 35 Unit cohesion, rotation system, 137-138 United Nations invasion of Kuwait, 320 International Atomic Energy Agency, 370 United ion j ial < immi sum in Disarmament, 370 Korean War, 103 U.S. actions legitimacy, 89, 90 United Nations So, urity Council, Korean War, 8' Unity of command, 101-102 Operation Desert Storm, 330 Universal Military Training, U.S. Army, 74-75 Unmanned Ground Vehicles, 390 Urban warfare, 418 U.S. aim of war, 22 American ingenuil \ , 1 1 American society fragmentation, 9, 10 American way of war, 7 strategic defense, 114 U.K., significant but unnoticed transition. 84- beliel m uniqueness, 22, 35 clustering of, 378-382 diversity, 378 political objectives, 21 primacy of position in world affairs, 35 as superpower development, xvii responsibilities, xvii unbound by the rules governing other nations, 2 U.S. Air Force access to all regions, 393-394 air superiority mission, 392 developing technologies and doctrine, 390 Korean War, 121, 122 Massive Retaliation, J 11 missions, 392-393 Operation Desert Storm, 340-345 accuracy, 343-344 claims of decisiveness, 339-340 closing backdoor, 338 enemy's ground combat forces, 341, 344 intelligence, 343 killing Hussein, 341 primary weapons systems, 181 Truman, 190-191 U.S. Army grown steadily separate, 118-119 joint doctrine and training, 303 Korean War relations, 118-119 U.S. Navy, Korean War relations, 1 19-120 U.S.S.R. effect of collapse on, 377-378 missions, 377-378 Vietnam, 244-251 U.S. Army, 39, 40-45 Active Defense Doctrine, 300-301 adaptibility, 42 airpower, 44 new role, 72 Army demobilized, 73 Army officer, case for service, 27 balanced force structure, 84 citizen soldiers, 21 counterinsurgency wars, resistance, 226-227 Counterrevolutionary War Doctrine, 221-227 decline, 69, 73, 77, 78-79, 82 firepower vs. combat power, 42-44 historical experiences, 40 individual replacement system vs. unit rotation, < infantry, 40 integration, 139-141, 140 Iraqi insurgency war, 443-444 joint doctrine, 395 Korean War Korean Augmentations, 133-134 unprepared, 153 weaknesses, 84 lack of preparation for war, 80 U.S. Army (continued) least glamorous service, 185 limited war, 205-206 man as dominant instrument, 38, 40 missions, 395 morale in 1950s, 156 offensive battles, 40 Operation Desert Storm, 317-318 claims of decisiveness, 339-340 technology, 367 post-Operation Desert Storm, 395-396 post- World War II revisions, 64-76 professional military education, 303 public opinion, 156 public relations, 123, 126 purposes, 79-80 readiness, 175 reduction in force, xx after first Persian Gulf War, 374-375 loss of officers, 374 Regular Army, 21 remaking, 300-304 Rumsfeld, destructive to Amis; 450 state of readiness, 73, 78-79 strength cuts, 154-155 substituted firepower for manpower, 44 in supporting role, 156 tanks, 43, 44-45 technology, 158-159, 160, 303-304 training, 43, 74-75, 81-82, 302-303 Universal Military Training, 74-75 U.S. Air Force grown steadily separate, 118-119 joint doctrine and training, 303 Korean War relations, 118-119 U.S. Marine Corps, relations between, 61 U.S.S.R. effect of collapse on, 377-378 missions, 377-378 Vietnam, 227 World War II, 39, 40-45 adaptibility, 42 airpower, 44 firepower vs. combat power, 42-44 historical experiences, 40 individual repl n i em unit rotation, 43 infantry, 40 man as dominant instrument, 40 offensive battles, 40 substituted firepower for manpower, 44 tanks, 43, 44-45 training, 43 U.S. Army Air Force, strategic bombing campaign, 50-52 U.S. Army Air Service, World War 1, 49 U.S. Congress, 381 approves Iraqi war, 409-410 Iron Triangle, 186-187 marketing, 186-187 U.S. Department of Defense characterized, 196 history, 196 U.S. Marine Corps, 58 Amphibious Warfare Doctrine, 58, 59 capability, 58 Central Pacific campaign, 58-61 characterized, 195-196 cultural tenets, 195 culture of, 15 dominant influence on Marine culture, 58 Enclave Strategy, 256-259 history, 72, 305 image of elite fighting force, 58 Japanese way of war, 58 joint doctrine, 395 Korean War, 96-97 man as dominant instrument, 58 maneuver warfare, 304-307 U.S. Marine Corps definition, 305 Marine way of war, 58-59 missions, 305, 395 new doctrinal thinking, 305-306 Operation Desert Storm, 306 post-Operation Desert Storm, 395-396 post- Vietnam, 304-307 rapid reaction force, 195-196 Truman, 191 U.S. Army, relations between, 61 Vietnam, 256-259 Combined Action Operational Doctrine, 256-258 Western way of war, 58 World War II, 58 aggressiveness, 60-61 capability, 38 casualties. 60 dominant influence on Marine culture, 58 image of elite fighting force, 58 man as dominant instrument, 58 Marine culture of war, 60-61 Marine way of war, 58-59 rejecting Army assistance, 61 U.S. Navy access to all regions, 393-394 capabilities, 346 command structure, Revolt of the Admirals, 179 developing technologies and doctrine, 390 first Persian Gulf War, 342, 345 Korean War, 88, 121-122 missions, 57, 346, 392-393, 393-394 naval aviation missions, 57 nuclear weapons, 165-167 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 421-422 primary weapons systems, 181 U.S. Air Force, Korean War relations, 1 19-120 Vietnam, 248-249 vision of war dominated by airpower, 57 World War II missions, 57 naval aviation missions, 57 vision of war dominated by airpower, 57 U.S. Secretary of Defense, 196 powers, 199-200 U.S. Special Forces, 225 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 418 Vietnam, 238-239 U.S.S.R. AirLand Battle Doctrine, 302 arms race, 160-161 Korean War, airpower, 120-121 U.S. Air Force effect of collapse on, 377-378 missions, 377-378 U.S. Army effect of collapse on, 377-378 missions, 377-378 Values military service, 27 value of human life, 31 Vasquez, John, 5 Viet Cong, 222-223 Vietnam, xviii 1955-67, 229-264 1967-75, 265-293 Abrams, 287-288, 288 advisory phase, 237-242 airpower, xviii, 244-251, 292 doctrine, 249-251 effectiveness, 250-251 objectives, 244-245, 249 analysis, 291-293 Buddhist persecution, 240 Cambodia, 288-289 casualties, 292 censorship, 266-269 rejection, 267-268 China, 279 Civic Affairs Group, 258 civilian control of military, 384 Clifford, Clark, 283-285, 284 counterinsurgency warfare, 225-226 cultural tenets, 9, 291-293 draft, 272-277 pacification of Americans, 276-277 early phase, 162 Eisenhower, 149, 237, 238 counter-force at every point axiom, 149 geography, 230-233, 231, 278 Giap's strategic plan, 224 Graduated Response, xviii, 244-251 flaws, 242 objectives, 244-245 ground combat forces, 251, 251-264, 252 troop strength, 251, 252, 255 U.S. Marine Corps vs. U.S. Army, 251-264 helicopters, 262-263 inl rscrvi si 1 1 1 Johnson, 236-237 ground troops, 251-252 Gulf of Tonkin attack, 240-241 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 241 Kennedy, 235-237, 238-239, 240 Diem assassination, 239-240 Kissinger, negotiations, 290-291 limiled war defensive strategy, 260-261 tactics, 260-261 McNamara conflict, 278-279 course change, 277-279 ground troops, 251-252 media, 265-266, 266-269, 372-373 military advisers, 182 Military Assistance and Advisory Group, 237, 238 military reorganization after, 295-315 National Guard, 270, 273 National Security Act, 182 negotiating while fighting, 285 Nixon, 285-291 Christmas Bombing campaign, 290-291 diplomatic offensive to neutralize China and U.S.S.R., 287 intensified bombing campaign, 286 Kissinger's negotiations, 290-291 mining of Haiphong, 290 One-War approach, 287-288 secret plan to end the war, 286 Vietnamization, 287-290 winning hearts and minds, 287 offensive ground war, 230 one-year tour of duty, 270 pacification programs, 256-258 peace agreement, 291 personnel policies, 269-277 personnel shortages, 269-272 psychological victory, 280-282 public opinion, 265, 266-269 reasons for American involvement, 233-237 results, 291-293 senior military leaders, duties as advisors to the commander-in-chief, 308 strategy, 230-233, 231 support of people of South Vietnam, 283 technology, 261-264, 292 as television war, 268-269 Tet Offensive, 280-285 training, 269-270 troop strength, 289, 289-290 unity of command, 242-244 U.S. Air Force, 244-251 U.S. Army, 227 U.S. Marine Corps, 256-259 Combined Action Operational Doctrine, 256-258 m (co uvd) U.S. Navy, 248-249 U.S. Special Forces, 238-239 Viet Cong, 222-223 war of attrition, 230-233 Westmoreland, 307-308 management tools, 259 Walker, Walton "Johnnie," 91, 93-96, 97, 102 War, sir alto Specific war characteristics, 15 creative force, 15-16 cultural determinants, 6 culturally regular, 8-9 doluiuive force, 15-16 as function of human nature, 16 as historical force, 15-16 national position determiner, 16 nature of causes delusion, 16-17 new American way, xvii panacea for, 387-388 political function, 1 as social force, 16 War of 1812, 23, 24 War of attrition Japanese way of war, 58-60 Kissinger, Southeast Asia, 207, 209-210 Osgood, Southeast Asia, 207, 209-210 Vietnam, 230-233 Westmoreland, 255 Way of war, cultural inheritance, 1 1 Wealth, 33 cultural tenets, 31,35 demonstrative, 33-34 post- World War II, 33 technology, 32-33 World War II, 33 Weapons of mass destruction, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 419 Weapon systems Hussein, 319-320 from U.S., 319 marketing, 186, 187 Weinberger Strategic Doctrine, 307-310 conduct of war, 307-308, 309 criteria for deployment, 307, 308-309 Western way of war, 7 U.S. Marine Corps, 58 Westmoreland, William, 257 Pentomic Doctrine, 159 Search and Destroy Operational Doctrine, 255 Vietnam, 307-308 management tools, 259 irofat n, 255 Westward expansion, 4 Will of American people draft, 28-29 Will to fight, 297 Wilson, Charles, 148, 150 World War I airpower, 39 U.S. Army Air Service, 49 World War II, 37-62, 184 aircraft carriers, 57 airpower, 37, 45-56 air war doctrine vs. ground war doctrine, 38 British approach, 46-49 role of naval aviation, ':>.- strategic bombing campaign, 47-49 armoi warfare, 39 bombing effects on German civilians, 55-56 bombing effects on Japanese civilians, 55-56 Central Pacific campaign, 58-60 as cultural endeavor, 1 cultural norms, 9 draft, 26 equality, 33 firepower, 42-43 Infantry, 40-41 hi decisi U.S. human and material U.S. Marine Corps aggressiveness, 60-61 casualties, 60 61-62 reofw; Warm. rejecting Army Yom Kippur War of 1973, 300-301 *Mffa *Tbe American Culture of War is a first-rate study that asks big questions and provides answers that are of value to American and non-American scholars alike. It makes a major contribution to the developing cultural approach to military history." —Jeremy Black, Professor of History, University of Exeter "Lewis combines a powerful argument with a detailed critique of U.S. strategy since World War IT as overly dependent on technology, and shows how these have eroded two traditional American moral concepts: the equal value of every human life and the universal civic responsibility to defend the country." — Dennis Shdwalter, Professor of History, Colorado College "The American Culture of War is a striking and magisterial tour de force. Combining the hard- headed realism and moral indignation of a professional soldier with the keen analytical oudook of a trained historian, Adrian hews exposes the political in-fighting, intellectual follies, cultural arrogance, media ignorance, inter-service rivalries, and changes in the national mood that have repeatedly caused the United States to wage its mosr recent wars in ways that play ro irs weaknesses rather than its strengths. The American Culture of War should be mandatory reading for policy makers, military leaders, students of military history, and all Americans with the slightest interest in national security." -Gregory J. W. Ur win, Professor of History and Associate Director, Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, Temple University ADRIAN R. LEWIS is Associate Professor of History and Departmen liversity of North Texas, Denton. He has taught at the Naval War College and ar West Point, and is a retired United Stares Army major. He is the author of Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory. 11 Routiedge jjj^ Taylor Kifrancis Group n, OxonOXl-URN, (J 780415 ll 979757l